Everything about the terrain favored the defenders. The convoluted
topography of ridges, draws, and escarpments served to compartment
the battlefield into scores of small firefights, while the general
absence of dense vegetation permitted the defenders full observation
and interlocking supporting fires from intermediate strongpoints. As at
Iwo Jima, the Japanese Army fought largely from underground positions
to offset American dominance in supporting arms. And even in the more
accessible terrain, the Japanese took advantage of the thousands of
concrete, lyre-shaped Okinawan tombs to provide combat outposts.
There were blind spots in the defenses, to be sure, but finding and
exploiting them took the Americans an inordinate amount of time and
cost them dearly.
The bitterest fighting of the campaign took place within an extremely
compressed battlefield. The linear distance from Yonabaru on the east
coast to the bridge over the Asa River above Naha on the opposite side
of the island is barely 9,000 yards. General Buckner initially pushed
south with two Army divisions abreast. By 8 May he had doubled this
commitment: two Army divisions of the XXIV Corps on the east, two
Marine divisions of IIIAC on the west. Yet each division would fight
its own desperate, costly battles against disciplined Japanese soldiers
defending elaborately fortified terrain features. There was no easy
route south.
By eschewing the amphibious flanking attack in late April, General
Buckner had fresh divisions to employ in the general offensive towards
Shuri. Thus, the 77th Division relieved the 96th in the center, and
the 1st Marine Division began relieving the 27th Division on the west.
Colonel Kenneth B. Chappell’s 1st Marines entered the lines on the
last day of April and drew heavy fire from the moment they approached.
By the time the 5th Marines arrived to complete the relief of 27th
Division elements on 1 May, Japanese gunners supporting the veteran
_62d Infantry Division_ were pounding anything that moved. “It’s hell
in there, Marine,” a dispirited soldier remarked to Private First Class
Sledge as 3/5 entered the lines. “I know,” replied Sledge with false
bravado, “I fought at Peleliu.” But soon Sledge was running for his
life:
As we raced across an open field, Japanese shells of all types
whizzed, screamed, and roared around us with increasing frequency.
The crash and thunder of explosions was a nightmare.... It was an
appalling chaos. I was terribly afraid.
General del Valle assumed command of the western zone at 1400 on 1 May
and issued orders for a major attack the next morning. That evening
a staff officer brought the general a captured Japanese map, fully
annotated with American positions. With growing uneasiness, del Valle
realized his opponents already knew the 1st Marine Division had
entered the fight.
[Illustration: