THE PALMERSTON PERIOD
The Conflict between Turkey and Egypt――Mahmud II., _Sultan_ of
Turkey――Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt――The victory of Nezib――The
Turkish Fleet――Wellington’s policy――The Eastern Question
――Wellington’s opinion――The London Conference, 1840――The
Insurrection in Syria and the Lebanon――An Ultimatum――The
Capture of Acre by the British Fleet, 1840――Schemes of
annexation.
THE Palmerston period, 1837‒52, was a great time in England for the
idea of the Restoration of _Israel_. It was a time of stirring events
in the East, events which raised some of the most momentous problems
that can engage the statesman’s mind. The English people watched from
day to day with the deepest interest the progress of annexations, of
conquest, of negotiations, which they believed would go far to decide
the future development and destinies of the greatest nations of the
world. The European horizon was so disturbed that a great political
authority of the day is said to have declared that “if an angel from
heaven were in the Foreign Office he would not preserve peace for
three months.”
The facts are sufficiently familiar to most readers. But it will be
necessary for our purpose to go over the oft-trodden ground, which
must be done rapidly.
In 1839 a tremendous crisis broke out between Turkey and Egypt as the
result of a series of conflicts and struggles. In the brief space of
eight years (1831‒39) Mehemet Ali (1769‒1849) had contrived to overrun
the whole of Syria, having organized a fleet and an army beyond the
legitimate necessities of his government, by acts of tyranny and
oppression against the very people for whose defence he pretended
to have raised them; and he forced these wretched people, whom he
was bound to protect, to join him in rebellion, thus fastening more
firmly the chains with which he had shackled them. Having concentrated
100,000 men on the Turkish frontier, he at once threw off the mask
and intimated to the European consuls his intention of declaring his
independence unless his demand for the government of Syria for life
and of Egypt _en hérédité_ were conceded.
He struck the first blow, and was very successful during the first
stage of the war. The victory of Nezib (24 June, 1839) was the last of
his triumphs. The new army, which he had taken pains to organize, was
only half trained. Still his power was unshaken, and his advantage was
not confined to the land. The Turkish admiral, beaten by Mehemet Ali,
and fearing for his life if he returned to Constantinople, determined
on an act of treachery, which would ingratiate him with the victorious
ruler of Egypt. He took the Turkish fleet, with some 20,000 men aboard,
to Alexandria, and surrendered it to Mehemet Ali.
The surprise and astonishment which the suddenness of these
occurrences caused did not allow English diplomacy much time to
consider. It was necessary to intervene at once, unless the Ottoman
Empire was to be broken up. Palmerston determined to carry out
Wellington’s (1769‒1852) policy, and to reduce the apparently
invincible Pasha to “a state of obedience and subordination to the
_Sultan_” (1808‒1839), Mahmud II. (1785‒1839). The difficulties seemed
formidable, but Palmerston’s conception of the diplomatic situation
was unerring. He scouted the idea of actual intervention on Egyptian
soil. The lessons of the battle of the Nile and of the earlier siege
of Acre had not been thrown away upon a survivor of the struggle with
Napoleon Bonaparte. A different strategic plan was adopted: a British
squadron was to compel the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali.
The imminent perils and dangers which surrounded this undertaking
from the political point of view were evident. A great international
problem arose. The solution of those important and complex problems
which include what is usually called the “Eastern Question” had long
occupied a considerable place in the field of international politics,
especially in England. There was scarcely one, perhaps, of the more
eminent English diplomatists who had not distinguished himself in this
department in a greater or a less degree; and there was scarcely an
aspirant to foreign political activity and distinction who had not
thought it one of the surest paths to his ambition to come forward
as a champion in this arena. It must, however, be borne in mind that
this question was continually taking on a new form, and accordingly
opinions and interests were always changing. In 1839‒40 controversy
about this question attained its greatest intensity, and the
interested powers were in a position of the darkest perplexity.¹
¹ Wellington wrote in 1829 to the Earl of Aberdeen: (1784‒1860)
“... it cannot be doubted that the measures completed
by this Treaty of Peace must encourage other nations of
Christians to endeavour to attain the same advantages by
similar means. The other Powers of Europe and all parties
in Europe must view the Treaty of Peace in the same light
as we do ... they must all consider it in the same light
as the death-blow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte,
and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of
its power” (_The Eastern Question: Extracted from the
Correspondence of the late Duke of Wellington_, London,
1877, _p._ 40).
After the traitorous defection of the Turkish fleet to the side of
Mehemet Ali, five great Powers of Europe officially intimated to the
Porte that they had determined to discuss and settle together the
embarrassing Eastern question, and ultimately a Conference was called
together in London, at which the Ambassadors of these Powers were to
meet with full authority from their Governments to bring the matter to
a definite issue. It appeared throughout that France was favourable to
Mehemet Ali’s ambitious projects, whilst England had decided to compel
him to evacuate Syria forthwith and to restore the fleet before it
would entertain any proposition of his to be allowed to retain Egypt
in hereditary possession, or any part of Syria during his lifetime.
The negotiations in London dragged on slowly; month after month passed
by, and the high contracting parties came to no definite decision.
Everybody in England was anxious that Great Britain should play an
important rôle in the Eastern Question. The state of the East had
become utterly corrupt and hopeless. Great Britain considered that it
was in its interest to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
What was meant by this principle? Great Britain as an Asiatic not
less than a European Power was interested to see that the Ottoman
Empire was made thoroughly independent and enabled to progress by
consolidating and developing its provinces. As to Syria, everybody in
England was aware that its possession was essential for the security
of the richest and most important provinces of Asiatic Turkey, to
which it was the military key. This was sufficiently demonstrated by
the events which actually took place.
On the 25th May, 1840, an insurrection of an alarming character broke
out in Syria and _The Lebanon_ among the Druses and Christians against
the Emir and the Egyptian Government. On the 15th of July, 1840, an
event occurred which brought the affairs of the Levant to a crisis.
A convention was signed in London between England, Russia, Austria
and Prussia, without the concurrence of France, whereby an ultimatum
was delivered to Mehemet Ali, calling on him to evacuate Palestine.
The four Powers demanded of him, first, a prompt submission to the
_Sultan_ (1839‒1861) Abdul Medjid (1823‒1861) as his Sovereign;
secondly, the immediate restoration of the Turkish fleet; thirdly,
a prompt evacuation of Syria, Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy
Cities. Moreover the four Powers declared the ports of Syria and Egypt
to be in a state of blockade. Consequently Acre, the fortress which
had been the great depot and arsenal of Mehemet Ali, and which in
1799 had withstood Bonaparte after the twelfth assault, when he had
been defeated by Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith (1764‒1840) with a
few sailors and marines and a force of undisciplined Turks, was now
successfully bombarded by the English Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford
(1768‒1847), and placed in possession of the _Sultan’s_ troops. The
fortress, which was considered invulnerable, surrendered on the 3rd of
November, 1840. _Jaffa_ surrendered to the new garrison of Acre, a few
days after the fall of the fortress. On the 3rd of November the happy
tidings of the fall of Acre were brought to Constantinople, and the
Government issued orders for public rejoicings; on the 19th of that
month the Turkish Governor was officially informed that the garrison
and inhabitants of _Jerusalem_ had given allegiance to the Porte.
The question of the future of Palestine now arose. Was Palestine
simply to be left to Turkey or was Great Britain to secure some
important places? The prevalent tendency in English opinion was in
favour of the annexation of Acre and Cyprus. Acre, in the hands of
England, or of any other nation commanding the sea, could be made
really impregnable, and Cyprus seemed also to be of great strategic
importance, especially to England. The reasons for such an annexation
were palpable. England and her Allies had not merely rescued Syria,
they had absolutely saved the whole Ottoman Empire. After the battle
of Nezib had given the defiles of Mount Taurus to Mehemet Ali, nothing
could have obstructed the rebels’ triumphant march to Constantinople.
The Allies had thus rendered to the Ottoman Empire the greatest
possible service that one State can receive from another. Gratitude
alone might have suggested a more valuable acknowledgment of this
service than Acre and Cyprus; but as the service had been rendered at
some risk, and at enormous expense, justice demanded that it should
be paid for; and nobody could suggest that it would be paid for too
dearly by a strip of territory which was of little value to Turkey,
though useful to England, and which in British hands would assuredly
supply the Porte with a fortress that could never be established
in its own territory. Acre and Cyprus garrisoned by British troops
would give Turkey the surest protection. Attention was also called to
the fact that no spot in the world was associated with so many proud
recollections as Acre, the theatre of British gallantry from the
days of Richard _Cœur de Lion_ (1157‒1199) to those of Admiral Sir W.
Sidney Smith and Admiral Sir Robert Stopford. Another consideration
had great weight with English opinion. The possession of Acre would
open a road for the return of Biblical truth to the land from which
that truth had spread to the human race; and Englishmen would feel
guilty of sin if they failed to impress upon their Government the need
of seizing this glorious and blessed opportunity. To take, however,
the more utilitarian view of the matter, Great Britain, occupying
the impregnable position of Acre, would not be under the necessity
of seeking the freedom of the overland route to India from any other
Power. She would command it at all times. Acre in the hands of Great
Britain would be a perfect guarantee against revolts in Egypt or in
Syria, and would in fact ensure the Turkish Empire against the only
danger that could threaten it on the side of Asia.
The effects of an English settlement in Syria on the general interests
of mankind presented a more serious question. Syria and the adjacent
countries were in a worse state than they had been 2000 years ago.
While the deserts of America and Australasia had been regained for the
use of man, while India had been brought to peace and unity and its
worst superstitions had been modified, if not altogether extirpated,
by the influence of European civilization, man had given place to the
savage creatures of the wilderness in those countries from which all
that he knows of good, was originally derived. An English settlement
in Syria would begin the work of regeneration in the most venerable
and interesting country in the world. England would be to Syria and to
the adjacent countries all that she had been to India――the protector
of the weak, the common arbiter, the universal peacemaker. Her laws
and her liberties enable her to fulfil that function, her commercial
interests fit her to undertake it, while her wealth, her naval
supremacy and her colonial power furnish her with the means required
for the purpose. Why should any other power oppose her acquiring that
region? That its acquisition would add to her commercial resources
and to her defensive strength had to be conceded. But had no nation
ever before sought to increase her commercial resources and add to
her defensive strength by means in themselves legitimate, which would
not in any way infringe upon the rights or interests of others? The
advancement of the world in civilization and happiness must remain
for ever at a standstill, if each nation is to be held in check by
the jealousy of the others. This was the attitude of public opinion on
this question from the point of view of human progress and of British
interests.