By the President:
JAMES MADISON,
_Secretary of State._
The Message was read, and, together with the Proclamation, ordered to lie
on the table.
SATURDAY, November 21.
_Sir James Jay._
Mr. JONES moved that the House should, according to the order of the day,
go into Committee of the Whole on the report in favor of the petition of
Sir James Jay. Agreed to, 18 to 29. The report being read with the letter
from the Secretary of State accompanying it,
Mr. TAYLOR opposed and Mr. JONES supported it.
The question being taken on concurrence with the report, the votes were,
in favor of it 45, against it 46; there appearing some doubt whether
this decision was correct, a second count was about to be had, when a
debate took place, in which Messrs. UPHAM, COOK, DANA, QUINCY, LOAN, and
BLACKLEDGE, supported, and Messrs. J. CLAY, GARDENIER, D. R. WILLIAMS,
HOLLAND, TAYLOR, and BURWELL opposed the report.
In support of the report it was urged that the secret mode of
correspondence, for which the petitioner prays a compensation, was very
useful in the Revolutionary War, and no doubt might be again; that the
testimony in favor of the invention was very satisfactory; that there
was on file in the office of the Secretary of State, a letter written by
General Washington in this invisible ink; that Mr. Jay had never received
compensation; that although it had been used by various persons, none had
ever yet known the composition of it but himself; that the report was
only to authorize the President to purchase this secret if he thought
fit, leaving him the judge of its utility.
Those who opposed the report, argued that it was absurd to vote away
money for a thing they did not and could not understand; that there never
yet was a secret ink made but a composition could be invented that would
bring it out, and that possibly Sir James himself might know such a
composition; that the House had no security before them that it was not
or would not be disclosed to other Governments as well as this; that if
secret correspondence was wanted, it had from late occurrences appeared
that Entick’s Dictionary and a key word would afford, by writing in
cipher, sufficient secrecy.
In the course of this debate much wit was displayed in speaking on
different modes of keeping secrets, and the futility of all; with
allusions to the secret proceedings of Congress, particularly those which
took place on the 19th instant, which were said to have been known before
the House took them up. Some amusement also arose amongst the members
from the difficulty of hearing each other, and the consequent mistakes
that took place.
The question on concurrence being taken was carried, 50 to 48.
The committee rose and reported to the House their agreement to the
resolution contained therein; which was read, as follows:
_Resolved_, That it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States to obtain, by purchase, at a reasonable price,
the exclusive right, on behalf of the public, of the system
invented by Sir James Jay, as submitted by him to the Executive
Department of Government: provided, in the opinion of the
President, it will be of public utility and importance to
possess the same.
The House proceeded to consider the said resolution; and, on the question
that the House do concur with the Committee of the whole House in their
agreement to the same, Messrs. J. CLAY and SOUTHARD opposed, and Messrs.
SLOAN, QUINCY, NEWTON, BLACKLEDGE, and CROWNINSHIELD, supported it. The
question was then taken, and decided in the affirmative--yeas 74, nays
53.
TUESDAY, November 24.
_British Aggressions._
Mr. BLOUNT, from the committee appointed on so much of the Message of the
President of the United States as relates to aggressions committed within
our ports and waters by foreign armed vessels; to violations of our
jurisdiction; and to measures necessary for the protection of our ports
and harbors; presented to the House a letter from the Secretary of the
Navy, stating that, in a letter addressed by him, on the twelfth instant,
to the chairman of the said committee, some erroneous information had
been given, and an omission made, which he had since discovered, and
thought it his duty now to correct. The said letter was read, and ordered
to lie on the table.
Mr. BLOUNT, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the
Message of the President of the United States as relates to aggressions,
&c., reported further, in part,
“That the numerous aggressions and violations of our
jurisdiction recently committed within our ports and waters
by British ships of war, whether they are to be regarded as
the effects of positive orders from the British Government, or
as proceeding from that unrestrained insolence and rapacity
in British naval commanders which previously produced the
murder of our fellow-citizen, Pierce, and the perpetration of
many other well-remembered outrages and irritating acts, are
convincing proofs of the necessity of placing our ports and
harbors, as speedily as possible, in a situation to protect
from insult and injury the persons and property of our citizens
living in our seaport towns, or sailing in our own waters,
and to preserve therein the respect due to the constituted
authorities of the nation.
“That the committee, having maturely considered the subject,
are of opinion that the protection desired can be best and most
expediously afforded by means of land batteries and gunboats,
as they have been induced to believe that by a judicious
combination and use of these two powers, effectual protection
can be given, even to our most important seaport towns, against
ships of any size unaccompanied by an army.
“That our most important ports and harbors, and those requiring
the earliest attention and the most expensive fortifications,
are, New Orleans, Savannah, Charleston, S. C., Wilmington, N.
C., Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New London,
Newport, R. I., Boston, Salem, Newburyport, Portsmouth, N. H.,
and Portland.
“And that the ports, harbors, and places of minor importance
requiring protection, and which may be protected by less
expensive works, are, St. Mary’s, Ga., Beaufort, and
Georgetown, S. C., Ocracoke, Albemarle Sound, James River,
York, and Rappahannock Rivers, Potomac, Patuxent, Annapolis,
and Eastern Shore, Md., Delaware Bay and River, Egg Harbor, N.
J., Amboy, Long Island, Connecticut shore, Tiverton, R. I., New
Bedford, Marblehead, and Cape Ann, York, Kennebunk, and Saco,
Kennebeck, Sheepscut, Damarescotta, Broad Bay, and St. Georges,
Penobscot, Frenchman’s Bay, and Passamaquoddy Bay.
“Wherefore, your committee holding themselves bound, by the
tenor of the resolution referred to them, to report hereafter
their opinion of the expediency of interdicting the waters
of the United States to foreign armed vessels, according as
circumstances, now unknown, may, when known, seem to require,
submit the following resolutions, viz:
“_Resolved_, That it is expedient to authorize the President of
the United States to cause such fortifications to be erected
as, in addition to those heretofore built, will, with the
assistance of gunboats, afford effectual protection to our
ports and harbors, and preserve therein the respect due to the
constituted authorities of the nation; and that there be, and
hereby is, appropriated for that purpose, out of any moneys
in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of ----
dollars.
“_Resolved_, That it is expedient to authorize the President
of the United States to cause to be built an additional number
of gunboats not exceeding ----, and to arm, equip, man, fit,
and employ the same for the protection of our ports and
harbors; and that there be, and hereby is, appropriated for
that purpose, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the sum of ----.”
The report was referred to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday.
TUESDAY, December 1.
Mr. QUINCY offered the following resolution:
_Resolved_, That the Secretary of the Department of War be
directed to lay before this House an account of the state of
the fortifications of the respective ports and harbors of the
United States, with a statement of the moneys appropriated for
fortifications remaining unexpended; and an estimate of the
sums necessary for completing such fortifications as may be
deemed requisite for their defence.
Which being under consideration,
Mr. Q. said the House would perceive the object of this resolution was to
obtain information; there was a document on their table which gave some
information on the subject, but was not explicit. This resolution was
exactly similar to one passed last session, by which the House obtained
some important and interesting information; this being the case, he hoped
no objection would be made to it.
The resolution was agreed to without a division.
_Soldiers of the Revolution, &c._
Mr. RANDOLPH rose and said, that as long as the subject of national
defence was in possession of a respectable committee of the House, and
as long as their report was pending before it, he had deemed it, if
not improper, at least unavailing in him, to offer any thing upon that
subject. But, that committee having reported, he saw, from the course
which the debate had taken yesterday, a necessity so pressing that he
could no longer dispense with it, for offering some propositions on
this most important subject. These propositions grew out of the almost
universal impression which seemed to exist that there was but one
peculiar mode of defence to which the nation could turn itself in this
perilous juncture of their affairs. When so great an appropriation was
demanded for this favorite expedient, he feared, that if other plans of
defence, which had at least as high claims to the public attention, were
not now brought forward, they might hereafter find an empty Treasury, and
be compelled to resort to the system of loans, recommended by the head of
that department, as the only means, however precarious, of providing for
them.
It had always been his opinion, that whether in war or in peace,
there was one system of national defence which ought sedulously to be
cherished, and concerning which there could not exist a contrariety of
opinion between any two men in that House, or out of it; and he had
hoped that the attention of the committee (for there were more than one)
would have been directed towards it. Were they not told, and was it not
self-evident, that if matters came to the last extremity we should not
only have an extensive frontier exposed to the inroads of the enemy’s
continental possessions, but that a vast line of country, from Detroit
to Natchitoches, would have the native savages let loose upon their
dispersed and almost defenceless population? Did there exist then no
necessity for defence but of a few places on the coast, the depots of
privileged wealth, when the whole line of back settlements were left
at the mercy of the enemy and their savage adherents, without a force,
even upon paper, to protect them? If it should be said that there
existed no obligation on the Union gratuitously to bestow arms upon the
individual States which had failed to furnish themselves, the same reason
would apply yet more forcibly to the fortification of States which had
neglected to provide that species of self-defence. In the one case the
arms issued were still the general property, at all times disposable for
the good of the whole; in the other, the fortifications were so much real
estate, vested in the country where erected; fixtures to the freehold. It
appeared to him that, whether they considered themselves in a state of
profound peace, or on the eve of war, or (as he feared would prove to be
the case) in actual war, it behooved them to arm the natural defence of
their country; to rely, as had been said by a gentleman from New York,
not upon delusive theory but established practice; upon that which,
heretofore, had carried them triumphant through danger, and upon which,
when they could no longer depend, there was an end of our existence as a
nation.
There was another subject to which he hoped the committee would also have
turned their attention, one on which, as on the first, no two men could
differ; not like gunboats, perishable in its nature, and susceptible of
dispute as to its utility, which remained to be tested by experience; a
train of formidable artillery, that might not only oppose the enemy in a
particular harbor, but calculated to change its position, to bear upon
his armed vessels wheresoever they might lie, to compel him to quit our
waters, and even, if he should effect a landing, confront him under any
possible change of circumstances. He was the more inclined to hope that
his opinion would prevail upon this subject, when he heard a gentleman
whose influence was almost decisive in that House--he trusted that it was
deserved--declare that terra firma was our natural element, that it was
madness to dream of coping with the enemy on his own vantage ground: and
yet all the provision which they had thought of making, was to fight him
with his own weapons. He reminded the House with what striking effect his
friend from Maryland, (Mr. R. NELSON,) whose military experience entitled
him to a peculiar weight in this matter, had on a former occasion
cautioned them, that erect what fortifications they might, the enemy were
not obliged to lie before them; that ships of war were a movable force on
the water, and to be resisted with effect must be opposed by a movable
force on the land.
These were the two leading measures which were impressed on his mind as
proper to be adopted. Muskets in the hands of our citizens, and cannon in
our arsenals, were so much national wealth, even exclusive of the idea
of present national danger. The uses to which they were to be applied
under any possible emergency, were not susceptible of dispute. No man
could arraign this as a visionary plan of defence, as had been done with
respect to gunboats and fortifications. Upon them however he should say
nothing at present, except that he thought his the preferable mode of
defence, and one entitled to be provided for, before the Treasury should
be drained for less worthy purposes.
But there was another and more important measure, which ought to precede
any step which the House might take for defence. It was a measure of
justice; which would not only entitle them to success, but was eminently
calculated to insure it; a measure which would unite all hearts, and
nerve every hand in the cause of their country. It would do away the
stigma of suffering those who had fought and bled in their service, to
starve in the streets. With what face could the Government call upon
the youth of the nation to turn out in the public defence, when their
eyes were every where assailed by the spectacle of their countrymen and
kindred, veterans of the Revolution, who had raised the proud fabric of
our independence, begging from door to door a morsel of bread? It was
impossible to contemplate the condition of these gallant men, who, after
giving to their country every thing, were consigned by it to beggary
and want, without sensations of indignation and shame, as well as of
commiseration. But it is a subject, said Mr. R., on which I will say no
more; I cannot supply feelings to those who are destitute of them; and I
should as soon undertake to raise the very dead as to excite those whom
the subject itself is unable to move. He concluded by offering three
resolutions, calculated to meet the objects he had in view, professing
himself, at the same time willing to submit to any amendment which did
not alter their substance.
Before he handed these resolutions to the Chair, Mr. R. said he would
obviate an objection which might be made at the first; that they had
already a law to provide for these persons. To the disgrace of the
statute book, they had a pension law. What was the provision? That a man
who had incurred disability by known wounds during the Revolutionary war,
after being tied down to the most minute proofs, which in most cases,
from the death or removal of his old companions in arms, he was unable to
give, although the fact might be of general notoriety, was, if he could
surmount all the difficulties thrown in his way, entitled to a miserable
annuity, to take date, not from the time when the disability occurred,
but; from the time when his claim should be established. So that the man
whose keen sensibility had restrained him from applying to the public for
relief, who had struggled on, in the hope of better days, till the last
gasp, was put off with a pension, which so far from discharging the petty
debts which he might have contracted previous to his application, would
hardly keep soul and body together; when, if his pension were to take
date from the time of the service being rendered, as in common justice it
ought to do, he might be placed in comparatively easy circumstances.
Mr. R. then submitted to the House the following resolutions:
_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made, by law, for an
adequate and comfortable support of such officers and soldiers
of the late Revolutionary army as are still existing in a
state of indigence, disgraceful to the country which owes its
liberties to their valor.
_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made, by law, for arming
and equipping the whole body of the militia of the United
States.
_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made, by law, for
procuring a formidable train of field artillery for the service
of the United States.
The resolutions were referred to a Committee of the whole House to-morrow.
WEDNESDAY, December 2.
Another member, to wit, from Delaware, NICHOLAS VAN DYKE, appeared,
produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
_Soldiers of the Revolution._
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the resolutions offered
by Mr. RANDOLPH yesterday; and the first resolution being under
consideration, as follows:
_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made, by law, for an
adequate and comfortable support of such officers and soldiers
of the Revolutionary army as are still existing in a state of
indigence, disgraceful to the country which owes its liberties
to their valor.
Mr. RANDOLPH said he trusted that on this resolution there would exist in
the House, as there did in the nation, but one sentiment. The provision
which had been made for the officers and soldiers of the Revolution
was notoriously scanty and mean. Who, he asked, enjoyed the carrying
trade for which, two years ago, we were near being plunged into a war?
Emigrants since the peace of 1783. Men who ran no risk--who put nothing
to hazard--whilst those who met the enemy in the field, with the gibbet
staring them in the face at the same time, were left to pine in want and
obscurity. Had the persons who achieved this right to trade with every
quarter of the globe less claim to the benefits acquired by their blood
than the man of yesterday? But they had no capital for such enterprises.
They had sown that others might reap. The very lands which they had won
with their swords had become the prey of rapacious adventurers. Should
the fruits of the Revolution inure to the sole benefit of those who never
put their persons to hazard, or even spent one dollar for the acquisition
of our independence? He reminded the House of the pathetic appeal which
had been made on a former occasion by one of its oldest members, (Mr.
VAN CORTLANDT,) whom he hoped would long enjoy his seat there: “We shall
not prove very chargeable to you--there are but few of us left, and they
are daily dropping off--you will not be burdened with us long--most of
us have broken our constitutions in the public service.” Mr. R. hoped
that provision would be made for these gallant veterans--living monuments
of the ingratitude of their country; that every man who had a claim on
the public for services rendered during the Revolution, would be made
comfortable for life, unless his own misconduct should forbid it.
Mr. QUINCY said he did not rise to make objections to the general object
of the resolution; but there was one part which he did not think it
decorous for the committee to adopt; he meant the epithet _disgraceful_.
He was not prepared to fix a disgrace upon the nation by his vote; if
it were true that it was disgraced, he should wish more evidence of the
fact than had been exhibited on that floor. Were he even to admit that
it was a disgrace, he was not willing to turn the eyes of the world upon
the shame of his country. In another point of view he objected to this
declaration, as it would, by a strained or forced construction, limit
the provision contemplated to be made. He should not offer an amendment
to the resolution, because he trusted the gentleman himself would amend
it. It would, however, meet his wishes either to strike out the last
declaratory sentence, or to strike out the words “disgraceful to the,”
and insert “in a.”
Mr. RANDOLPH said that he did not feel for his resolution that sort of
parental affection which authors were supposed to bear towards their
works. The language was perfectly immaterial to him, so as it embraced
his object. He thought it needless in a matter of this kind to attend to
those verbal niceties with which the gentleman from Massachusetts had
amused himself and the committee. So far from disgracing the country,
he thought the acknowledgment in question the first step towards wiping
off the stigma--a sort of atonement; and if the nation was disgraced, it
was their duty as faithful servants to tell her so, and not to flatter
her with the success of her arms, and persuade her that she was the very
mirror and pink of chivalry, when they knew to the contrary.
It was matter of notoriety, and as such it was proper for the House to
act upon, that there existed a great number of citizens in this nation in
a state of indigence, who, if their country had done its duty, might, and
probably would, have been in far different circumstances. This failure on
the part of Government had thrown the evidences of their claims into the
hands of men, many, if not most of them, emigrants since the Revolution.
He asked whether our public lands, our free commerce--every blessing of
our country--should be participated by those who had sacrificed nothing
to our independence, and the men who achieved it be suffered to live and
die in wretchedness? This was the question which he had propounded to the
House, and those who could not comprehend it in its present shape, would
not be assisted by any explanations which it was in his power to give.
He knew comparisons were odious, but he must be permitted to make one.
He would compare the services of Captains Lewis and Clarke, in exploring
the continent of the Pacific Ocean, and their remuneration, with the
hardships and dangers of the soldiers of the Revolution and their reward.
He had no disposition to undervalue the services of those gentlemen and
their companions; far from it. He thought them deserving of what they had
obtained, and he had voted accordingly. But he should be guilty of gross
injustice were he to aver that their labors had been as important to the
United States as the services of those who had fought their battles,
before they were United States. Yet, what a wide difference in their
remuneration! On the one side, ample compensation; on the other, the
statute of limitation, or perhaps a scanty pension. Mr. R. wished this
subject to be taken up on the broadest ground--that where services could
be shown, they should be recompensed--that the State should take the
sufferer under her protection, and secure him from want.
Mr. THOMAS asked the gentleman who moved this resolution, whether he
intended to confine his provisions to the officers and soldiers of the
Revolutionary war, and not to extend relief to other sufferers? It was
well known that there were many others in the service who suffered
equally with those in the army--some of whom had lost their limbs, and
others who performed meritorious services--and were of as much benefit
as soldiers. Were they excluded by the resolution? It was but lately that
an officer, who commanded one of our armed ships in the Revolutionary
war, was in a state of almost starvation; and there were many more equal
sufferers and equally meritorious with those who served in the army.
Mr. RANDOLPH could only say, that his object was to provide for every man
who had fought, whether in the militia, the regular army, or the navy.
Mr. QUINCY said he really had not meant to amuse the House or the
gentleman from Virginia by the observations which he had made. In certain
cases words were things, and certainly this was one of those cases. Would
the committee declare their own disgrace by passing the resolution as
it now stood? No; they would declare their country to be disgraced. He
could not consent to this. He therefore moved, as he wished to make as
little alteration in the resolution as possible, to strike out the words
“disgraceful to the,” and insert “in a.”
Mr. RANDOLPH did not perceive the necessity of the amendment, neither
was he very tenacious of the language of his resolution. The object
of it alone was dear to him. Yet, there were occasions in which it
behooved men, and nations too, to confess their sins. He thought the
present one of them. Would the State of Georgia, for instance, have
done herself more honor, if, instead of passing sentence of indelible
disgrace on the Legislature which passed the famous law of the 5th of
January, 1795, commonly called the Yazoo act, and expunging it from
her records, she had faintly censured its authors and their abettors
by a dainty circumlocution? He feared he would not be pardoned for
introducing the Yazoo act in this case, since he had seen a most
respectable Representative from the State of Georgia, (Mr. TROUP,)
attacked on all sides for daring to lisp the word Yazoo. They were told
it was a worn out thing. That the House and the people were tired of
it. That, like the cry of wolf in the fable, it had been repeated until
no one would heed it. Mr. R. said that those who calculated in this way
reckoned without their host. The people of the Union could never become
familiarized and hardened to acts of corruption, by whomsoever they might
be practised or patronized. Whether the words were stricken out or not,
was perfectly immaterial to him. Perhaps, in rendering the censure more
delicate, it was only rendered more severe. He thought the situation of
these gentlemen--for gentlemen they were, by the most honorable of all
titles, the sword--disgraceful to the country. Whenever the country was
disgraced, he was for confessing it, that the people might be roused to
wipe it away. For this reason he had said that the navy of the United
States was a disgraced navy, and he should continue to say so until its
character was retrieved.
Mr. QUINCY said he was as willing as any gentleman to confess his own
sins, but did not like to cast censure on other people, much less on his
country. They would declare, by passing the resolution as it now stood,
that their country was disgraced. He hoped they would not do it. He had
no objection to the House confessing its own misdeeds. Let us, said he,
work out our own reformation, but not pass a censure on our country. He
declared his objection to the resolution to extend no further than to
those words.
The amendment moved by Mr. QUINCY was then agreed to without a division;
and the question recurring on the original resolution,
A motion was then made for the committee to rise, and carried--75 voting
in favor of it.
TUESDAY, December 8.
_Fortifications and Gunboats._
On motion of Mr. BURWELL, the House went into a Committee of the Whole
on the bill from the Senate for building gunboats, and the bill for
fortifying our ports, as reported by the Committee of Aggressions.
The bill from the Senate being still under consideration,
Mr. MILNOR said, when he was on the floor yesterday, and interrupted by
the message from the President, it was his intention to have moved an
amendment. The bill provided for building one hundred and eighty-eight
gunboats; he moved to strike out the words “and eighty-eight,” so as
to reduce the number to one hundred. He thought a hundred gunboats in
addition to those they already had, would be fully sufficient, if they
also adopted other modes of defence. He had yesterday stated that he did
not believe the building additional fortifications, and an additional
number of gunboats, would effect the object which appeared to be
contemplated by the committee. He confessed he did not place as much
reliance in gunboats as some gentlemen did. While he thought they might
be useful in aid of land batteries or frigates, it was also his opinion,
that if gentlemen examined the statement respecting different aggressions
by a certain power, they would find that not one single act of aggression
could have been prevented or punished by any batteries on land or
gunboats in aid of them. They were not committed in the face of our
batteries, or in that part of our ports and harbors where the gunboats
could have acted with effect; they were committed within the mouths of
our rivers, or just outside them. He thought the construction of a few
frigates would be expedient, in addition to those now in our possession.
They might act with gunboats; and might drive any foreign nation either
to the necessity of bringing a large force on our coasts, and keeping it
all together, by which the number of their aggressions would be lessened,
or expose their fleets to a force which would be able to avenge the
insults offered to us.
Mr. BURWELL said he should vote against the amendment proposed, and
in favor of the number reported by the Committee of Aggressions, as
contained in the bill from the Senate now under discussion. It appeared
to Mr. B. that the gentleman from Pennsylvania had taken a very incorrect
view of the subject. That gentleman has objected to this law because
it did not make provision for ships of war to serve as a defence to
our commerce, and because he supposed the committee had taken up this
mode of defence to the exclusion of any other. Mr. B. said it must be
obvious to every gentleman that it was almost impossible to have crowded
into one bill all the measures of defence which might become necessary;
thus it contained no provision for arming the militia, for raising a
standing army, building or repairing frigates, &c. The only question now
was, on building a number of gunboats, for defence against the attack
of a foreign nation. He thought a sufficient number should at once be
authorized: for if the number were insufficient to answer the intended
purpose, the money expended in their purchase would be so much thrown
away; so much expended from which the public would derive no benefit.
The opinions of those men best acquainted with the force which might be
necessary, which had been communicated to the Committee of Aggressions,
has stated this as the competent number.
With respect to the expense of building gunboats, it would be found that
the cost of building a frigate would be much greater than a number of
gunboats equal to the number of guns carried by a frigate. The Secretary
of the Navy had estimated the annual expense of gunboats at $11,000.
Mr. B. admitted that the sum appeared enormous, and it remained for the
consideration of the House whether they would expend so large a sum for
that purpose. The estimate of the Secretary of the Navy went upon the
ground that during the whole of the year, forty men would be required
to man each of these boats. Mr. B. thought that regulations might be
adopted, that would render eight or ten men sufficient to be regularly
employed on board these boats; a sufficient force fully to man and
use them upon occasion might be organized from the different ports or
seaport towns; and it would be found, by recurring to the President’s
Message, that the same idea had been entertained by the Executive. And
he believed, that although the Secretary of the Navy had estimated
$11,000 as the sum necessary for the annual expense, he had done it on
the supposition that forty men would be employed during the whole year in
each gunboat. At times when Europe and the United States were at peace,
it would not be necessary that more than a small portion of those boats
should be afloat; they might be kept in ordinary, relying on the seamen
of the port for any sudden emergency.
With respect to the propriety of building gunboats, he would observe that
they were not a mere experiment; they were sanctioned by the practice of
Europe, and were very beneficial for the defence of ports against sudden
attack. The French, Spanish, Dutch, and other nations, in the vicinage
of the British Navy, had combined their boats with land batteries, for
the purpose of defence against the assaults of that formidable Navy.
These boats were also a part of a system heretofore practised in other
countries, and proposed to be further pursued here.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD said that there was some inconsistency in the
observations of the gentleman from Pennsylvania; he had said gunboats
would be useful with the aid of large vessels, and at the same time said
they were entirely useless in the mouths of rivers or deep waters. [Mr.
MILNOR explained that he had meant they would be useless when acting
alone.] Mr. C. said he had formed a very different opinion, indeed,
from that expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania with respect to
gunboats. It was well known that no longer ago than the year before
last, this Government had employed eight or ten gunboats to assist in
the attack on Tripoli; they all crossed the Atlantic in safety, except
one boat. Although they did not come into the attack on Tripoli, because
a peace was prematurely concluded, yet he himself had heard the late
Commodore Preble say that, without them the squadron would not have been
competent to have made an effectual assault on the city. These boats then
kept the sea in very tempestuous weather, a fact which the despatches
from the commanding officer had announced. He believed that they could
not at this time adopt a better mode of defence than that proposed by the
bill. He should be sorry to see the proposed number reduced, because he
believed they would render important services, if at any time our ports
or harbors should be attacked. These gunboats were not boats that would
sink the moment they got into rough water; they were boats of 60 or 70
tons burden, which might navigate the globe with safety. He spoke from
experimental knowledge. The gentleman surely did not mean to say they
could not swim. In Mr. C.’s opinion, there could be no better system of
defence in aid of fortifications than that proposed by the bill.
Mr. BLOUNT presumed the gentleman would admit, as a certainty, that it
was the duty of the House to provide effectual protection. The select
committee having determined, in their own mind, that the best system of
defence would be composed by fortifications and gunboats, had inquired
what number, would be of use. The answer to this inquiry was already
before the House; it was stated that the United States had already
69 gunboats--that 257 were the whole number which might be usefully
employed; consequently that 188 were wanting. If it were the object of
gentlemen to afford a certain protection to the country, he hoped they
would not hesitate to pass this bill. If the gentleman from Pennsylvania
should be able, when the subject was properly before them, to prove to
Mr. B. that frigates or ships of war would add to the protection which
might be afforded by fortifications and gunboats, he would vote with him
for their construction. It would be time to discuss this when the subject
was before them. He hoped the idea of the utility of a naval force would
not induce gentlemen to withhold from the Executive that force which
they had signified as necessary for the protection of our ports and
harbors. If any doubt were entertained by gentlemen who were not members
of the last Congress, there was a report, which he held in his hand,
made at a former session, containing the opinions of naval officers on
the expediency or utility of these boats. The report was lengthy, and he
should not call for the reading of it, except gentlemen wished it. There
was, however, no necessity to demonstrate their utility, as no gentleman
had attempted to show that they were not eminently and essentially useful
as one species of defence.
The gentleman last up has stated that I wished this mode of defence
because it was the wish of the Executive. I stated expressly, and the
gentleman must so have understood me, that the committee had selected
this number of gunboats because they were informed that this number
would be necessary. I referred to the document where this statement is
expressed and where it may be found. I meant to express the opinion, that
if we built a less number than necessary, it would be a waste of public
money; and that protection would not be obtained by a less force than
that which is proposed.
Mr. B. also said that the 88 gunboats would cost $440,000; that sum,
when applied to the building of a large frigate, would not complete her;
and when built, she would carry but 44 guns, one-half the number of
guns which would be carried by 88 gunboats; besides which, the expense
of rigging and making her fit for service would be enormous. Thus, by
building one frigate only at the same expense as would complete 88
gunboats, they lost 44 guns, besides the additional expense of fitting
out and manning the frigate. He had, however, only risen at this time to
explain that he had been misrepresented when it was stated that he had
said he should vote for this number of gunboats because the Executive had
recommended it.
Mr. SMILIE said the question was, whether they would appropriate a
certain sum of money for the defence of their ports and harbors. He had
not heard it said, and he hoped it never would be said, that they ought
to defend themselves beyond their own shores. He confessed that he was
now called upon to give his vote on a question to the decision of which
he was not competent; but it being his duty to decide, he should, on this
as on other subjects with which he was not well acquainted, depend upon
the opinions of those who were. He believed many gentlemen in the House
were in the same situation with himself, not being acquainted with naval
affairs. It was the duty of the Executive to communicate information
in answer to any inquiries which it was necessary to make. They had
performed that duty, and the answers were in favor of gunboats. Should
he then pursue any opinion of his own in contradiction to this, when he
had no evidence on which to ground that opinion? Certainly not; he should
depend upon those who possessed better information on the subject than
himself, except there was something so absurd in their opinions that he
could not swallow it.
Mr. CHANDLER said, when they had information from actual examination,
that the contemplated number of gunboats would be necessary, he did
believe that the proposed sum should be appropriated to that object. The
gentleman from Pennsylvania, who had moved this amendment, professed
himself as willing to protect our ports and harbors as any gentleman, but
wished to strike out part of the number of gunboats, in order to adopt
another mode of defence. Admitting that a frigate could be built for the
sum which would complete eighty-eight gunboats; could he demonstrate
that the force of forty-four guns would be equal to eighty-eight of
heavier metal? Another thing he would mention; when the gunboats were
constructed, a part of them might be removed, and they could increase or
diminish the force at any particular place, as occasion might require;
if they had one frigate in place of them, they could not divide her
strength, and it could be retained at one point only.
Mr. NEWTON said it was not his intention to take up the time of the
committee in a disquisition on the subject of gunboats; though, were he
to attempt it, he had no doubt but he might be equally qualified with
some gentlemen who had displayed their eloquence on this occasion. He
thought they should now take into consideration the situation of the
country in relation to Great Britain. Why were they now talking of
defence, of fortifications, and of gunboats? Because they had arrived
at a perilous crisis; the nation had been attacked; the blood of its
citizens had been spilled; and they must have war, if reparation were
not made. They heard by the papers that a Minister was to be sent to
negotiate on the subject; but when that Minister arrived here, would
any gentleman say that they would receive that reparation which he was
prepared to offer? He believed not. When our affairs were thus situated,
and as the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. MACON) said a few days
ago, when they were actually in a state of war, ought they not to make
a better use of their time and the public money, than in debating on
the details of a bill? If a treaty with Great Britain were laid upon
their table at this moment, should they for that reason desist from
preparations for defence? No; that nation had trampled on every moral
principle; there was no faith in her; paper and parchment were no
security for her good conduct. If they wished to be respected by that
power, they must place themselves in a situation to return injury for
injury; to retaliate on her for the violations of their rights. When
they did this, they might expect something like decency of conduct, or
respect for their rights from that power; until they put themselves in a
situation to command her respect, they would in vain expect to receive it.
Mr. GARDENIER said that although he was not one of those who entertained
a great passion for gunboats, yet he could see certain situations in
which they would be useful in aid of fortifications; but they should
be restricted to a certain number. The mode of fortification which
was proposed, was by gunboats and batteries; and the proportionate
expenditure for these two objects, how much for one, and how much for the
other, was a subject which would engage the attention of the House when
it came properly before them. He should feel no objection to vote for the
whole number of gunboats, were he certain at the same time that enough
would be appropriated for land-batteries and other objects.
Mr. MASTERS said, if the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina
(Mr. BLOUNT) had for its object to authorize the President to dam up
the Hudson River by sinking blocks, he trusted the good sense of the
committee would reject such a preposterous proposition. The injurious
consequences of such an experimental measure to the city of New York,
and the State at large, would be beyond calculation. It would, in all
human probability, inundate, in high freshets, a considerable part of
the town; and in low water, in the summer season, so prevent the influx
of water as to cause the tide to recede more than thirty miles, and ruin
a number of most flourishing towns one hundred and seventy miles up the
river. The effects would be ruinous to one of the finest rivers in the
world. It was a well-known fact that sinking the piers of Westminster
bridge, in the river Thames, caused the tide to recede in that river
upwards of seven miles; take the same data for calculation, and the tide
in Hudson River would recede more than fifty miles. This, said Mr. M., is
a visionary scheme to evade the real object of defence, and to introduce
false notions of economy. Whenever we attempt to make appropriations for
permanent forts and batteries, expense and economy are brought forward
as an objection. The objects of necessary defence, and a prudent,
well-regulated economy, can be easily reconciled; but your plausible and
popular sound of economy, which is always the sweeping argument when
this and similar measures are under consideration, is like a fine net,
which is intended to catch every thing, both great and small. It may
serve for a fine fancy to fill up a speech with, but will not answer for
fortifications. It will endanger the nation by keeping us defenceless
and weak, tempt aggressions, and invite the destruction of our seaport
towns. Where, then, will be your economy?
Mr. QUINCY said he would only ask the gentleman from North Carolina,
as to his precise meaning in inserting the word “works.” This word
was, perhaps, in common life, confined to constructions other than
fortifications; he believed, however, it might include fortifications
also. When he had asked the question as to the species of works
contemplated to be erected, he had no conception that it was possible,
under an expression of this kind, to comprehend the sinking of blocks to
choke up the harbor of New York; for he had thought the erection of works
was putting up, whilst sinking blocks was putting down. He had, however,
a different object in rising. He had understood it to be the intention
of this bill not only to authorize the repair of old fortifications,
but the erection of new ones; and the bill as it stood antecedent to
the gentleman’s amendment, might have been competent to that end. Now,
as the gentleman had amended it, it would imply works different from
fortifications as he understood. If indeed it were the real object of the
gentleman to repair old fortifications only, and not to erect new ones,
the bill would now answer his purpose fully. If it were otherwise, he
conceived the language was not correct.
Mr. BLOUNT said he felt very little solicitude as to the fate of his
motion. His intention was to give a greater latitude to the discretion
of the President. He would not, however, undertake to dispute with the
gentleman from Massachusetts on the precise meaning of words; for he had
not spent his early life within the walls of a college, as that gentleman
had, but in the field, fighting for the liberties of his country. Under
the belief that the word _works_ did include fortifications, he had made
his motion for amendment. It was the intention of the committee both to
erect new works and to repair old ones. If the gentlemen from New York
and Massachusetts were determined to restrain the President from giving
that protection to the port of New York which the people of that State
should think proper, he was content. He did not wish to waste the time of
the House unnecessarily, especially on a subject which required so much
expedition.
Mr. COOK said he lived in a port in which there was sufficient depth
of water for any British man of war, and he thought he should feel as
indignant at any proposition for destroying the harbor as the gentleman
from New York. He hoped the feelings of other gentlemen in the House
would be in unison with his. If they were arrived at such a point of
degradation, that, in case of attack, they must retreat to or beyond the
mountains, and if instead of defending they must abandon the coast to
its fate, they had better adopt this measure, and block up their ports
altogether. After such a proposition as this, he should not be surprised
at any one which could be made; it appeared to him that the spirit of our
forefathers was departing the country. He was alarmed when he heard such
a proposition as this, and he hoped there would be sufficient magnanimity
in the House to give the amendment a decided negative.
WEDNESDAY, December 9.
Another member, to wit, EDWARD ST. LOE LIVERMORE, from Massachusetts,
appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in
the House.
_Fortifications and Gunboats._
The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported yesterday by the
Committee of the Whole to the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled “An
act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of
gunboats.”
Mr. DURELL said, as there appeared to be a considerable diversity of
opinion on this gunboat business, and as a number of gentlemen from, the
North did not readily fall into the scheme of the Southern gentlemen,
and as he was from the North, he would state some reasons why this bill
should not pass. He thought, as every gentleman appeared to think, that
this was a crisis which called for union and great exertion; the great
object was, to arm the nation to meet an event which they would be called
to meet ere long. The question was now on one species of this arming, on
which there were different opinions.
It appeared that, in addition to fortifications, the precise number of
one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats was called for. A question had
been asked, why that number was exactly calculated as being necessary;
the chairman of the committee, who reported the bill, states that this
number was thought necessary by the Executive Department. It was not to
the system of gunboats that he had an objection, for he believed that,
to a certain extent, they might be useful; but he did not believe that
gunboats in connection with fortifications, would attain the end for
which they were acknowledged to be proposed. In casting his eye over the
documents before him, he perceived that gunboats were assigned to certain
situations in the North, where he was confident they could never be of
use. He was positive of this fact. Four gunboats were assigned to the
port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He would appeal to gentlemen in the
House, acquainted with the situation of that port, whether they seriously
believed that four gunboats, or that twenty, would be of any service
there? It was impossible that they should; the situation of the port,
the strength and rapidity of the tide, were such that they could not be
used. The same observation would apply to a number of ports east of that;
it was generally conceded that gunboats were not calculated for deep and
turbulent waters; the Northern shores were not sand banks, and gentlemen
seemed to think these were necessary to allow gunboats to defend even
themselves.
He saw that for the ports of Norfolk and New York, there were assigned
a large number of gunboats. He was inclined to believe that a number of
frigates, to the amount of the expense of these gunboats, would be more
consonant with the wishes of the people in the mouth of the Hudson, than
so many gunboats.
One hundred and twenty-eight gunboats to Norfolk and New York! The
expense of sixty-four, one half of this number, would be fully equal to
the expense of four forty-four gun frigates; and he was of opinion that
these, at one-half the expense, would be considered by the gentlemen
from Norfolk and New York, and by the House, as better calculated than
gunboats to defend those ports. Mr. D. could see no reason why they
should not have their choice in this respect. He, therefore, concluded
with moving to strike out “one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats,” and
insert “one hundred and twenty-four gunboats, and four forty-four gun
frigates.”
Mr. BLOUNT called for a division of the question, wishing the first
question taken on striking out.
Mr. GARDNER felt very conscious of the importance of fortifying the
various ports and harbors of the United States, and should give the bill
his support on its passage; but he had been in hopes yesterday that
the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would have
prevailed. He wished to see the system of gunboats put into operation,
and to see the efficiency of that mode of defence properly tested. There
appeared to be many different opinions on the subject; and he perceived
the House would not be satisfied till the experiment was tried, and their
utility known. He was willing that as many gunboats should be employed as
was sufficient for defence in those waters where they might be useful;
but he did not think they would be efficient in the Northern and Eastern
ports of the United States. He should be obliged to gentlemen if they
would strike out a part of this number of gunboats, and appropriate
the sum applicable to them to another mode of defence. There appeared
to be a large majority in favor of the bill, but if they would be so
condescending as to fortify the Northern ports in a way most agreeable to
the people interested in their defence, he should feel gratified at it.
He was in favor of the amendment, though he would rather a large number
should be stricken out; and hoped the question on striking out would be
carried, whether ships of war were inserted or not. It had been yesterday
said, by a gentleman from Virginia, that if a less number were built than
that proposed, they would be useless. This argument could have no weight
with those who did not think they would afford defence at all; but, for
his own part, he should vote for any thing in the shape of defence, till
it should be found insufficient by experiment.
Mr. BACON observed, that some gentleman had undertaken in themselves, to
represent the whole Northern part of the Union, and had expressed their
wishes that the House would condescend to listen to the united prayers
of the representatives from those States. He only rose to say, that he,
for one, protested against being considered as joining in that request.
He was of opinion that the mode embraced by the bill would better accord
with the sentiments of the people of the Northern States, than that
which those gentlemen had proposed. He had no intention of making any
calculation on the subject, because he did not consider himself qualified
to do it; but would barely observe that, were the question fairly tried
in the Northern interest, those gentlemen would be found in the negative.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD said he considered the present proposition as much the
same with that which was yesterday offered in Committee of the Whole, and
to which the committee was decidedly opposed. He trusted the decision of
the House to-day would be the same as that of the committee yesterday.
He thought his friend from New Hampshire was extremely mistaken in his
calculations of the comparative expense of gunboats, and frigates of
forty-four guns. It would be seen by the report of the Secretary of the
Navy, that the estimates for gunboats would amount to about $5,000;
and he thought it would not go beyond it. Taking this for granted, the
gentleman’s calculations of expense must fall to the ground. Mr. C.
then stated the expense of frigates which had been built, from which it
appeared that the expense of building one frigate was fully as much as
that of sixty-four gunboats. If they proposed to strike out this number
of gunboats in order to build frigates, they must add a sum of one
million of dollars to the appropriation.
Mr. SAWYER said it was not his intention to trouble the House often with
his observations; for, being but a young member, he sat there more for
the purpose of acquiring information than of giving it; nor should he
have risen at this time, had not his duty compelled him to reply to some
remarks, and to oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from New
Hampshire, (Mr. DURELL.) The gentleman wished the United States to have a
fleet; to have four forty-four gun frigates to assist in the defence of
New York. For his own part, Mr. S. wished the United States were in such
a situation as to enable them to usher into existence a fleet capable of
annihilating at one blow the whole naval power of England, which had so
long proved a scourge to all nations, and to this nation in particular.
Such a consummation was devoutly to be wished; but the attainment of
such an object by the United States, was utterly impossible: they had
not means wherewith to do it, and an attempt which should fall short of
the end, would do the nation more injury than good, by tending to swell
the already overgrown naval power of Great Britain. At present, he must
say, he was entirely opposed to a Naval Establishment, and differed
entirely with the gentleman from Massachusetts, upon the propriety of
any such establishment in the present situation of affairs; he wished
to have nothing to do with any establishment unconnected with a system
of land defence. There was a time when a Naval Establishment might
have been consistent with national policy; when a naval armament, such
as could then have been constructed, might have been instrumental, by
proper management, in maintaining the balance of naval power in Europe;
that time was, when the combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland,
were nearly a match for the British naval force; but that time was now
elapsed; that opportunity, which might have been so advantageously
seized, was, through an unfortunate prejudice in favor of one nation and
against another, suffered to escape unheeded. They now saw the effects of
that policy; the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were swept from
the ocean; the British Navy retained the undisputed possession of every
sea, and it would be an extravagant undertaking in the United States
to attempt the creation of a naval force calculated to make a serious
impression upon Great Britain; they would become the mere shipwrights of
Great Britain, who would be ready to receive their ships as fast as they
could be launched. Could they erect a navy equal to that which Denmark
had possessed? Could they build and equip twenty-four sail of the line
at once? If they could do this, experience had fatally shown, that so
far from aiding in the defence of this nation, that force would soon be
turned against it; England, with a superior force, would soon convert
them into a means of offence against this nation. But it would not be
in the power of the United States, encumbered as they were by a great
national debt, and cramped in their resources by interruptions of their
trade, to provide a navy as respectable as that of Denmark was; and
surely any smaller force could not be contemplated. Let us then, said
he, apply our limited means to a mode of defence on which more reliance
may be placed; let us in the first place put our ports and harbors in
such a state of defence as will, in a great degree, prevent our feeling
the want of a navy. To effect this object, he said, they must have
recourse to gunboats. He did not conceive this means of defence to be
so trivial as the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. DURELL) seemed to
think them; not that they could be relied on as an efficient system of
defence by themselves; not that they were to expel the British squadron
from our shores, (though it was thought they could effect that object;)
but because, in conjunction with land batteries and fortifications, they
would ensure some safety of person and property in our seaport towns. By
judicious management, by disposition in shoal waters, so as to aid the
batteries on shore, they might be the means of preventing our cities from
being plundered and burned, and our banks and stores from being rifled of
their wealth. In this point of view, he considered them as part of a land
defence, totally unconnected with a navy; they were not to go into deep
water; the ocean was not their element; they were to remain in stations
from which they might afford the greatest assistance to our forts and
batteries, and when hard pressed or overpowered by force they could take
shelter under them. This, said Mr. S., is the great advantage they have
over heavy ships, there being no danger of their capture while we can
maintain possession of our forts.
The British have not dared to attack a single French port since, though
they had full possession of the channel and every means of attack which
their unopposed naval superiority could afford. Though they saw preparing
in those ports materials for their destruction, though they saw rising up
in them means of offence so much dreaded as to require the utmost vigor
of national exertion to provide against them, still did they stand aloof.
Had Copenhagen been defended by gunboats distributed so as to act with
the batteries, she would not have fallen so easy a prey; in fact, the
few gunboats they had did all the execution that was done to the British
shipping; for the fleet which remained in the port for its defence had
no retreat from the superior force of the enemy, but where they could be
pursued by vessels of equal size, while the gunboats ran under the forts
and continued to annoy the British ships until those forts were taken by
land. And if all the vessels which were captured had been gunboats, how
much better would it have been for the Danes; how much less heavy would
the loss of a few boats have been than that of so many large ships, so
long building and accumulating, and at such an immense expense! But in
order to show the inutility of gunboats, as well as fortifications, this
House was told the British could succeed against our towns by landing a
sufficient number of men below our forts and attacking them by land. This
is exactly, Mr. S. said, what he wished to hear; for it was conceding
at once that our gunboat and fortification defence would be too much
for them to pass, that they would be compelled to give up the idea of
carrying the place by water, and thus lose all the great advantages which
their boasted irresistible naval power could afford them.
Mr. COOK said he could have wished that the different modes of defence
should have been united, and decided upon together; but from the
disposition of gentlemen who were in favor of the gunboat system, the
House appeared to be compelled now to decide on this alone. It was well
known that he was not averse to the proposition for constructing a number
of gunboats; that he had last session given his vote in favor of them,
and was now in favor of increasing the number, believing that in some
situations they might be eminently useful; but when he found that so
large a sum had been appropriated, almost to the exclusion of any other
mode of defence, he deemed it his duty to give his vote in favor of a
proposition tending more equally to apportion the modes of defence.
It had been moved to strike out of the bill a certain number of
gunboats, and insert a certain number of ships of war. That a navy was
necessary for the protection of our commerce was the opinion of President
Washington, expressed at a time when our commerce was comparatively
small. [Mr. C. here read an extract from an address to Congress from
President Washington.] Mr. C. acknowledged that he had not experimental
knowledge on this subject; but he appealed to the candor of those
gentlemen who advocated this mode of defence, to accord to him that
liberality which he would exercise towards them. He meant to impeach the
motives of no man. He conceived that every gentleman would act according
to the dictates of his conscience, and he claimed their indulgence to do
the same.
Were the navy now to be increased to repel aggression from any foreign
power, it would be regarded as a proper measure. He was not in favor of a
large increase of our Navy; but he conceived it necessary to have a few
large ships to drive from their ports scattering ships of an enemy. He
thought himself not out of order, since the opinion of the President of
the United States on the subject of gunboats had been read, verbally to
quote his opinion on this subject. The President was in favor of large
ships; he thought it was improper that any single ship should be able to
block up a port or harbor of the United States; and that a remedy should
be provided. Mr. C. thought that no danger could arise to the liberties
of the people from an increase of the Navy; he called upon gentlemen who
supported that doctrine to quote a single instance where any nation had
lost its liberties from a navy. He did not himself consider an increase
of our Navy necessary at the present moment, but it might be necessary
at a future time; it would not, therefore, be improper now to provide
materials, that they might have them in readiness when wanted. At present
their attention should be directed solely to the defence of their
cities on the seacoast; but at any future time, when it should be made
satisfactorily to appear to this Government that the nations of Europe
were disposed to coalesce for the purpose of asserting those rights which
were dear to every maritime power, he hoped the United States would be
ready and willing to join them in maintaining the freedom of navigation.
It has been said, by some people, observed Mr. C., that we ought to lie
by on our arms and avert the event of the European contest; let them
alone, say they, let Buonaparte fight it out with them. Now this was a
doctrine to which Mr. C. could not subscribe. If there was one great
power disposed to control and domineer over the ocean, and the United
States had great property at stake, why not pay their proportion, their
footing as it were? He considered an opposite conduct pusillanimous and
unjust. They had more tons of shipping afloat, and were more largely
concerned in the freedom of the seas, than any nation on earth, one only
excepted; and should they say that they would lie by unconcerned, while
the dearest rights of nations were destroyed by any one nation! It must
be clear to every one that they should not, and yet instead of increasing
their defensive powers where they were assailable and most vulnerable, he
was hurt to hear gentlemen propose means of defence for points perfectly
unconnected with existing evils, which consisted in the harassing their
navigation, and inflicting injuries on their floating commerce.
Mr. C. did not want ships for protection of our cities; he had no fear of
their being burnt; he considered them as sufficiently protected by the
proposed fortifications and gunboats, but all the money in the Treasury
should not be applied to these subjects. The merchants of the United
States were more concerned for the defence of their property which they
had sent beyond seas than for the burning or sacking of our cities.
Some cities, it was true, had been burnt during the Revolutionary War;
but it should be recollected that the enemy then carried on a war of
extermination, and even invited the savages to burn our towns. The war
which was now feared was not a war of the same stamp; it would be merely
a war for the right of trade, and not carried on in so sanguinary a
manner.
Mr. FISK said the gentleman from Massachusetts was opposed to this
measure because it would take all the money out of the Treasury. He
should show: _First_, That it was beyond their means; and _Second_, That
it was not a measure of exigency. Would he be willing to leave our ports
and harbors unprotected, and go abroad to protect our commerce? Mr. F.
did not think that the merchants of the United States would support that
doctrine. If they did, he wished they were out of the United States.
The gentleman had told the House that his feelings had been wounded at
the deference shown to the statements of the Secretary of War, and a
few minutes after, read an extract from an English newspaper, giving
an account of a transaction which had taken place between gunboats and
English vessels. Mr. F. confessed he was not a little surprised at his
preferring the authority of English newspapers to that of the Head of a
Department in our own country. A gentleman who did this, might be allowed
to indulge in the spirit of prophecy. He had said, if they adopted this
measure, they would soon feel the effects of it. Mr. F. wished the
gentleman would show how. The gentleman had said, because a few towns
were burnt last war, the House seemed to think that the war which was
expected would be a war of extermination; but that this was to be a
harmless war, a mere war of trade. He would ask that gentleman what was
the conduct of Great Britain towards Denmark? Had they spared the town
of Copenhagen? He believed not. Would they spare the towns of New York
or Norfolk, if it were in their power to destroy them? He thought not.
Mr. F. thought the great question now was, What was the most efficient
force--what would afford the most complete protection to our ports and
harbors? The gentleman had said that they had now no force which could
contend with an eighty or ninety gun ship. If that were the case, Mr. F.
said, his argument completely recoiled upon himself. They had now eight
or ten frigates, and if these could not contend with one eighty or ninety
gun ship, they had better stop where they were, and not erect more of
such inefficient force. Let us consider the subject for a few moments,
said Mr. F. This is not an untried force; it was tried before that
gentleman had existence. The instance mentioned by the gentleman from
North Carolina, (Mr. SAWYER,) might have shown that this force would be
sufficient. It was the opinion of a most experienced naval commander, and
whose standing and information entitled him to more than ordinary credit,
that he would rather have four gunboats than a forty-four-gun frigate.
A frigate could not carry the same metal as a gunboat. If a frigate was
dismasted, becalmed, or any accident whatever happened to her, she could
not get out of the way. These reasons should have weight on the minds of
any gentleman, particularly of one who did not pretend to experimental
knowledge on this subject. If the Treasury was as low as it was said to
be, they should surely pursue the cheapest means of defence. By adopting
the mode of defence by gunboats, in preference to defence by frigates,
they would have, at the same expense, a third more in number of guns,
besides double the weight of metal. With gunboats there was no loss of
time in putting about. Not so with a frigate. She must first discharge
one side, and then go about, before she could fire the other. But,
gentlemen who were steeled against conviction, and determined, at all
events, to have a Navy, would not be influenced by argument or reason.
Had not Denmark a Navy? What became of it? It fell into the hands of a
superior naval power, and that will be the fate of our Navy if we erect
one.
Mr. THOMAS said that the gentleman on his right, his colleague, (Mr.
GARDENIER,) had told the House that he should vote to build the whole
number of gunboats, not because he thought them an efficient defence,
but because he considered them feeble machines. This reasoning might
be conclusive in the mind of that gentleman, and he did not care what
influenced him, since it appeared they should have his vote for the bill.
However, Mr. T. said he merely rose to reply to one remark of that
gentleman. He knew that it had been rung through the country, by
electioneering gentry, for these number of years, that the formidable
navy, so carefully raised by the former Administration, had been sold
off by the present one, and the nation left without defence; and that
gentleman (Mr. G.) had repeated the same story, that the formidable navy
which had been raised with so much care had been sold off, to the eternal
disgrace of the nation. Hearing this assertion, Mr. T. thought it his
duty, on that floor, to declare that not a single national ship had been
ordered to be sold since the present Administration came into power; that
not a single vessel had been sold except from orders issued previous to
the time that the administration of this Government was taken out of the
hands of those coinciding with that gentleman in political sentiment.
The amendment offered by Mr. DURELL was then negatived--ayes 19.
The bill being about to be read a third time this day, its decision was,
on motion of Mr. ELLIOT, postponed till to-morrow.
THURSDAY, December 10.
_Fortifications and Gunboats._
The bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for
the construction of an additional number of gunboats,” together with the
amendment agreed to yesterday, was read the third time.
Mr. ELLIOT.--When an humble and uninfluential individual, voluntarily
isolating himself from the several great parties that divide, distract,
and ruin our devoted and degraded country--our devoted and degraded
country--(I repeat the expression, sir, for I know it to be as consonant
to the rules of order as I shall prove it to be incontestably true;) when
such an individual rises to deliver his sentiments upon an important
subject of national concern, it would seem that the singularity of his
situation might attract attention, however deficient he may be in the
solid powers of argument, or the brilliant tones of eloquence. But these
are inauspicious times. These are not the _mollia tempora fundi_--the
soft reasons of persuasion--the calm hours of peace. They are times of
alarm and denunciation. For myself, peculiar and almost irresistible
reasons would impel me to continue silent, not only this day, but for
the short remainder of my political existence. But there are periods
when silence is almost equivalent to an abandonment of duty. Private
afflictions, as inconceivable by others as they are indescribable by
myself, were I disposed to describe them, indispose me for political
exertion. There are times, however, when even the most refined feelings
of the human heart should give place to the sublime energies of the human
mind. When imperious duty calls, the latter should be exerted, even if
it be only that the former, when the great effort is over, should resume
their empire with more exquisite sensibility.
The present is one of those great crises that rarely occur in the
annals of nations--it is, indeed, a crisis of most awful moment. Our
political day of hope and joy and peace is suddenly overcast with thick
and dark clouds. In the language of sacred oriental poetry, it is a day
of darkness and gloominess--a day of clouds and thick darkness--as the
morning spread upon the mountains.
In casting my eye over the various documents upon the table, my attention
is for the moment attracted by one which has been placed upon it this
morning--a report from the Committee on Revisal and Unfinished Business,
upon matters undetermined at the last session. In this I find mention
made of several propositions upon the subject of the defence of the
nation, which I had the honor then to propose, and which it was not
the pleasure of the House then to act upon. Propositions of a similar
character, so far as respects the fortification of the ports and harbors,
the organization and arming of the militia, and the equipment of the
frigates, it is now hinted, will be carried into effect in the course of
the present session. I am happy that my doctrines are becoming popular,
and that there is some prospect of their adoption. But it is because I
fear, and indeed believe, that the present bill is pressed upon us for
the purpose of superseding every measure of national defence which would
comport with the true interest and the honor of the nation, that I am so
decidedly opposed to it, and that I consider the Republic degraded by the
substitution of a weak and miserable policy for measures of a manly and
magnanimous character, at a crisis which peculiarly requires them.
The principal argument, although this does not seem to be openly avowed,
in favor of the present measure, is the supposed predilection of the
Executive for this system of defence. Indeed, this is but a new edition,
or rather a new volume, of the celebrated proclamation and gunboat
system, which, instead of elevating us in the scale of nations, has
greatly sunk the national character. The objects in view are to protect
the commerce of the Union to a certain extent, and to protect our coasts
and seaports. Of course this measure is to constitute a material, if
not the principal part of a general system of national defence and
protection. The object is proper and patriotic, and it is a subject
of deep regret that the means are inefficient. But history and human
experience have settled the true character of these machines, and as we
have nothing else to hope for, we can expect nothing like an energetic
and effectual system.
The President _shall_ recommend. The voice of the constitution is
imperative. It makes it the duty of the Chief Executive Magistrate to
take upon himself the responsibility of explicitly recommending to the
Legislature such measures as he deems the public welfare to require. In
making the inquiry, in what manner has this great and solemn duty been
performed at the present moment? the transition is easy to the Message
of the President at the commencement of this session. These messages,
as public documents, and addressed exclusively to the Legislature, are
certainly fair subjects of criticism; and whoever shall be impelled by
duty to speak unpleasantly of the present system of administration, will
have an abundant source of rich consolation in the reflection, that, when
gunboats are the subject of discussion, it is impossible to be out of
order. The present system begins and ends with gunboats. In the Message
to which allusion has been made, which should have been as a polar star
to guide us at this dark season, not a single measure is explicitly and
unequivocally recommended. I will read that part of it which relates to
the Naval Establishment:
“The gunboats already provided have been chiefly assigned to
New York, New Orleans, and the Chesapeake. Whether our movable
force on the water, so material in aid of the defensive works
on the land, should be augmented in this or any other form,
is left to the wisdom of the Legislature. For the purpose of
manning these vessels, in sudden attacks on our harbors, it is
a matter for consideration whether the seamen of the United
States may not justly be formed into a special militia, to be
called on for tours of duty, in defence of the harbors where
they shall happen to be; the ordinary militia of the place
furnishing that portion which may consist of landsmen.”
Here the Executive submits certain matters for consideration, without
assuming to himself the responsibility of expressly recommending them.
In relation to the Naval Establishment, he only talks of a movable force
on the water; and if we should build our flotilla of two hundred and
fifty-seven gunboats, at an expense which will be shown to be enormous,
and, in the event of a war with Great Britain, two or three British
ships of the line, and as many frigates, should come upon our coast, and
blow them all to atoms, as would infallibly be the case if they were to
come in contact with them, we shall no doubt be told that a wise and
prudent Executive never recommended such an ill-judged, degrading, and
disastrous measure. But for what purpose are gunboats to be built? To
protect commerce and the coast. Every one knows that we cannot protect
our commerce in every clime and on every sea against the naval power of
Great Britain. It would be unwise, therefore, at present, to exhaust our
resources by building a navy of ships of the line. It does not follow,
however, that nothing can be done; that we cannot support our own
jurisdiction. Nothing effectual, it is certain, can be done by gunboats.
They have never been of use but as auxiliaries to more extensive and
substantial establishments; and they have always been of so little
comparative use, as to render it impossible to ascertain the amount of
the service they have rendered. We may safely challenge their advocates
to produce a single instance in which, alone and unconnected with works
of more consequence, they have been of any essential use at all, for
purposes either of offence or defence. In my researches into their
history I have met with no instance of the kind. Here I shall advert to
a document, the reading of which has been called for by the honorable
chairman of the committee on that part of the President’s Message
relative to aggressions committed within our waters, and with which I
should not otherwise have troubled the House. I do it at this time,
because I find my voice failing so fast that I shall be unable to go so
fully into the subject as I originally contemplated. This I shall not
regret myself, and still less will the House regret it. In the message of
February 10, 1807, communicating the information requested by the House
of Representatives in relation to the utility and efficacy of gunboats,
we find, indeed, that gunboats apparently constitute but a subordinate
species of defence, and yet they are spoken of as competent to almost
all the purposes of national protection. A flotilla of no less than two
hundred is contemplated.
Annexed to the Message are the opinions of several military and naval
officers, some of them celebrated and some of them obscure. General
Gates, whose memory we all venerate, has been mentioned. He merely gives
his opinion, and furnishes no particular information upon the subject. He
is followed by General Wilkinson, the hero of the Sabine and New Orleans,
the man who violates your constitution at the point of the bayonet in
order to preserve it inviolate; the idol of popular delusion for the
moment, but the object of a very different homage from the wise and good.
Unfortunately, the letter of this great character conveys no information.
Commodore Barron says: “Ten or twelve of these boats will probably be
sufficient to compel to remove from her position a frigate, and so on in
proportion to the size and number of the enemy’s ships. To do more than
annoy would be difficult. With those vessels a great number and a long
time would be necessary to capture a ship of war; but few commanders
would feel secure while open to the attack of an enemy, which, however
inferior, he could not destroy.” This is all very candid and very strong
reasoning against the cause it is produced to support. It is matter of
regret, however, if it ever has been ascertained that gunboats have been
able to remove a ship of war from her position, that we have not been put
in possession of that information. The following remarks are taken from
the communication of Captain Tingey: “The efficacy of gunboats in the
defence of coasts, ports, and harbors, must be obvious to every person
capable of reflection; when it is considered with what celerity they
can generally change their position and mode of attack, extending it
widely to as many different directions as their number consists of, or
concentrating nearly to one line of direction. Such, indeed, is believed
to be the great utility of gunboats for defence, that, notwithstanding
the gigantic power of the British Navy, in its present state, a judicious
writer in the British Naval Chronicle, after advising a plan for raising
a fleet of 150 or 200 gunboats to assist in repelling the threatened
invasion of that country, says, ‘a gunboat has this advantage over a
battery on shore, that it can be removed at pleasure from place to
place, as occasion may require, and a few such vessels, carrying heavy
guns, would make prodigious havoc among the enemy’s flat-bottomed boats
crowded with soldiers.’” Surely we do not expect the British will come to
invade us in flat-bottomed boats. If they should do so, we may array this
miserable machinery against them, and shall probably be victorious.
But it is a popular system--the people are in favor of it--and this is an
overwhelming answer to every argument that can be urged against it.
With whom is it popular? Certainly not with the people in the Northern
States, for a very great majority of them are opposed to it. Within two
or three years we have received addresses from the Legislature of New
York and Rhode Island, passed, I believe unanimously, in both States, in
favor of an enlarged and more efficient system of naval defence. Those
two States, of course, may be considered as opposed to this project. No
one will set down Connecticut as friendly to gunboats. Is it popular
in Massachusetts? One gentleman from that State (Mr. BACON) protests
against being considered as the Representative of a people hostile to
this mode of defence. But that gentleman will not tell us that a very
large majority of his constituents are attached to the system, or that
among those who are, one in fifty has any practical or even historical
information upon the subject. Are your constituents, Mr. Speaker, in
favor of this mode of defence? I presume not. When, two or three years
ago, you opposed this establishment in its infancy, you undoubtedly
represented their sentiments and feelings, as most certainly you
supported their true interest. The Representatives from New Hampshire,
and others from the Eastern States, ask you to excuse them from accepting
their proportion of these boats, and to give them a few frigates in
exchange. You refuse their request.--They ask for frigates, and you give
them gunboats. As it respects my own constituents, I have not been able
to find any gunboat men among them. It is probable, however, that there
are some, as there may be men in that quarter, as in others, willing to
believe whatever the Executive believes; but I trust there are fewer of
these miserable minions in that district than in some others in the Union.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD said he regretted that the present had been represented
as a local question, applicable to the South; and it had been stated that
the defence of the North was not at all in the question. Mr. C. viewed it
in a very different light. He considered the whole seaboard of the United
States, that every inhabitant on the coast, was deeply interested in the
bill now about to pass. Gunboats would as well assist to protect the
passage leading into Boston harbor, as the mouth of the Chesapeake. They
were certainly fit to aid in the protection of any of the Northern ports.
He was astonished when he heard a doubt expressed upon the subject. He
was glad to hear a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) say he should
vote for the bill. He would rather have his vote than his speech on the
subject, as well also the vote of one of his colleagues (Mr. UPHAM) who
followed him in debate, and took the same course. Both these gentlemen
said they should vote for the bill on the table, and yet they observed
they could not approve of this mode of defence. It would thus appear
that their votes were vastly more reasonable than their arguments. He
trusted that on this bill the House would give a unanimous vote. What was
the proposition? To put our ports and harbors in some state of defence.
Was the measure embraced by this bill all the defence proposed? No;
but it was all proposed to be decided on at present, because it could
be almost immediately accomplished. And who knew when this force might
be wanted? He did not say it would be wanted to-day, to-morrow, or the
next day; but possibly the return of Spring might bring an occasion for
its service to repel an invader; and, where the risk was deemed even
probable, procrastination in preparing for the worst would be the height
of imprudence.
In regard to the utility of gunboats, gentlemen differed; and well and
honestly they might, because their use had not in this country been
sufficiently confirmed by experience. Mr. C. would, however, quote an
instance or two in which they had been eminently useful, even in our
own country. He had learnt, from a very correct source, that in the war
between Great Britain and France, in 1760, when the American colonies
took a part, there was an instance on record which proved that these
gunboats were employed with success in the river St. Lawrence--that four
gunboats, carrying one 18 pound cannon and 20 men each, did attack and
capture a brig of 16 guns and 180 men, killing 60 or 70 men in the brig,
while the gunboats lost but a single man, and received little or no other
injury. If any gentleman doubted, Mr. C. would give the respectable
authority of the Vice President of the United States for the fact. Mr.
C. had understood he was an officer actually employed by the Colonial
Government in that service. Another instance had been given to him by a
naval gentleman of eminence, who was not now in the service of the United
States, but who, he believed, if called upon, would do himself great
honor. Mr. C. then read the statement made by that gentleman, to this
effect: “In 1776, the Roebuck and Liverpool, two British frigates--one
of them mounting 44 guns on two decks--lay in the river Delaware,
below Philadelphia. A flotilla of American gunboats attacked them with
spirit. The engagement was severe, and victory terminated in favor of
the gunboats. One of the frigates (the Roebuck) was crippled and driven
on shore, and would have been taken possession of, if the ammunition
in the boats had held out. As it was, after the Roebuck floated off
into deeper water, both frigates abandoned their station, and left the
gunboats masters of the river.” It was probable that there might be
some gentleman of the Revolution near him who might have known of the
fact; if so, would it have no impression on the House? He presumed it
would have a favorable impression, as it deservedly ought. He could cite
other instances--he could say, that in the neighborhood of Gibraltar,
at Algeziras, the Spanish gunboats had in many cases attacked British
frigates, and sometimes 74-gun ships, and very much annoyed them. He knew
of no instance of their capture, because it often happened, that a new
wind springing up, carried the vessels out of the reach of their fire. It
was also believed to be a fact, that the British naval commanders in the
mouth of the Straits of Gibraltar had always been alarmed in moderate and
calm weather when they saw the gunboats of Algeziras coming out to attack
their ships of war. Engagements with them were not uncommon, and the
boats frequently had the advantage, and captured merchant vessels under
their convoy, and carried them off, in spite of all the efforts to save
them which could be made by the men of war.
Mr. SOUTHARD was in hopes this bill would have met with very little
opposition, especially when it was considered that it was but a part
of a system of defence, of which the other parts would be decided in
progression. Various objections had been made to the bill. Some gentlemen
supposed that gunboats were altogether insufficient for defence, and that
the scheme was merely ideal and visionary; and some had attempted to
prove that gunboats had never been used. A gentleman from Massachusetts
had just disproved this by circumstantial accounts of two engagements;
one on the river St. Lawrence, and one in the river Delaware. In the last
instance, about twelve gunboats engaged two British ships of war. Mr.
S. would state, from good authority, that the reason why these vessels
were not made a prize, was, that the gunboats were not supplied with a
sufficient quantity of powder and ammunition. This statement and fact
would go far to do away the impressions of those gentlemen who suppose
that gunboats are of no efficiency as a defence, or that their utility
was ideal. In the progress towards the passage of this bill, every day
new difficulties had been discovered, and new objections raised to
its passage. Some gentlemen told them if they passed this bill, and
appropriated a sum of money sufficient for the object proposed by it,
that they would not leave money in the Treasury adequate to the expense
of building land batteries, &c. Another objection was, that if they
appropriated money for building gunboats, fortifications, and batteries
for the seaports, there would be no money left wherewith to provide arms
for the militia. If these remarks were even correct, they possessed no
weight, because gunboats, fortifications, and land batteries, and arming
the militia, were but three several parts of one great system.
After these remarks, he would only state his own idea of what ought to
be done. He thought they should first provide gunboats; secondly, erect
fortifications and land batteries; thirdly, pass a law providing for
arming the militia--for, unless men were armed, they could not prevent
an enemy from landing, destroying, and laying waste the country. Mr.
S. hoped everything would be done which was requisite for protection.
Gentlemen had said that our resources were not sufficient to meet
these objects. Mr. S. would observe that there was, in the Treasury,
money sufficient to answer all these purposes; if not, the country had
resources within itself, fully adequate to every measure of protection
and defence. He would not go, as some gentlemen had, into calculations
of dollars and cents. If the nation was embroiled in war, its expense
would be incalculable. It was impossible to form even an idea of the
enormous expense that would accrue from war. But, Mr. S. would withdraw
all the money out of the Treasury; he would not leave a cent; he would
even drain the blood from his own veins, if it were necessary, for the
defence of his country. If the nation was involved in war, life, liberty,
and property, every thing, was at stake; and all their energies should be
exerted to repel the invader.
Mr. KEY said he conceived he possessed the right to give his sentiments
on this subject; and he felt it a duty to assign those reasons which
would induce him to vote for the bill under consideration.
Mr. K. had no doubt but, in forming a general system of defence, some
few frigates would be found necessary; but he strongly feared they could
neither construct line of battle ships or frigates before it would be
necessary to use them. Some gentlemen had asserted that the nation was at
war; he would not combat this position, though it was not tenable. Some
gentlemen said we were on the eve of war, with whom he thought. If they
were engaged in war, it would not be upon any other part of the frontier
than that accessible by water. Of course the most vulnerable points of
the country were upon the seashore. He therefore thought that every
species of defence competent to the protection of these points should be
adopted, and of this description were fortifications and batteries, aided
by gunboats; not that they composed the best possible means of defence,
but the best that could be constructed within a given time.
There were, as far as Mr. K. knew, in modern times, but two instances,
and but one that was remarkable, of the efficacy of gunboats as a part
of a system. One case was the defence of Cadiz, when Nelson, with his
whole fleet, anchored in the bay of Cadiz, and was repulsed, principally,
he believed, by the instrumentality, but certainly by the assistance
of gunboats. In case of attack, made on our ports, gunboats being
locomotive, would, in such circumstances, be advantageous. Another case
of the success of gunboats occurs in the bay of Gibraltar; they are there
secured from attack, until, like spiders darting upon flies, they spring
out in calm weather, and always capture their prey.
These gunboats took their origin in an early part of this century, when
Gibraltar was surprised by the enemy. Gunboats were then introduced into
the Gut of Gibraltar, and from the time that Britain captured Gibraltar,
to the present day, such has been the effect of these boats, that the
British were always obliged to send supplies and provisions to Gibraltar
under convoy. He had mentioned this circumstance, to show that gunboats
had acted offensively as well as defensively. If gentlemen, however,
considered them as alone a sufficient defence for this country, they
were most miserably mistaken; they were merely eligible as a means of
defence in aid of fortifications. Mr. K. agreed with the gentleman who
had yesterday said that these boats would be no protection against ships
of war, with wind and tide in their favor, in Chesapeake Bay; but, as
offensive weapons, they might be placed at points where they might lie
in readiness till a proper time should arrive in which they could act
with advantage. A number of frigates had been, for some time, lying in
the Chesapeake. Mr. K. did religiously believe, if the nation had been
in a state of war, (and a contrary situation alone had prevented the
experiment being made,) that twelve gunboats, stationed at Norfolk, could
have driven them away from their anchorage. And why did he believe so?
Because they could have chosen their time, when the weather was calm,
and large ships could not be worked. It was in this way that gunboats
could greatly injure ships of war, and, if not destroy them, could
injure them so much as to render them unmanageable. He did not conceive
that gunboats should be considered as incapable of rendering essential
services, because they had not hitherto driven the British squadron
out of the Chesapeake, for the measures taken by the Executive had not
warranted such a step. We are not at war, said he; when, by the shameless
impressment of our seamen and other injuries, and when consummating her
folly and wickedness by the attack on the Chesapeake, the English nation
gave cause for war, we did not go to war. In his judgment, and he was
reluctant to withhold praise where it was due, a much wiser course was
taken; he meant the call upon that Government for reparation before a
resort was had to war. Had they gone to war, on the spur of the occasion,
they would have committed to the mercy of the British navy twenty
millions of American property, afloat on the ocean; it would have fallen
a sacrifice to the superior naval force of our opponents. If honorable
reparation be made, the course which had been pursued would have been
wise; at all events, whether reparation be made or not, time had been
given to our citizens to save a great portion of their property. A
measure of immediate war would have brought bankruptcy on our cities, and
ruin on our citizens. It was well, for this reason, to put the event off
as long as possible--the longer it was put off, the better we should be
prepared for it when it did arrive.
FRIDAY, December 11.
_The Gunboat Bill._
Mr. JOHNSON said, although he should not pretend to propose measures of
great national defence, he considered it a prudent exercise of his right
as a member, to express his sentiments upon subjects proposed by others,
upon which it became his duty to vote. He was in favor of the passage
of the bill. He believed that they had arrived at a crisis; a crisis
which had marked the maritime annals of Great Britain with the blood of
American citizens; the period had arrived when this nation must receive
a satisfaction for injuries inflicted, and a security from future wrong;
or the sword must again be drawn to defend that liberty which was the
boast of all, and which had cost so much. They had before them evidence
sufficient to demonstrate the probability of war, an event which could
not be long protracted but by an honorable accommodation. While America
mourned the loss of her sons, she had wisely forborne to strike a blow
which her wrongs had justified. New instructions had been despatched
to our Minister at the Court of St. James since the outrage upon the
Chesapeake, and a last appeal made to the reason and justice of that
Government by whom they had been so much injured. The negotiation had
terminated in England, and even now a special Minister was expected from
Great Britain to attempt a settlement here. The door to reconciliation
had not been closed, and he hoped it would not be barred so long as
a real desire could be traced in Great Britain to make an honorable
settlement of all important differences. But every thing they could hear
or see proved the propriety of making preparations for the worst event.
Our Government had been the injured party, and must have redress.
The conduct of the Administration had been arraigned. Mr. J. did not
hesitate to approve the conduct of the Executive, and particularly in
this late and important transaction, it had acted with prudence, wisdom,
and firmness. If feeling had not been governed by prudence, the nation
might have been in a state of actual war. Perhaps our wrongs might have
justified it; but while there remained a hope for honorable peace,
negotiation was the proper course. We fear no nation, but let the time
for shedding human blood be protracted, when consistent with our safety.
If our claims upon the justice of England should be disregarded, there
would be time enough for human butchery. He looked around him, and saw
many who had witnessed the calamities and miseries of the American
Revolution. But if war could not be avoided, accumulated horrors would
not induce the American people to endanger their independence. They would
say, like the immortal WASHINGTON, the former victorious leader of their
armies, “I will conquer or die with my countrymen.” Unanimity, in times
of public exigency, was all-important; any other course than that which
had been pursued by the Administration, might and would have created
division; but if they should now be driven into war by the injustice of
Great Britain, where was the man who would not be with them, who would
not approve the conduct of the Administration, pronounce our cause just,
and appeal to Heaven for victory.
As to the system of gunboats, which had involved such a wide range
of discussion, and almost every national topic, he had no practical
knowledge of their utility; but he could state the evidence he had of
their utility to the full extent contended for. First, it was a system
which had been recommended by the President, supported by the opinions of
General Gates, Commodore Barron and Captain Tingey. He perceived that a
very large majority of the Representatives of the seacoast, from Georgia
to Maine, was in their favor. They are used by most of the powers of
Europe, and particularly in the Mediterranean, for defence, and often for
offence. They were considered particularly useful in the North of Europe
and the Baltic, on account of moderate tides, shallow water, and narrow
seas. He had also many examples of their practical utility. In the war
between France and England and her colonies, a case had been cited of an
attack and conflict in the river St. Lawrence, in the year 1763, between
four American gunboats and a French vessel of war, carrying 16 guns and
180 men. The battle was obstinate; the French lost 60 or 70 men, the hull
and rigging of the vessel were cut to pieces, while only one man was
killed on board the gunboats. A battle had been mentioned by the same
member, which happened in the Delaware during the Revolution, where two
English frigates were attacked by gunboats, one of the frigates driven
from our waters, and the other stranded, and would have been captured but
for the want of powder. Again: the celebrated battle between the English
navy and the French flotilla of gunboats off the port of Boulogne, in
the British Channel. Lord Nelson was charged with the destruction of
these gunboats, and made the attack for that express purpose. The first
attack was made with thirty vessels of war of all sizes; he failed in the
enterprise, and was obliged to retire. This great naval commander, not
having satisfied himself or his nation by this attempt, ten days after
returned to the assault, with more ships of the line, a larger number of
frigates and brigs, and renewed the fight; after a very bloody battle and
great loss, he was again repulsed. In fact, nothing did the English so
much fear as these gunboats, properly managed. A few years ago, it would
be recollected, Napoleon collected above one hundred thousand soldiers
for the purpose of invading England. This created alarm and agitation in
Great Britain, and this project the British Cabinet knew could not be
effected without the aid of the French flotilla of gunboats at the port
of Boulogne. The late Minister, Mr. Pitt, to divert the attention of
Napoleon from this design, by British gold and British influence, created
a new coalition upon the continent of Europe against France. For the
moment, this coalition had its desired effect, and it is known to all how
it had terminated. It had resulted in the conquest of the North, cost the
lives of thousands, and inundated Europe with human blood.
Mr. MACON said it appeared to him that the only question at present
discussed was, whether the number of boats authorized by this bill was
the proper number. Some cases had been stated in which gunboats had been
efficacious, and some in which they had not. Mr. M. did not mean to
dispute their efficacy, but as gentlemen on the seacoast were divided on
the subject, until gentlemen could better agree as to number and utility,
so large a number ought not to be built.
There was another thing he should have been glad to have seen before
he voted on this bill; he should have wished to have seen how these
boats were to be manned. They might be told that people would volunteer
their services on board of these boats. There must be some way in which
they must be manned; unmanned, they would be perfectly useless. He
did not like legislating in this detached way; it had been tried in
former days; first passing one law, they must pass another to render it
effectual. He wished to see some efficient method in which these boats
should be manned; he could have wished that the whole system should go
hand in hand. The President was authorized to man these boats. Was any
authority given to draught sailors for the purpose, or how were they to
be supplied? It was essential that this should be known. He should wish,
and if he thought he could succeed he would make a motion to recommit
the bill to a select committee for the purpose of making this provision.
Suppose twenty boats were stationed at Norfolk, did they know that
these boats could be manned? In his opinion, the bill should contain a
regulation for manning them; every law should stand upon its own merits,
and he should always protest against passing one law which would oblige
them to pass another to carry it into effect. Let us, said he, see the
whole system, and then let us vote upon it.
Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL said it had not been his intention to speak on this
subject. There was sufficient cause to induce him still to decline
entering into the debate. His indisposition would certainly prevent him
from examining the subject in that manner which its importance required;
and he would therefore have persevered in his original intention of
remaining silent, had not an attempt been made to make an impression on
the public mind, that the friends of this measure were about to drain
the Treasury of the United States for a system of defence that would
prove inefficient--for a mere useless experiment. This might therefore
require some explanation, that the motives of gentlemen who were about
to vote for this system of defence should be known, as well as their
objects. In the discussion of this subject, gentlemen had also gone
into an examination of the utility of our Naval Establishment, and the
expediency of increasing it at this time, which was in his opinion a
distinct subject, that had little or no connection with the proposed
measure. It would be time sufficient to examine that question when it
came properly before the House. There had also been a very novel mode of
argument introduced on this occasion, and it was the second time it had
been used during the present session--that of gentlemen arguing against
the expediency of a measure, while they declared their intention to vote
for it. This was indeed a new method of legislating, and may be intended
to answer a double purpose: it may perhaps enable gentlemen to say to
those of their constituents opposed to this measure, (if such there are,)
We were inimical to it; we exposed its weakness in the House, and showed
its inefficiency--you cannot therefore blame us for its adoption. While,
on the other hand, they might say to the friends of the measure, We have
supported it by our votes, and are therefore entitled to your confidence
on that ground. Mr. C. did not say that this was the object of gentlemen;
but if it was not, it appeared to him difficult to ascertain what it
could be. It would have appeared much more consistent for those gentlemen
who seriously believed the system to be useless, to vote as well as speak
against it; and it were to be wished that those who intended to vote for
the bill before the House, had permitted it to pass without opposing
it; but, as this course of argument had been pursued, he deemed it a
duty he owed to his country, to those he had the honor to represent,
and to himself, to express to the House (though in a very brief manner)
some of the reasons which would induce him to vote for the bill. He did
not pretend to possess much information on the subject of gunboats--he
had therefore hitherto declined entering into the discussion, and
waited to hear what might be advanced on the subject by those who had
greater opportunities than himself of knowing their efficiency or
inefficiency--but he had found those who had spoken on this subject were
obliged, like himself, to depend on the information of others, and did
not pretend to furnish the House with any practical knowledge on this
subject. They must, therefore, form their opinions from the reasoning on
the case, and such evidence as they were possessed of.
The first important inquiry would seem to be, whether the present state
of our relations with foreign powers was such as required the adoption of
effective measures for national defence. It appeared to be agreed by all
that it was. No one denied the importance of the present crisis. It could
not be denied by any gentleman who would reflect a moment on the repeated
aggressions that have been committed on our commerce, the violated
rights of our seamen, the insult offered to our national flag, and the
murder of our fellow-citizens. These all go to prove, incontestable,
the necessity of our putting the nation in a state of defence. The next
inquiry was, of what nature ought our defensive preparations to be? It is
clear, they ought to be calculated to meet and repel the attacks that we
have a right to expect from those who are likely to become our enemies.
Those attacks are to be expected on our coasts and seaport towns which
are most exposed, and most vulnerable to a marauding enemy. The species
of defence, therefore, that we ought to adopt, should certainly be such
as was calculated to protect, as far as in our power, our coast, our
harbors, and our seaport towns, from insult and ruin; unless, indeed,
these are to be abandoned to the enemy on his first approach. We are then
to determine whether we shall defend these or not.
Will the nation consent to expose to an enemy, without an effort to
repel him until he has landed, the whole extent of your seacoast, all
your seaport towns on the margin of the ocean? This would be a dangerous
experiment, and he had supposed too wild a scheme to be advocated by
any reflecting politician: though it seemed to be the favorite doctrine
of some gentlemen in this House, who were opposed to every species of
defence, except placing arms in the hands of the militia. It is true the
foe might be repelled by your militia, and no doubt would be; but, what
would the citizens of those towns and on your seacoast say? Would they
not justly complain that you had neglected their interest, had deserted
them in the day of danger, and left them to be pillaged and destroyed by
an enemy, without one effort to protect them? They certainly would, and
their complaints would be well founded. There were, however, he presumed,
but very few willing to subscribe to this doctrine--though it had been
advocated by some gentlemen in this House, who appeared opposed not only
to ships of war and gunboats, but also to fortifications.
Taking it then as admitted, that the coast and seaport towns are to be
defended against naval attacks, what were the means in their power best
calculated to effect that object? On this point there was, as might
be expected, some difference of opinion. Mr. C. believed it would not
be contended by any gentleman that our coast and seaport towns could
be effectually defended by fortifications alone. No man was so wild
in his plans as to say so. The whole coast, from Maine to the Gulf of
Mexico, cannot be fortified--some other mode of defence must therefore
be resorted to. He apprehended also, it would not be contended that the
naval force now in our possession, in addition to fortifications, was
sufficient to afford effectual protection to our seaports. This had
not been pretended; its inefficiency was too well known for a single
individual to rely upon it. There was then no question on the point that
they must acquire an additional floating force in aid of fortifications.
What kind of addition was it in their power to make? There was but one
alternative left them--either to build an additional number of ships of
war sufficient for that object, or to resort to the system of gunboats.
They had been very earnestly called upon by some gentlemen to make an
addition to the navy and unite this with gunboats. This would probably be
found impracticable at the present crisis. Mr. C. had expected that those
gentlemen who wished to have reduced the number of gunboats proposed,
and substitute a few frigates in their place, would have shown the
practicability of building their frigates in sufficient time to answer
the present exigency. If this could not be effected, the proposition was
useless. Mr. C. said the building of a large navy was not consistent with
the policy or interest of this country. If it were in their power to do
so, it would be at war with the genius of their Government, the interests
of the people, and the security of their liberties.
Mr. QUINCY said he would not have risen now, but for an observation of
the gentleman from Tennessee, as to speculative opinions. Mr. Q. had
before not expressed his own opinion merely, but the opinion of men
deeply interested and much experienced in this question. He could not
boast of personal experience on the subject, but he had conversed with
merchants and persons in naval employ, and he had found but one sentiment
existed, that they might be useful, but not so much as to supersede
the necessity of other modes. He recollected an observation made by a
merchant deeply interested in the defence of our ports. When his opinion
was asked of the efficiency of gunboats, he said, “you may have gunboats;
but attempt to use them on our coasts, and you would soon not have a gun
left on your boats.” Much better would it be that these guns should be
rested on carriages, and those distributed along the sea coasts. He had
no objection to gunboats when contemplated to be used in shoal and narrow
waters; but he must express an opinion against their efficiency in deep
and rough waters, not from his own experience, but because it appeared
to be the opinion of men skilled in naval affairs; and because the great
mass of men interested in the defence of the ports were averse to this
mode of defence. He should not vote for the bill, because he should, by
so doing, abandon the best interests of the country; and because, when so
large a sum was appropriated, it would seem that land batteries were to
be proportionably neglected.
Mr. RANDOLPH said that so long as the details of the bill were under
consideration, he had forborne to trouble the House with his sentiments,
but now, on its final passage, he conceived himself entitled to express
freely and fully his objections to it. His object was not to make
proselytes, but to present to the House and to his country the grounds
of his refusal to sanction the measure. When perhaps seventy or eighty
speakers had repeatedly risen in its favor, it was surely reasonable that
the few individuals opposed to it should be heard in their own behalf.
He complained of the manner in which business had been conducted. Instead
of a comprehensive system, the whole extent of which might be embraced by
the House, measures had been laid before them piecemeal, and discussions
of the most vague and unprofitable nature had grown out of them. So
far from that general diffusion of information which was so desirable,
they were totally destitute of any concerning the disjointed members
which had been laid upon their table, and which he despaired ever seeing
connected in one perfect whole. The deliberations which had arisen upon
them defied analysis. It was a sort of Parthian warfare, in which the
difficulty lay not in vanquishing the enemy, but in coming up with him.
He had not proceeded (as was alleged) upon his own speculative opinion.
Experiment had proved the inadequacy of this species of armament. When
the President of the United States issued his proclamation, commanding
the British ships of war to retire from our waters, the want of adequate
force alone could justify a failure to carry that proclamation into
effect. A consciousness of his incapacity to enforce obedience to it,
was notoriously one of the causes why Congress had been convened.
Whosoever denied this must have the hardihood to charge the President
with being deficient in his duty, which he presumed gentlemen were not
prepared to do; and surely it was his bounden duty to enforce respect
for the authority of the nation on those by whom it had been treated
with derision and contempt. The British force remaining within our
jurisdiction, in defiance of the laws, were as much an invading foe as if
they had taken possession of the Capitol. The miseries of war had been
feelingly depicted.
Mr. R. was as strong an advocate for peace as any gentleman on that
floor; provided it were a safe and honorable peace. To his apprehension
the arguments which had been urged would justify submission to any
extent. He would ask if it was the duty of the Chesapeake to submit for
the sake of peace, or to have resisted to the utmost of her strength?
She was no more called upon by her duty to resist that attack, than
the nation was now called upon to repel the attack which had been made
upon her sovereignty. The obligation to resist was in both cases the
same. Was any person disposed to applaud as a preserver of peace the
unfortunate man of whom he should say no more than that he was not
more bound to return the broadside of the enemy than Government were
to expel their ships from our harbors after commanding them to depart.
Much as he cherished peace, Mr. R. would be sorry to see it preserved by
such forbearance; and it was only the inability to execute that could
reconcile it for a moment to the feelings of the nation. The proclamation
ought not to have been issued, or it should have been enforced. Let it
not be supposed that he was an advocate for defence by forty-four gun
frigates. Since the existence of their navy the United States had lost
two of their stoutest ships to an enemy, and in both instances without
even a show of resistance. It was true that in one of these instances,
the victor, as if in contempt, had thrown the worthless thing back upon
our hands, instead of sending it where he wished it had gone--to Halifax,
or to the bottom. An attempt to build a navy at this time would bring
not relief but suffering. Mr. R. put little confidence in the regular
navy, as it was called, which just sufficed to bait the war-trap, or
in the gunboats. Like the contemptible insects to which they had been
compared by their advocates, it was hoped that they would find shelter in
their insignificance, but if they should prove instruments of annoyance,
eventually they would be turned against ourselves. He wished to see
the public treasure employed in putting arms into the hands of all who
were capable of bearing them, and in providing heavy artillery, not in
the erection of a naval force, which, whether great or small, unless
it too could retreat beyond the mountains, must fall into the hands of
the enemy. If they wanted a force that should combine strength with
simplicity, ready at all times for the public protection, they had such a
force amply in their power.
The question was put on the passage of the bill, and decided in the
affirmative--yeas 111, nays 19.
MONDAY, December 14.
DANIEL CLARK, the Delegate from the Territory of Orleans, appeared,
produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
FRIDAY, December 18.
_Embargo._
The following is the Message from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States_:
The communications now made, showing the great and increasing
dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise,
are threatened, on the high seas and elsewhere, from the
belligerent powers of Europe, and it being of the greatest
importance to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem
it my duty to recommend the subject to the consideration of
Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the advantage which
may be expected from an inhibition of the departure of our
vessels from the ports of the United States.
Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every
preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present
crisis.
I ask a return of the letters of Messrs. Armstrong and
Champagny, which it would be improper to make public.