The 5th Marines finally fought clear of the devilish Awacha Pocket on
the 10th, ending a week of frustration and point-blank casualties.
Now it became the turn of the 7th Marines to engage its own nightmare
terrain. Due south of their position lay Dakeshi Ridge. Coincidentally,
General Buckner prodded his commanders on the 11th, announcing a
renewed general offensive along the entire front. This proclamation may
well have been in response to the growing criticism Buckner had been
receiving from the Navy and some of the media for his time-consuming
attrition strategy. But the riflemen’s war had progressed beyond
high-level exhortation. The assault troops knew fully what to
expect--and what it would likely cost.
The 7th Marines was an experienced outfit and well commanded by
Guadalcanal and Bougainville veteran Colonel Edward W. Snedeker. “I
was especially fortunate at Okinawa,” he said, “in that each of my
battalion commanders had fought at Peleliu.” Nevertheless, the regiment
had its hands full with Dakeshi Ridge. “It was our most difficult
mission,” said Snedeker. After a day of intense fighting, Lieutenant
Colonel John J. Gormley’s 1/7 fought its way to the crest of Dakeshi,
but had to withdraw under swarming Japanese counterattacks. The next
day, Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger’s 2/7 regained the crest
and cut down the counterattackers emerging from their reverse-slope
bunkers. The 7th Marines were on Dakeshi to stay, another significant
breakthrough.
“The Old Breed” Marines enjoyed only a brief elation at this
achievement because from Dakeshi they could glimpse the difficulties
yet to come. In fact, the next 1,200 yards of their advance would
eat up 18 days of fighting. In this case, seizing Wana Ridge would
be tough, but the most formidable obstacle would be steep, twisted
Wana Draw that rambled just to the south, a deadly killing ground,
surrounded by towering cliffs pocked with caves, with every possible
approach strewn with mines and covered by interlocking fire. “Wana
Draw proved to be the toughest assignment the 1st Division was to
encounter,” reported General Oliver P. Smith. The remnants of the _62d
Infantry Division_ would defend Wana to their deaths.
Because the 6th Marine Division’s celebrated assault on Sugar Loaf
Hill occurred during the same period, historians have not paid as much
attention to the 1st Division’s parallel efforts against the Wana
defenses. But Wana turned out to be almost as deadly a “mankiller” as
Sugar Loaf and its bloody environs. The 1st Marines, now led by Colonel
Arthur T. Mason, began the assault on the Wana complex on 12 May. In
time, all three infantry regiments would take their turn attacking the
narrow gorge to the south. The division continued to make full use of
its tank battalion. The Sherman medium tanks and attached Army flame
tanks were indispensable in both their assault and direct fire support
roles (see sidebar). On 16 May, as an indicator, the 1st Tank Battalion
fired nearly 5,000 rounds of 75mm and 173,000 rounds of .30-caliber
ammunition, plus 600 gallons of napalm.
Crossing the floor of the gorge continued to be a heart-stopping race
against a gauntlet of enemy fire, however, and progress came extremely
slowly. Typical of the fighting was the division’s summary for its
aggregate progress on 18 May: “Gains were measured by yards won, lost,
then won again.” On 20 May, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol’s 3/1
improvised a different method of dislodging Japanese defenders from
their reverse-slope positions in Wana Draw. In five hours of muddy,
back-breaking work, troops manhandled several drums of napalm up the
north side of the ridge. There the Marines split the barrels open,
tumbled them down into the gorge, and set them ablaze by dropping
white phosphorous grenades in their wake. But each small success
seemed to be undermined by the Japanese ability to reinforce and
resupply their positions during darkness, usually screened by mortar
barrages or small-unit counterattacks. The fighting in such close
quarters was vicious and deadly. General del Valle watched in alarm
as his casualties mounted daily. The 7th Marines, which lost 700 men
taking Dakeshi, lost 500 more in its first five days fighting for the
Wana complex. During 16-19 May, Lieutenant Colonel E. Hunter Hurst’s
3/7 lost 12 officers among the rifle companies. The other regiments
suffered proportionately. Throughout the period 11-30 May, the division
would lose 200 Marines for every 100 yards advanced.
Heavy rains resumed on 22 May and continued for the next ten days.
The 1st Marine Division’s sector contained no roads. With his LVTs
committed to delivering ammunition and extracting casualties, del Valle
resorted to using his replacement drafts to hand-carry food and water
to the front lines. This proved less than satisfactory. “You can’t
move it all on foot,” noted del Valle. Marine torpedo bombers flying
out of Yontan began air-dropping supplies by parachute, even though
low ceilings, heavy rains, and enemy fire made for hazardous duty.
The division commander did everything in his power to keep his troops
supplied, supported, reinforced, and motivated--but conditions were
extremely grim.
To the west, the neighboring 6th Marine Division’s advance south below
the Asa River collided against a trio of low hills dominating the open
country leading up to Shuri Ridge. The first of these hills--steep but
unassuming--became known as Sugar Loaf. To the southeast lay Half Moon
Hill, to the southwest Horseshoe Hill and the village of Takamotoji.
The three hills represented a singular defensive complex; in fact
they were the western anchor of the Shuri Line. So sophisticated were
the mutually supporting defenses of the three hills that an attack
on one would prove futile unless the others were simultaneously
invested. Colonel Seiko Mita and his _15th Independent Mixed Regiment_
defended this sector. Its mortars and antitank guns were particularly
well-sited on Horseshoe. The western slopes of Half Moon contained
some of the most effective machine gun nests the Marines had yet
encountered. Sugar Loaf itself contained elaborate concrete-reinforced
reverse-slope positions. And all approaches to the complex fell within
the beaten zone of heavy artillery from Shuri Ridge which dominated the
battlefield.
[Illustration: