_This is the last photograph taken of LtGen Simon B. Buckner, Jr., USA,
right, before he was killed on 19 June, observing the 8th Marines in
action on Okinawa for the first time since the regiment entered the
lines in the drive to the south._]
When news of Buckner’s death reached the headquarters of the
_Thirty-second Army_ in its cliff-side cave near Mabuni, the staff
officers rejoiced. But General Ushijima maintained silence. He
had respected Buckner’s distinguished military ancestry and was
appreciative of the fact that both opposing commanders had once
commanded their respective service academies, Ushijima at Zama, Buckner
at West Point. Ushijima could also see his own end fast approaching.
Indeed, the XXIV Corps’ 7th and 96th Divisions were now bearing down
inexorably on the Japanese command post. On 21 June Generals Ushijima
and Cho ordered Colonel Yahara and others to save themselves in order
“to tell the army’s story to headquarters,” then conducted ritual
suicide.
[Illustration: END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN IIIAC ZONE]
General Geiger announced the end of organized resistance on Okinawa the
same day. True to form, a final _kikusui_ attack struck the fleet that
night and sharp fighting broke out on the 22d. Undeterred, Geiger broke
out the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing band and ran up the American flag at
Tenth Army headquarters. The long battle had finally run its course.
[Sidebar (page 49): Subsidiary Amphibious Landings
Although overshadowed by the massive L-Day landing, a series of smaller
amphibious operations around the periphery of Okinawa also contributed
to the ultimate victory. These subsidiary landing forces varied in size
from company-level to a full division. Each reflected the collective
amphibious expertise attained by the Pacific Theater forces by 1945.
Applied with great economy of force, these landings produced fleet
anchorages, fire support bases, auxiliary airfields, and expeditionary
radar sites for early warning to the fleet against the _kamikazes_.
No unit better represented this progression of amphibious virtuosity
than the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac) Amphibious Reconnaissance
Battalion, commanded throughout the war by Major James L. Jones,
USMC. Jones and his men provided outstanding service to landing
force commanders in a series of increasingly audacious exploits in
the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas (especially Tinian), and Iwo Jima.
Prior to L-Day at Okinawa, these Marines supported the Army’s 77th
Division with stealthy landings on Awara Saki, Mae, and Keise Shima in
the Kerama Retto Islands in the East China Sea. Later in the battle,
the recon unit conducted night landings on the islands guarding the
eastern approaches to Nakagusuku Wan, which later what would be called
Buckner Bay. One of these islands, Tsugen Jima contained the main
Japanese outpost, and Jones had a sharp firefight underway before he
could extract his men in the darkness. Tsugen Jima then became the
target of the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, which stormed ashore a few
days later to eliminate the stronghold. Jones’ Marines then sailed to
the northwestern coast to execute a night landing on Minna Shima on
13 April to seize a fire base in support of the 77th Division’s main
landing on Ie Shima.
The post-L-Day amphibious operations of the 77th and 27th Divisions
and the FMFPac Force Recon Battalion were professionally executed and
beneficial, but not decisive. By mid-April, the Tenth Army had decided
to wage a campaign of massive firepower and attrition against the
main Japanese defenses. General Buckner chose not to employ his many
amphibious resources to break the ensuing gridlock.
Buckner’s consideration of the amphibious option was not helped by a
lack of flexibility on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who kept
strings attached to the Marine divisions. The _Thirty-second Army_ in
southern Okinawa clearly represented the enemy center of gravity in the
Ryukyu Islands, but the JCS let weeks lapse before scrubbing earlier
commitments for the 2d Marine Division to assault Kikai Shima, an
obscure island north of Okinawa, and the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions
to tackle Miyako Shima, near Formosa. Of the Miyako Shima mission
Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith observed, “It is unnecessary,
practically in a rear area, and its capture will cost more than Iwo
Jima.” General Smith no longer served in an operational capacity,
but his assessment of amphibious plans still carried weight. The JCS
finally canceled both operations, and General Buckner had unrestricted
use of his Marines on Okinawa. By then he had decided to employ them in
the same fashion as his Army divisions.
Buckner did avail himself of the 8th Marines from the 2d Marine
Division, employing it first in a pair of amphibious landings during
3-9 June to seize outlying islands for early warning radar facilities
and fighter direction centers against _kamikaze_ raids. The commanding
general then attached the reinforced regiment to the 1st Marine
Division for the final overland assaults in the south.
Buckner also consented to the 6th Marine Division’s request to conduct
its own amphibious assault across an estuary below Naha to surprise the
Japanese Naval Guard Force in the Oroku Peninsula. This was a jewel of
an operation in which the Marines used every component of amphibious
warfare to great advantage.
Ironically, had the amphibious landings of the 77th Division on Ie
Shima or the 6th Marine Division on Oroku been conducted separately
from Okinawa they would both rate major historical treatment for
the size of the forces, smart orchestration of supporting fires,
and intensity of fighting. Both operations produced valuable
objectives--airfields on Ie Shima, unrestricted access to the great
port of Naha--but because they were ancillary to the larger campaign
the two landings barely receive passing mention. As events turned out,
the Oroku operation would be the final opposed amphibious landing of
the war.
[Illustration:
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 126987
]
]
_Legacy_
There was little elation among the exhausted Marines in southern
Okinawa at the official proclamation of victory. The residual death
throes of the _Thirty-second Army_ kept the battlefield lethal. The
last of General Ushijima’s front-line infantry may have died defending
Kunishi Ridge and Yuza Dake, but the remaining hodgepodge of support
troops sold their lives dearly to the last. In the closing period
17-19 June, die-hard Japanese survivors wounded Major Earl J. Cook,
CO of 1/22; Major William C. Chamberlin, S-3 of the 8th Marines; and
Lieutenant Colonel E. Hunter Hurst, CO of 3/7. Even the two Marines who
had survived so long in the shell crater on Sugar Loaf saw their luck
run out in the final days. Private First Class Bertoli died in action.
A Japanese satchel charge seriously wounded Corporal Day, requiring an
urgent evacuation to the hospital ship _Solace_.
[Illustration: