On motion, it was

_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be requested to

inform this House whether SAMUEL HAMMOND, a member of this House, has not

accepted of an Executive appointment, and when?

_Ordered_, That Mr. BRYAN and Mr. EPPES be appointed a committee to

present the foregoing resolution to the President of the United States.

_Georgia Claims._

The House resumed the consideration of the resolution reported yesterday

from the Committee of the Whole on the Georgia Claims.

Mr. ELLIOT.--It cannot but be considered as a very fortunate

circumstance, and one which cannot fail to have a favorable influence

upon the final decision of this important question, that, since the

delivery of the animated observations which yesterday so powerfully

attracted the attention of the House, we have been afforded a few hours

of tranquil retirement from the tempest of the forum, for the purpose,

useful at all times, and peculiarly so at the present time, of calm

reflection. To transfer ourselves in a moment from the flowery fields

of fancy, to the rugged road of argument, to descend instantaneously

from the elevated scenes of eloquence to the humble walks of common

sense, requires an effort transcending ordinary powers. In claiming your

attention, Mr. Speaker, for a greater portion of the day than I commonly

occupy in debate upon this floor, I shall not address you in the style

of compliment or ceremony. It is time to banish from these walls that

idle frippery of ceremonious conversation, which is suited only to a

new year’s compliment, or a birthday salutation, and to catch a little

of the sturdy spirit of antiquity. A bold, a loud, an impressive appeal

is made to the American people. In that appeal I fearlessly and most

cordially unite. I regret, however, the existence of a precedent which

at once justifies and demands these addresses to the people. Much as I

wish to disseminate correct information, particularly on a subject which

I believe is but imperfectly understood without these walls, except by

interested persons, and convinced as I am that the subject is understood,

and an opinion formed upon it, by every member of this House, I shall not

so completely follow the example before us as to speak to the people in

the first instance, but shall, as usual, direct my observations to the

House.

I propose to examine, in a concise, and if it be in my power, in an

argumentative manner, the following questions, which have a direct

application to the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.

CLARK) to the resolution under consideration, and which, at the same

time, open to view the whole extent of the subject:

Did the State of Georgia, in the year 1795, possess a title to the

territory in question?

Were the Legislature of Georgia, in 1795, invested with the

constitutional power of making a sale of the territory, and did they make

such sale to those from whom the present claimants derive their title or

pretended title? And if such sale was made, what title or color of title

did it convey?

Were the members of the Legislature of Georgia, in 1796, invested with

the constitutional power of rescinding the acts of their predecessors in

relation to such sale, and did they rescind them?

Were the claims or pretended claims of the present claimants in any

manner recognized by the act of cession of the territory in question from

Georgia to the United States? And,

Do justice and policy, or either justice or policy, require that the

whole or any part of the five millions of acres, reserved by the act of

cession from Georgia to the United States, for the purpose of satisfying

claims of a certain description against Georgia, in reference to the

said territory, should be appropriated for the purpose of satisfying the

claims of the present claimants?

However extensive the outline which I have sketched of the subject, the

survey will be a rapid one.

It is necessary that I should make one or two preliminary observations. I

have uniformly been opposed to the doctrine which has been so powerfully

advocated, that Congress is competent to make a legislative decision

upon the validity or invalidity of the conflicting acts of Georgia. We

possess no such powers. But as individuals we may express our opinions.

Nor am I disposed to do any thing which shall have a tendency to impugn

the title of the United States to this territory. Without deciding the

question of title, my principal object is to show that the claimants are

in possession of so strong a color of title, that it will be good policy

to authorize a negotiation with them for the abandonment of their claim,

especially as we have a prospect of obtaining that abandonment on their

part, without going beyond the reservation in the act of cession, and

of course without the actual expense of a single dollar to the United

States.

Did the State of Georgia, in the year 1795, possess a title to the

territory in question?

To answer this inquiry, it is only necessary to make one or two

quotations from the articles of agreement and cession, entered into on

the 24th of April, 1802, between the Commissioners of the United States

and those of Georgia. In the first article, “the State of Georgia cedes

to the United States all the right, title, and claim, which the said

State has to the jurisdiction and soil of the lands situated within

the boundaries of the United States south of the State of Tennessee,”

&c. By the second article, “The United States accept the cession above

mentioned, and on the condition therein expressed; and they cede to the

State of Georgia whatever claim, right, or title, they may have to the

jurisdiction or soil of any lands lying within the United States, and out

of the proper boundaries of any other State, and situated south of the

southern boundaries of the States of Tennessee, North Carolina, and east

of the boundary line herein above described, at the eastern boundary of

the territory ceded by Georgia to the United States.” Whatever claim or

title the United States might previously have had to the territory, they

thought proper, in 1802, to combine with it, and to fortify it, by that

of Georgia; and surely we shall not do any act, or adopt any principle,

tending to impair the title under which we now exercise jurisdiction over

the territory.

Were the Legislature of Georgia, in 1795, invested with the

constitutional power of making a sale of the territory, and did they make

such sale to those from whom the present claimants derive their title or

pretended title? And if such sale was made, what title or color of title

did it convey?

In this age of political revolution and reformation, for I consider it

an age of reformation as well as revolution, there are still certain

principles and maxims, not merely venerable for their antiquity,

but consecrated by their conformity to the common sense and reason

of mankind, which are considered as universal in their application,

and irresistible in their influence. Among these may be numbered the

principles which attach to the government of every regularly-organized

community; the power of pledging the public faith, and that of alienating

the right of soil of the vacant territory of the nation. In every free

government, there must exist the power of legislation, or of making

laws; a distinct power, charged with the execution of the laws, and a

judicial power. The union of these different powers in the same man or

body of men, is the very essence of despotism. Thus in France, prior to

the Revolution, it was a fundamental maxim of State that the King was

the Legislator of the French Monarchy; and the power exercised in some

instances by certain parliaments, of refusing to register the edicts of

the monarch, however in practice it might operate as an obstruction

to legislation, was in theory only a matter of form, or at most but a

temporary check upon the executive power. In oligarchies the legislative

power is vested in the rich and noble; and in aristocracies, in a few

individuals who are presumed to be the wisest and the best in the

community. In governments of the democratic form, this power resides in

the great body of the people, and is exercised by themselves or their

representatives. The base of the temple of American liberty is democracy,

or the sovereignty of the people; representation and confederation

are the principal pillars which support the great superstructure. As

the State governments are unquestionably representative democracies,

the General Government is a representative federal republic. In every

government of the representative form, the representatives of the people

are vested with power to pledge the public faith, and to alienate the

vacant territory of the nation. Were the members of the Legislature of

Georgia, in 1795, invested with this authority? Certainly it was within

the sphere of those constitutional rights and powers, which had never

been surrendered to the General Government. We have since recognized that

authority by receiving a solemn deed of cession of the territory from a

subsequent Legislature of Georgia, transferring to us not only the soil,

but the right of jurisdiction. Was this authority exercised in 1795? In

the act of the Legislature of that State of the 7th of January in that

year, granting this territory to those from whom the present claimants

derive their claims, certain lands are described, and it is enacted

that those lands shall be sold to such and such persons, as tenants in

common, and not as joint tenants. The land shall be sold, or, in other

words, the right of soil shall be alienated. A proper distinction is

taken between the _dominium utile_ and the _dominium directum_ of the

civilians. No transfer was made of the right of jurisdiction, although

such imaginary transfer forms a prominent article in the reasons assigned

by the Legislature of 1796 for passing the rescinding act. From this view

of the subject, whatever may be the present state of the question of

legal title, who can doubt that the present claimants, honest purchasers

from the original grantees, upon the faith of an independent State, and

innocent of fraud, if fraud existed, possess such a color of title, such

an equitable claim, as to render it prudent and politic to enter into a

compromise with them upon reasonable terms?

Were the members of the Legislature of Georgia, in 1796, invested with

the constitutional power of rescinding the acts of their predecessors in

relation to such sale, and did they rescind them?

Congress is incompetent to the decision of this question. Nor is such

decision necessary. I will, however, make one or two inquiries, and state

one or two principles, which are applicable to the subject, which at the

same time will go to strengthen the ground I have taken as to color of

title in the claimants, and the policy of extinguishing their claims.

Can a legislature rescind a contract made by its predecessors?

Writers on national law make a distinction between laws which operate in

the nature of contracts, and those which have no such operation. Every

enlightened and reasonable man will subscribe to the opinion that a

pledge of the public faith, given by the competent authority, ought to be

irrevocable. Laws which pledge the faith of the community, which create

contracts, which vest rights in individuals or in corporate bodies, it

may safely be assumed as a general principle, are irrepealable. Laws of

merely municipal operation are alterable or repealable at the pleasure of

the existing legislature.

Can the judicial power declare a legislative act void, as having been

passed by means of corruption?

Different opinions have existed in our country as to the right claimed

by the judiciary, of deciding upon the constitutionality of laws. The

better opinion seems to be, that from the nature of our Government, and

the very terms of the constitution itself, by which that instrument is

declared to be the supreme law of the land, the judges not only ought

to exercise that power, but that they cannot avoid its exercise. If I

am not mistaken, some gentlemen, who deny that the judges possess this

right, are prepared to invest them with the more dangerous one of setting

aside a legislative act on the ground of corruption. To admit that the

judiciary may examine into the motives of the Legislature in passing

laws, or that they may receive and decide upon evidence tending to prove

corruption in the legislative body, would certainly be going much further

than those have gone who have claimed for that department the right of

deciding upon the constitutionality of laws. Suppose a trial of title

between a person claiming under the act of Georgia, of 1795, and another

claiming under the United States, and suppose evidence offered to the

Court to prove the corruption of the Legislature of Georgia, in what a

peculiar situation the judges would be placed? And would they listen

for a moment to an application for the admission of such evidence? It

may well be doubted. Do not then the present claimants possess a very

strong color of title? Is it not prudent to extinguish claims of this

description?

Were claims, or the pretended claims of the present claimants, in any

manner recognized by the act of cession of the territory in question from

Georgia to the United States? And,

Do justice and policy, or either justice or policy, require that the

whole or any part of the five millions of acres, reserved by the act of

cession from Georgia to the United States, for the purpose of satisfying

claims of a certain description against Georgia, in reference to the said

territory, should be appropriated for the purpose of satisfying the

claims of the present claimants?

I have anticipated the principal arguments in favor of the equity of

the claims, and the policy of a compromise with the claimants. The

memorialists state that their claims were particularly contemplated

by the Commissioners, both of the United States and of Georgia. They

have offered us no evidence of this fact, and we are not to take it for

granted. Indeed, I am far from thinking it my duty either to advocate or

answer the pamphlet of the memorialists, and I shall make but this single

allusion to it. Whatever may be its merits, it has had no influence upon

my mind in forming my opinion. An examination of the official documents

upon our tables will evince, however, that by a very strong implication,

if not by express provision, these claims have been recognized, both by

the act of cession, and by the law of Congress passed in consequence.

The gentleman from Virginia has expressed his surprise that the Chairman

of the Committee of Claims had contented himself with reporting facts and

principles, and that he has not adopted the novel procedure of reporting

something tantamount to an elaborate speech in favor of the claims. As

the speech of the gentleman from Virginia is unfortunately destitute

of argument against the claims, and as it might be possible to deduce

from it reasons in their favor, it might perhaps be proper for him to

print it and annex it to the report, as a substitute for that which he

thinks the chairman ought to have subjoined for the edification of the

House. My feeble optics have been able to discover but one attempt at

argument, which is in those observations which relate to the Message of

the President, and the proceedings of Congress, on the act of Georgia,

in 1795, and which, it is contended, were notice, to purchasers and

to the world, of fraud. At that time, it was not suspected that fraud

had been committed, and the reason for those proceedings was, that the

United States possessed, or were supposed to possess, certain claims

to the territory. There are certain subtile, sublimated, ethereal,

heaven-descended geniuses, the soft and silken texture of whose minds

would suffer infinite discomposure from the contact of that rude and

knotty thing--an argument. That gentleman is not of this description. Too

often have we witnessed his argumentative powers to entertain this idea.

I regret that he has declaimed instead of reasoning upon this occasion,

as I believe that argument, particularly upon important subjects, is

more useful than mere declamation. From motives which I cannot develope,

for I ascribe improper views to no one, the present is attempted to be

made a party question. The people are told that the Capitol has become

a scene of political and private iniquity, of fraud and federalism;

that the majority, of their Representatives are committing a stupendous

robbery upon the public patrimony, and their indignation is invoked

upon the plunderers. What facts exist to justify these denunciations?

