THE SYRIAN PROBLEM
The conflicting interests of the Powers――Was the conflict
irreconcilable?――Public opinion――A new principle――The
independence of Syria――A neutral position――The Zionist idea
as the only solution――A practical proposition.
PUBLIC opinion had for a long time laboured under the impression
that the intricacy of the Eastern question was due much more to the
conflicting interests of the Powers engaged in its solution than to
any insurmountable barrier between them and the _Sultans_ Mahmud II.,
Abdul Medjid and Mehemet Ali. With France and Mehemet Ali on the
one side and the four European Powers on the other, it was evident
that war would have the most disastrous effect on the contending
parties. The question arose whether the interests of the parties
were irreconcilable, and whether it was not possible to devise an
arrangement acceptable to both sides and thus to avert war. Some
political leaders thought that they could settle the question, and
that it would be possible to adopt a policy sufficiently far-reaching
and just to satisfy the expectations of the five Powers.
It was common knowledge that the great dilemma in which Turkey and
Egypt found themselves had throughout hinged on the question of
Syria. Without the possession of Syria the power of Mehemet Ali became
insecure; with it he would be in a very strong position, because
Turkey could only exist by his sufferance. In fact, the possession
of Syria would give a tremendous advantage to either side.
The problem was therefore to enable each of the Governments to prevent
Syria from passing into the hands of the enemy. And there was only
one possible solution――namely, the establishment of an independent
state in Syria. The grounds for this conclusion may be stated in the
following series of propositions:
(1) That the _Sultan_, unassisted, was powerless to retain
Syria.
(2) That Egypt had no right to Syria, except in so far
as lawlessness and violence might make its possession
necessary.
(3) That Egypt had a right to independence, if she could
achieve it.
(4) That if Syria remained part of Turkey, the independence of
Egypt would be constantly menaced.
(5) That if Syria remained part of Egypt, the existence of
Turkey would be rendered insecure.
(6) That the insecure position of Turkey would endanger the
peace of Europe.
(7) That Syria, being a conquered kingdom, had the right to
regain her independence if she could.
(8) That by the existence of Syria as an independent state
both Turkey and Egypt would remain intact.
(9) That the neutral position of the new state would keep
both Turkey and Egypt in check, and prevent either from
becoming too powerful.
Mehemet Ali could not object to a solution on these lines. He would
be protected by the _Sultan_, Abdul Medjid, and would be at liberty
to extend his influence in other directions. But the _Sultan_,
having been paramount lord of Syria, might reasonably claim some
consideration for consenting to the independence of Syria. Who was
to pay this consideration?
It is at this point that we have to turn to the old idea of Zionism to
find the only just and natural solution. Bishop Newton’s commentaries,
Witherby’s moralisings, Byron’s poetry――to these lines of approach
to Zionism was now added the tendency of British politics. A hundred
times the promoters of the Zionist idea had been disheartened, a
hundred times they had taken it up again. Now political developments
offered the background for a new propaganda for Zionism. The
Restoration of _Israel_, an idea dear not only to the sentimentalist,
the essayist and the littérateur, but also to every believer in the
Bible and to every friend of liberty, had become an actual question of
the day.
If only the five European Powers could agree to settle the Eastern
question upon the basis of Syrian independence, the carrying out
of the details would be an easy matter. France would no doubt agree
to such an arrangement. The amount of the consideration required by
Turkey would be raised from the resources of Syria, augmented by a sum
to be contributed by the Jews. Their contribution might be looked upon
as consideration for their admission into Syria.
An arrangement of this character would satisfy all the parties
concerned. Mehemet Ali would become the hereditary Sovereign of Egypt.
France would be contented. The Jews would be virtually restored to
their land. The Syrians would gladly agree, as their country would in
this way achieve independence, while the Jews would help them to gain
this end.
From then onwards, the Jews would begin to immigrate into Syria from
every part of the world; they would carry in their train the apparatus
of civilization, and would form a nucleus for the creation of European
institutions. They would acquire and exercise the rights and duties
of citizenship in their own country, and would build up, under the
protection and auspices of the five European Powers, the government
and independence of the Turco-Syrian State. And from this change other
advantages also would accrue. Turkey would be relieved of the pressure
that had been destructive of her interests. The consideration that she
would receive for her consent would be the means of resuscitating her
energies and restoring her strength. It would enable her to push on
her reforms and again take her position as a powerful nation.
It must at once be admitted that the condition of Syria presented a
host of difficulties, on account of the division of the inhabitants
into a number of separate tribes. But this fact only proved the
necessity for the introduction of fresh material, with a view to
welding together all classes into one harmonious community. The
necessity of introducing fresh material into the social fabric of
Syria once admitted, it followed as a matter of course that the
immigration of the Jews into Syria would provide the most acceptable
material. The establishment of European institutions in Asia (so
far as they might be suitable) would follow, and in all probability
England would in that way find a new ally, whose friendship might
eventually prove of advantage to her in dealing with Eastern affairs.