After their disaster at Trenton, the English forces suspended
hostilities for a long time. Paine, maintaining his place on General
Greene's staff, complied with the wish of all the generals by wielding
his pen during the truce of arms. He sat himself down in Philadelphia,
"Second Street, opposite the Quaker meeting,"--as he writes the
address. The Quakers regarded him as Antichrist pursuing them into
close quarters. Untaught by castigation, the leaders of the Society,
and chiefly one John Pemberton, disguised allies of the Howes, had put
forth, November 20, 1776, a second and more dangerous "testimony." In
it they counsel Friends to refuse obedience to whatever "instructions or
ordinances" may be published, not warranted by "that happy constitution
under which they and others long enjoyed tranquillity and peace." In his
second _Crisis_ (January 13, 1777) Paine refers to this document, and
a memorial, from "a meeting of a reputable number of the inhabitants of
the city of Philadelphia," called attention of the Board of Safety to
its treasonable character. The Board, however, not having acted, Paine
devoted his next three months to a treatment of that and all other moral
and political problems which had been developed by the course of the
Revolution, and must be practically dealt with. In reading this third
_Crisis_, one feels in every sentence its writer's increased sense of
responsibility. Events had given him the seat of a lawgiver. His first
pamphlet had dictated the Declaration of Independence, his second
had largely won its first victory, his third had demonstrated the
impossibility of subjugation, and offered England peace on the only
possible terms. The American heart had responded without a dissonant
note; he held it in his hand; he knew that what he was writing in that
room "opposite the Quaker meeting" were Acts of Congress. So it proved.
The third _Crisis_ was dated April 19, 1777, the second anniversary of
the first collision (Lexington). It was as effective in dealing with the
internal enemies of the country as the first had been in checking
its avowed foes. It was written in a city still largely, if not
preponderantly, "tory," and he deals with them in all their varieties,
not arraigning the Friends as a Society. Having carefully shown that
independence, from being a natural right, had become a political and
moral necessity, and the war one "on which a world is staked," he says
that "Tories" endeavoring to insure their property with the enemy should
be made to fear still more losing it on the other side. Paine proposes
an "oath or affirmation" renouncing allegiance to the King, pledging
support to the United States. At the same time let a tax of ten,
fifteen, or twenty per cent be levied on all property. Each who takes
the oath may exempt his property by holding himself ready to do what
service he can for the cause; they who refuse the oath will be paying a
tax on their insurance with the enemy. "It would not only be good policy
but strict justice to raise fifty or one hundred thousand pounds, or
more, if it is necessary, out of the estates and property of the King
of England's votaries, resident in Philadelphia, to be distributed as
a reward to those inhabitants of the city and State who should turn out
and repulse the enemy should they attempt to march this way."
These words were written at a moment when a vigorous opposition, in and
out of Congress, was offered to Washington's Proclamation (Morris-town,
January 25, 1777,) demanding that an oath of allegiance to the United
States should be required of all who had taken such an oath to the King,
non-jurors to remove within the enemy's lines, or be treated as enemies.
Paine's proposal was partly followed on June 13th, when Pennsylvania
exacted an oath of allegiance to the State from all over eighteen years
of age.
Paine was really the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. His election had
not been without opposition, and, according to John Adams, there was
a suggestion that some of his earlier writings had been unfavorable to
this country. What the reference was I cannot understand unless it
was to his anti-slavery essay, in which he asked Americans with what
consistency they could protest against being enslaved while they were
enslaving others. That essay, I have long believed, caused a secret,
silent, hostility to the author by which he suffered much without
suspecting it. But he was an indefatigable secretary. An example of the
care with which foreign representatives were kept informed appears in a
letter to William Bingham, agent of Congress at Martinique.
"Philadelphia, July 16th, 1777.--Sir,--A very sudden opportunity
offers of sending you the News-papers, from which you will collect the
situation of our Affairs. The Enemy finding their attempt of marching
thro' the Jersies to this City impracticable, have retreated to Staten
Island seemingly discontented and dispirited and quite at a loss what
step next to pursue. Our Army is now well recruited and formidable. Our
Militia in the several States ready at a day's notice to turn out and
support the Army when occasion requires; and tho' we cannot, in the
course of a Campaign, expect everything in the several Parts of the
Continent, to go just as we wish it; yet the general face of our Affairs
assures us of final success.
"In the Papers of June 18th & 25 and July 2d you will find Genl.
Washington and Arnold's Letters of the Enemy's movement in, and retreat
from the Jersies. We are under some apprehensions for Ticonderoga, as
we find the Enemy are unexpectedly come into that Quarter. The Congress
have several times had it in contemplation to remove the Garrison from
that Place--as by Experience we find that Men shut up in Forts are not
of so much use as in the field, especially in the highlands where every
hill is a natural fortification.
"I am Sir
"Your Obt. Humble Servt.
"Thomas Paine.
"Secretry to the Committee for Foreign Affairs."'
* MS., for which I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, Philadelphia.
After the occupation of Philadelphia by the British (September 26,
1777), Paine had many adventures, as we shall presently see. He seems to
have been with Washington at Valley Forge when the Pennsylvania Assembly
and President (Thomas Wharton, Jr.,) confided to him the delicate and
arduous task assigned by the following from Timothy Matlack, Secretary
of the Assembly:
"Lancaster, Oct. 10, 1777. Sir,--The Hon'ble house of As'y have proposed
and Council have adopted a plan of obtaining more regular and constant
intelligence of the proceeding of Gen. Washington's army than has
hitherto been had. Everyone agrees that you are the proper person for
this purpose, and I am directed by his Exc'y, the pr't, to write to you
hereon (the Prs't being engaged in writing to the Gen'l, and the Express
in waiting).
"The Assembly have agreed to make you a reasonable compensation for your
services in this business, if you think proper to engage in it, which I
hope you will; as it is a duty of importance that there are few, however
well disposed, who are capable of doing in a manner that will answer all
the intentions of it--perhaps a correspondence of this kind may be the
fairest opportunity of giving to Council some important hints that may
occur to you on interesting subjects.
"Proper expresses will be engaged in this business. If the expresses
which pass from headquarters to Congress can be made use of so much the
better;--of this you must be judge.
"I expect Mr. Rittenhouse will send you a copy of the testimony of the
late Y. M. by this opp'y, if time will admit it to be copied--'t is a
poor thing.--Yours, &c, T. M."*
* Pa. Arch., 1779, p. 659. Paine at once set to work: p.
693, 694.
What with this service, and his correspondence with foreign agents,
Paine had his hands pretty full. But at the same time he wrote important
letters to leading members of Congress, then in session at York,
Pennsylvania.
The subjoined letter sheds fresh light on a somewhat obscure point in
our revolutionary history,--the obscurity being due to the evasions of
American historians on an episode of which we have little reason to
be proud. An article of Burgoyne's capitulation (October 17th) was as
follows:
"A free passage to be granted to the army under General Burgoyne to
Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America
during the present contest: and the port of Boston to be assigned for
entry of transports to receive the troops whenever General Howe shall so
order."
A letter was written by Paine to Hon. Richard Henry Lee, dated at
"Headquarters, fourteen miles from Philadelphia," October 30th, 1777.
"I wrote you last Tuesday 21st Inst., including a Copy of the King's
speech, since which nothing material has happened at Camp. Genl.
McDougal was sent last Wednesday night 22d. to attack a Party of the
Enemy who lay over the Schuylkill at Grey's Ferry where they have a
Bridge. Genls. Greene & Sullivan went down to make a diversion below
German Town at the same Time. I was with this last Party, but as the
Enemy withdrew their Detachment We had only our Labor for our Pains.
"No Particulars of the Northern Affair have yet come to head Qrs.,
the want of which has caused much Speculation. A copy, said to be the
Articles of Capitulation was recd. 3 or 4 days ago, but they rather
appear to be some proposals made by Burgoyne, than the Capitulation
itself. By those Articles it appears to me that Burgoyne has capitulated
upon Terms, which we have a right to doubt the full performance of,
Vizt., 'That the Offrs. and Men shall be Transported to England and not
serve in or against North America during the present War'--or words to
this effect.
"I remark, that this Capitulation, if true, has the air of a National
treaty; it is binding, not only on Burgoyne as a General, but on England
as a Nation; because the Troops are to be subject to the conditions of
the Treaty after they return to England and are out of his Command. It
regards England and America as Separate Sovereign States, and puts them
on an equal footing by staking the faith and honor of the former for the
performance of a Contract entered into with the latter.
"What in the Capitulation is stiled the '_Present War_' England affects
to call a '_Rebellion_,' and while she holds this Idea and denies
any knowledge of America as a Separate Sovereign Power, she will not
conceive herself bound by any Capitulation or Treaty entered into by
her Generals which is to bind her as a _Nation_, and more especially
in those Cases where both Pride and present Advantage tempt her to a
Violation. She will deny Burgoyne's Right and Authority for making such
a Treaty, and will, very possibly, show her insult by first censuring
him for entering into it, and then immediately sending the Troops back.
"I think we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we trust her with the
power of abusing our Credulity. We have no authority for believing she
will perform that part of the Contract which subjects her not to send
the Troops to America during the War. The insolent Answer given to
the Commissrs. by Ld. Stormont, '_that the King's Ambassadors reed, no
Letters from Rebels but when they came to crave Mercy?_ sufficiently
instructs us not to entrust them with the power of insulting Treaties of
Capitulation.
"Query, Whether it wd. not be proper to detain the Troops at Boston &
direct the Commissioners at Paris to present the Treaty of Capitulation
to the English Court thro' the hands of Ld. Stormont, to know whether it
be the intention of that Court to abide strictly by the Conditions and
Obligations thereof, and if no assurance be obtained to keep the Troops
until they can be exchanged here.
"Tho' we have no immediate knowledge of any alliance formed by our
Commissioners with France or Spain, yet we have no assurance there is
not, and our immediate release of those prisoners, by sending them to
England, may operate to the injury of such Allied Powers, and be perhaps
directly contrary to some contract subsisting between us and them prior
to the Capitulation. I think we ought to know this first.--Query, ought
we not (knowing the infidelity they have already acted) to suspect they
will evade the Treaty by putting back into New York under pretence of
distress.--I would not trust them an inch farther than I could see them
in the present state of things.
"The Army was to have marched yesterday about 2 or 3 Miles but the
weather has been so exceedingly bad for three days past as to prevent
any kind of movement, the waters are so much out and the rivulets so
high there is no passing from one part of ye Camp to another.
"I wish the Northern Army was down here. I am apt to think that nothing
materially offensive will take place on our part at present. Some
Means must be taken to fill up the Army this winter. I look upon the
recruiting service at an end and that some other plan must be adopted.
Suppose the Service be by draft--and that those who are not drawn
should contribute a Dollar or two Dollars a Man to him on whom the lot
falls.--something of this kind would proportion the Burthen, and those
who are drawn would have something either to encourage them to go, or to
provide a substitute with--After closing this Letter I shall go again to
Fort Mifflin; all was safe there on the 27th, but from some preparations
of the Enemy they expect another attack somewhere.
"The enclosed return of provision and Stores is taken from an account
signed by Burgoyne and sent to Ld. George Germain. I have not time to
Copy the whole. Burgoyne closes his Letter as follows, 'By a written
account found in the Commissary's House at Ticonderoga Six thousand
odd hundred Persons were fed from the Magazine the day before the
evacuation.'
"I am Dear Sir, Yr. Affectionate Hble. Servt.
"T. Paine. "Respectful Compts. to Friends.
"If the Congress has the Capitulation and Particulars of ye Surrender,
they do an exceeding wrong thing by not publishing ym. because they
subject the whole Affair to Suspicion."'
* I am indebted for this letter to Dr. John S. H. Fogg of
Boston. It bears the superscription: "Honbl. Richd. Henry
Lee Esq. (in Congress) York Town. Forwarded by yr humble
Servt. T. Matlack, Nov. 1, 1777." Endorsed in handwriting of
Lee: "Oct: 1777. Mr. Paine, Author of 'Common Sense.'"
Had this proposal of Paine, with regard to Bur-goyne's capitulation,
been followed at once, a blot on the history of our Revolution might
have been prevented. The time required to march the prisoners to Boston
and prepare the transports would have given England opportunity to
ratify the articles of capitulation. Washington, with characteristic
inability to see injustice in anything advantageous to America, desired
Congress to delay in every possible way the return of the prisoners to
England, "since the most virtuous adhesion to the articles would not
prevent their replacing in garrison an equal number of soldiers who
might be sent against us." The troops were therefore delayed on one
pretext and another until Burgoyne declared that "the publick faith is
broke." Congress seized on this remark to resolve that the embarkation
should be suspended until an "explicit ratification of the Convention of
Saratoga shall be properly ratified by the Court of Great Britain." This
resolution, passed January 8, 1778, was not communicated to Burgoyne
until February 4th. If any one should have suffered because of a remark
made in a moment of irritation it should have been Burgoyne himself; but
he was presently allowed to proceed to England, while his troops were
retained,--a confession that Burgoyne's casual complaint was a mere
pretext for further delay. It may be added that the English government
behaved to its surrendered soldiers worse than Congress. The question of
ratifying the Saratoga Convention was involved in a partisan conflict in
Parliament, the suffering prisoners in America were forgotten, and they
were not released until the peace,--five years after they had marched
"with the honours of war," under a pledge of departure conceded by Gen.
Gates in reply to a declaration that unless conceded they would "to a
man proceed to any act of desperation sooner than submit."
Concerning this ugly business there is a significant silence in Paine's
public writings. He would not have failed to discuss the matter in his
_Crisis_ had he felt that anything honorable to the American name or
cause could be made out of it.*
* Professor Fiske ("Am. Revolution," i., p. 341) has a
ferocious attack on Congress for breaking faith in this
matter, but no doubt he has by this time read, in Ford's
"Writings of Washington," (vol. vi.) the letters which bring
his attack on the great commander's own haloed head.
In his letter to Hon. R. H. Lee (October 30, 1777) Paine mentions
that he is about leaving the head-quarters near Philadelphia for Fort
Mifflin. Mr. Asa Bird Gardener, of New York, who has closely studied
Paine's military career, writes me some account of it.
"Major-Gen. Greene was charged with the defence of the Delaware, and
part of Brig.-Gen. Varnum's brigade was placed in garrison at Fort
Mercer, Red Bank, and at Fort Mifflin, Mud Island. A bloody and
unsuccessful assault was made by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians on Fort
Mercer, defended by the 1 st and 2d Reg'ts. R. I. Continental Inf'y. The
entire British fleet was then brought up opposite Fort Mifflin, and
the most furious cannonade, and most desperate but finally unsuccessful
defence of the place was made. The entire works were demolished, and
most of the garrison killed and wounded. Major-Gen. Greene being anxious
for the garrison and desirous of knowing its ability to resist sent Mr.
Paine to ascertain. He accordingly went to Fort Mercer, and from thence,
on Nov. 9 (1777) went with Col. Christopher Greene, commanding Fort
Mercer, in an open boat to Fort Mifflin, during the cannonade, and were
there when the enemy opened with two-gun batteries and a mortar battery.
This _very_ gallant act shows what a fearless man Mr. Paine was, and
entitles him to the same credit for service in the Revolution as any
Continental could claim."
{1778}
The succession of mistakes, surprises, panics, which occasioned the
defeats before Philadelphia and ended in the occupation of that city by
the British general, seriously affected the reputation of Washington.
Though Paine believed that Washington's generalship had been at fault
(as Washington himself probably did*), he could utter nothing that
might injure the great cause. He mistrusted the singleness of purpose
of Washington's opponents, and knew that the commander-in-chief was as
devoted as himself to the American cause, and would never surrender it
whatever should befall. While, therefore, the intrigues were going on at
Yorktown, Pennsylvania, whither Congress had retreated, and Washington
with his ill-fed and ill-clad army were suffering at Valley Forge, Paine
was writing his fifth _Crisis_, which had the most happy effect. It was
dated at Lancaster, March 121, 1778. Before that time (February 19th)
General Gates had made his peace with Washington, and the intrigue
was breaking up, but gloom and dissatisfaction remained. The contrast
between the luxurious "Tories" surrounding Howe in Philadelphia, and
Washington's wretched five thousand at Valley Forge, was demoralizing
the country. The first part of this _Crisis_, addressed "to General
Sir William Howe," pointed wrangling patriots to the common enemy; the
second, addressed "to the inhabitants of America," sounded a note of
courage, and gave good reasons for it. Never was aid more artistic
than that Paine's pen now gave Washington. The allusions to him are
incidental, there is no accent of advocacy. While mentioning "the
unabated fortitude of a Washington," he lays a laurel on the brow of
Gates, on that of Herkimer, and even on the defeated. While belittling
all that Howe had gained, telling him that in reaching Philadelphia, he
"mistook a trap for a conquest," he reunites Washington and Gates, in
the public mind, by showing the manoeuvres of the one near Philadelphia
part of the other's victory at Saratoga. It is easy for modern eulogists
of Washington to see this, but when Paine said it,--apparently aiming
only to humiliate Howe,--the sentence was a sunbeam parting a black
cloud. Coming from a member of Greene's staff, from an author whose
daring at Fort Mifflin had made him doubly a hero; from the military
correspondent of the Pennsylvania Council, and the Secretary of the
Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs,--Paine's optimistic view of
the situation had immense effect. He hints his official knowledge that
Britain's "reduced strength and exhausted coffers in a three years' war
with America hath given a powerful superiority to France and Spain,"
and advises Americans to leave wrangling to the enemy. "We never had
so small an army to fight against, nor so fair an opportunity of final
success as _now_."
* See his letter to the President of Congress. Ford's,
"Writings of Washington," vol. vi., p. 82.
This fifth _Crisis_ was written mainly at Lancaster, Pa., at the house
of William Henry, Jr., where he several times found shelter while
dividing his time between Washington's head-quarters and York.* Every
number of the _Crisis_ was thus written with full information from
both the military and political leaders. This _Crisis_ was finished and
printed at York, and there Paine begins No. VI. The "stone house on the
banks of the Cadorus," at York, is still pointed out by a trustworthy
tradition as that to which he bore the chest of congressional papers
with which he had fled to Trenton, when Howe entered Philadelphia.** It
is a pleasant abode in a picturesque country, and no doubt Paine would
have been glad to remain there in repose. But whoever slept on his watch
during the Revolution Paine did not. The fifth _Crisis_ printed, he
goes to forward the crisis he will publish next. In April he is again
at Lancaster, and on the 11th writes thence to his friend Henry Laurens,
President of Congress.***
* This I learn by a note from Mr. Henry's descendant, John
W. Jordan. At this time Paine laid before Henry his scheme
for steam-navigation.
** The house is marked "B. by J. B. Cookis in the year
1761." It is probable that Congress deemed it prudent to
keep important documents a little way from the edifice in
the centre of the town where it met, a building which no
longer stands.
*** I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, of Philadelphia, for
this and several other letters of Paine to Laurens.
"Lancaster, April 11th, 1778. Sir,--I take the liberty of mentioning
an affair to you which I think deserves the attention of Congress. The
persons who came from Philadelphia some time ago with, or in company
with, a flag from the Enemy, and were taken up and committed to
Lancaster Jail for attempting to put off counterfeit Contl. money,
were yesterday brought to Tryal and are likely to escape by means of an
artful and partial Construction of an Act of this State for punishing
such offences. The Act makes it felony to counterfeit the money
_emitted_ by Congress, or to circulate such counterfeits knowing them to
be so. The offenders' Council explained the word 'emitted' to have
only a retrospect meaning by supplying the Idea of '_which have been_'
'emitted by Congress.' Therefore say they the Act cannot be applied
to any money emitted after the date of the Act. I believe the words
'emitted by Congress' means only, and should be understood, to
distinguish Continental Money from other Money, and not one Time from
another Time. It has, as I conceive, no referrence to any Particular
Time, but only to the particular authority which distinguishes Money
so emitted from Money emitted by the State. It is meant only as a
discription of the Money, and not of the Time of striking it, but
includes the Idea of all Time as inseparable from the Continuance of the
authority of Congress. But be this as it may; the offence is Continental
and the consequences of the same extent. I can have no Idea of any
particular State pardoning an offence against all, or even their letting
an offender slip legally who is accountable to all and every State alike
for his crime. The place where he commits it is the least circumstance
of it. It is a mere accident and has nothing or very little to do with
the crime itself. I write this hoping the Information will point out the
necessity of the Congress supporting their emissions by claiming every
offender in this line where the present deficiency of the Law or the
Partial Interpretation of it operates to the Injustice and Injury of the
whole Continent.
"I beg leave to trouble you with another hint. Congress I learn has
something to propose thro' the Commissrs. on the Cartel respecting the
admission and stability of the Continental Currency. As Forgery is a Sin
against all men alike, and reprobated by all civil nations, Query, would
it not be right to require of General Howe the Persons of Smithers and
others in Philadelphia suspected of this crime; and if He, or any other
Commander, continues to conceal or protect them in such practices, that,
in such case, the Congress will consider the crime as the Act of the
Commander-in-Chief. Howe affects not to know the Congress--he ought to
be made to know them; and the apprehension of Personal Consequences may
have some effect on his Conduct. I am, Dear Sir,
"Your obt. and humble Servt.,
"T. Paine.
"Since writing the foregoing the Prisoners have had their Tryal, the one
is acquitted and the other convicted only of a Fraud; for as the law now
stands, or rather as it is explained, the counterfeiting--or circulating
counterfeits--is only a fraud. I do not believe it was the intention of
the Act to make it so, and I think it misapplied Lenity in the Court
to suffer such an Explanation, because it has a tendency to invite and
encourage a Species of Treason, the most prejudicial to us of any or all
the other kinds. I am aware how very difficult it is to make a law
so very perfect at first as not to be subject to false or perplexed
conclusions. There never was but one Act (said a Member of the House
of Commons) which a man might not creep out of, _i. e._ the Act which
obliges a man to be buried in woollen. T. P."
The active author and secretary had remained in Philadelphia two days
after Howe had crossed the Schuylkill, namely, until September 21st.
The events of that time, and of the winter, are related in a letter to
Franklin, in Paris, which is of too much historical importance for any
part of it to be omitted. It is dated Yorktown, May 16, 1778.
"Your favor of Oct 7th did not come to me till March. I was at Camp when
Capt Folger, arrived with the Blank Packet The private Letters were,
I believe, all safe. Mr. Laurens forwarded yours to York Town where I
afterwards recd. it.
"The last winter has been rather barren of military events, but for your
amusement I send you a little history how I have passed away part of the
time.
"The 11th of Sepr. last I was preparing Dispatches for you when the
report of cannon at Brandywine interrupted my proceeding. The event of
that day you have doubtless been informed of, which, excepting the
Enemy keeping the ground, may be deemed a drawn battle. Genl. Washington
collected his Army at Chester, and the Enemy's not moving towards him
next day must be attributed to the disability they sustained and the
burthen of their wounded. On the 16th of the same month, the two Armies
were drawn up in order of battle near the White horse on the Lancaster
road, when a most violent and incessant storm of rain prevented an
action. Our Army sustained a heavy loss in their Ammunition, the
Cartouch Boxes, especially as they were not of the most seasoned
leather, being no proof agst. the almost incredible fury of the weather,
which obliged Genl. Washn. to draw his Army up into the country till
those injuries could be repaired, and a new supply of ammunition
procured. The Enemy in the mean time kept on the West Side of
Schuylkill. On Fryday the 19th about one in the morning the first alarm
of their crossing was given, and the confusion, as you may suppose, was
very great. It was a beautiful still moonlight morning and the streets
as full of men women and children as on a market day. On the eveng.
before I was fully persuaded that unless something was done the City
would be lost; and under that anxiety I went to Col. Bayard, speaker of
the house of Assembly, and represented, as I very particularly knew
it, the situation we were in, and the probability of saving the City if
proper efforts were made for that purpose. I reasoned thus--Genl. Washn.
was about 30 Miles up the Schuylkill with an Army properly collected
waiting for Ammunition, besides which, a reinforcement of 1500 men were
marching from the North River to join him; and if only an appearance
of defence be made in the City by throwing up works at the heads
of streets, it will make the Enemy very suspicious how they throw
themselves between the City and Genl. Washington, and between two
Rivers, which must have been the case; for notwithstanding the knowledge
which military gentlemen are supposed to have, I observe they move
exceedingly cautiously on new ground, are exceedingly suspicious of
Villages and Towns, and more perplexed at seemingly little things which
they cannot clearly understand than at great ones which they are fully
acquainted with. And I think it very probable that Genl. Howe would
have mistaken our necessity for a deep laid scheme and not have ventured
himself in the middle of it But admitting that he had, he must either
have brought his whole Army down, or a part of it. If the whole. Gen. W.
would have followed him, perhaps the same day, in two or three days at
most, and our assistance in the City would have been material. If only
a part of it, we should have been a match for them, and Gen. W. superior
to those which remained above. The chief thing was, whether the cityzens
would turn out to defend the City. My proposal to Cols. Bayard and
Bradford was to call them together the next morning, make them fully
acquainted with the situation and the means and prospect of preserving
themselves, and that the City had better voluntarily assess itself
50,000 for its defence than suffer an Enemy to come into it. Cols.
Bayard and Bradford were in my opinion, and as Genl. Mifflin was then in
town, I next went to him, acquainted him with our design, and mentioned
likewise that if two or three thousand men could be mustered up whether
we might depend on him to command them, for without some one to lead,
nothing could be done. He declined that part, not being then very well,
but promised what assistance he could.--A few hours after this the alarm
happened. I went directly to Genl. Mifflin but he had sett off, and
nothing was done. I cannot help being of opinion that the City might
have been saved, but perhaps it is better otherwise.
"I staid in the City till Sunday [Sep. 21st], having sent my Chest and
everything belonging to the foreign Committee to Trenton in a Shallop.
The Enemy did not cross the river till the Wednesday following. Hearing
on the Sunday that Genl. Washn. had moved to Swederford I set off for
that place but learning on the road that it was a mistake and that he
was six or seven miles above that place, I crossed over to South-field
and the next Morning to Trenton, to see after my Chest On the Wednesday
Morning I intended returning to Philadelphia, but was informed at
Bristol of the Enemy's crossing the Schuylkill. At this place I met Col.
Kirkbride of Pennsburg Manor, who invited me home with him. On Fryday
the 26th a Party of the Enemy about 1500 took possession of the City,
and the same day an account arrived that Col. Brown had taken 300 of
the Enemy at the old french lines at Ticonderoga and destroyed all their
Water Craft, being about 200 boats of different kinds.
"On the 29th Sept I sett off for Camp without well knowing where to
find it, every day occasioning some movement I kept pretty high up the
country, and being unwilling to ask questions, not knowing what company
I might be in, I was three days before I fell in with it The Army had
moved about three miles lower down that morning. The next day they made
a movement about the same distance, to the 21 Mile Stone on the Skippach
Road--Head Quarters at John Wince's. On the 3d Octr. in the morning they
began to fortify the Camp, as a deception; and about 9 at Night marched
for German Town. The Number of Continental Troops was between 8 and
9000, besides Militia, the rest remaining as Guards for the security of
Camp. Genl. Greene, whose Quarters I was at, desired me to remain
there till Morning. I set off for German Town about 5 next morning.
The Skirmishing with the Pickets began soon after. I met no person for
several miles riding, which I concluded to be a good sign; after this I
met a man on horseback who told me he was going to hasten on a supply
of ammunition, that the Enemy were broken and retreating fast, which
was true. I saw several country people with arms in their hands running
cross a field towards German Town, within about five or six miles, at
which I met several of the wounded on waggons, horseback, and on foot.
I passed Genl. Nash on a litter made of poles, but did not know him.
I felt unwilling to ask questions lest the information should not
be agreeable, and kept on. About two miles after this I passed a
promiscuous crowd of wounded and otherwise who were halted at a house to
refresh. Col: Biddle D.Q.N.G. was among them, who called after me, that
if I went farther on that road I should be taken, for that the firing
which I heard ahead was the Enemy's. I never could, and cannot now
learn, and I believe no man can inform truly the cause of that day's
miscarriage.
"The retreat was as extraordinary. Nobody hurried themselves. Every one
marched his own pace. The Enemy kept a civil distance behind, sending
every now and then a Shot after us, and receiving the same from us. That
part of the Army which I was with collected and formed on the Hill on
the side of the road near White Marsh Church; the Enemy came within
three quarters of a mile and halted. The orders on Retreat were to
assemble that night on the back of Perki-ominy Creek, about 7 miles
above Camp, which had orders to move. The Army had marched the preceding
night 14 miles and having full 20 to march back were exceedingly
fatigued. They appeared to me to be only sensible of a disappointment,
not a defeat, and to be more displeased at their retreating from German
Town, than anxious to get to their rendezvous. I was so lucky that night
to get to a little house about 4 miles wide of Perkiominy, towards which
place in the morning I heard a considerable firing, which distressed me
exceedingly, knowing that our army was much harassed and not collected.
However, I soon relieved myself by going to see. They were discharging
their pieces, wch. tho' necessary, prevented several Parties going till
next day. I breakfasted next morning at Genl. W. Quarters, who was at
the same loss with every other to account for the accidents of the day.
I remember his expressing his Surprise, by saying, that at the time he
supposed every thing secure, and was about giving orders for the Army
to proceed down to Philadelphia; that he most unexpectedly saw a Part (I
think of the Artillery) hastily retreating. This partial Retreat was,
I believe, misunderstood, and soon followed by others. The fog was
frequently very thick, the Troops young and unused to breaking and
rallying, and our men rendered suspicious to each other, many of them
being in Red. A new Army once disordered is difficult to manage, the
attempt dangerous. To this may be added a prudence in not putting
matters to too hazardous a tryal the first time. Men must be taught
regular fighting by practice and degrees, and tho' the expedition
failed, it had this good effect--that they seemed to feel themselves
more important after it than before, as it was the first general attack
they had ever made.
"I have not related the affair at Mr Chew's house German Town, as I was
not there, but have seen it since. It certainly afforded the Enemy time
to rally--yet the matter was difficult. To have pressed on and left
500 Men in ye rear, might by a change of circumstances been ruinous. To
attack them was loss of time, as the house is a strong stone building,
proof against any 12 pounder. Genl. Washington sent a flag, thinking it
would procure their surrender and expedite his march to Philadelphia; it
was refused, and circumstances changed almost directly after.
"I staid in Camp two days after the Germantown action, and lest any ill
impression should get among the Garrisons at Mud Island and Red Bank,
and the Vessels and Gallies stationed there, I crossed over to the
Jersies at Trenton and went down to those places. I laid the first night
on board the Champion Continental Galley, who was stationed off the
mouth of Schuylkill. The Enemy threw up a two Gun Battery on the point
of the river's mouth opposite the Pest House. The next morning was a
thick fog, and as soon as it cleared away, and we became visible to each
other, they opened on the Galley, who returned the fire. The Commodore
made a signal to bring the Galley under the Jersey shore, as she was
not a match for the Battery, nor the Battery a sufficient Object for the
Galley. One Shot went thro' the fore sail, wch. was all. At noon I went
with Col. [Christopher] Greene, who commanded at Red Bank, over to fort
Mifflin (Mud Island). The Enemy opened that day 2 two-gun Batteries, and
a Mortar Battery, on the fort. They threw about 30 Shells into it that
afternoon, without doing any damage; the ground being damp and spongy,
not above five or six burst; not a man was killed or wounded. I came
away in the evening, laid on board the Galley, and the next day came to
Col. Kirkbride's [Borden-town N. J.]; staid a few days, and came again
to Camp. An Expedition was on foot the evening I got there in which I
went as Aid de Camp to Genl. Greene, having a Volunteer Commission for
that purpose. The Occasion was--a Party of the Enemy, about 1500, lay
over the Schuylkill at Grey's ferry. Genl. McDougall with his Division
was sent to attack them; and Sullivan & Greene with their Divisions were
to favor the enterprise by a feint on the City, down the German-town
road. They set off about nine at night, and halted at day break, between
German Town and the City, the advanced Party at the three Miles Run. As
I knew the ground I went with two light horse to discover the Enemy's
Picket, but the dress of the light horse being white made them, I
thought, too visible, as it was then twilight; on which I left them
with my horse, and went on foot, till I distinctly saw the Picket at
Mr. Dickerson's place,--which is the nearest I have been to Philadelphia
since Sepr., except once at Coopers ferry, as I went to the forts. Genl.
Sullivan was at Dr. Redman's house, and McDougall's beginning the attack
was to be the Signal for moving down to the City. But the Enemy either
on the approach of McDougall, or on information of it, called in their
Party, and the Expedition was frustrated.
"A Cannonade, by far the most furious I ever heard, began down the
river, soon after daylight, the first Gun of which we supposed to be
the Signal; but was soon undeceived, there being no small Arms. After
waiting two hours beyond the time, we marched back, the cannon was then
less frequent; but on the road between German town and White marsh we
were stuned with a report as loud as a peal from a hundred Cannon at
once; and turning round I saw a thick smoke rising like a pillar, and
spreading from the top like a tree. This was the blowing up of the
Augusta. I did not hear the explosion of the Berlin.
"After this I returned to Col. Kirkbride's where I staid about a
fortnight, and set off again to Camp. The day after I got there Genls.
Greene, Wayne, and Cadwallader, with a Party of light horse, were
ordered on a reconnoitering Party towards the forts. We were out
four days and nights without meeting with any thing material. An East
Indiaman, whom the Enemy had cut down so as to draw but little water,
came up, without guns, while we were on foot on Carpenter's Island,
going to Province Island. Her Guns were brought up in the evening in a
flat, she got in the rear of the Fort, where few or no Guns could bear
upon her, and the next morning, played on it incessantly. The night
following the fort was evacuated. The obstruction the Enemy met with
from those forts, and the _Chevaux de frise_ was extraordinary, and had
it not been that the Western Channel, deepened by the current, being
somewhat obstructed by the _Chevaux de frise_ in the main river, which
enabled them to bring up the light Indiaman Battery, it is a doubt
whether they would have succeeded at last. By that assistance they
reduced the fort, and got sufficient command of the river to move some
of the late sunk _Chevaux de frise_. Soon after this the fort on Red
Bank, (which had bravely repulsed the Enemy a little time before) was
avacuated, the Gallies ordered up to Bristol, and the Capts. of such
other armed Vessels as thought they could not pass on the Eastward side
of Wind mill Island, very precipitately set them on fire. As I judged
from this event that the Enemy would winter in Philadelphia, I began to
think of preparing for York Town, which however I was willing to delay,
hoping that the ice would afford opportunity for new Manoeuvres. But the
season passed very barrenly away. I staid at Col. Kirkbride's till the
latter end of Janay. Commodore Haslewood, who commanded the remains of
the fleet at Trenton, acquainted me with a scheme of his for burning the
Enemy's Shipping, which was by sending a charged boat across the river
from Cooper's ferry, by means of a Rocket fixt in its stern. Considering
the width of the river, the tide, and the variety of accidents
that might change its direction, I thought the project trifling and
insufficient; and proposed to him, that if he would get a boat properly
choyed, and take a Batteau in tow, sufficient to bring three or four
persons off, that I would make one with him and two other persons who
might be relied on to go down on that business. One of the Company,
Capn. Blewer of Philadelphia, seconded the proposal, but the Commodore,
and, what I was more surprized at, Col. Bradford, declined it. The
burning of part of the Delaware fleet, the precipitate retreat of the
rest, the little service rendered by them and the great expence they
were at, make the only national blot in the proceedings of the last
Campaign. I felt a strong anxiety for them to recover their credit,
wch., among others, was one motive for my proposal. After this I came to
camp, and from thence to York Town, and published the _Crisis_ No. 5, To
Genl. Howe. I have began No. 6, which I intend to address to Ld. North.
"I was not at Camp when Genl. Howe marched out on the 20th of Deer,
towards White marsh. It was a most contemptible affair, the threatenings
and seeming fury he sate out with, and haste and Terror the Army
retreated with, make it laughable. I have seen several persons from
Philadelphia who assure me that their coming back was a mere uproar, and
plainly indicated their apprehensions of a pursuit. Genl. Howe, in
his Letter to Ld. Go. Germain, dated Dec. 13th, represented Genl.
Washington's Camp as a strongly fortified place. There was not, Sir, a
work thrown up in it till Genl. Howe marched out, and then only here and
there a breast work. It was a temporary Station. Besides which, our men
begin to think Works in the field of little use.
"Genl. Washington keeps his Station at the Valley forge. I was there
when the Army first began to build huts; they appeared to me like a
family of Beavers; every one busy; some carrying Logs, others Mud, and
the rest fastening them together. The whole was raised in a few days,
and is a curious collection of buildings in the true rustic order.
"As to Politics, I think we are now safely landed. The apprehension
which Britain must be under from her neighbours must effectually prevent
her sending reinforcements, could she procure them. She dare not, I
think, in the present situation of affairs trust her troops so far from
home.
"No Commissrs. are yet arrived. I think fighting is nearly over, for
Britain, mad, wicked, and foolish, has done her utmost. The only part
for her now to act is frugality, and the only way for her to get out
of debt is to lessen her Government expenses. Two Millions a year is a
sufficient allowance, and as much as she ought to expend exclusive of
the interest of her Debt. The Affairs of England are approaching either
to ruin or redemption. If the latter, she may bless the resistance of
America.
"For my own part, I thought it very hard to have the Country set on fire
about my Ears almost the moment I got into it; and among other pleasures
I feel in having uniformly done my duty, I feel that of not having
discredited your friendship and patronage.
"I live in hopes of seeing and advising with you respecting the History
of the American Revolution, as soon as a turn of Affairs make it safe
for me to take a passage to Europe. Please to accept my thanks for the
Pamphlets, which Mr. Temple Franklin informs me he has sent. They are
not yet come to hand. Mr. & Mrs. Bache are at Mainheim, near Lancaster;
I heard they were well a few days ago. I laid two nights at Mr.
Duffield's, in the winter. Miss Nancy Clifton was there, who said the
Enemy had destroyed or sold a great quantity of your furniture. Mr.
Duffield has since been taken by them and carried into the City, but is
now at his own house. I just now hear they have burnt Col. Kirk-bride's,
Mr. Borden's, and some other houses at Borden Town. Governor Johnstone
(House of Commons) has wrote to Mr. Robt. Morriss informing him
of Commissioners coming from England. The letter is printed in the
Newspapers without signature, and is dated Febry. 5th, by which you will
know it.*
* The arrival of the Commissioners caused Paine to address
his _Crisis VI_. to them instead of to Lord North, as he
tells Franklin is his intention. The above letter was no
doubt written in the old stone house at York.
"Please, Sir, to accept this, rough and incorrect as it is, as I have
[not] time to copy it fair, which was my design when I began it; besides
which, paper is most exceedingly scarce.
"I am, Dear Sir, your Obliged and Affectionate humble Servt,
"T. Paine.
"The Honble. Benj. Franklin, Esqr."
Paine's prophecy at the close of his fifth _Crisis_ (March, 1778), that
England, reduced by her war with America, was in peril from France, was
speedily confirmed. The treaty between France and America (February 6th)
was followed by a war-cloud in Europe, which made the Americans sanguine
that their own struggle was approaching an end. It was generally
expected that Philadelphia would be evacuated. On this subject Paine
wrote the following letter to Washington:
"York Town, June 5th, 1778.--Sir,--As a general opinion prevails that
the Enemy will quit Philadelphia, I take the Liberty of transmitting
you my reasons why it is probable they will not. In your difficult and
distinguished Situation every hint may be useful.
"I put the immediate cause of their evacuation, to be a declaration of
War in Europe made by them or against them: in which case, their Army
would be wanted for other Service, and likewise because their present
situation would be too unsafe, being subject to be blocked up by France
and attacked by you and her jointly.
"Britain will avoid a War with France if she can; which according to my
arrangement of Politics she may easily do--She must see the necessity of
acknowledging, sometime or other, the Independance of America; if she is
wise enough to make that acknowledgment now, she of consequence admits
the Right of France to the quiet enjoyment of her Treaty, and therefore
no War can take place upon the Ground of having concluded a Treaty with
revolted British Subjects.
"This being admitted, their apprehension of being doubly attacked, or
of being wanted elsewhere, cease of consequence; and they will then
endeavor to hold all they can, that they may have something to restore,
in lieu of something else which they will demand; as I know of no
Instance where conquered Plans were surrendered up prior to, but only in
consequence of a Treaty of Peace.
"You will observe, Sir, that my reasoning is founded on the supposition
of their being reasonable Beings, which if they are not, then they are
not within the compass of my System, I am, Sir, with every wish for your
happiness, Your Affectionate and Obt. humble Servant,
"Thos. Paine.
"His Excellency, Genl. Washington, Valley Forge."
Shortly after this letter to Washington tidings came that a French
fleet, under Count d'Estaing, had appeared on the coast, and was about
to blockade the Delaware. The British apparently in panic, really by
order from England, left Philadelphia, June 18th. This seeming flight
was a great encouragement. Congress was soon comfortably seated in
Philadelphia, where Paine had the pleasure of addressing his next
_Crisis_ to the British Peace Commissioners.
In Philadelphia Congress was still surrounded by a hostile population;
Paine had still to plead that there should be no peace without
republican independence. Even so late as November 24, 1778, the French
Minister (Gerard) writes to his government: "Scarcely one quarter of
the ordinary inhabitants of Philadelphia now here favour the cause (of
independence). Commercial and family ties, together with an aversion to
popular government, seem to account for this. The same feeling exists
in New York and Boston, which is not the case in the rural districts."
While Franklin was offered in Paris the bribe of a peerage, and the like
for several revolutionary leaders, similar efforts were made in America
to subdue the "rebellion" by craft. For that purpose had come the Earl
of Carlisle, Sir George Johnstone, and William Eden. Johnstone had
retired from the Commission in disgust. Referring to the invitation of
the Peace Commissioners, that America should join them against France,
he says: "Unless you were capable of such conduct yourselves, you
would never have supposed such a character in us." He reminds the
commissioners, who had threatened that America must be laid waste so as
to be useless to France, that increased wants of America must make her
a more valuable purchaser in France. Paine mentions Sir H. Clinton with
some significance, and suspects the truth that he had brought orders,
received from England, overruling an intention of the peace envoys to
burn Philadelphia if their terms were rejected. He says he has written
a _Crisis_ for the English people because there was a convenient
conveyance; "for the Commissioners--_poor Commissioners_!--having
proclaimed that '_yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown?_ have
waited out the date, and, discontented with their God, are returning
to their gourd. And all the harm I wish them is that it may not wither
about their ears, and that they may not make their exit in the belly of
a whale."