_An Okinawan civilian is flushed from a cave into which a smoke
grenade had been thrown. Many Okinawans sought the refuge of caves
in which they could hide while the tide of battle passed over them.
Unfortunately, a large number of caves were sealed when Marines
suspected that they were harboring the enemy._]
The division attacked south the next day into broken country thereafter
known as the Awacha Pocket. For all their combat prowess, however, the
Marines proved to be no more immune to the unrelenting storm of shells
and bullets than the soldiers they had relieved. The disappointing
day also included several harbingers of future conditions. First, it
rained hard all day. Second, as soon as the 5th Marines seized the
nearest high ground they came under such intense fire from adjacent
strongpoints and from higher ground within the 77th Division’s zone to
the immediate southeast they had to withdraw. Third, the Marines spent
much of the night engaged in violent hand-to-hand fighting with scores
of Japanese infiltrators. “This,” said one survivor, “is going to be a
bitch.”
The Peleliu veterans in the ranks of the 1st Marine Division were
no strangers to cave warfare. Clearly, no other division in the
campaign could claim such a wealth of practical experience. And while
nothing on Okinawa could match the Umurbrogol’s steep cliffs, heavy
vegetation, and endless array of fortified ridges, the “Old Breed” in
this battle faced a smarter, more numerous foe who had more artfully
prepared each wrinkle in the moonscape. In overcoming the sequential
barriers of Awacha, Dakeshi, and Wana, the 1st Marine Division faced
four straight weeks of hell. The funneling effects of the cliffs and
draws reduced most attacks to brutal frontal assaults by fully-exposed
tank-infantry-engineer teams. General del Valle characterized this
small unit fighting as “a slugging match with but temporary and limited
opportunity to maneuver.”
General Buckner captured the fancy of the media with his metaphor
about the “blowtorch and corkscrew” tactics needed for effective cave
warfare, but this was simply stating the obvious to the Army veterans
of Biak and the Marine veterans of Peleliu and Iwo Jima. Flamethrowers
were represented by the blowtorch, demolitions, by the corkscrew--but
both weapons had to be delivered from close range by tanks and the
exposed riflemen covering them.
On 3 May the rains slowed and the 5th Marines resumed its assault,
this time taking and holding the first tier of key terrain in the
Awacha Pocket. But the systematic reduction of this strongpoint would
take another full week of extremely heavy fighting. Fire support
proved excellent. Now it was the Army’s time to return the favor of
interservice artillery support. In this case, the 27th Division’s field
artillery regiment stayed on the lines, and with its forward observers
and linemen intimately familiar with the terrain in that sector,
rendered yeoman service.
[Illustration: _A “Ronson” tank, mounting a flame thrower, lays down a
stream of fire against a position located in one of the many Okinawan
tombs set in the island’s hillsides._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 122153
]
At this point an odd thing happened, an almost predictable chink in the
Japanese defensive discipline. The genial General Ushijima permitted
full discourse from his staff regarding tactical courses of action.
Typically, these debates occurred between the impetuous chief of
staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Cho, and the conservative operations
officer, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. To this point, Yahara’s strategy of
a protracted holding action had prevailed. The _Thirty-second Army_ had
resisted the enormous American invasion successfully for more than a
month. The army still intact, could continue to inflict high casualties
on the enemy for months to come, fulfilling its mission of bleeding the
ground forces while the “Divine Wind” wreaked havoc on the fleet. But
maintaining a sustained defense was anathema to a warrior like Cho,
and he argued stridently for a massive counterattack. Against Yahara’s
protests, Ushijima sided with his chief of staff.
The great Japanese counterattack of 4-5 May proved ill-advised and
exorbitant. To man the assault forces, Ushijima had to forfeit his
coverage of the Minatoga sector and bring those troops forward into
unfamiliar territory. To provide the massing of fires necessary to
cover the assault he had to bring most of his artillery pieces and
mortars out into the open. And his concept of using the _26th Shipping
Engineer Regiment_ and other special assault forces in a frontal
attack, and, at the same time, a waterborne, double envelopment would
alert the Americans to the general counteroffensive. Yahara cringed in
despair.
[Illustration: _Marines of the 1st Division move carefully toward the
crest of a hill on their way to Dakeshi. The forwardmost Marines stay
low, off of the skyline._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 120412
]
The events of 4-5 May proved the extent of Cho’s folly. Navy
“Flycatcher” patrols on both coasts interdicted the first flanking
attacks conducted by Japanese raiders in slow-moving barges and
native canoes. Near Kusan, on the west coast, the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, and the LVT-As of the 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion greeted
the invaders trying to come ashore with a deadly fire, killing 700.
Further along the coast, 2/1 intercepted and killed 75 more, while the
1st Reconnaissance Company and the war dog platoon tracked down the
last 65 hiding in the brush. Meanwhile the XXIV Corps received the
brunt of the overland thrust and contained it effectively, scattering
the attackers into small groups, hunting them down ruthlessly. The
1st Marine Division, instead of being surrounded and annihilated in
accordance with the Japanese plan, launched its own attack instead,
advancing several hundred yards. The _Thirty-second Army_ lost more
than 6,000 first-line troops and 59 pieces of artillery in the futile
counterattack. Ushijima, in tears, promised Yahara he would never again
disregard his advice. Yahara, the only senior officer to survive the
battle, described the disaster as “the decisive action of the campaign.”
[Illustration: