THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC AND POLITICS
Appeals to Public
We may now consider in a more general fashion the political methods
of the Southern Pacific group during the first thirty years of their
railroad history. We have seen that they not only relied upon the
talents of their legal staff in taking advantage of defects in the law,
but that in two cases—the case of the railroad commission of 1880, and
that of the subsidy in San Francisco in 1863—they probably resorted
to the direct use of money to accomplish their ends. Yet a whole state
cannot be bought, though individuals may be, and it would do injustice
to the breadth of view of the associates to suppose that they limited
themselves to any such crude device. Indeed, the frequency with which
money bribes were offered probably diminished as time went on.
Consideration of the general policies of Mr. Stanford and of Mr.
Huntington seems to show that they met the public demand for regulation
of rates and fares in no less than five distinct ways.
The first method consisted of appeals to the general public through
testimony before legislative committees, communications to the
newspapers, letters to private organizations which interested
themselves in the government control of corporations, and other
similar devices. By these various means Stanford, at least, spread his
philosophy of industry widely abroad. He took the general position that
agitation upon the subject of railroads was due to misapprehension of
the facts. Most alleged abuses were imaginary, but the Central Pacific
stood ready to correct any that were shown to exist.[277] Railroad
fares and freights were cheaper in California than anywhere else in
the world, all things considered.[278] In case further reduction were
desired, the true policy was to place as few burdens upon the railroads
as possible, to encourage in this way new construction, and to rely
on competition for the desired result. The interests of the railroad
and of the public were the same.[279] Monopolies in the United States
were possible only to the extent that they were beneficent. There was
properly no right of control in the state. The Granger decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States were a flagrant violation of the
principles of free government. If the people wanted to exercise control
over a railroad they must do as the state does when it exercises
the right of eminent domain; that is to say, they must pay to the
individual owners the full value of whatever was taken for public use.
Anything else was confiscation. Moreover, at best, regulation could
not be complete, because it could not ever compel the shipper to ship
equally over all lines, and because, while commerce was world-wide,
American governments could regulate but one link in the chain. In
California, regulation was peculiarly inexpedient so long as the
railway system of the state was incomplete.[280]
Huntington’s Views
Mr. Huntington shared Mr. Stanford’s views, or at least approved the
conclusion to which they led, but does not seem to have courted the
same publicity in respect to the matter. Interviews he distrusted. “I
notice,” he wrote in 1875, “that some correspondent of a San Diego
paper has been interviewing Mr. Crocker. It is very difficult for any
one to be interviewed by an infernal newspaper without getting hurt;
and Mr. Crocker is not the most unlikely to get hurt of all the men I
know.”
Yet in spite of this attitude towards the newspaper reporter,
Huntington had a keen appreciation of the importance of shaping public
opinion, and was familiar with the ordinary devices used for the
purpose, including the manipulation of the press. He was concerned over
the attitude of the _Sacramento Record Union_. “If I owned the paper,”
he said, “I would control it or burn it.”[281] “I wish you would have
it sent over the wires as often as you can that the Southern Pacific
is being rapidly built,” he wrote Colton from New York in 1877.[282]
Again, “Yours of November 28 with Northern Pacific clips is received.
Many of the articles are very good. It is much better that all such
articles with petitions be sent direct to members of the Senate and
House, we keeping in the background as much as possible.”[283]
In November, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton that:
Gwynn left for the South yesterday. I think he can do us considerable
good if he sticks for his hard money and anti-subsidy schemes; but if
it was understood by the public that he was here in our interest, it
would no doubt hurt us. When he left I told him he must not write to
me, but when he wanted I should know his whereabouts, etc., to write
to R. T. Colburn of Elizabeth, New Jersey.[284]
Influential Individuals Favored
A second method employed by the associates in their efforts to oppose
public regulation of corporate affairs was that of paying personal
attention to men who possessed or were believed to possess influence.
In its simplest form this involved the employment at liberal salaries
of the ablest legal talent which could be found. The policy was,
however, pushed much further than the statement made would indicate.
Huntington’s letters to his associates in the West were full of
suggestions as to what should be done and of commendations for, or
criticism of, what had been accomplished.
In April, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton that he had given Dr.
Linderman, director of the United States Mint, a letter of introduction
to him, Colton, at San Francisco. This was because the location of
a new building for the Mint might be of importance to the Central
Pacific.[285] In October of the same year Huntington gave a pass to a
certain congressman and ex-governor, but warned Colton that the man
was a slippery fellow and should not be trusted too much.[286] Crocker
wrote to Colton in February, 1875:
I fully appreciate your position there and need of ... a Senator of
the United States. We tried to get him off sooner the best we knew. I
think he did not want to go, and I fear when he gets there he will not
be earnest in our interest as formerly. Stanford thinks I am mistaken
and I hope I am.[287]
A letter dated July 26, 1876, shows that Huntington was trying to
get up a party of twenty-five southern members of Congress to visit
California over the Southern Pacific. He wanted none but the best
men—that is, men who would “go for the right as they understand it,
and not as Tom Scott[288] or somebody else understands it,” but he was
willing to pay the expenses of the trip for such men.[289] In order
to help persuade representative men to make this trip, Huntington
telegraphed Colton to have some of the prominent men in San Francisco
wire Senator Gordon, of Georgia, urging that the visit should be
made.[290] “I noticed you are looking after the State Railroad
Commission,” Huntington adds in another letter to the same address, “I
think it is time.”[291] Again:
I am sorry to learn that the receipts are so very poor south of
San Francisco, but it is a good time to take the State Railroad
Commissioners over the roads. I am glad to notice that you are looking
after the Commissioners. I think it very important.[292]
Still again, in May, 1877, Huntington wrote:
I am glad you are paying some attention to General Taylor and Mr.
Kasson. Taylor can do us much good in the South. I think, by the way,
he would like to get some position with us in California. Mr. Kasson
has always been our friend in Congress, and as he is a very able man,
has been able to do us much good, and he has never lost us one dollar.
I think I have written you before about Senator.... He may want to
borrow some money, but we are so short this summer, I do not see how
we can let him have any in California.[293]
Letters like these cover only one period and refer to the activity
of only three out of the five associates, but there is sufficient
outside evidence of a general nature to indicate that this policy was
systematically followed by the Stanford group.
Lobbying in Washington and Sacramento
In addition to the attempt in a general way to gain the good-will of
the public or of influential members of it, the Central Pacific was
regularly represented at Washington and Sacramento when legislation
was pending. Huntington, as has been said, took care of the company’s
affairs in Washington. He had offices in New York and Boston also,
and divided his time between the three places while Congress was
in session—four days in Washington, two in New York, and one in
Boston.[294] Stanford attended to matters in Sacramento, either in
person or through representatives such as William Carr or Stephen T.
Gage. The latter was also for many years the company’s agent in Nevada.
Both Huntington and Stanford, of course, were assisted by a corps of
lawyers and political aides-de-camp, some of whom were very highly
paid. General Franchot, for instance, Huntington’s chief assistant,
received at one time a salary of $20,000 a year, besides a liberal
expense account. Much criticism has been directed at the activity of
Central Pacific agents in the lobbies at Washington and Sacramento, but
a large portion of it was probably legitimate.
