I ask concerning it, how ought we to reason? What is our duty?

First. Do all you can to prohibit. Next, if you fail in this--if, in

spite of your laws and their penalties, this description of persons be

brought into the United States, then place yourselves in such a situation

as may enable you best to meliorate the condition of this unhappy class

of men, consistent with self-preservation, and with the deep stake which

an important section of the country has in the policy which you adopt.

On both accounts forfeit. First, because it is the best means of

prohibition. The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. EARLY) declares it is the

only means by which you can do it effectually. The argument he used on

this point, on a former day, is to my mind conclusive. From the situation

of the Southern States, particularly Georgia, you can only prevent the

traffic by taking away the inducement to purchase. And this can only be

done by making the right of every purchaser be forfeited as a penalty.

Next, if contrary to your laws they be imported, they are thrown on the

humanity of the United States. They are brought here by our citizens, and

it is the duty of the National Government to reserve the control of them,

so as to be certain that the best is done for the amelioration of their

condition that our own safety permits. On this account, forfeit. It is

only as a commercial regulation that the National Government can get this

control. If we do not take that title in these persons into the United

States, which the laws of some States recognize, in those States they

are slaves--they must be slaves. Those States can never permit them to

be any thing else. This can only be done by forfeiture. The character of

your policy will depend upon what you do with them after the forfeiture.

Gentlemen reason as if those persons were inevitably to be sold under the

hammer. Certainly this is not the necessary consequence. Are they not

after forfeiture at your control? May you not do with them what is best

for human beings in that condition in which these miserable creatures

are, when they first arrive in this country, naked, helpless, ignorant

of our language, our climate, our laws, our character, and our manners?

Are you afraid to trust the National Government, and yet, by refusing to

forfeit, will you throw them under the control of the States, all of whom

may, and some of them will, and must, make them slaves?

But the great objection to forfeiture is, “it admits a title.” I answer,

first, this does not necessarily follow. All the effect of forfeiture

is, that whatever title can be acquired in the cargo shall be vested

in the United States. If the argument of the gentleman be correct, and

the species of cargo be such as that, from the nature of the thing,

no title can be acquired in it, then nothing can vest in the United

States; and the only operation of forfeiture is to divest the importer’s

color of title by the appropriate commercial term--perhaps the only

term we can use effectual to this purpose, and which does not interfere

with the rights of the States. Grant that these persons have all the

rights of man; will not these rights be as valid against the United

States as against the importer; and by taking all color of title out of

the importer, do we not place the United States in the best possible

situation to give efficiency to the rights of man, in respect to the

persons so imported?

But, next, let us agree that forfeiture does admit a species of title,

lost on one side and acquired on the other; such as we cannot prevent

being recognized in those States where these importations will most

frequently take place; I ask, which is best, and which most humane? Admit

a title, gain it for the United States, and then make these miserable

creatures free, under such circumstances, and in such time, as their

condition into which they are forced permits, or deny the possibility of

acquiring a title, and leave them to be slaves? But my colleague (Mr.

BIDWELL) has a sovereign specific for this. He says, “We do not make

them slaves, we only leave them to the laws of the respective States.”

But I ask, if the laws of all the States may, and those of some of the

States do, and necessarily will make them slaves, “by leaving them to

the operation of the laws of these States,” do we not as absolutely make

them slaves as though we voted them to be such in this House? To my mind,

when we have the power, if we fail to secure to ourselves the means of

giving them their freedom, under proper modifications, we have an agency

in making them slaves. To me it seems that the amendment proposed,

striking out the forfeiture, will defeat the very end its advocates

have in view. Really, sir, I fear it will happen to the honorable mover

of the amendment (Mr. BIDWELL) as it happened to another celebrated

asserter of African rights--I mean the renowned Knight of La Mancha.

We all recollect that while that worthy knight was, with all the real

honesty in the world, descanting on the moral fitness of things on the

eternal, unalienable, imprescriptible rights of man!--that during all

that time he was exercising himself and instructing others on these

themes--the very persons he had undertaken to deliver--the great African

Princess Micomicona, Queen of the great African Kingdom Micomicon, with

her father, her mother, her brothers, her sisters, in short her whole

family, were left in absolute and irretrievable slavery; their fetters

not knocked off, nor their shackles lightened, nor one ray of light

thrown in upon their prison. And yet the good knight, with all possible

self-complacency, astride of his theories, was couching his lance,

scouring the plain, the mirror of philanthropic chivalry, the very cream

of the milk of human kindness!

Now, I say, sir, a little more practicable good, and a little less

theoretic impulse. Reason and legislate according to the actual state

of this description of persons. Place yourselves so as to do the best

possible for their good. They are thrown on your mercy. Do not trust

to others. You can be most certain this power will not be abused in

your own hands. Forfeit--because this is the technical word for getting

the control of them, and the only certain way of making them secure of

your humanity. But what shall be done with them? That is a subsequent

consideration. It is enough for me to know that this House can never do

any thing with them which humanity and self-preservation do not dictate.

Gentlemen will not pretend that these Africans have more rights by nature

than our children. And yet, in every parish, poor children are bound

out, without their consent, until they are of age, and of capacity to

take care of themselves. These Africans are as helpless, ignorant, and

incompetent as such children, and the wisdom of the National Legislature

certainly can, and I have no doubt will, devise means to make them useful

members of society, without any infringement of the rights of man.

Mr. MACON, (the Speaker.)--I still consider this a commercial question.

The laws of nations have nothing more to do with it than the laws of

the Turks or the Hindoos. We derive our powers of legislation not

from the laws of nations, but from the constitution. If this is not a

commercial question, I would thank the gentleman to show what part of the

constitution gives us any right to legislate on this subject. It is in

vain to talk of turning these creatures loose to cut our throats.

Suppose we leave them as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BIDWELL)

has suggested, what will become of them? They will be smuggled in and

made slaves. All the arguments which I have yet heard have served to

confirm the opinion that a forfeiture is the only effectual mode of

prohibition; and though our sincerity has been doubted with an if, yet I

believe every member in this House is solicitous to put a complete stop

to this nefarious traffic.

WEDNESDAY, December 31.

_Importation of Slaves._

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported by the Committee

of the Whole on the twenty-ninth instant, to the bill to prohibit

the importation or bringing of slaves into the United States, or the

territories thereof, after the 31st of December.

Mr. SLOAN was decidedly opposed to the amendment. He was aware that some

might charge him with departing from his well-known peaceable principles,

in contending for so sanguinary a punishment as death. But many crimes

inferior to this were punished with death, and he thought that there

ought to be a proportion in these things. Mr. S. stated the hardships of

the Africans, and the cruel circumstances attending their importation,

and insisted on the magnitude of the crime at considerable length.

After some conversation between Mr. SMILIE and the SPEAKER, on a point of

order, Mr. DANA called for a division of the question. The question was

accordingly divided, the first being on striking out of the bill so much

as inflicts the punishment of death.

Mr. ELY was against striking out. He deemed the crime in question as one

of the most heinous kind, and one which ought to be punished capitally.

But his principal reason for advocating so severe a punishment was, that

he thought it the most effectual method of putting a stop to the trade.

The other provisions of the bill were, in his opinion, not sufficient.

If the punishment of death was inflicted, he presumed no persons would

venture to engage in the trade, and run the risk of being punished,

especially, as the traffic is one of the most uncertain and perilous

kinds. It is said, if you punish with such severity, none will inform;

but will any one venture to run the risk under this impression? Mr. E.

thought not. Besides, this is the most humane punishment, because it will

most effectually prevent the accumulation of miseries that result from

the trade. It will, also, remove all the difficulties on the subject of

forfeiture, by preventing the introduction of slaves.

Mr. TALLMADGE said he considered the question before the House to be,

whether we should strike out that part of the section which attaches the

crime of felony to this nefarious traffic, and, of course, annexes to it

the punishment of death. He trusted the House would not consent to strike

out that clause of the bill, the retention of which should receive his

hearty support.

Since I have had the honor of a seat in this House, I can scarcely

recollect an instance in which the members seem so generally to agree in

the principles of a bill, and yet differ so widely as to its details.

There seems to be great unanimity respecting the atrocity of the crime,

but a wide difference of opinion as to the measures necessary to prevent

it. To me, it is matter of surprise as well as of regret, that gentlemen,

who appear so ardently engaged to prevent the introduction of slaves into

our country, should not be willing to unite with us in providing for it

an adequate punishment. The evils which may be expected to result from

this commerce, if persisted in, will fall on the Southern States; and the

Eastern and Middle States are accused of carrying it on. If this be the

fact, and gentlemen are sincere in their declarations, why will they not

unite with us to mete out that punishment which, on their own statements,

will fall exclusively on those who are concerned in this execrable

traffic from the Northern States?

Mr. MOSELY.--The only objection which has been made against this section

of the bill, as it was originally introduced, is, that the severity of

the penalty as there prescribed, would probably prevent the law from

being carried into execution.

I entirely agree in the justice of the general remark, that it is the

certainty, more than the severity, of the punishment, which tends to

prevent the commission of crimes; that when the penalty is excessive or

disproportioned to the offence, it will naturally create a repugnance to

the law, and render its execution odious.

But I would ask, in the first place, what punishment can be considered as

too severe to be inflicted on this inhuman and murderous traffic? Viewed

in all its consequences, there is hardly to be found, I apprehend, in the

whole catalogue of crimes, one attended with more accumulated guilt. I

have, indeed, sir, heard no gentleman suggest any thing in palliation of

this offence, or deny that it is justly deserving of death. Why, then,

are we to presume that the law would not be enforced? The gentlemen from

the South assure us that they, and the people whom they represent, are

sincerely solicitous to prevent the further importation of slaves into

this country, and they will cheerfully and cordially co-operate in the

most effectual measures for that purpose. Will they, then, from motives

of tenderness to the persons employed in importing them, be unwilling to

subject those persons to the punishment they justly merit?

Sir, there is one circumstance worthy of attention, which I think must

obviate every objection of this sort. Who are the people engaged in this

business? We have been repeatedly told, and told with an air of some

triumph, by gentlemen from the South, that it is not their citizens; that

they have no concern in this nefarious traffic; that it is the people

from the Northern States who import these negroes into the Southern

States, and thereby seduce their citizens to become their purchasers.

If this be the fact, are we to believe that they will entertain any

particular feelings of partiality or passion towards this class of

people, or that they will not feel a just degree of indignation towards

them, and be disposed to subject them to the most exemplary punishment?

And as it respects the great body of the people in the Northern States,

at least, I will presume to say, of the State which I have the honor to

represent, should any of their citizens be convicted upon this law, so

far from charging their Southern brethren with cruelty or severity in

hanging them, they would acknowledge the favor with gratitude. When we

consider the character of the persons engaged in this traffic, that they

are the most hardened and abandoned of the human species, and that it

is extremely lucrative, can we suppose that any penalty short of death

will deter them from it? I shall be very glad if even this will have the

effect.

Mr. LLOYD.--Though this traffic is sanctioned by the Constitution and

laws of the United States, I regard it with hatred and abhorrence, and

conceive it to be of the highest importance that we take means to put

a complete stop to its further continuance. But, in my opinion, the

punishment of death is not best calculated to accomplish this object.

Besides, it is not proportional to the crime. This subject has not,

I conceive, been fairly argued. Very few of the negroes brought into

this country are kidnapped and stolen away. Look at the condition of

the people of Africa. Three-fourths of those brought into this country

are slaves originally, either by descent or conquest. It is a fact

that slavery prevails extensively in Africa. Those taken in conquest

are disposed of and sent abroad on account of the vindictive spirit of

those people. Such is their thirst for revenge, that this is absolutely

necessary for the safety of the conqueror. Of course, all the arguments

urged on the ground of the slaves being kidnapped and carried away from a

state of freedom, are fallacious.

Mr. OLIN.--I would ask gentlemen if they would not as soon be willing to

be brought to the halter as to be made slaves for life? If they would,

and I trust they would, man-stealing is a crime as bad as murder, and

ought to be punished as heavy. I was at first against the punishment of

death; but I own that gentlemen have convinced me by their arguments, and

I am now the other way. I am persuaded that gentlemen will think there is

nothing dishonorable in this changing one’s mind.

Mr. EARLY.--I formerly thought that the decision on this question was not

a matter of any great importance; but as it seems now to be considered as

a prelude to an attack on subsequent parts of the bill, it appears to me

now important that the subject be well understood and rightly decided.

What are you told? You are now told that a forfeiture is unnecessary,

and that to inflict the punishment of death is the only way to stop this

trade. I consider this as an old attack revived in a new form. I hope the

House will pardon me for undertaking to assign reasons for the bill as

reported.

I should like to know how the fear of death will operate on a man who

is bound with his slaves to a country where he knows the punishment

will not be enforced. He will be bound to a country where the people

see slaves every hour of their lives; where there is no such abhorrence

of the crime of importing them, and where no man dare inform. My word

for it, I pledge it to-day, and I wish it may be recollected; no man in

the Southern section of the Union will dare inform. It would cost him

more than his life is worth. No man would risk it when it led to the

punishment of death, when it was not for an offence which nature revolts

at. They do not consider it as a crime.

The gentleman (Mr. SMILIE) has said that, in the Southern States, slavery

is felt and acknowledged to be a great evil, and that therefore we will

execute a severe law to prevent an increase of this evil. Permit me to

tell the gentleman of a small distinction in this case. A large majority

of the people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as a crime.

They do not believe it immoral to hold human flesh in bondage. Many

deprecate slavery as an evil; as a political evil; but not as a crime.

Reflecting men apprehend, at some future day, evils, incalculable evils,

from it; but it is a fact that few, very few, consider it as a crime.

It is best to be candid on this subject. If they considered the holding

of men in slavery as a crime, they would necessarily accuse themselves,

a thing which human nature revolts at. I will tell the truth. A large

majority of people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as even

an evil. Let the gentleman go and travel in that quarter of the Union;

let him go from neighborhood to neighborhood, and he will find that this

is the fact.

Mr. HOLLAND.--In the Southern States slavery is generally considered

as a political evil, and in that point of view nearly all are disposed

to stop the trade for the future. But have capital punishments been

usually inflicted on offences merely political? I believe not. Fine

and imprisonment are the common punishments in such cases. The people

of the South do not generally consider slavery as a moral offence. The

importer might say to the informer that he had done no worse, nor even

so bad as he. It is true that I have these slaves from Africa; but I

have transported them from one master to another. I am not guilty of

holding human beings in bondage. But you are. You have hundreds on your

plantations in this miserable condition. By your purchases you tempt

traders to increase the evil. You and your ancestors have introduced this

calamity into the country, and you are continuing, you are augmenting

it. The importer might hold the same language to the jury and the judge

who try him. He might tell them that they were even more guilty than he.

Under such circumstances the law inflicting death would not be executed.

But if you punish by fine and imprisonment only, you will find the people

of the South willing and ready to execute the law.

Mr. DWIGHT.--We are all happily agreed in the great object of the

bill--the prevention of the importation of slaves into the United States.

Unfortunately, we are not so well agreed in the means to effect this

object. It is not, however, at all strange that men should differ about

the best mode to accomplish so important a purpose; and especially

men in the circumstances in which we are placed. Those of us who come

from the Northern and Eastern States, where slavery exists not at all,

or but in a slight degree, would naturally view this subject in a very

different light from gentlemen who represent the Southern States, where

slavery always has existed, and that to a great extent. As great a degree

of unanimity as is possible is of much importance, both for the purpose

of effectually preventing this inhuman traffic, and for the honor and

reputation of our country.

The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. EARLY) has informed us repeatedly that

a law making this a capital offence cannot be executed in the Southern

States; that the importation of slaves has so long been familiar to them,

that a great majority of the people consider it not as an aggravated

crime, and a large portion of them as no crime at all; that if we make

such an offence capital; if we make the consequence of importing a cargo

of slaves to be the loss of life, no man will ever be prosecuted for

it, because no man will dare inform. All the gentlemen, sir, from the

Southern States, who have spoken on this subject, have told us that

they earnestly wish effectually to prevent the slave trade in future. I

am disposed to credit them fully. Indeed, I cannot conceive that they

should not sincerely and fervently wish to prevent a traffic, which,

if persisted in, must in all human probability, first or last, bring

upon them and their families the most tremendous calamities. If, then,

they view the subject in this light, if they are sincere in making

these declarations, there is not only no danger that the law will not

be executed, but they will unite to a man to execute the law; the whole

community will inform; a regard to their own lives, and the lives of

their posterity, will drive them to it. And if, sir, in the rigid

execution of this statute, its penalties fall upon men from the Eastern

States, who are profligate enough to engage in this inhuman trade, I most

heartily concur with my colleague in saying, let the law have its full

force, let it fall with all its force upon the offender; let him die.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, on striking out so much of the

first section as inflicts the punishment of death on owners and masters

of vessels employed in the slave trade, it was carried--yeas 63, nays 53,

as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., John Archer, Joseph Barker, Burwell

Bassett, Silas Betton, John Boyle, William A. Burwell, William

Butler, George W. Campbell, Martin Chittenden, John Claiborne,

Joseph Clay, George Clinton, jun., John Clopton, Orchard Cook,

Ezra Darby, John Dawson, William Dickson, Peter Early, James

Elliot, Caleb Ellis, Ebenezer Elmer, James Fisk, Isaiah L.

Green, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, John G.

Jackson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, Nehemiah Knight, Edward

Lloyd, Patrick Magruder, Robert Marion, William McCreery,

David Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah

Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas Newton, jun., John Randolph,

John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Peter Sailly, Thomas

Sanford, Martin G. Schuneman, Dennis Smelt, John Smith, Samuel

Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, Samuel

Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Uri Tracy, Abram Trigg, Daniel C.

Verplanck, Robert Whitehill, Eliphalet Wickes, Nathan Williams,

Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--Evan Alexander, Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George M.

Bedinger, Barnabas Bidwell, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount,

James M. Broom, Robert Brown, Levi Casey, John Chandler,

Matthew Clay, Frederick Conrad, Leonard Covington, Richard

Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, junior, Theodore Dwight,

Elias Earle, William Ely, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, John

Fowler, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Silas Halsey, Seth Hastings,

David Hough, John Lambert, Duncan McFarland, Josiah Masters,

John Morrow, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jeremiah Nelson, Gideon

Olin, John Porter, John Pugh, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John

Russell, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John

Smilie, Benjamin Tallmadge, David Thomas, Thomas W. Thompson,

Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, John

Whitehill, David R. Williams, Marmaduke Williams, and Alexander

Wilson.

The question on inserting, in lieu of what was stricken out, a clause

prescribing imprisonment for not more than ten, nor less than five years,

was carried without a division.

The amendments to the second and third sections were read and agreed

to, when, after several unsuccessful attempts to adjourn, the further

consideration of the subject was postponed till Friday--ayes 71--to which

day the House adjourned.

MONDAY, January 5, 1807.

Another member, to wit, MATTHEW WALTON, from Kentucky, appeared, and took

his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, January 7.

_Salt Duty._

Mr. J. RANDOLPH, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was

referred, on the third ultimo, so much of the President’s Message as

relates “to a suppression of the duties on salt, to a continuation of the

Mediterranean fund, and to the state of our revenues,” presented a bill

repealing the acts laying duties on salt, and continuing in force, for a

further time, the first section of the act, entitled “An act further to

protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary

Powers;” which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole

on Friday next.

FRIDAY, January 9.

Another member, to wit, MATTHEW LYON, from Kentucky, appeared, and took

his seat in the House.

MONDAY, January 12.

_Duties on Salt._

Mr. J. RANDOLPH moved that the House resolve itself into a Committee of

the Whole on the bill for “repealing the acts laying duties on salt, and

continuing in force the first section of an act, entitled an act further

to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the

Barbary Powers.”[45]

TUESDAY, January 20.

_Suspension of the Anti-slavery of the Ordinance of ’87 in Indiana._

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from William Henry Harrison,

Governor of the Indiana Territory, enclosing certain resolutions passed

by the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the said

Territory, relative to a suspension, for a certain period, of the sixth

article of compact between the United States and the Territories and

States north-west of the river Ohio, made on the thirteenth of July, one

thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven; which were read, as follows:

_Resolved, unanimously, by the Legislative Council and House of

Representatives of the Indiana Territory_, That a suspension

of the sixth article of compact between the United States and

the Territories and States north-west of the river Ohio, passed

the 13th day of July, 1787, for the term of ten years, would

be highly advantageous to the said Territory, and meet the

approbation of at least nine-tenths of the good citizens of the

same.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the abstract question of liberty

and slavery is not considered as involved in a suspension of

the said article, inasmuch as the number of slaves in the

United States would not be augmented by the measure.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the suspension of the said

article would be equally advantageous to the Territory, to the

States from whence the negroes would be brought, and to the

negroes themselves.

To the Territory, because of its situation with regard to the

other States; it must be settled by emigrants from those in

which slavery is tolerated, or for many years remain in its

present situation, its citizens deprived of the greater part

of their political rights, and, indeed, of all those which

distinguish the American from the citizens and subjects of

other governments.

The States which are overburdened with negroes would be

benefited by their citizens having an opportunity of disposing

of the negroes which they cannot comfortably support, or

of removing with them to a country abounding with all the

necessaries of life; and the negro himself would exchange

a scanty pittance of the coarsest food for a plentiful and

nourishing diet, and a situation which admits not the most

distant prospect of emancipation, for one which presents no

considerable obstacle to his wishes.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the citizens of this part of

the former North-western Territory consider themselves as

having claims upon the indulgence of Congress in regard to a

suspension of the said article, because at the time of the

adoption of the ordinance of 1787 slavery was tolerated, and

slaves generally possessed by the citizens then inhabiting

the country, amounting to at least one-half the present

population of Indiana, and because the said ordinance was

passed in Congress when the said citizens were not represented

in that body, without their being consulted, and without their

knowledge and approbation.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That, from the situation, soil,

climate, and productions of the Territory, it is not believed

that the number of slaves would ever bear such proportion to

the white population, as to endanger the internal peace and

prosperity of the country.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That copies of these resolutions be

delivered to the Governor of this Territory, to be by him

forwarded to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker

of the House of Representatives of the United States, with a

request that they will lay the same before the Senate and House

of Representatives, over which they respectively preside.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That a copy of these resolutions be

delivered to the delegate to Congress from this Territory,

and that he be, and he hereby is, instructed to use his best

endeavors to obtain a suspension of the said article.

The resolutions were referred to Mr. PARKE, Mr. MASTERS, Mr. RHEA of

Tennessee, Mr. SANFORD, Mr. ALSTON, Mr. JEREMIAH MORROW, and Mr. TRIGG,

to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

MONDAY, January 26.

Another new member, to wit, WILLIAM W. BIBB, from Georgia, returned to

serve as a member for the said State, in the place of Thomas Spalding,

who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was

qualified, and took his seat in the House.

_Suspension of the Habeas Corpus._

A message was received from the Senate, by Mr. SAMUEL SMITH, as follows:

Mr. SPEAKER: I am directed by the Senate of the United States

to deliver to this House a confidential message, in writing.

The House being cleared of all persons except the members and the Clerk,

Mr. SMITH delivered to the SPEAKER the following communication in writing:

_Gentlemen of the House of Representatives_:

The Senate have passed a bill suspending for three months the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in certain cases, which

they think expedient to communicate to you in confidence,

and to request your concurrence therein, as speedily as the

emergency of the case shall in your judgment require.

Mr. SMITH, also, delivered in the bill referred to in the said

communication, and then withdrew.

The bill was read as follows:

A Bill suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus for three months,

in certain cases.

_Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America, in Congress assembled_, That

in all cases, where any person or persons, charged on oath

with treason, misprision of treason, or other high crime or

misdemeanor, endangering the peace, safety, or neutrality

of the United States, have been or shall be arrested or

imprisoned, by virtue of any warrant or authority of the

President of the United States, or from the Chief Executive

Magistrate of any State or Territorial Government, or from any

person acting under the direction or authority of the President

of the United States, the privilege of the writ of _habeas

corpus_ shall be, and the same hereby is suspended, for and

during the term of three months from and after the passage of

this act, and no longer.

Mr. P. R. THOMPSON moved that the message and the bill received from the

Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that the doors be opened.

Mr. BURWELL and Mr. SMILIE spoke in support of the motion.

Mr. EARLY thought that a previous order should be taken to remove the

injunction of secrecy. To open the doors and admit strangers to hear the

debate, and yet continue the injunction of secrecy on members, would

present a singular spectacle.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said they could not be bound to secrecy except by their

own vote. If there was any charm by which they could be bound, except

their own act, he wished it might be dissolved.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL hoped the usual course would be pursued; read the bill

a second time, and then refer it to a Committee of the Whole.

Mr. ALSTON thought the question, whether the bill should pass to a second

reading, first in order.

The SPEAKER decided that the motion to open the doors was in order, and

the question on that motion must first be taken.

The yeas and nays being demanded by one-fifth of the members present,

they were ordered to be taken.

The question then was put on the motion, _That the message and bill

received from the Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that the doors

be now opened_; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 123, nays 3.

Mr. EPPES moved that the bill be rejected.[46] This motion was afterwards

withdrawn to give place to another motion, but with the idea of renewing

it again.

Mr. BURWELL said he was unacquainted with the particular reasons which

had induced the Senate to pass this bill. None had been assigned when

the bill was communicated, and no additional documents presented. He

could, therefore, only be governed by that information which the House

had received; and he believed that it would justify the motion before the

House. The President, in his Message of the 22d, says, “on the whole,

the fugitives from Ohio and their associates from Cumberland, or other

places in that quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New

Orleans.” If that be the case, upon what ground shall we suspend the writ

of habeas corpus? Can any person imagine the United States are in danger,

after this declaration of the President, who unquestionably possesses

more correct information than any other person can be supposed to have.

In another part of the Message, we are informed--

“That the persons arrested at New Orleans have been embarked

for some of the Atlantic ports, probably on the consideration

that an impartial trial could not be expected during the

present agitations of New Orleans, and that that city was not

as yet a safe place of confinement. As soon as these persons

shall arrive, they will be delivered to the custody of the law,

and left to such course of trial, both as to place and process,

as its functionaries may direct; the presence of the highest

judicial authorities to be assembled at this place within a few

days, the means of pursuing a sounder course of proceedings

here than elsewhere, and the Executive means, should the judges

have occasion to use them, render it equally desirable, for the

criminals as for the public, that being already removed from

the place where they were apprehended, the first regular arrest

should take place here, and the course of proceedings receive

here its proper direction.”

The President evidently holds out the idea, that the correct and proper

mode of proceeding can be had under the existing laws of the United

States. These persons may be transferred from the military to the civil

authority, and be proceeded against according to law. Those, therefore,

who fear the escape of the traitors already apprehended, and would, by

this measure, obviate the difficulty, must perceive that consequence

would not ensue. Mr. B. said he should consider the suspension of

the habeas corpus as holding out an idea of danger and alarm, which

was highly improper, inasmuch as it did not exist. It is true, this

conspiracy was once formidable, extensive, and threatening; but it has

been dissipated by the vigilance of Government. He would ask gentlemen,

if they seriously believed the danger sufficiently great to justify the

suspension of this most important right of the citizen, to proclaim the

country in peril, and to adopt a measure so pregnant with mischief, by

which the innocent and guilty will be involved in one common destruction?

He said this was not the first instance of the kind since the formation

of the Federal Government; there had been already two insurrections in

the United States, both of which had defied the authority of Congress,

and menaced the Union with dissolution. Notwithstanding one of them

justified the calling out of fifteen thousand men, and the expenditure

of one million of dollars, he had not heard of a proposition to suspend

the writ of habeas corpus. What, then, will be said of us, if now, when

the danger is over, firm in the attachment of the people to the Union,

with ample resources to encounter any difficulties which may occur, we

resort to a measure so harsh in its nature, oppressive in its operation,

and ruinous as a precedent? While, in former times, it was thought unsafe

to suspend this most important and valuable part of the constitution, he

would ask, whether the necessity at the present time could be considered

greater? With regard to those persons who may be implicated in the

conspiracy, if the writ of habeas corpus be not suspended, what will be

the consequence? When apprehended, they will be brought before a court of

justice, who will decide whether there is any evidence that will justify

their commitment for further prosecution. From the communication of the

Executive, it appeared there was sufficient evidence to authorize their

commitment. Several months would elapse before their final trial, which

would give time to collect evidence, and if this shall be sufficient,

they would not fail to receive the punishment merited by their crimes and

inflicted by the laws of their country.

Mr. B. said he could conceive no injury that would result on this score;

and, indeed, if some persons should elude justice, it would not endanger

society so materially as to come within the terms of the constitution.

He observed, it appeared to him the commencement of an insurrection was

the only time when the writ of habeas corpus ought to be suspended;

when the seizure of the ringleaders, by dismaying the inferior agents,

would enable the Government, without the effusion of blood, to suppress

it. But it was manifest that, at this moment, every thing intended

by the conspirators was effected, or they were in the hands of the

civil authority; there was, therefore, no good reason to take this

precautionary step with that view; while on the one hand, it would

unavoidably produce unnecessary alarm, and much inconvenience to the

citizens of the United States. Nothing but the most imperious necessity

would excuse us in confining to the Executive, or any person under him,

the power of seizing and confining a citizen, upon bare suspicion, for

three months, without responsibility, for the abuse of such unlimited

discretion. Mr. B. said he could judge from what he had already seen,

that men, who are perfectly innocent, would be doomed to feel the

severity of confinement, and undergo the infamy of the dungeon. What

reparation can be made to those who shall thus suffer? The people of the

United States would have just reason to reproach their representatives

with wantonly sacrificing their dearest interests, when, from the facts

presented to this House, it seems the country was perfectly safe, and

the conspiracy nearly annihilated. Under these circumstances, there can

be no apology for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,

and violating the constitution, which declares “the writ of habeas corpus

shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of invasion or rebellion,

the public safety may require it.”

Mr. B. said he hoped he had shown that, admitting the two cases specified

in the constitution existed, they were not accompanied with such symptoms

of calamity as rendered the passage of the bill expedient.

What, in another point of light, would be the effect of passing such a

law? Would it not establish a dangerous precedent? A corrupt and vicious

Administration, under the sanction and example of this law, might harass

and destroy the best men of the country. It would only be necessary to

excite artificial commotions, circulate exaggerated rumors of danger,

and then follows the repetition of this law, by which every obnoxious

person, however honest, is surrendered to the vindictive resentment of

the Government. It will not be a sufficient answer, that this power will

not be abused by the President of the United States. He, Mr. B. believed,

would not abuse it, but it would be impossible to restrain all those who

are under him. Besides, he would not consent to advocate a principle bad,

in itself, because it will not, probably, be abused. For these reasons,

Mr. B. said, he should vote to reject the bill.

Mr. ELLIOT said that he regretted the motion to reject the bill had been

made, because, considering the subject of very great importance, he

thought it most proper that it should take the usual course of business,

that the bill should be read a second time, and referred to a Committee

of the Whole, for the purposes of deliberation and discussion.

Called upon, however, said Mr. E., to answer to the question, Shall

the bill be rejected? I must answer that question in the affirmative,

as I should deem it my duty to advocate its rejection in any form

which it might assume, and in any stage of its progress; and I deem it

equally my duty, on the present occasion, to express my sentiments upon

the subject. It is, indeed, difficult for me, consistently with the

sincere and high respect which I entertain for the source from whence

this measure originated, to express, in decorous terms, the hostility

which I feel to the proposition. I am therefore disposed to consider it

as an original proposition here; as a motion in this body to suspend,

for a limited time, the privileges attached to the writ of habeas

corpus. And, in this point of view, I am prepared to say that it is the

most extraordinary proposition that has ever been presented for our

consideration and adoption. Sir, what is the language of our constitution

upon this subject? “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall

not be suspended, except when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the

public safety shall require it.” Have we a right to suspend it in any and

every case of invasion and rebellion? So far from it, that we are under

a constitutional interdiction to act, unless the existing invasion or

rebellion, in our sober judgment, threatens the first principles of the

national compact, and the constitution itself. In other words, we can

only act in this case with a view to national self-preservation. We can

suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in a case of extreme emergency;

that alone is _salus populi_ which will justify this _lex suprema_. And

is this a crisis of such awful moment? Is it necessary, at this time,

to constitute a dictatorship, to save the people from themselves, and

to take care that the Republic shall receive no detriment? What is the

proposition? To create a single Dictator, as in ancient Rome, in whom

all power shall be vested for a time? No; to create one great Dictator,

and a multitude, an army of subaltern and petty despots; to invest, not

only the President of the United States, but the Governors of States

and Territories, and, indeed, all persons deriving civil or military

authority from the supreme Executive, with unlimited and irresponsible

power over the personal liberty of your citizens. Is this one of those

great crises that require a suspension, a temporary prostration of the

constitution itself? Does the stately superstructure of our Republic

thus tremble to its centre, and totter towards its fall? Common sense

must give a negative answer to these questions. What are the facts?

Is it, indeed, a case of rebellion? We are officially informed that

rebellion has reared its hydra front in the peaceful valleys of the West.

But we are also informed by the Executive that treason has no prospect

of success; that “the fugitives from the Ohio, and their associates

from Cumberland, cannot threaten serious danger even to the city of

New Orleans.” Not a single city, still less a Territory or a State, is

considered in danger; and the Executive, not only possesses all the

information which has been communicated to us, but much more, for we

are informed that the communication has been made under the reservation

contained in the resolution requesting it, and of course all the facts

in the knowledge of the Executive, which are decided to be improper

for disclosure at this time, have been kept back. And the Executive,

possessing all this information, assures us that the public safety is not

endangered. Can we, under these circumstances, consent to the investiture

of dictatorial powers in that department of the Government which thus

assures us that all is safe? It would be contrary to the spirit of the

constitution.

But we shall be told that the constitution has contemplated cases of this

kind, and, in reference to them, invested us with unlimited discretion.

When any gentleman shall advance such a position, we, who advocate the

rejection of the bill, will meet him upon that ground, and put the

point at issue. We contend that the framers of the constitution never

contemplated the exercise of such a power, under circumstances like the

present; and that the constitution itself, instead of authorizing, has

prohibited such discretion, unless in an extreme case. And can any member

lay his hand upon his heart and say, that the present is a case of that

description? He who cannot do this must, with us, consider the proposed

measure as unconstitutional.

Let us pay a little attention to the nature and character of the writ

of habeas corpus. It has its origin in Great Britain, and is there

considered in two great points of view, as it respects the monarch, and

as it respects the subject. As it respects the monarch, it is one of

the _jura prerogativa_, a writ of prerogative; but it is not considered

as calculated to increase the power of the king, or the splendor of the

throne; in its origin and true character it is viewed as a prerogative,

exercised by the king, or those authorities to whom his judicial powers

are supposed to be delegated, only for the purpose of securing the

constitutional rights of the subject, and restraining the invasion of

those rights. As it respects the subject, it is a writ of right, and is

emphatically called, by English writers, a writ of liberty.

By the provisions of the famous statute of Charles II., which has even

been called a second _magna charta_, its privileges are guarantied to all

British subjects at all times. An eminent English author, and the most

popular writer upon subjects of legal science, considers its suspension

as the suspension of liberty itself; declares that the measure ought

never to be resorted to but in cases of extreme emergency; and says that

the nation then parts with its freedom for a short and limited time, only

to resume and secure it for ever. Hence, he compares the suspension of

the habeas corpus act in Great Britain to the dictatorship of the Roman

Republic.

But objectionable as the bill upon the table is in point of principle,

it is, if possible, still more objectionable in point of detail. It

invests with the power of violating the first principles of civil and

political liberty, not only the supreme Executive, and the Executives of

individual States and Territories, but all civil and military officers

who may derive any authority whatever from the Chief Magistrate. And it

extends the operation of the suspension of the privileges of the habeas

corpus, not only to persons guilty or suspected of treason, or misprision

of treason, but, to those who may be accused of any other crime or

misdemeanor, tending to endanger the “peace, safety, or neutrality,” of

the United States! What a vast and almost illimitable field of power

is here opened, in which Executive discretion may wander at large and

uncontrolled! A vast and dangerous scene of power, indeed! It gives the

power of dispensing with the ordinary operation of the laws to a host

of those _little great men_, who are attached to every Government under

heaven. I wish not to reflect upon any of those subordinate officers who

may be employed by the Government of my country.

But no one will doubt that, in times of alarm and danger, many men

will be clothed with the functions of office, who are incompetent to

the discreet exercise of such boundless discretion. I can never wish

to see such persons invested with the means of aiming at the heads of

their private enemies, or other innocent and unoffending citizens, the

thunderbolts of public indignation, or scorching them with the lightning

of public suspicion. Says the poet:

“Could great men thunder, Jove would ne’er be quiet,

For every petty pelting officer

Would use his heaven for thunder.”

Let us again ask for evidence of the necessity of this measure? Certainly

none can be produced, for we are informed, from the first authority,

that if the present be not a time of profound peace, it is far from

being a period of public danger. The leader of this petty rebellion has

been called the modern Catiline. Undoubtedly, he possesses many of the

qualities which a celebrated ancient historian ascribes to the Catiline

of Rome: his genius, his address, his activity, his profligacy; but he

is destitute of his means and resources. He wants that power of doing

mischief which the Roman conspirator possessed. So far is he from being

able to make war upon his country, that he cannot take possession of a

single city. He is rapidly hastening to the same fate, although he may

not meet it in the same manner. Already is he “damn’d to everlasting

fame,” or rather, damned to everlasting infamy. Already is he a fugitive.

Already a price is set upon his head. In the papers of this morning,

we see that the Governor of Orleans has offered a reward for his

apprehension. We cannot but detest the traitor, but we can have no fears

of the consequences of the treason.

Mr. E. concluded, by expressing a hope that the bill would meet a decided

vote of rejection.

Mr. EPPES.--When I feel a decided hostility to a principle, it is not

material to me in what form I meet it. Decidedly opposed to the principle

of this bill, I shall vote against it in all its stages, and cannot but

hope that the motion of my colleague to reject it will prevail. By this

bill, we are called upon to exercise one of the most important powers

vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States. A power

which suspends the personal rights of your citizens, which places their

liberty wholly under the will, not of the Executive Magistrate only, but

of his inferior officers. Of the importance of this power, of the caution

which ought to be employed in its exercise, the words of the constitution

afford irresistible evidence. The words of the constitution are: “The

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless

when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require

it.” The wording of this clause of the constitution deserves peculiar

attention. It is not in every case of invasion, nor in every case of

rebellion, that the exercise of this power by Congress can be justified

under the words of the constitution. The words of the constitution

confine the exercise of this power exclusively to cases of rebellion or

invasion, where the public safety requires it. In carrying into effect

most of the important powers of Congress, something is left for the

exercise of its discretion. We raise armies when, in our opinion, armies

are necessary. We may call forth the militia to suppress insurrection

or repel invasion, when we consider this measure necessary. But we can

only suspend the privilege of the habeas corpus, “when, in cases of

rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.” Well, indeed, may

this caution have been used as to the exercise of this important power.

It is in a free country the most tremendous power which can be placed

in the hands of a legislative body. It suspends, at once, the chartered

rights of the community, and places even those who pass the act under

military despotism. The constitution, however, having vested this power

in Congress, and a branch of the Legislature having thought its exercise

necessary, it remains for us to inquire whether the present situation

of our country authorizes, on our part, a resort to this extraordinary

measure.

The inquiry is confined within very narrow limits. The power can only

be exercised under the constitution, “when, in cases of rebellion or

invasion, the public safety may require it.” Our country is not invaded.

We have only, therefore, to inquire whether there exists in this country

a rebellion, and whether the public safety requires a suspension of the

habeas corpus. Of the existence of the rebellion or combination against

the authority of the United States there can be no doubt, as we have

on our table a detailed account of its origin and progress. I shall

confine my observations solely to the latter part; whether the public

safety requires a suspension of the habeas corpus for its suppression.

In the communication now on our table, from the Executive, we have been

informed that the militia of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the

Mississippi and Orleans Territories, have been ordered out. That General

Wilkinson was at Orleans, on the 10th of December, with his troops

from the Sabine, which from other information we know to consist of one

thousand effective men. These are resources of the nation now in active

operation. What is the force of the conspirators? By the same documents,

we are informed that “some boats, accounts vary from five to double or

treble that number, and persons, differently estimated from one to three

hundred, had passed the falls of the Ohio to rendezvous at the mouth of

Cumberland river, with others expected down that river.” From the same

document it appears that the force which comes down Cumberland river

amounts to two boats, in one of which is Aaron Burr. From this statement,

it appears that the largest calculation as to the actual force of the

conspirators, is three hundred. But when we know the propensity of human

nature to magnify accounts of this kind, we may fairly infer that the

whole force does not exceed one hundred and fifty men. To oppose which,

we have one thousand regular troops, and the militia of Ohio, Kentucky,

and Tennessee, and of the Mississippi and Orleans Territories. Is there

a man present who believes, on this statement, that the public safety

requires a suspension of the habeas corpus? This Government has now

been in operation thirty years; during this whole period, our political

charter, whatever it may have sustained, has never been suspended. Never,

under this Government, has personal liberty been held at the will of a

single individual. Shall we, in the full tide of prosperity, possessed

of the confidence of the nation, with a revenue of fifteen millions of

dollars, and six hundred thousand freemen, able and ready to bear arms in

defence of their country, believe its safety endangered by a collection

of men which the militia of any one county in our country would be

amply sufficient to subdue? Shall we, sir, suspend the chartered rights

of the community for the suppression of a few desperadoes; of a small

banditti already surrounded by your troops; pressed from above by your

militia; met below by your regulars, and without a chance of escape, but

by abandoning their boats, and seeking safety in the woods? I consider

the means at present in operation amply sufficient for the suppression

of this combination. If additional means were necessary, I should be

willing to vote as many additional bayonets as shall be necessary for

every traitor. I cannot, however, bring myself to believe that this

country is placed in such a dreadful situation as to authorize me to

suspend the personal rights of the citizen, and to give him, in lieu

of a free constitution, the Executive will for his charter. I consider

the provision in the constitution for suspending the habeas corpus as

designed only for occasions of great national danger. Like the power of

creating a Dictator in ancient Rome, it prostrates the rights of your

citizens and endangers public liberty. Like that it may, on some very

extraordinary occasions, prove salutary, but like that, it ought never

to be resorted to but in cases of absolute necessity; or, to use the

emphatic language of the constitution, “when the public safety requires

it.” Believing that the public safety is not endangered, and that the

discussion of this question is calculated to alarm the public mind at a

time when no real danger exists, I shall vote for the rejection of the

bill in its present stage.

Mr. VARNUM said if he was of opinion with the gentlemen from Vermont

and Virginia, he should vote for the rejection of this bill; but he

entertained a different opinion, and, unless he heard something to

change it, he should vote differently from them. He did not believe

the constitution restricted the power of the Government to suspend the

privilege of the habeas corpus in cases where the country was shaken to

its centre. There were no expressions in it to justify this inference.

Its terms are: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended, except when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public

safety shall require it.” Will gentlemen deny that there exists in the

United States at present a rebellion? I presume not, said Mr. V., it is

too notorious to admit of doubt. Will they deny that the conspiracy has

been formed with deliberation, and has existed for a long time? Is it not

evident that it has become very extensive? If, then, this is the case,

and the head of the conspiracy has said that he is aided by a foreign

power; if this is true, are we justified in considering the country in

a perfect state of safety, until it is brought to a close? I conceive

not. I consider the country, in a degree, in a state of insecurity;

and if so, the power is vested in the Congress of the United States,

under the constitution, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I am

also apprehensive that we shall not be able to trace the conspiracy to

its source without such a suspension. We have had an instance in which

the head of the conspiracy has been brought before a court of justice,

and where nothing has been brought against him. It is not my wish to

insinuate that any court or public functionary is contemplated by this

conspiracy; yet it is possible that this may be the case, and the very

existence of the country may depend on tracing it to its source. I am not

disposed to advocate sanguinary punishments, but I think they ought to be

exemplary in regard to the chiefs of the conspiracy; for which purpose

we ought to adopt those measures which will lead to a full discovery of

those concerned in it. I am sensible that the Government of the United

States has not hitherto resorted to this measure; but I know a particular

State of the Union who did consider the measure necessary, in the case

of an insurrection which occurred within her limits; and I think it very

doubtful whether that insurrection would have so happily closed, if it

had not been for her suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Have we had

any insurrection or rebellion in the United States like this? We have had

one insurrection in Massachusetts, but whence did it arise? Not from a

design to subvert the Government, but from the burden of taxes; taxes

which, perhaps, exceeded those laid in any country since the formation of

society. I do not mean, by these observations, by any means to justify

that insurrection, and, I believe, from the circumstances with which I

am acquainted, that the insurrection which took place in Pennsylvania

did not go to the subversion of the Government. But let us look at this

conspiracy. While the nation, from one extreme to the other, enjoys a

degree of prosperity and happiness unparalleled in any other nation, and

not a single individual within our limits has any reason to complain of

oppression, an insurrection is fomented, subversive of the Government

and destructive of the rights of the people. It appears to me that this

insurrection is the most aggravating of all insurrections which history

gives us an account of. There is not the least oppression or the least

pressure of circumstances, to induce any individual to rise up against

the Government of this country; and it consequently betrays the greatest

turpitude of mind in those who either lead or unite in it. For these

reasons, I think it ought to be traced to its source, and I think it very

doubtful whether this can be effected without, in the first instance,

suspending the habeas corpus. Will gentlemen say that any innocent man

will have a finger laid upon him, should this law pass? No; there is no

probability of it; it is scarcely possible. But, even if it be possible,

if the public good requires the suspension of the privilege, every man

attached to the Government and to the liberty he enjoys, will be surely

willing to submit to this inconvenience for a time, in order to secure

the public happiness. The suspension only applies to particular crimes,

the liberties of the people will not therefore be touched. I do think

a great responsibility will rest on this branch of the Legislature, in

case they refuse to pass this act. Suppose the head of this conspiracy

shall be taken in a district of country where no evidence exists of

the crime charged to him, and he shall consequently be set at liberty

by the tribunals of justice; where will the responsibility rest, but

upon this branch of the Legislature? It is too great for me, as an

individual member, to bear. I shall, therefore, vote for this bill,

under the impression that it will not have the injurious effects that

some gentlemen seem to apprehend; and that it will only more effectually

consign the guilty into the hands of justice.

Mr. R. NELSON.--As the motion to reject the bill meets my most hearty

approbation, and as I consider it involving a great national question,

I cannot reconcile it to my duty to give a silent vote on it. I shall,

however, in order to avoid an unnecessary consumption of the time of the

House, offer my remarks in as concise a compass as possible. I shall

first consider the nature of the writ of habeas corpus; afterwards

examine its effects, not only on the individual, but on the community at

large; taking into view the mode of proceeding under it, to show, as I

conceive, that no danger can ensue, on the refusal to pass this bill.

What is a writ of habeas corpus? It is a writ directing a certain person

in custody to be brought before a tribunal of justice, to inquire into

the legality of his confinement. If the judge is of opinion that the

confinement is illegal, the person will of course be discharged; if,

on the contrary, from the evidence, he shall be of opinion that there

is sufficient grounds to suspect that he is guilty of offence, he will

not be discharged. Now, to me, it appears that this is a proper and

necessary power to be vested in our judges, and that a suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus is, in all cases, improper. If a man is taken

up, and is denied an examination before a judge or a court, he may,

although innocent in this case, continue to suffer confinement. This, in

my opinion, is dangerous to the liberty of the citizen. He may be taken

up on vague suspicion, and may not have his case examined for months, or

even for years. Would not this bear hard upon the rights of the citizen?

Let us turn over a leaf, and see how the Government stands. If the person

accused is legally committed, or if it shall be proved that he has

committed any offence, the judge will say that he shall not be released.

If he has committed an offence, there can be no grounds for this

suspicion, because, without such suspension, he will not be discharged,

because it does not follow that, inasmuch as a man has a right to demand

that he be brought before a judge by a writ of habeas corpus, he shall

therefore be discharged. He is only bound to examine him, and if he finds

there is strong reason to believe he has committed a crime, he may remand

him to confinement.

This is a writ of right, which ought to exist under all governments on

earth. What right? The right of being examined by the tribunals of his

country, to determine whether there is any ground for the deprivation

of his liberty. Is this a right which ought to be suspended merely to

gratify the apprehensions of gentlemen? I think not. The framers of the

constitution have said: “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of invasion or rebellion,

the public safety shall require it.” Well, but, says the gentleman from

Massachusetts, can any one deny that this is a rebellion? It may perhaps

be, but I think it does not deserve the name of a rebellion; it is a

little, petty, trifling, contemptible thing, led on by a desperate man,

at the head of a few desperate followers: a thing which might have been

dangerous, if the virtue of the people had not arrested and destroyed

it. But admit that it is a rebellion; will every rebellion justify a

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus? The constitution says: “the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except

when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require

it.” Does, then, the public safety require this suspension? Does the

constitution justify it? And, under present circumstances, confining a

man in prison without a cause. There is no danger, the enemy is not at

our door; there is no invasion; and yet we are called upon to suspend the

writ of habeas corpus. This precedent, let me tell gentlemen, may be a

ruinous, may be a most damnable precedent--a precedent which, hereafter,

may be most flagrantly abused. The Executive may wish to make use of more

energetic measures than the established laws of the land enable him to

do; he will resort to this as a precedent, and this important privilege

will be suspended at the smallest appearance of danger. The effect will

be, that whenever a man is at the head of our affairs, who wishes to

oppress or wreak his vengeance on those who are opposed to him, he will

fly to this as a precedent; it will truly be a precedent fraught with the

greatest danger; a precedent which ought not to be set, except in a case

of the greatest necessity; indeed, I can hardly contemplate a case in

which, in my opinion, it can be necessary.

In my opinion, this is a measure which ought never to be proposed, unless

when the country is so corrupt that we cannot even trust the judges

themselves. This, I consider the cause of the frequent suspension of

this privilege in England. Whenever the whole mass of society becomes

contaminated, and the officers of the judicial court are so far corrupted

as to countenance rebellion, and release rebels from their confinement,

it may be then time to say, they shall no longer remain in your hands;

we will take them from you. But I apprehend there is no such danger

here, and I repeat it, we are at once creating one of the most dangerous

precedents, and passing one of the most unjust acts that was ever

proposed.

Mr. SLOAN.--At the same time that I express my purpose to vote on the

same side with the gentleman from Maryland, I shall take the liberty of

assigning very different reasons for my vote from those offered by him.

The gentleman from Virginia has mentioned two preceding insurrections,

which he considers of much greater magnitude than this. I am of a

different opinion. Compared to this, I consider them as only a drop

to the bucket. For a moment, let me ask the attention of gentlemen to

those insurrections, or as I think they might, with more correctness, be

termed, oppositions to Government. In consequence of certain citizens

thinking themselves aggrieved by certain acts, in which they have been,

in some measure, justified by their subsequent repeal, a handful of

people raised in opposition to their execution. What analogy do those

oppositions bear to this rebellion? I consider the late or present

conspiracy to be of greater magnitude than any we know of in history.

Under what authority has it been created? Under that of a man of great

abilities and experience, who states that he expects encouragement from

foreign nations. I do not pretend to say that this is a fact; but what

has he done? Has he not drawn resources from every part of the Union? I,

therefore, consider it of great magnitude, and it is certainly excited

against the best government on earth, under which the people enjoy the

greatest happiness. I shall, however, vote against the bill, under the

belief that we may confidently rely on the love and affection of the

people for their Government, to which we are already probably indebted

for its suppression. Had this measure been brought forward a month or six

weeks ago, I should have voted for it.

Mr. BIDWELL said, although he was not satisfied of the necessity of

passing this bill, he was not prepared to reject it, in its present

stage. As it had received the sanction of the Senate, he was disposed to

treat it as a subject worthy of discussion and deliberation, by referring

it in the usual course, to a Committee of the whole House. Before the

passing of any bill of this nature, the House ought to have satisfactory

proof that a rebellion in fact existed, (for there was no pretence of

an invasion,) and that the public safety required a suspension of the

privilege of habeas corpus. By the terms of the constitution, both of

these pre-requisites must concur, to authorize the measure. The first

inquiry would naturally turn upon the existence of a rebellion. On

that point he had no doubt. To constitute a rebellion, in the sense

of the constitution, he did not think it necessary that a battle

should have been fought, or even a single gun fired. If troops were

enlisted, assembled, organized, and armed, for the purpose of effecting

a treasonable object, it amounted to actual rebellion. Such was the

existing state of things. The public notoriety of the fact was, perhaps,

sufficient evidence for the Legislature to act upon, if necessary; but

they had also the official statement of the President to that effect.

He had, therefore, no doubt of the existence of a rebellion, and that,

too, of a more wanton and malignant character than any insurrection which

had heretofore been raised against our Government; for it had not been

occasioned by any grievances, real or imaginary, but must have originated

in motives of personal ambition, or some more unworthy passion.

An existing rebellion, however, even of this aggravated description,

was not alone sufficient to justify a suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus. To bring it within constitutional justification, it must be

required by the public safety. That was a matter of opinion, rather than

of fact. He was convinced that the proposed suspension was not requisite

for the purpose of suppressing the conspiracy; for by the vigilance

and energy of our Executive Government, seconded and supported by the

exertions of particular States and Territories, and the army, this deep

laid conspiracy was already in a good measure suppressed, and he trusted

the means now in operation would complete the suppression. A suspension

of the habeas corpus could not be necessary, except for the detection

and conviction of the conspirators. A thorough investigation ought

undoubtedly to be made. If any persons concerned in the conspiracy were

arrested in situations which precluded an immediate production of such

evidence as would warrant their confinement, justice would require that

they should be detained until the proper evidence could be procured; but

in the mean time they might be discharged by virtue of a habeas corpus;

for, though he agreed with the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. NELSON,)

in the importance and utility of this writ, he could not subscribe to

the doctrine which he understood that gentleman to maintain, that it

would entitle a person to a discharge only for causes of irregularity

in the arrest. Want of legal evidence to show, by oath or affirmation,

probable cause for detention, would be a ground of discharge. In ordinary

cases, indeed, the release and escape of a guilty person, for such want

of evidence, was esteemed a smaller evil than a denial of the common

privilege. If it were so in respect to this conspiracy, there was, in his

opinion, no good reason for passing this bill. That was a point which

appeared to him worthy of some deliberation.

It had been mentioned in the debate, that in the whole history of our

Government, notwithstanding two insurrections, the habeas corpus had, in

no instance, been suspended. It was true. But an instance had been cited

from one of the States. During the insurrection in Massachusetts there

was such a suspension, in pursuance of a constitutional provision; and it

was generally acknowledged to have been a necessary and salutary measure.

He had never understood that it was abused, or that it was considered by

the people of that State, a dangerous example. It was justified by the

occasion. But it did not, therefore, follow, that a similar suspension

would be justifiable on this occasion. That must depend on the present

state and circumstances of the nation. Although a rebellion existed, he

was not satisfied that the public safety required so strong and severe

a measure. But, as it was an important question, on which the House had

not yet taken time to deliberate, he was willing that the bill should

go, according to the usual course of proceeding, to a Committee of the

Whole; and therefore, he should not give his vote for rejecting it in the

present state.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I shall give my vote in a very different manner from

the gentleman who has just sat down. I was extremely happy to witness

the very prompt and decided opposition this measure received in the

House, and from the quarter whence that opposition originated; and I

subscribe with great pleasure to the sound constitutional doctrine,

which the gentleman from Pennsylvania advanced this morning before our

doors were opened. We are now told that to reject this bill at its first

reading, will be to depart from the usual course of proceeding in this

House, and an attempt is made to enlist the feelings of members so far

at least as to permit the bill to progress one step farther, that we

may avoid violating that decorum which ought to be observed between

the two Houses. I do not, however, consider the subject in this light.

I conceive, on the contrary, it is as competent to us to reject the

bill on its first as on any other reading. I well recollect that about

eight years ago an important bill was smuggled through the House by this

fastidious mode of proceeding. Gentlemen were allured from their honest

opinions, and finally, by finesse and management, the bill was carried

through the House. I understand that this course is pursued by the other

branch of the Legislature on bills carried from this House; and I believe

it will be found that with regard to the passage of bills between the

two Houses, the course of procedure on the part of this House is more

liberal than that pursued by the other. For I do not recollect a single

instance in which the vote of a single member can stop the passage of a

bill in this House received from the other branch of the Legislature. I,

therefore, feel no scruples on this score. I think it just as well to

say, that we will permit this bill to pass to a second or third reading,

as to say that though we are opposed to the principle contained in a

resolution which may originate in this House, we nevertheless permit a

committee to bring in a bill to carry it into effect, because we may

destroy the bill at its last stage. This appears to be a strange course

of reasoning. It is like permitting yourselves to be bound in chains that

you may be loosed again, or going into prison that you may afterwards

come out. Gentlemen talk of the propriety of discussing this subject,

but when a subject is so clear that every man has made up his mind upon

it, where is the need of discussion? If it is not so clear, will any

gentleman say that the discussion now had, in which every member has a

right to speak twice, which is once more in my opinion than is necessary,

will not be sufficient to develope all the merits and demerits of the

bill? Will gentlemen undertake to say, if every member shall give the

mature, or as it may be, crude suggestions of his mind, that the subject

will not be sufficiently discussed, and lead to the formation of a

correct judgment? I believe it will. And therefore, on this ground, a

bill may as well be decided in its present stage as before a Committee of

the Whole.

Some gentlemen, to whom I have listened with considerable gratification,

tell us that, out of respect to the other branch, we ought not at this

time to reject the bill. I, however, feel no such respect on this

occasion, and shall express none. On the contrary, I am free to declare,

that when a measure, tending to impose a burden on the people, or to

detract from the privileges of the citizen, comes from that quarter, I

shall always view it with jealousy. The inequality of the representation

in that branch, the long tenure of office, and the custom with which

they are so familiar of conducting their proceedings in conclave,

(the House will recollect how long it was after the adoption of the

constitution before the public could get admission into their twopenny

gallery,) render all their proceedings touching the public burdens, or

the liberties of the people, highly suspicious. And to say the truth, I

am not at all surprised that they did close their doors on this occasion,

that they might not be under the inspection of the public eye, while

they were passing the bill on the table. I say so, because I am willing

to abide by the good old principle of judging all men by myself; and if

I had introduced such a bill, I should have been glad, my name did not

appear on the Journals, that the public might not know to whom they were

indebted for such a precedent.

I have another objection to the bill, besides that of the quarter from

which it originated, or the manner in which it has been presented to the

House. It appears to my mind like an oblique attempt to cover a certain

departure from an established law of the land, and a certain violation

of the Constitution of the United States, which we are told have been

committed in this country. Sir, recollect that Congress met on the first

of December, that the President had information of the incipient stage

of this conspiracy about the last of September--that the proclamation

issued before Congress met, and yet that no suggestion, either from

the Executive or from either branch of the Legislature, has transpired

touching the propriety of suspending the writ of habeas corpus until

this violation has taken place. I will never agree in this side-way

to cover up such a violation, by a proceeding highly dangerous to the

liberty of the country, or to agree that this invaluable privilege shall

be suspended, because it has been already violated, and suspended, too,

after the cause, if any there was, for it has ceased to exist. No; I

wish to be true to those principles which I have constantly maintained,

and, God willing, ever will maintain so long as I have a seat on this

floor, or have life. It has heretofore been the glory of those with

whom I have acted, that in all our battles we have combated for the

principles of the constitution and the laws of our country, in the

persons of those in whom they have been attempted to be violated, however

infamous and contemptible. When those principles were prostrated under

the sedition law, what did we say? That the character of the man accused

could not change the laws of the land, or impair his rights--that we

would support the constitutional rights of the citizen, in the person

of the meanest reptile, as well as in the persons of those who occupy

the highest stations in society. We have done so--let us continue to do

so, regardless of popular clamor or odium, and we shall still continue

to find ourselves on true ground. We never inquired what kind of a man

Callender was--we said, such is the law and the constitution; let justice

take its course. I could quote other examples equally strong, but in

deference to the feelings of the House I shall desist from doing it.

I beg pardon for detaining the House so long. I will, however, endeavor

to express the remaining ideas I have to offer in a few words. There is

another consideration which renders this bill highly objectionable. I

consider the case as now at issue, whether the United States is under a

military or civil government, or, in other words, whether the military

government is subject to the civil power, or the civil authority to the

military. I conceive that a case has occurred, in which the military has

not only usurped the civil authority, but in which it has usurped nothing

short of omnipotent power; and I consider this bill as calculated to give

a softening and smoothing over to this usurpation; and on this ground I

cannot assent to it. Suppose this bill either to pass or not to pass,

what has been the practice under the constitution? By the expression,

under the constitution, I do not mean conformably to it. Men have been

taken up by a military tribunal, and have been transported contrary to

law. I say transported, for if a man can be transported from the district

where the offence with which he is charged was committed, he may also

be deported to Cayenne, or transported to Botany Bay. And even you

yourself, (addressing the Speaker,) if such acts be sanctioned by this

bill, in your passage from this House to your lodgings, may be arrested,

put on board a vessel and carried whithersoever the military authority

may choose. To this I will never give my consent. It has been very well

remarked by my colleague, that this is not the first case in which an

insurrection has occurred in the United States, but that it is the first

case in which an attempt has been made to suspend the precious privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus.

I put it to any man, whether, now that we have received information of

the extent of this conspiracy, and when we find that Catiline, Cethegus,

and Lentulus, have not as many brother conspirators as themselves, this

conspiracy is equal to that in Pennsylvania in 1794 or 1795? In physical

force it is not comparable to it, however in intellectual talent it may

be. I conceive then that according to the Constitution of the United

States, there is but one case in which the writ of habeas corpus can be

suspended, and I should not go into this view of the subject, if it had

not been misstated by all those who have preceded me in the debate. My

view of the subject is this--that this privilege can only be suspended

in cases in which not merely the public safety requires it, but that

the case of the public safety requiring it, must be united with actual

invasion or actual rebellion. Now, with whatever epithets gentlemen may

dignify this conspiracy, I am not even of the opinion of the gentleman

from Maryland (Mr. R. NELSON)--I think it nothing more nor less than

an intrigue--and I am happy that I can declare on the honor, not of a

soldier, but of a citizen, that I believe it to be a foreign intrigue,

availing itself of domestic materials for answering its purposes, and

poor indeed must be the soil of this, or of any other state of society,

which would not furnish such materials.

A gentleman from Massachusetts has stated to the House that the

organization and administration of the Government, at this time, forbids

the apprehension of any abuse being made of the powers delegated under

this law. Surely, sir, the gentleman could not mean to urge this as any

thing new. He must have known, if he had consulted history--as doubtless

he has--that the king _de facto_, and the administration _de facto_,

are always above suspicion. That there never was a proposition brought

forward, that did not find a majority ready to say, There is surely no

danger of any improper use of this power in our time, for we are all

honorable men, and we would not delegate it, if an improper use could

be made of it; and that, if we reject a measure, we ought not to do it

so much on account of ourselves, as on account of those who come after

us. And what will those who come after us say of us? They will follow

our example, and declare that the character of their forefathers was

above every doubt and every suspicion. Now, for myself, I beg leave

to be permitted to disclaim every argument of this kind. I do not,

indeed, consider it fair to introduce such an argument. Let us take

up the question on its own merits and demerits, without any allusion

or reference to our own virtues, or the degeneracy of posterity. For

myself, I have no hesitation in saying that I will not grant this power

at any time, except under the most imperious necessity; and I say this

without any disrespect to this honorable body, or to any of the public

functionaries. Take man as he is, and in his best estate, you find him

an animal prone to abuse and corruption. There does not exist a single

constitution or law in the world, that does not enforce this salutary

truth.

I shall consider this bill, if it passes, as establishing a new era in

the Government. When I was a boy, I recollect to have consulted such

chronological tables as I could get access to. I recollect to have read,

that at a certain time, monarchy was abolished in Rome; a little while

after, the first Dictator was named; then the second Dictator--and I

believe, as in a case of apoplexy, she scarcely got over the third fit.

I believe a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus might have, here,

the same effect as the establishment of the first Dictatorship at Rome.

In what situation would it place yourselves and the citizens of this

country? It would leave them at the mercy, not merely of a justice of

the peace, but at the mercy of every subaltern officer of the army and

navy. I believe it would comport as much with the safety and interest

of this confederacy to give us power to send these people off, as to

put this power in their hands. I believe we should be as trustworthy as

they. And, let me ask, what compensation to an innocent man, to a man of

honor and feeling, to a man of character, who should be tied neck and

heels and sent off to New Orleans, and who should ultimately be proved

to be innocent--I ask what compensation it would be to him to bring an

action of damages? Against whom? A man without visible property? And what

action? An action on the most mercenary principle. To be indemnified

in his fame by dollars and cents. The injury would be irreparable. At

present, all stand under the law. If any one offend, let him be brought

under it. But, in this way, to put a man in an oyster boat, or skipper,

and transport him to a distance from the place of his arrest, and then

say he shall have a remedy, in case of his innocence, against an inferior

officer, is absurd. If we pass such a bill, which God forbid! it should

contain a large appropriation, and Government should be obliged to make

good the injured party--to afford him redress. I say they should grant

a large appropriation, for it is not for men with epaulets and gold

buttons to make reparation. If the bill passes, we are told it will be

but temporary. Why, the Sedition law was but temporary; and I think,

sir, (alluding to the Speaker,) you were one of those who aided its

passage--much against your will--by being present at the altar when it

was more than once re-enacted. As to its three months continuance, I

consider that as one of the most objectionable features of the bill--as

a bait to the trap; as the entering wedge. If it is made reconcilable to

the interests and feelings of this House to pass it for three months, do

you think we will then feel the same lively repugnance to it that we now

do? No! It has been truly said, that no man became perfectly wicked at

once; and it may be affirmed, with equal truth, that a nation is never

enslaved at once. Men must be initiated by degrees, and their repugnance

must be gradually overcome. Let me state a case. It is proposed to extend

the time of service of the Executive Magistrate from four, to five, or

eight years, or for life. If it be prolonged for a term, do you believe

we shall stop at its expiration? No! Once extended for life, he will then

claim the power to choose his successor, and the hereditary principle

will follow. This is the old trick. Let me, however, tell gentlemen that

old birds are not to be caught with chaff, though, unfortunately for

them, the mass of mankind does not consist of old birds. Pass one other

law, and I would quit the country. A twin brother to this same bill was

introduced into the British Parliament in 1794; and that bill to prevent

seditious assemblies, was brought forward for about as good reasons as

this. According to it, if four or five persons assembled, and refused on

the notice of a magistrate, to disperse, they were considered guilty of

sedition, and were dispersed by force. These two bills form a complete

tyranny--and tyranny of the most odious kind, because established under

the mask of liberty. Was the tyranny of Robespierre less intolerable,

oppressive, or odious, because inflicted in the name of the people,

than a like tyranny in Turkey, under the Grand Seignor and his Muftis?

Take one other thing along with you. These two fatal wounds, inflicted

on the liberties of the English nation, were inflicted by the man who

came forward in the character of a reformer--by the man who came forward

as the advocate of a Parliamentary reform; from which circumstance he

acquired that popularity which enabled him to inflict those deadly wounds

on the liberty of his country.

Having said so much with regard to the principle, permit me to add one

word on the details of the bill. There is a departure in it from the

known, accustomed, and received language of the constitution, in the

use of the word “authority.” The words are “warrant or authority.” The

expression is, in my opinion, too lax. Perhaps, we may be told, that

the bill may be amended on the third reading. But my objection to the

principle contained in it is such, that I will not consent to carry to

a third reading that which under no amendment can be rendered palatable

to my taste. Mr. R. concluded by observing that he had so far exhausted

himself that he was unable to go on.

Mr. SMILIE.--I shall not detain the House long by the remarks which I

propose to make on this subject. I shall waive all observations on the

mode of proceeding on this occasion--whether we shall reject the bill on

its first, or suffer it to go to a second reading. The question is now

put, and I am called upon to give my vote, either in the affirmative or

negative. I, therefore, feel under a necessity to put my negative upon

it. I consider this one of the most important subjects upon which we

have been called to act. It is a question which is neither more nor less

than, whether we shall exercise the only power with which we are clothed,

to repeal an important part of the constitution? It is in this case

only, that we have power to repeal that instrument. A suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, in all respects, equivalent

to repealing that essential part of the constitution which secures that

principle which has been called, in the country where it originated,

the “palladium of personal liberty.” If we recur to England, we shall

find that the writ of habeas corpus in that country has been frequently

suspended. But, under what circumstances? We find it was suspended in

the year 1715, but what was the situation of the country at that time?

It was invaded by the son of James II. There was a rebellion within the

kingdom, and an army was organized. The same thing happened in the year

1745. On this occasion it was found necessary to suspend it. In latter

times, when the Government had grown more corrupt, we have seen it

suspended for an infinitely less cause. We have taken from the statute

book of this country, this most valuable part of our constitution. The

convention who framed that instrument, believing that there might be

cases when it would be necessary to vest a discretionary power in the

Executive, have constituted the Legislature the judges of this necessity,

and the only question now to be determined is, Does this necessity exist?

There must either be in the country a rebellion or an invasion, before

such an act can be passed. I really doubt whether either of these exist.

I really doubt whether a single law of the United States has been, as

yet, violated. I will not say this is the fact; but I do not know any

thing to prove the contrary. But, supposing that a rebellion does exist,

we are then left at liberty to decide whether it is such a one as to

endanger the peace of society to such a degree that no ordinary remedy

will answer. If an ordinary remedy will not, it may be our duty to apply

an extraordinary one. What is this mighty business? What is the opinion

of the Executive as to its danger? Does he consider it dangerous? It is a

little remarkable that, in every instance under the British Government,

the proposition of such a measure originated with the Executive, while

here, without any intimation of danger from the Executive, we propose,

on our own suggestion, to suspend one of the most valuable privileges

that is secured to the citizen. Let us attend to the communication of the

President on this subject. He states that, according to his information,

the persons concerned in the conspiracy depend on receiving two kinds of

aid; foreign aid, and aid derived in their own country. After giving his

opinion of the foreign aid expected, he says:

“On the whole, the fugitives from the Ohio, with their

associates from Cumberland, or any other place in that quarter,

cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New Orleans.”

The President declares that, in his opinion, there is no danger to be

apprehended. With regard to foreign force, he states his reasons for

thinking there is no danger. As the Message is in the hands of every

gentleman, there can be no necessity for me to read it. But he explicitly

declares, from the state of our relations with other nations, there can

be no danger from that quarter. This being the deliberate opinion of the

Executive Magistrate, who is more deeply responsible on this occasion

than any other member of the Government, is it not most extraordinary

that we should attempt to take steps which can only be justified in the

last resort? Are gentlemen aware of the danger of this precedent? This

is the first attempt ever made under the Government to suspend this

law. If we suspend it when the Executive tells us there is no danger,

on what occasion may it not be suspended? Let us suppose that it shall

be suspended on this occasion, what will be its effect? Parties will

probably for ever continue to exist in this country. Let us suppose a

predominant party to conjure up a plot to avenge themselves. Do not

gentlemen see that the personal liberty of all their enemies would be

endangered? I mention this to forewarn gentlemen of the dangerous ground

before them. I do not say that our country may not, at some future day,

be in such a situation as to justify such a suspension, but I have never

yet seen her in such a situation, and, at this moment, I think it does

not exist. When we see the great body of the people so firmly attached

to their Government, ought we to be thus alarmed on beholding a few

desperate and unprincipled men attempting to stir up an insurrection?

There is another consideration which will induce me to give my hearty

negative to this bill. If foreign nations see that we are obliged, under

such circumstances, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, will it not

show that the constitution is incapable of supporting itself, without the

application of the most dangerous and extraordinary remedies?

Mr. DANA.--I understand that the question is, whether the bill shall

be rejected on its first reading, without passing through the ordinary

forms of proceeding. In such cases, the ordinary question is, Is there

any thing in the bill proper for the House to deliberate upon? If they

are of opinion that it can be modified in such a way as to ensure its

passage, it ought to go to a Committee of the Whole. This was my opinion

when the motion was first made to reject the bill. I was disposed to vote

against the question, although the bill went to repeal the constitution.

I have been accustomed to view the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

as the most glorious invention of man. I was notwithstanding, however,

from a respect to the other branch of the Legislature, disposed to

investigate the subject--to examine whether there was any necessity for

it. As, on the one hand, I was inclined to believe that the judgment of

the Senate had, on this occasion, been tinged by a strong abhorrence of

rebellion; so I was willing, on the other, to take time to guard myself

against an equally strong feeling of abhorrence of dictators. But, on

one principle, I cannot agree to consider this bill as a proper subject

of investigation, for one moment. I perceive, on further examination

of the bill, that the Senate have provided for its suspension in cases

where persons have been already presented. Had it been confined to

future arrests, I might have agreed to deliberate on it, but viewing it

in the light of an _ex post facto_ law, I must give it my instantaneous

negative. There is another principle which appears to me highly

objectionable. It authorizes the arrest of persons, not merely by the

President, or other high officers, but by any person acting under him.

I imagine this to be wholly without precedent. If treason was marching

to force us from our seats, I would not agree to do this. I would not

agree thus to destroy the fundamental principles of the constitution, or

to commit such an act, either of despotism or pusillanimity. Under this

view of the subject, I am disposed to reject the bill, as containing a

proposition on which I cannot deliberate.

The yeas and nays were then taken on the question, “Shall the bill be

rejected?”--yeas 113, nays 19, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jr., Isaac Anderson, David Bard, Joseph

Barker, Burwell Bassett, George M. Bedinger, Silas Betton,

William W. Bibb, Phanuel Bishop, John Blake, jr., Thomas

Blount, James M. Broom, Robert Brown, John Boyle, William A.

Burwell, William Butler, George W. Campbell, John Campbell,

Martin Chittenden, John Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay,

George Clinton, jr., Frederick Conrad, Orchard Cook, Leonard

Covington, Samuel W. Dana, Ezra Darby, John Davenport, jr.,

John Dawson, Theodore Dwight, Peter Early, James Elliot, Caleb

Ellis, Ebenezer Elmer, William Ely, John W. Eppes, William

Findlay, James Fisk, John Fowler, James M. Garnett, Charles

Goldsborough, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Silas

Halsey, John Hamilton, Seth Hastings, James Holland, David

Holmes, David Hough, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, James

Kelly, Thomas Kenan, John Lambert, Joseph Lewis, jr., Henry

W. Livingston, Edward Lloyd, Matthew Lyon, Duncan McFarland,

Patrick Magruder, Robert Marion, William McCreery, David

Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow,

John Morrow, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jeremiah Nelson, Roger Nelson,

Thomas Newton, jr., Timothy Pitkin, jr., John Porter, John

Pugh, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John

Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, John Russell,

Peter Sailly, Thomas Sammons, Martin G. Schuneman, Ebenezer

Seaver, James Sloan, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, John Smith,

Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, William

Stedman, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge,

Samuel Tenney, Philip R. Thompson, Thomas W. Thompson, Uri

Tracy, Abram Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van

Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, Robert Whitehill,

David R. Williams, Marmaduke Williams, Alexander Wilson, Joseph

Winston, Richard Wynn, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--Evan Alexander, John Archer, Barnabas Bidwell, John

Chandler, Richard Cutts, Elias Earle, Isaiah L. Green, William

Helms, Josiah Masters, Gurdon S. Mumford, Gideon Olin, Thos.

Sanford, Henry Southard, David Thomas, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel

C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, Eliphalet Wickes, and Nathan

Williams.

MONDAY, February 2.

_Death of the Representative, Levi Casey, Esq._

Mr. THOMAS MOORE, a member of this House for the State of South Carolina,

informed the House of the death of his colleague, General LEVI CASEY,

late one of the members of the said State in this House: Whereupon,

_Resolved, unanimously_, That a committee be appointed to take order for

superintending the funeral of General LEVI CASEY, late a Representative

from the State of South Carolina.

_Ordered_, That Mr. THOMAS MOORE, Mr. EARLE, Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS, Mr.

MARION, Mr. EARLY, and Mr. HOLLAND, be appointed a committee, pursuant to

the said resolution.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of this House will testify

their respect for the memory of General LEVI CASEY, late one of their

body, by wearing crape on the left arm for one month.

On motion of Mr. HOLLAND,

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of this House will attend the

funeral of the late General LEVI CASEY this day, at one o’clock.

_Resolved, unanimously_, That a message be sent to the Senate to notify

them of the death of General LEVI CASEY, late a member of this House, and

that his funeral will take place, this day, at one o’clock.

THURSDAY, February 5.

_National Defence._