_Okinawa’s caves behind front lines were used as temporary hospitals
for emergency operations and treatment, at times when casualties
could not be rushed to the rear or to a hospital ship standing in the
transport area off of the landing beaches._]
Okinawa proved extremely costly to all participants. More than
100,000 Japanese died defending the island, although about 7,000
uncharacteristically surrendered at the end. Native Okinawans suffered
the most. Recent studies indicate as many as 150,000 died in the
fighting, a figure representing one third of the island’s population.
The Tenth Army sustained nearly 40,000 combat casualties, including
more than 7,000 Americans killed. An additional 26,000 “non-battle”
casualties occurred; combat fatigue cases accounted for most of these.
Marine Corps casualties overall--ground, air, ships’
detachments--exceeded 19,500. In addition, 560 members of the Navy
Medical Corps organic to the Marine units were killed or wounded.
General Shepherd described the corpsmen on Okinawa as “the finest,
most courageous men that I know ... they did a magnificent job.” Three
corpsmen received the Medal of Honor (see sidebar). As always, losses
within the infantry outfits soared out of proportion. Colonel Shapley
reported losses of 110 percent in the 4th Marines, which reflected
both the addition of replacements and their high attrition after
joining. Corporal Day of 2/22 experienced the death of his regimental
and battalion commanders, plus the killing or wounding of two company
commanders, seven platoon commanders, and every other member of his
rifle squad in the battle.
The legacy of this great battle can be expressed in these categories:
• _Foreshadow of Invasion of Japan._ Admiral Spruance described the
battle of Okinawa as “a bloody, hellish prelude to the invasion of
Japan.” As protracted a nightmare as Okinawa had been, every survivor
knew in his heart that the next battles in Kyushu and Honshu would
be incalculably worse. In a nutshell, the plans for invading Japan
specified the Kyushu landings would be executed by the surviving
veterans of Iwo Jima and Luzon; the reward of the Okinawa survivors
would be the landing on the main island of Honshu. Most men grew
fatalistic; nobody’s luck could last through such infernos.
• _Amphibious Mastery._ By coincidence, the enormous and virtually
flawless amphibious assault on Okinawa occurred 30 years to the month
after the colossal disaster at Gallipoli in World War I. By 1945 the
Americans had refined this difficult naval mission into an art form.
Nimitz had every possible advantage in place for Okinawa--a proven
doctrine, specialized ships and landing craft, mission-oriented weapons
systems, trained shock troops, flexible logistics, unity of command.
Everything clicked. The massive projection of 60,000 combat troops
ashore on L-Day and the subsequent series of smaller landings on the
surrounding islands represented the fruition of a doctrine earlier
considered hare-brained or suicidal.
• _Attrition Warfare._ Disregarding the great opportunities for
surprise and maneuver available in the amphibious task force,
the Tenth Army conducted much of the campaign for Okinawa in an
unimaginative, attrition mode which played into the strength of the
Japanese defenders. An unrealistic reliance on firepower and siege
tactics prolonged the fighting and increased the costs. The landings
on Ie Shima and Oroku Peninsula, despite their successful executions,
comprised the only division-level amphibious assaults undertaken after
L-Day. Likewise, the few night attacks undertaken by Marine and Army
forces achieved uncommon success, but were not encouraged. The Tenth
Army squandered several opportunities for tactical innovations that
could have hastened a breakthrough of the enemy defenses.
• _Joint Service._ The squabble between the 1st Marine Division and the
77th Division after the Marines seized Shuri Castle notwithstanding,
the battle of Okinawa represented joint service cooperation at its
finest. This was General Buckner’s greatest achievement, and General
Geiger continued the sense of teamwork after Buckner’s death. Okinawa
remains a model of interservice cooperation to succeeding generations
of military professionals.
• _First-Rate Training._ The Marines who deployed to Okinawa received
the benefit of the most thorough and practical advanced training of the
war. Well-seasoned division and regimental commanders, anticipating
Okinawa’s requirements for cave warfare and combat in built-up areas,
conducted realistic training and rehearsals. The battle produced few
surprises.
• _Leadership._ Many of those Marines who survived Okinawa went on to
positions of top leadership that influenced the Corps for the next two
decades or more. Two Commandants emerged--General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
Jr., of the 6th Marine Division, and then-Lieutenant Colonel Leonard
F. Chapman, Jr., CO of 4/11. Oliver P. Smith and Vernon E. Megee rose
to four-star rank. At least 17 others achieved the rank of lieutenant
general, including George C. Axtell, Jr.; Victor H. Krulak; Alan
Shapley; and Edward W. Snedeker. And Corporal James L. Day recovered
from his wounds and returned to Okinawa 40 years later as a major
general to command all Marine Corps bases on the island.
[Illustration: