When the governor saw the destruction that the enemy had wrought in
the churches, and that he could not check it because the army that was
fleeing always had the start of the other, he determined to put the
churches in a condition of defense, and accordingly assigned to each
one a number of soldiers who should confront the Sangleys--so that,
since the people of the villages could not deliver themselves from
the enemy's fury, the temples and the dwellings of the religious,
which were most important, might be saved. The governor also sent
them word, threatening that he would put all the Sangleys that were
left in the country to the sword, if they did any more damage to the
villages or the churches, since it was a token of cowardice to wreak
vengeance on him who was not to blame, or who made no resistance. They
replied that they did no harm where they were not harmed, and that
they would leave the villages in peace if the roads were left free
to themselves by which they were intending to pass to Los Limbones,
in order to build champans there to make ready for [their return to]
China. This reply was less haughty than the tone of their earlier
bravado. From that time they did not burn any church, although they
burned the village of Santa Maria and that of Siniloan, with a visita
of Pangil, because the Indians had been stationed there and many of
the Sangleys slain. After this, they continued their march to Cainta,
and the governor in pursuit of them to the post of Mahayhay--a place
through which the enemy must necessarily pass if they would go to Los
Limbones--in order to fight there with the enemy the battle which
was impossible in the mountains which the enemy had selected for
their encampment. Many from the enemy's camp came every day to ours
asking for mercy, alleging [that they had been coerced by] violent
measures on the part of their leaders in the revolt. They readily
found mercy, and with this and kind treatment they were sent back to
Manila. The opinions of the rest were as vacillating as their courage,
many of them lacking confidence in the governor. Thinking that they
did not deserve pardon for their offences, they preferred to persist
in these obstinately, rather than to yield to the governor's mercy
and surrender; and although there were embassies from one side to
the other, this intercourse was carried on with little confidence
on either side. On ours, negotiations for peace were carried on by
a father of the Society of Jesus, [75] who was a minister to the
Sangleys, and General Geronimo Enrriquez, their alcalde-mayor of
the Parian, for whom they had the utmost affection; on their side,
by some of their leaders, with the mandarin--although not with so
much privilege, [76] on account of having been created for their
purpose--the lieutenant-commander of the Sangley forces. He was a
boastful and audacious man, who resisted the negotiations for peace,
and had with his own hand killed several men because he was suspicious
of their being concerned therein. But the father of the Society,
anxious that peace should be secured, in order that the shedding of
so much blood might be stopped--especially for the sake of the many
Sangleys who were there more because they trusted others than to
carry out their own purpose--laying aside any consideration of his
own life, went many times, at the evident risk of death, to confer
with the mandarin and the leaders, assuring them, on the part of the
governor, of pardon and kind treatment to those who laid down their
arms and surrendered themselves to him. He answered their complaints,
the chief of these being that the governor had commanded that their
comrades who were scattered through the provinces should be slain,
when they had committed no offence. The answer was that the very
people in their own camp who had been caught by our men had revealed
that those others were accomplices in their guilt, and cognizant of
the revolt; for they had confessed that it was general throughout the
provinces. He said that there was therefore no wisdom in leaving some
of the Sangleys free while we were fighting others in the field, since
the former would take up arms against us at the first opportunity; and
finally that they should avail themselves of the present opportunity,
as being invited to make peace, and should not constrain the governor
to an extreme demonstration of his anger, as that would result in
the entire destruction of them all--as they themselves could see by
the few who had been killed on our side, and the thousands that had
fallen on theirs. Persuaded by these arguments, they undertook to
hold another council and give an answer on the following day.