battles of the previous two or three hundred years, the percentage
of losses to the vanquished had been small. The battle of the Nile,
therefore, received an attention perhaps beyond its intrinsic worth. As
Nelson wrote to Howe:--“By attacking the enemy’s van and centre, the
wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled to throw what
force I pleased on a few ships.” The real point of interest is not the
result, which was foregone, but Nelson’s ability to see his opportunity
and to make the utmost of it. Therein lay his superlative greatness.
Of the prizes, three were found to be new and good ships. One of them,
the _Franklin_, was renamed _Canopus_, and as late as 1850 was still on
the effective list of the British Navy.
The defeat of the French at the Nile had far reaching effects.
Russia, Austria, Turkey, Naples and Portugal formed with England a
great anti-French Alliance. A large Russian fleet appeared in the
Mediterranean, but accomplished no services there. It was under
suspicion of having private designs on Malta rather than of assisting
the Alliance.
From 1762 onward, when Catherine the Great came to the throne of
Russia, an enormous number of retired or unemployed English officers
took service in the Russian Navy. To one of these, Captain Elphinstone
(who subsequently re-entered the British service), has been traced
the origin of the idea upon which Nelson acted in the battle of the
Nile. To another, General Bentham, originally a shipwright, who
returned to the British service in 1795, was due a revolution in
dockyard management. To him was due the introduction of machinery into
dockyards: a matter needing much diplomacy and caution, as popular
feeling against machinery then ran high. However, by 1798, Bentham had
steam engines installed in the dockyards. He also commenced the first
caisson known in England, using it for the great basin at Portsmouth
Yard. In the face of considerable opposition he also introduced deep
docks, basins and jetties at Portsmouth, for the speedy fitting out of
ships.
In 1799, the _personnel_ was settled at 120,000, and the Naval
Estimates were £13,654,000.
In April of this year, the French, under Bruix, with twenty-five ships
of the line, came out of Brest, which was being cruised off by Bridport
with sixteen sail. Having warned Keith, who was blockading Cadiz, and
St. Vincent, who lay at Gibraltar, Bridport fell back on Bantry Bay,
where he was reinforced with ten ships.
[Illustration: GENERAL BENTHAM.]
Bruix ran down south, his orders being to join the Spaniards in Cadiz,
but the weather was unfavourable and his crews so illtrained[54]
that he made no attempt to attack Keith’s squadron, but ran on into the
Mediterranean. Keith himself joined St. Vincent at Gibraltar.
On May 11th, St. Vincent arrived at Minorca with twenty sail. Nelson,
with sixteen ships (of which four were Portuguese) was scattered over
the Mediterranean, his base being at Palermo. On the 13th, Bruix
reached Toulon, and a week later seventeen Spaniards from Cadiz reached
Cartagena.
To prevent these joining up with Bruix, St. Vincent lay between the two
bases: but the risk that either fleet might suddenly fall on Nelson was
such, that he sent four of his ships to him. He was, however, presently
reinforced with five ships, bringing his net total to twenty-one.
St. Vincent’s health having now given out, he handed the fleet over
to Lord Keith, who learned that Bruix, with twenty-two sail, had left
Toulon on the 27th May; but for some reason or other made for that
place. Bruix reached the Spaniards at Cartagena, without interference,
on June 23rd, and so had thirty-nine ships to oppose the British
twenty-one. These, falling back upon Minorca, were there reinforced by
ten ships from home, thus bringing the total up to thirty-one.
Meanwhile, Bruix putting to sea again at once, made for Cadiz, which he
reached on July 12th, and leaving again on the 21st, made for Brest;
Keith, some two weeks behind him, in pursuit.
The net result of Bruix’s cruise was that the French fleet at Brest
rose to the enormous total of ninety warships, collected to cover an
invasion of England. As, however, Napoleon, who was to command, did
not reach France until October, nothing was done in 1799, thus allowing
ample time for the concentration of English ships. Had the Brest Armada
struck at once, matters for England had been none too rosy, since the
only force guarding the Channel was Bridport’s fleet of twenty-six
sail, at Bantry.
August saw 20,000 Russians landed at the Helder from British
transports. These captured the Texel fortifications, inside of which
lay what was left of the Dutch fleet. The Dutch admiral declined to
surrender, but his crews refused to fight, and eventually the ships
were handed over without firing a shot. The ships were found to be
antiquated in design and badly built, and were never of any use to the
English Navy.
In the latter part of this year, two Spanish frigates were captured by
four English. These ships were bringing home the year’s South American
treasure. The prize money divided among the four captains amounted to
£160,000.
Twenty-one vessels were lost during the year. Only three of them,
however, were lost by capture, and of these the largest was a ten-gun
brig!
The prizes of the year consisted of eight French frigates, five Spanish
frigates and twenty-four Dutch ships. In this year also the very fast
French privateer, _Bordelais_, was taken, being chased and overhauled
by the _Revolutionnaire_, an ex-French frigate, and the only frigate in
the Navy at this time able to catch up with French ones.
The _personnel_ granted for the year 1800, was 110,000, with an
additional 10,000 for March and April only. The ships in commission
were 100 ships of the line, seventeen small two-deckers and 351
frigates and lesser craft.
No naval fighting of much importance took place, but the year was
otherwise very momentous. Napoleon, who had made himself First Consul,
was busy reorganising the French Navy, and one of his first acts was
to offer terms of peace. These, however, were refused by the British
Government.
On July 25th, the Danish frigate, _Freya_, out with a convoy, was met
by some British ships. She refused to allow “the right of search.”
Firing followed, and the _Freya_ was captured. An embassy, to explain
matters to the Danes, went, accompanied by a fleet of nine ships of the
line, five frigates and four bombs, under Admiral Dickson.
This action--the intentions of which were obvious--aroused the
resentment of the Russian Emperor Paul. Nelson’s suspicion that the
Russians wished to capture Malta for themselves, have already been
alluded to. These intentions came to light now; for Paul, having got
himself declared Grand Master of the Knights of St. John of Malta,
seized some 300 British merchant ships in Russian ports, and said that
he would not let them go till Malta (which was then besieged and about
to fall to the British) was given up to him.
The British Government ignored the Malta claim, and many of the British
merchant ships equally ignored the Russian orders about remaining in
harbour. Quite a number sailed away; the rest, however, were seized and
burned, by Paul’s orders. To reinforce himself against very probable
reprisals, Paul--presumably influenced by Napoleon--formed the “Armed
Neutrality.” Russia and Sweden signed on December 16th, and on the
19th, Denmark and Prussia.
Meanwhile, Malta, which had been blockaded and besieged by the British
ever since the battle of the Nile, was in grievous straits. In
February, 1800, the _Genereux_, seventy-four (one of the two ships of
the line which escaped from the Nile), left Toulon, with some frigates,
intent on relief. She was, however, intercepted and captured by Nelson.
In March, the _Guillaume Tell_, the other survivor of the Nile, which
had been lying at Malta, attempted on the night of the 30th to run the
blockade to procure help. In doing so, she encountered the British
frigate _Penelope_, which chased her, attacking her rigging. The firing
brought up two ships of the line, _Foudroyant_ and _Lion_, but the
Frenchman made such a defence that both these were disabled before she
was reduced to submission, and it was to the _Penelope_ frigate that
she ultimately struck. This particular fight is generally reckoned as
the finest defence ever made by a French ship.
Malta was eventually starved into surrender, and the final capitulation
took place on the 5th September, 1800, after a siege of practically two
years.
The capture of Malta was perhaps one of the finest exhibitions of
“Admiralty” in the whole war. No waste of life in assaults took place:
the fortress was systematically starved into surrender by the judicious
use of Sea Power to prevent any relief.
In this year (1800), several ships were lost, the principal being the
_Queen Charlotte_ (100), which was accidentally burned and blown up off
Capraja, on the 17th of March. The majority of her crew perished with
her. Eighteen other ships were wrecked, while two (a twenty gun and a
fourteen) mutinied and joined the enemy. These were the only British
ships that actually changed hands. Captures amounted to fourteen ships
of from eighty to twenty-eight guns, and a large number of privateers
and small craft.
The year 1801 saw the Estimates at £16,577,000. The _personnel_ voted
was 120,000 for the first quarter of the year, after which it was to
rise to 135,000, with a view to dealing with the Armed Neutrality. The
number of ships in commission was substantially the same as in the
previous year.
The avowed objects of the Armed Neutrality were to resist “the right of
search,” to secure any property under a neutral flag, that a blockade
to be binding must be maintained by an adequate force, and that
contraband of war must be clearly defined beforehand. In substance,
they amounted to the free importation into France of those naval stores
of which she stood most in need. Wisely enough the British Government
decided to break up the coalition by diplomacy, if possible, and
failing that, by force. Incidentally, it may be noted that the Tsar,
who was at the head of the coalition, was more or less a madman, in
possession of a very considerable fleet.
In March, 1801, a fleet of twenty ships of the line and a large number
of auxiliaries, under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second in
command, sailed for the Baltic. On arrival at Copenhagen, the Danes
were found to be moored in a strong position under cover of shore
batteries. The attack was confided to Nelson with twelve ships, which
fared badly enough for Parker after the battle had lasted three hours
to make a signal to withdraw.[55] Nelson, however, disregarded this,
and continued till the Danish fire began to slacken an hour later.
But as the Danes continually reinforced their disabled ships from
the shore, and fired into those which had surrendered, the slaughter
promised to go on indefinitely. Things being thus, Nelson, under a flag
of truce, threatened to set fire to the damaged ships and leave their
crews to their fate unless firing ceased. It has been alleged that this
was a clever piece of bluff in order to extricate his ships from an
awkward position: but all the evidence goes to show that he was fully
in a position to carry out his threat, while as he made no attempt to
move during the negotiations the bluff story is absurd. It appears to
have been an act of humanity, pure and simple.
Ultimately, the bulk of the Danish fleet was surrendered, and a
fourteen weeks’ armistice arranged, Nelson explaining that he required
this amount of time to destroy the Russian fleet!
Subsequently the Swedish fleet was dealt with, but it took refuge
under fortifications. About the same time news came that the mad Tsar
had been assassinated, and that his successor had no wish to continue
hostilities.
Nelson (now Commander-in-Chief) appeared off Kronstadt, under the
guns of which the Russians had taken shelter in May. Negotiations
followed,[56] and ultimately Russia was granted the right to trade with
belligerents--probably a diplomatic concession in order to detach her
sympathy from France.
In the meantime, Napoleon’s invasion schemes were shaping. To this
day it is unknown whether he was serious or not at this, or for that
matter, any other period. That he intended his preparations to be
taken seriously (as they were by all save Nelson) is clear enough.
It is further clear from his vast preparations that he would have
used his flotilla had the chance occurred; but the mere fact that he
never attempted actual invasion is of itself sufficient answer to all
the homilies that have been written about Napoleon’s inability to
understand “Sea Power.”
The army at Boulogne, the flat-bottomed boats, all served to keep
England in a panic, and that was worth much. He had experience to guide
him. Past experience was an English attack on the flotilla like that of
Rodney many years before. In August, 1801, such an attack came, Nelson
directing it. It was found fully prepared for and defeated with ease.
In the Mediterranean, Ganteaume, who had left Brest with seven ships
of the line convoying 5,000 troops, reached Alexandria, but before he
could disembark his soldiers, Keith appeared, and he hurried back to
Toulon.
Linois left Toulon with a small squadron, and was driven into
Algeciras, where he beat off Samaurez and a considerably more powerful
squadron. Retreating from this, Samaurez fell in with a Spanish
squadron, the ships of which, in the confusion of a night action,
attacked each other, with the result that the two best ships were
destroyed.
In October, 1801, the preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens were signed
and hostilities ceased.
The total losses to the enemy in the war are given as follows by
Campbell:--
FRENCH. DUTCH. SPANISH. TOTAL.
Ships of the line 45 25 11 81
Fifties 2 1 0 3
Frigates 133 31 20 184
Sloops, etc. 161 32 55 248
---
TOTAL 516
---
The corresponding British loss was only twenty-one ships of _all
classes_, and of these only two ships of the line were captured. The
bulk of British losses was accounted for by wrecks.
VII.
FROM THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE FINAL FALL OF NAPOLEON.
With the Peace of Amiens the usual reduction of the Navy took place.
The 104 ships of the line in commission the year before sank to
thirty-two in 1802. The _personnel_ fell to 50,000.
It may here be remarked that of the ships put out of commission a great
number were unfit for further service: 111 ships of various classes
being in so bad a way that they were sold or broken up. Many others
were cut down to serve in inferior rates.
Early in 1803 it became abundantly clear that Napoleon was preparing
for a new war, and in May, war was declared on him by the British
Government. It is of interest to note that Napoleon, in dismissing the
British Ambassador, said to him that he “intended to invade England,”
adding that he considered it might be “a very risky undertaking.” At
the time war was declared Napoleon was not quite ready, and never
regained the ground thus lost.
Little or nothing happened to show that a great naval struggle was
in progress. The French ships lay secure in harbour; the British
tossed outside in ceaseless blockade work. But these months of seeming
inaction settled the fate of France. The French crews, never very
efficient, grew less and less so in harbour, while every day outside
hardened the British and added to their efficiency. Seeing that the
British _personnel_, which was but 50,000 at the early part of the
year, was suddenly expanded to 100,000 in June, the advantages of
this shaking down of raw crews were obvious enough. When eventually
battle was joined, the difference between the English and the French
_personnel_ was such that for every round got off by the latter, any
British ship could fire _three_! Victory was won long before a single
battle shot had been fired. Trafalgar was made a certainty by the great
blockades.
When war broke out the general disposition of the hostile squadrons was
as follows:--(the figures in brackets representing frigates and small
craft)--
BRITISH. FRENCH.
Outside. Inside.
Toulon 14 (32) 10 (6)
Ferrol 7 (4) 5 (2)
Rochefort 5 (2) 4 (7)
Brest 20 (11) 18 (7)
Texel to Dunkirk 9 (21) 5 (11)
The invasion flotilla was distributed about Boulogne to the tune of
1,450 of the flotilla, 120 brigs and a few frigates. In the Texel
district were 645 more of the flotilla.
Reserve squadrons were stationed in home waters ample to deal with the
small craft defending flotillas.
So passed away the year 1803. Both sides reinforced their squadrons as
rapidly as new ships could be produced. Beyond this nothing happened.
[Illustration: POSITIONS OF THE SHIPS OF THE LINE AT THE OUTBREAK OF
WAR.]
The year 1804 opened with the same lack of result. Napoleon made
himself Emperor in May, and to some extent weakened his squadrons by
the removal from them of officers suspected of Republican views. In
July, however, things were nearing completion, and Latouche Treville
was put in supreme command of the whole expedition against England.
He received explicit orders to evade Nelson (who watched Toulon) and
to rendezvous at Brest for invasion purposes. He died, however, in
August[57] and the plans fell through.
After some delay, Villeneuve was appointed in his place; but instead
of the invasion idea there came plans of oversea enterprises, possibly
designed with a view to drawing all British forces of the moment away
from the Channel, thus leaving things clear for an invasion. But again
there comes the doubt whether Napoleon ever expected this to succeed,
whether he really thought of much else than keeping England perturbed
and busy while he matured plans for other parts of Europe, and whether
he did not realise that “Sea Power” had its limitations as well as its
advantages, and never really sought anything further than to cause
Britain to spend so much in naval defence that she had little left to
subsidise his Continental foes with. Better than most men he was able
to estimate Nelson’s limitations. He clearly estimated fully enough
that Nelson was no particularly brilliant strategist, and that he was
more likely to forecast correctly what Nelson would do, than was Nelson
to divine his purpose. He under-estimated indeed what Nelson really did
mean,--the particular genius which made Nelson invincible as a leader
of men, how Nelson was a tactician able to gauge exactly the competence
of the enemy and to win victory by doing seemingly foolish things
accordingly.
At least, it would appear that there Napoleon erred. But there is no
judging Napoleon--the strangest mixture of genius and charlatan that
the world has ever seen or is ever likely to. It is even unsafe to say
that Napoleon did not foresee Trafalgar; unsafe to believe that, in
his view, French fleets had no purpose other than to keep the English
occupied. Napoleon is ever the one man in history that no one can ever
surely know, whether we take him as the biggest liar who ever lived, or
as the greatest genius the world has ever known.
In January, 1804, the British Fleet in commission consisted of
seventy-five ships of the line, with forty others in reserve; 281
lesser craft were in commission and a few in reserve.
The intentions of Spain had long been mistrusted in England. As a
precaution, the Spanish treasure fleet was attacked without warning,
and over a million pounds’ worth of booty secured. Spain, thereupon,
made her intentions clear, and declared war. A few lesser ships changed
hands during the year; but even the minor happenings were of small
account.
In the year 1805, the number of British ships built, building and
ordered, stood at 181 ships of the line, and 532 lesser vessels besides
troop-ships, store-ships and harbour vessels. The _personnel_ was
120,000 and the Naval Estimates £15,035,630.
Napoleon’s “Army of Invasion” now amounted to a nominal 150,000
men[58] in the Boulogne district alone, men all trained in embarking
and disembarking. The famous “Let me be master of the Channel but
for six hours” had been uttered.[59] If ever invasion were seriously
contemplated it was so in this year 1805.
There followed those well-known operations--the “drawing away of
Nelson,” of which so much had been written.
In substance, Napoleon quite understood the situation so far as Nelson
was concerned. He understood that Nelson’s fleet did not watch Toulon
closely. He understood that if Villeneuve came out from Toulon when
Nelson was not close by, Nelson would blindly seek him, probably in the
wrong direction.
In this, and up to a certain point beyond, Napoleon was entirely
correct. But he made one error. He regarded Nelson as a fool. In
estimating Nelson to be easily outwitted he was not perhaps far wrong;
but beyond that, he failed to understand the man with whom he had to
deal.
It was these qualities of Nelson that rendered any invasion hopeless.
Nelson had seen enough to know that the fighting value of the enemy was
small, and that for him to attack at all costs and all hazards meant
no hazard to the result. With one single idea, to find the enemy and
destroy him, he was just the one enemy for whom Napoleon’s genius had
no answering move.
Villeneuve got out of Toulon on January 20th. He cruised about, Nelson
cruising elsewhere looking for him. Eventually, Villeneuve, damaged by
a gale, returned to Toulon, whence he presently emerged again on March
29th, and sailed for the West Indies. Ten days after he had done so,
Nelson learned that the French had passed Gibraltar on April 8th; but
delayed by contrary winds and lack of information, the British fleet
was a long way behind. As for Villeneuve, he picked up six Spaniards at
Cadiz, and went to the West Indies with seventeen ships of the line.
Nelson followed far behind with ten. He pressed on so hard, however,
that he reached Barbadoes on June 4th, the same day that Villeneuve,
not so very far away, left Martinique, where he had been lying.
Therefrom, Nelson sailed south to Trinidad, off which he arrived at the
same time as Villeneuve, sailing north, came off Antigua.
On June 11th, Villeneuve (whose crews were already sick) set out to
return to Europe. Two days later, Nelson, who had gone north again,
followed suit.
These hole and corner movements, impossible to-day, are not of much
interest, save in so far as they indicate the certainty of information
in these days and the uncertainty in those.
The “decoyed away fleet” idea has nothing in it, because in any such
scheme Villeneuve could surely either have doubled back when half-way,
or in any case would not have remained in the West Indies.
Nelson sent ahead fast frigates, with information that Villeneuve was
returning; consequently arrangements for his reception were made.
Off Finisterre, Villeneuve encountered Calder, and an indecisive
action resulted. Two Spanish ships were captured. The following day,
Villeneuve attempted to attack, but wind and weather prevented. On the
third day the wind shifted, but Calder failed to attack. For this he
was subsequently court-martialled and severely reprimanded.
Nelson, meanwhile, touched Gibraltar,[60] then proceeded north to join
Cornwallis off Brest, and thence to England in his flagship _Victory_.
Villeneuve, having picked up a few more ships at Ferrol, making
his total force twenty-nine sail, put into Cadiz,[61] off which
Collingwood maintained a weary blockade of him.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 1805.]
Early in September, news reached England that Villeneuve was at Cadiz,
and Nelson left Southsea Beach on September 14th, sailing next day.
Collingwood, off Cadiz, had been reinforced up to twenty-four sail.
A martinet officer of the old type, it is likely enough that had
Villeneuve come out, he might have done something against the worn-out
blockaders. The arrival of Nelson, on September 28th, changed all this.
Collingwood’s red tape restrictions were countermanded, and the spirit
of the entire fleet changed accordingly. As usual, Nelson spared no
effort to keep the men fit and healthy.