Correspondence from Washington
Certainly the watch which the associates kept on legislation was very
close. Huntington’s own activities in 1875, 1876, 1877, and 1878 are
vividly described in the letters which he wrote Colton during these
years, and some few of these deserve to be reproduced if only for
the picture they suggest of the man who wrote them. In March, 1875,
Huntington wrote:
I notice a bill passed the House some few days since, called up by
Williams of Michigan. I forget its title, but it called for reports,
etc., etc., from the Pacific roads. Of course it was something ugly or
it would not have passed.[295]
This was mere routine. By June, 1876, however, the legislative work had
increased. Mr. Huntington told Colton:
There is a terrible fight kept up on us in Washington. But while they
may bite us, they will not eat us up. Sherrell telegraphed me to come
to Washington in great haste, as Lawrence was to pass his bill at
once; so I went over and got the committee to recall it from the House
back to the committee, so the demagogue from Ohio cannot trouble us
before the 6th of July. In the meantime we will be working on our land
proposition in the Senate. Just what we can do I cannot say, but I
shall surely keep trying.[296]
The following month he added:
I returned from Washington last night. Our matters look better there,
but we are not out of danger. It has been so very hot here for the
last few weeks that it has come near using me up. You know I do not
spare myself when I have anything to do.[297]
In August, 1876, Huntington wrote Colton:
I have thought I could stand anything, but I am fearful this damnation
Congress will kill me. Senator Edmunds told another Senator yesterday
that he would pass his Pacific Railroad Sinking Fund Bill before
Congress adjourned, but I think he will not, and I have some hope
Congress will adjourn by the time this reaches you.[298]
And in March, 1877, he was able to say:
Congress has adjourned, and we have not been hurt, except by the
paying out in Washington of some money for hotel bills, etc.
I am quite sure that we stand better in Washington at this time than
we ever did before.
The Pacific Mail Steamship Co. got no aid. I will tell you some things
about that some time. The Sinking Fund Bill did not pass, but is in a
much better shape to pass than it has ever been before. I stayed in
Washington two days to fix up the Railroad Committee in the Senate.
Scott was there, working for the same thing, but I beat him for once
certain, as the committee is just what we want it, which is a very
important thing for us. You will no doubt notice before you get this
that we were not able to pass the Texas-Pacific bill.[299]
The committee with which Huntington was so content was changed somewhat
later, much to his disgust.[300]
It was not until the first part of 1878, however, that his letters show
him again hard at work. In January, 1878, Huntington wrote to Colton:
I notice what you write of the communists in the California
Legislature, and am very sorry to know it, but the feeling in Congress
is not much better, and yet, somehow, I do not think we shall be much
hurt, although Scott is working hard and developing more strength than
I supposed he had. He had the Railroad Committee of the House. I think
we have it now.[301]
The following month he said:
I returned from Washington last night, and I am as near used up
as I ever was in my life before. I am spending my last winter at
Washington. As I feel today, I would not agree to spend another there
for all the property we all have. Our matters are looking fair in
Washington, Scott is very bitter in the discussion. He used some
business compliments and all such stuff, and I am compelled to play
him; but it is very distasteful to me.[302]
This letter is followed in the record by a series of others of the same
tenor, which will be presented without comment.
... I have done all I can to prevent certain bills from being reached,
and do not think any bills can be that will hurt us, but if there are,
they will pass, as this Congress is, I think, the worst set of men
that have ever been collected together since man was created.[303]
I returned from Washington last night. I am almost happy to think
I shall not be called there again this session, as Congress has
adjourned its first session, and may the likes of it never meet again.
I think in all the world’s history never before was such a wild set of
demagogues honored by the name of Congress. We have been hurt some,
but some of the worst bills have been defeated, but we cannot stand
many such congresses.[304]
* * * * *
Friend Colton: I returned from Washington this morning and found on my
desk yours of the 10th inst., No. 74. Thurman’s funding bill has not
passed the House yet, but it will, I think, although I am endeavoring
to get it to the Judiciary Committee. If I can I think we can get it
amended, but even that is doubtful. There were some mistakes made by
us when the bill was in the Senate; the greatest was in Gould going
to Washington; but it is too long a story to write now. I will tell
you when we meet, if we have nothing better to talk of. This Congress
is nothing but an agrarian camp, the worst body of men that ever
before got together in this country. Scott is making a hard fight
on his Texas and Pacific bill. He has made a combination with the
Northern Pacific, which will give him some strength, how much I cannot
tell. The Northern Pacific are to ask for guarantee of their bonds
by the United States. I shall come to California soon after Congress
adjourns. Find some one to buy me out of everything there. I am tired
and want to quit.[305]
* * * * *
... I notice what you say of Thurman’s Sinking Fund Bill—of course it
is bad, but if we could have amended it so as to make it a finality,
and give us 6 per cent on the fund, it would not have been so bad. It
may not pass, but I think it will for this is the worst Congress we
have ever had; if it should, we must beat it in the courts, if we can.
I go to Washington tonight; I should have gone last night, but for the
reason that Clara has been quite sick for some days.
Mr. Sherrell telegraphed me yesterday that I must not fail of being
there this morning. I cannot attend to this Washington business much
longer.[306]
I returned from Washington last night. I hope to get through there
without being hurt any more; but it seems as though every committee in
both Houses had something before them that we had an interest in.[307]
Skilled Wire-Pulling
There is no need to comment in any detail upon these letters. Their
occasional indication of discouragement doubtless meant nothing more
than that Huntington sometimes grew tired and hot and angry with the
opposition which he encountered. A characteristic of the man was that
he never really gave up. The Thurman bill referred to will be described
in another connection.
Scott was a railroad man, at one time president of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, who was seeking to persuade Congress to subsidize a
transcontinental railway by the southern route. The land proposition
was a scheme of the associates to induce the federal legislature to
buy back a portion of the Central Pacific land grant at the government
price. As a whole, the letters so far quoted show that Huntington was a
persistent and energetic lobbyist, although the record of Congressional
legislation shows that he was far from uniformly successful.
[Illustration: C. P. Huntington]
On the whole, the railroad managers pulled wires with a skill which
rapidly increased with experience. Sometimes the company was made to
appear prominently, and sometimes it was kept in the background when
legislation was desired. Huntington found that some members of Congress
were disinclined to talk to him concerning Southern Pacific matters.
In such cases he had recourse to third parties—perhaps a constituent
of the member in question, perhaps a friend. The same methods were
employed in dealing with state legislation. In 1875 the Southern
Pacific desired a franchise permitting it to build through Arizona.
Huntington wrote Colton that he thought this would cost less if other
interests than the associates stood at the front while the franchises
were being obtained, but that after the charters were obtained it
should be known that they were controlled by the Southern Pacific.[308]
He said:
I am inclined to believe that if you could get the right man on that
line in Arizona to work with the few papers they have there, to
agitate the question in the territory, asking that some arrangement be
made with the S. P., at the same time offer the S. P. a charter in the
territory that would free the road from taxation, and one that would
not allow for any interference with rates until ten per cent interest
was declared on the common stock, I believe the Legislature could be
called together by _the people_ for $5,000 and such a charter granted.
Then we would take the chances of having such a charter made good by
Congress or the State when it became one.[309]
At one time Huntington even suggested that the Southern Pacific might
bear the expense of an extra session of the Arizona legislature
in order to hasten consideration of legislation favorable to the
company.[310] The desired legislation was eventually obtained, but not
until February, 1887.
Unethical Dealings
Did or did not the Huntington group, including Stanford at Sacramento
and Reno, and Huntington at Washington, employ improper means in
their endeavor to influence votes? This is another question upon the
answer to which much depends. That passes were issued to members of
the legislature, members of Congress, and judges of courts, and that
gentlemen of these types were entertained at dinner in Sacramento was
generally known. We have Mr. Gage’s statement, at least, that no more
than this took place in Nevada. He told the United States Pacific
Railway Commission of 1887, that his expenditures in that state over a
period of eight years had amounted to $2,000, and added:
... and I would like to produce to you the files of the newspapers in
order to show the existence of the misapprehensions that existed among
the good people of Nevada, as indicated by their press, concerning
my relations with the legislature of Nevada, session after session
for the sixteen years. I remarked yesterday that it was one of the
greatest sources of regret that I had, the imputations which were
cast on my character, and which I feel I have not deserved, and which
I feel I may not live long enough to outgrow. One of these is that I
have spent money in the Nevada legislature for the Central Pacific
like water; and those things were constantly asserted, and I believe
frequently believed by a good many good people in the State, but they
were not true. As I asserted to you yesterday, I have kept an accurate
account of the expenses for the first eight years that I was attending
the sessions of the Nevada legislature, which included my personal
expenses during that time, and they figure up $2,000, or a fraction
under it, as it was. Now, if any one thinks that $2,000, or less,
could corrupt a legislature for eight years, including the personal
expenses of myself, he must invoice members of the Nevada legislature
at a very low price, and “buy them by the string.”[311]
Mr. Gage would not say, however, when asked pointblank, whether or not
he had paid any money or made any provisions of advantage or reward to
any member of the legislature of California or Nevada.[312] Nor would
Mr. Stanford say more in reply to the inquiries of the United States
Pacific Railway Commission than that the company would not include in
any settlement with the United States, vouchers to which objections
were made.[313]
On the whole, there is a good deal of evidence that the owners of the
Central Pacific went further in influencing legislation than any
strict system of ethics would allow. Huntington once stated his own
position as follows:
If you have to pay money to have the right thing done, it is only just
and fair to do it.... If a man has the power to do great evil and
won’t do right unless he is bribed to do it, I think the time spent
will be gained when it is a man’s duty to go up and bribe the judge. A
man that will cry out against them himself will also do these things
himself. If there was none for it, I would not hesitate.[314]
Further Evidence
More important than the record of such general expressions of opinion
are the affidavits filed in the San Francisco subsidy litigation
described in an earlier chapter. Nor is anyone likely to read the
letters of Mr. Huntington to Mr. Colton in the late seventies without
becoming convinced that the possibility of purchasing votes was
constantly before Huntington’s mind. Huntington wrote Colton at one
time that the (Southern Pacific) company could not get legislation
unless it paid more than it was worth.[315] In another communication
he said: “If we pass the Sinking Fund Bill and beat Scott and the
Union Pacific, it will hurt us not less than half flora”;[316] and in
still another we find the cheery comment: “Matters do not look well in
Washington, but I think we shall not be much hurt, although the boys
are very hungry and it will cost considerably to be saved.”[317]
In November, 1877, Huntington wrote Colton:
You have no idea how I am annoyed by this Washington business, and I
must and will give it up after this session. If we are not hurt this
session it will be because we pay much money to prevent it, and you
know how hard it is to get it to pay for such purposes; and I do not
see my way clear to get through here and pay the January interest
with other bills payable to January 1st, with less than $2,000,000,
and possibly not for that.... I think Congress will try very hard to
pass some kind of a bill to make us commence paying on what we owe the
Government. I am striving very hard to get a bill in such a shape that
we can accept it, as this Washington business will kill me yet if I
have to continue the fight from year to year, and then every year the
fight grows more and more expensive; and rather than let it continue
as it is from year to year, as it is, I would rather they take the
road and be done with it.[318]
In one case where the salary to be paid a certain individual was under
consideration, Huntington wrote Colton frankly that it was important
that the man’s friends in Washington should be on the railroad’s side,
and that if this could be brought about a salary of $10,000 to $20,000
a year would be worth while. Huntington wanted the man to make a
proposition in writing, however, that he would control his friends for
a fixed sum.[319] When asked about the meaning of his correspondence,
Huntington denied that these expressions had any vicious significance.
He said he kept on high ground,[320] and even objected to the free use
of liquor and cigars.[321] Specifically, he gave instructions to his
people never to use money in any immoral or illegal sense. “Buying
votes in a legislature was bad policy,” said he, and his position
in these matters received the formal support of Stanford. But such
assertions are entitled to less weight than Huntington’s less guarded
phrases.
Heavy General and Legal Expenses
There is no question that the control exercised by the Central Pacific
management over the legal and miscellaneous expenses of the company
was informal to the last degree. Huntington had a great deal of
money to spend and he turned it over to trusted agents without too
many questions. He would pay $5,000 or $10,000 at a time to General
Franchot, for instance, without inquiring where it went or how it
was paid.[322] Checks were made out in all cases to I. E. Gates, Mr.
Huntington’s assistant in New York, and were indorsed by him either
to payee or in blank.[323] Vouchers covering such items were made
out simply to “Expense,” or to “Legal expense.”[324] In many cases
expenditures authorized by Stanford, Crocker, or Huntington were
represented by no vouchers at all,[325] the filing of vouchers being
subsequently waived at stockholders’ meetings.
All in all, the general and legal expenses of the Central Pacific
between the years 1875 and 1885 averaged over $500,000 annually. The
only reply to the government inquiry as to what this money had been
paid out for was Stanford’s statement already quoted that vouchers to
which there were objections would not be included in any settlement
with the United States, but that the moneys would be treated as still
in the treasury.[326] This was plainly an evasion of the point at issue.
Company in Politics
Still another question is how far the headquarters of the Central
Pacific in the various capitals were used as agencies for the election
of legislators and other persons who owed their position to railroad
influence. It is the unhesitating popular judgment that the railroad
at an early date “entered politics.” In a long letter dated August
26, 1873, Eugene Casserly asserted that the Central Pacific aimed to
be and was a third party in the politics of the state, holding the
balance of power between the Democratic and the Republican parties, and
controlling or seeking to control at will each or both of them. “This
third party,” continued Mr. Casserly, “has the usual attributes of a
political party, the same apparatus and appliances. It has its leaders,
its managers, its editors, its orators, its adherents. It selects
these from both parties, but mostly from the party in the majority.
Whether they call themselves Republicans or Democrats, and however they
divide or contend on party issues, they move as one man in the cause of
the railroad against the people. To that cause they give their first
allegiance.”
Bassett Polemic
This statement of Mr. Casserly calls to mind another charge or series
of charges made by a man named J. M. Bassett in the years following
1892. Mr. Bassett was one of the early pioneers. He came to California
in 1851, and was at various times miner, printer, newspaper man,
railroad employee, and member of the Oakland city council. At one time
he was Leland Stanford’s secretary. After Mr. Stanford had been forced
out of the presidency of the Southern Pacific, Bassett began to publish
a series of open letters to Collis P. Huntington, and continued them
weekly, with occasional intervals, for several years. The sustained
vivacity and pungency of this polemic, and the systematic virulence
with which Bassett reviewed and criticized the Huntington policies make
the series a noteworthy journalistic achievement. Mr. Bassett denounced
Mr. Huntington for the overcapitalization of the Southern Pacific
system, for its failure to pay taxes, for its carelessness of the lives
of its employees and of the public, for its attempt to evade repayment
of the debt which it owed to the United States government, and for
the general mismanagement which, he asserted, had taken place under
Huntington’s control. With respect to the interference of the Southern
Pacific in politics, Bassett wrote to Huntington in 1895:
What chief executive of the State, before the present incumbent,
has there been who did not owe his nomination and election to the
Southern Pacific Company and in acknowledgment of his debt hasten to
obey its slightest command? Has there ever been a Board of Railroad
Commissioners before last November in which you did not own at least
two members? Have you not named every Harbor Commissioner appointed
during the past twelve years?
Have you not hitherto chosen San Francisco’s Police Commissions and
do you not now exercise a dictatorial power over the city’s police,
especially the Harbor Police? Were not the Judges of the two United
States Courts in San Francisco appointed at the instance of Leland
Stanford? How many Superior Courts are there in the State in which a
citizen may bring an action against you in full confidence that he
will be fairly and impartially dealt with? Doubtless there are such
but the difficulty is to find them. Before the recent elections how
long did you control the government of San Francisco? Have you not
dictated the government of Oakland for the past twenty-five years?
Until last election had you not continuous control of Alameda County’s
government?...[327]
When one desires to test the accuracy of accusations like those of
Casserly and of Bassett, one has first to remember that they are in
accord with the substantially uncontradicted declarations of men
of all degrees of prominence in California over a period of fifty
years. Political campaigns have been waged on the question of the
railroad versus the people. Not only newspapers like the _Sacramento
Union_ and the _San Francisco Examiner_, but men like John T. Doyle,
at one time state railroad commissioner, General Howard, a leading
member of the Constitutional Convention of 1879, and H. H. Haight,
at one time governor of the state of California, have asserted that
railroad influence was a real and important factor in the politics of
California. While neither a corporation nor an individual can properly
be convicted on the strength of current report, the presence of so much
smoke, over so long a period, is fair evidence of some fire.
Documentary Evidence
Direct testimony relating to the political activity of the Huntington
group comes from Mr. Huntington himself in two ways. In the first
place there have been published certain letters which passed between
Huntington and his associate, Mr. Colton, in the years 1875 to 1878.
These documents have been referred to in other connections. They
came out in the course of court proceedings, and have the weight of
confidential communications, not intended for publication. Extracts
from these letters will presently be given. Besides this, certain
statements were given by Huntington to the press in 1890 which bear
directly upon the point at issue. These statements were intended to
discredit Stanford, but in the course of the heated controversy to
which they gave rise they were not denied by Stanford nor withdrawn by
their author.
On May 1, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton:
I noticed what you say of Piper; he is a wild hog; don’t let him come
back to Washington, but as the house is to be largely Democratic, and
if he was to be defeated, likely it would be charged to us, hence,
I should think it would be well to beat him with a Democrat; but I
would defeat him anyway, and if he got the nomination put up another
Democrat and run against him, and in that way elect a Republican. Beat
him.[328]
Asked to whom the letter referred, Huntington later said that if he
remembered the person, and he thought he did, he was a man whose views
ran contrary to all human interests.[329]
A letter in June, 1876, reads as follows:
I hope ... will be sent back to Congress. I think it would be a
misfortune if he was not.... has not always been right, but he is
a good fellow and is growing every day.... is always right, and it
would be a misfortune to Cal. not to have him in Congress. Piper is a
damned hog, and should not come back. It is shame enough for a great
commercial city like San Francisco to send a scavenger like him to
Congress once....[330]
Again, in November, 1876, Huntington wrote Colton:
I hope ... is elected and ... defeated, as it was generally understood
here that our hand was over one and under the other....[331]
A still later letter relates to the pending election of a senator from
California. Huntington said:
We should be very careful to get a U. S. Senator from Cal. that will
be disposed to use us fairly, and then have the power to help us ...,
I think, will be friendly, and there is no man in the Senate that can
push a measure further than he can.[332]
Controversy between Associates
The correspondence which has just been cited is not offered in order
to discredit Mr. Huntington, or for any reason except to show that
it was Huntington’s belief in the years 1875, 1876, and 1877 that
the influence of the Central Pacific should be used to advance the
political interests of persons favorably inclined toward his railroad
system and to discourage those in opposition. The personal controversy
which took place between Stanford and Huntington in 1890 brought
out some additional evidence of the same sort. This dispute arose
ostensibly because of the election of Stanford in 1883-84 as senator
from California in place of A. A. Sargent, one of Huntington’s friends.
In reality it was probably only the final outcome of a growing tension
between the two men, due to dissatisfaction on Huntington’s part with
the small amount of time which Stanford devoted to railroad affairs,
and perhaps to jealousy of the prominence which Stanford enjoyed in
public estimation.[333]
However this may be, Stanford resigned the presidency of the Southern
Pacific Company at the annual meeting of the stockholders on April 9,
1890, and Huntington was elected in his place. In his address to the
board of directors of the company, Huntington used the following words:
Gentlemen, for the honor that you have done me in electing me
President of the Southern Pacific Company ... I promise you that I
will be as true to the interest of the company in the future as I have
been in the past. I can promise you nothing more, for at all times my
personal interest has been second to that of the company. It shall be
so in the future, and in no case will I use this great corporation to
advance my personal ambition at the expense of its owners, or put my
hands into the treasury to defeat the people’s choice, and thereby put
myself into positions that should be filled by others; but to the best
of my ability will I work for the interest of the shareholders of the
company and the people, whom it should serve.[334]
This statement attracted attention, and Huntingdon was asked to
explain. In an interview with a reporter of the _San Francisco
Examiner_ he said further:
From this time on we are going to follow one business. We are railroad
men and intend to conduct a legitimate railroad business. To do that
successfully politics must be let alone.... If a man wants to make
a business of politics, all well and good; if he wants to manage a
railroad, all well and good; but he can’t do both at the same time.
I have seen the ante-rooms down here in this building full of men
trying to learn or get something out of politics. Why should they come
here? This is no place for them. But then they were not to blame.
The tip went forth that political work was being done at Fourth and
Townsend streets, and they merely followed the tip. Well, there won’t
be any more tips sent out of these railroad offices. Politics have
worked enough demoralization in our company already, and they have
gone out of the door never to return....
Things have got to such a state, that if a man wants to be a constable
he thinks he has first got to come down to Fourth and Townsend streets
to get permission. Hereafter people who come to Fourth and Townsend
streets must have railroad business to transact. The Southern Pacific
Company is out of politics, and will attend to its business like any
other private company or individual should do.[335]
Such statements naturally led to an open breach between Huntingdon and
Stanford.[336]
The point at issue was not, however, whether it was proper for the
Southern Pacific to defend itself against political attack. On this
there is every reason to suppose that all parties were agreed. It was
rather whether the company should be used as an instrument to advance
the personal interests of individuals. In the same connection the
question arose whether railroad men should act together in political
matters not connected with railroad affairs. Huntington, who had
little interest in general politics, thought they should not. It is
probable enough that Stanford or some of his subordinates had, on the
other hand, used their influence as railroad men for personal and party
ends.
Unscrupulousness of Associates
One rises from the study of the political activities of the owners of
the Central Pacific with a feeling of indignation at the selfishness
of these men, their indifference to all save considerations of private
gain, and their readiness to use any and all methods which would
advance their financial interests. The associates met the proposal of
government regulation as a threat to rob them of their property and
resisted it as they would have opposed any other attack. They never
conceded that any question of public interest was involved which it was
necessary for them to respect. They frankly defended the use of money
as a method of persuading men to do what was right—which inevitably
meant, of course, what in their judgment was right. They fell out among
themselves, not because any one of them questioned the philosophy which
inspired their opposition to public control, but because one of them
was suspected of using power, developed in the course of the defense of
railroad interests, to advance personal ambitions which ran counter to
the views of his associates. These things should be plainly stated and
their force clearly understood.
It is the writer’s opinion, however, that the amount of money spent
by the Central Pacific in the purchase of legislative or other votes
has probably been overestimated in the public mind. Direct bribery
is a clumsy weapon and one difficult to conceal if practiced on any
considerable scale. It was probably also unnecessary to a corporation
such as the Central Pacific with other favors to bestow. Members of
Congress might, indeed, be employed by the railroad when legislation
was pending. Huntington maintained that this was legitimate,[337] and
Gage once admitted that the company had to employ everybody who could
pull a pound. The practice was more easily defensible than bribery, and
could be applied to a better class of men. Other men might be reached
through patronage, still others through discrimination in rates or
through preferences. The suggestion that unfavorable legislation would
hinder construction was potent with legislators from districts which
still lacked rail connection. Yet Huntington once said of a man who
was opposing him and whom he thought he could bribe, that his better
judgment told him the associates could not afford to take the scamp
into camp,[338] and this probably represented the situation at most
times. Whether this worked for the eventual salvation of the Huntington
group, is for the moralist to say.