BRITISH POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST
The Russo-Turkish War, 1877‒78――The Turkish Revolution
――Disappointed hopes――Jewish colonization and British
commercial interests in Palestine.
IN dealing with the political events of 1839‒40, 1855‒56 and 1860‒61,
we have attempted to show that Great Britain has always stood for the
regeneration of the Near East――an idea of which political Zionism is
an expression, inasmuch as it aims at introducing into the Near East a
new civilizing and harmonizing force in the shape of a revived Hebrew
nation. If we review the events in connection with the next Near
Eastern crisis, that of 1877‒78, we shall find that the guiding idea
of British policy was the same.
On April 24th, 1877, Russia declared war against Turkey. After a war
of eight to nine months, Russia had approached Constantinople. The
treaty of San Stefano was signed on March 3rd, 1878, but it had to
be submitted to the European Powers for revision, and to that end the
European Powers met in Congress at Berlin on June 13th, 1878, where
the whole San Stefano Treaty was to be discussed. Some days before the
Congress met――on the 4th of June――a separate convention was concluded
between Great Britain and Turkey, under which Great Britain agreed
for all time to defend the Asiatic dominions of the Ottoman Empire
“by force of arms,” and in return the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, promised
to introduce all necessary reforms, as agreed upon with his ally, and
to hand over the island of Cyprus for occupation and administration
by England at an annual tribute. This convention with Turkey was one
of the most important measures of foreign policy which have ever been
resolved upon by a British Government. It was a victory, won without
bloodshed by English policy, on the Eastern Question. Cyprus is the
nearest island to the Suez Canal. At that time England had no position
in Egypt close to the Canal itself, and for many reasons the taking
of Egyptian territory was impracticable: hence the possession of
Cyprus was attended with special advantages. But the possession of
Cyprus could not be dissociated from the pledges given by Turkey and
the responsibilities taken on by Great Britain with regard to the
Asiatic provinces. It was clear that the Asiatic provinces could
not be rescued from misrule except by Western agency, and that it
was necessary for English authority to be on the spot. Cyprus was
considered the best station that could be chosen for such a purpose.
The Porte was expected to develop the vast natural resources of its
Asiatic Empire, or, at least, to allow that task to be accomplished
by others. The Marquess of Salisbury (1830‒1903) made that clear in
words of undiplomatic plainness when he stated that the protection
of England must depend on the readiness of the Porte “to introduce
the necessary reform into the government of the Christians and other
subjects of the Porte.” The Jews no less than the Christians and
the more enlightened and progressive Mohammedans of the East looked
to England for a sort of political and economic renaissance. The
occupation of Cyprus brought England into the neighbourhood of
Palestine, and made England in the eyes of Zionists the most important
Western European power in connection with Palestine.
The same idea guided British policy with regard to Egypt.
In 1882, an early year of Gladstone’s government, Egyptian affairs
were growing rapidly worse. On June 11th armed revolt broke out
in Alexandria. On July 30th the British Cabinet decided to take
action. The Porte was informed by our Ambassador at Constantinople,
the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava (1826‒1902), that Great Britain
considered that on her was laid the duty of restoring order in
Egypt, and of safeguarding the Suez Canal. The services of a Turkish
army corps were declined. On August 16th Sir Garnet (afterwards
Viscount) Wolseley (1833‒1913) landed at Alexandria, and in September
the revolt ended. Major Baring (afterwards the Earl of Cromer)
(1841‒1917) was sent to Egypt as British Agent and Consul-General, in
order to assume supreme control of Egyptian foreign and home affairs,
by means of which peace and stability were eventually to be restored
to Egypt, the country was to be freed from external oppression, and
internal prosperity such as she had not known for many centuries was
to be secured. The real mission of Great Britain was to restore to
Egypt a stable Government, which, like that of India, would lead to
a just and wise administration of the country. To pretend that such
an administration could be developed out of the existing conditions,
by giving Egypt a sound constitution by means of the ballot-box, was
to ignore the plainest facts of politics. Egypt’s one chance was to
procure a strong and permanent protectorate capable of shielding her
from rapacious influences from without and from the effects of the
political ignorance and weakness wrought within through centuries of
abject servility.
Thus throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century British
statesmen recognized that the only way to save the near East from
decay was to bring a stronger and more healthy influence to bear
upon the Turkish Government from without. The idea of a spontaneous
regeneration from within was always held to be inadmissible.
But early in the twentieth century events took place which seemed to
indicate that Turkey was going to solve her problems for herself. The
Turkish Revolution, 1908, marked a new epoch.
The overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of constitutional
government in Turkey were greeted with enthusiasm in England,
where even the most advanced Radicals, the most voluble preachers
against “the unspeakable Turk,” had entirely stopped “their flow
of depreciation.” And on the other side, nothing was so significant
and gratifying during the rejoicings which followed the announcement
of the Constitution in Turkey as the spontaneous demonstrations of
national enthusiasm for Great Britain. Everybody had long been aware
that all sections of the Levant populace were filled with friendly
feelings towards England, and that different races of the Empire
regarded her as their special champion. But in their most sanguine
moments Englishmen could not have anticipated such impressive
demonstrations as were witnessed in every quarter of the Turkish
capital. This friendly feeling was important not only from the
political but also from the commercial point of view. For many years
past the extension of British commerce in Turkey had been slow; the
openings for the development of trade had not been numerous. But under
a progressive and friendly Government, bent on setting its house in
order and raising Turkey to the rank of a great Power, such drawbacks
must immediately disappear.
Unfortunately, the cordial relations at first established between
Great Britain and the new Turkey did not endure. British policy took
on a different orientation, and Turkey came under other influences.
Of the more far-reaching effects of this development it is not
within our province to speak. But from the Zionist point of view it
was undoubtedly a great misfortune that Great Britain seemed to be
abandoning her traditional policy of working for the regeneration
of the Near East through the maintenance of friendly relations with
Turkey. For the promise of spontaneous internal reform, which was
held out for a time by the Turkish revolution, was not fulfilled, and
Zionist effort in Palestine, which might have received an enormous
impetus, was doomed to struggle on against the obstacles imposed by
the inertia and corruptness of a Turkish Government scarcely differing
from the old autocracy except in its greater chauvinism.
None the less, it is a fact that the great growth of Palestinian
commerce which has accompanied the progress of the Jewish settlement
is due mainly to increased trade with the United Kingdom and British
possessions. The Consular Reports (Appendix lxxxvii) show that the
exports from the _Jaffa_ district amounted to £636,000; over £480,000
worth went to England or Egypt. Thus the Jewish colonization movement
has helped in some degree to advance British commercial interests in
the Near East.