Are we about to barter away the rights and interests of the people? Are

we about to be guilty of a wanton waste of the public property? Are

we guilty of political apostasy? No such thing. We are about to make

arrangements for carrying into effect a solemn stipulation in the treaty

with Georgia, and a solemn act of our predecessors, by devoting a part

of the five millions of acres, specially reserved for that purpose, for

which the United States never paid a cent, and never will pay a cent, to

the extinguishment of the colorable claims of equitable claimants. Yet

we are told that this act of equity, good faith, and good policy, is a

stupendous crime, compared with which the flagitious acts of the former

“unprincipled administration” dwindle into “petty larcenies.” I am a

republican--a democratic republican. I was opposed to the general system

of that administration. But I do not think it magnanimous, or honorable,

malignantly to triumph over fallen foes. Nor do I dread the union of

honest men. It can be dreadful only to the dishonest.

It is said that the circumstance that one of the great officers of

the Government is numbered among the claimants, ought to scatter

consternation through this House. It is unnecessary for me to undertake

a vindication of the character of that gentleman. Does his office divest

him of the common rights of a citizen? Does it deprive him of the right

of petitioning the National Legislature? But his contracts are resorted

to for the purpose of proving that he has extended his official influence

within our walls. Unfortunate, indeed, is the application of this

argument. By the report upon the table, it appears that three members are

contractors, and we all see that two of them are opposed to the present

claims.

Believing, Mr. Speaker, that this act of enormous robbery, this wanton

dissipation of the public treasure, this abominable league between

corruption and federalism, of which we hear so much, is neither more nor

less than an act of just national policy; believing with the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the late Attorney-General, that

“the interest of the United States, the tranquillity of those who may

hereafter inhabit that territory, and various equitable considerations,

which may be urged in favor of most of the present claimants, render it

expedient to enter into a compromise on reasonable terms;” and believing

that this compromise ought to be delayed no longer, I shall give a

decided vote in opposition to the proposed amendment, and in favor of the

original resolution, as reported by the Committee of Claims.

Mr. LUCAS.--I am, sir, in favor of the amendment proposed to the report

now under consideration. The unparalleled fraud which has been practised

by the divers land companies styled purchasers, under the act, or

pretended act, of Georgia of 1795, and by the Legislature that passed

that act, have been fully noticed and exposed in the course of the

debates which took place on the same subject, during the last session of

Congress, and again during these two last days. This notorious fraud,

odious as it is on the part of the land companies, is still much more

so on the part of the members of the Legislature of Georgia, as their

country had confided in them, and that themselves had pledged their faith

under the obligation of an oath. But there are other instances of fraud

and deception, materially affecting the purchase or claim in question,

which have been solely practised by the land companies, and in which

the Legislature of Georgia had no kind of participation. These charges

cannot be resisted by the ordinary means of denial of facts, for they are

supported upon authentic documents.

It ought to be observed that the four land companies who are original

purchasers under the act of the Legislature of Georgia, passed on the

7th January, 1795, stated in their petition, containing their proposals

to the Legislature to purchase certain lands belonging to the State of

Georgia, that the land contained within the bounds which were described

in their petition, amounted to 21,750,000 acres. It was evidently upon

the faith of this statement, that the Legislature consented to sell that

land for $500,000. However, it is now ascertained that the quantity of

the land thus described amounts to 35,000,000 of acres, and the companies

themselves compute it to be near 40,000,000. From this it appears

evidently that the companies have deceived the Legislature by stating

what was not true, that the contracts are legal and obligatory. The

parties ought not only to have contracted with liberty of choice, but

they ought also to have contracted with a due knowledge of the matter,

which was the object of the contract. This has not been the case here;

the Legislature have sold twice as much land as they intended to sell,

or, which is the same thing, they have sold it one time cheaper than

it was their intention, and all this loss is the result of the false

statement given by the land companies.

It is an incontrovertible maxim of law, that none ought to be benefited

by his own wrongs; this maxim applies with a double force in a contract

between the sovereign authority and private persons. The contract between

the Legislature and the land companies having been entered into by the

means of a statement which proves to be false, and which has been made by

the parties that claim the benefit arising thereof, the contract becomes

vitiated and of no effect.

Should this wrong not be sufficient to invalidate the contract, there is

another wrong that would arise from it; by the act of 1795, a reserve

was made of two millions of acres out of the several tracts sold to the

Georgia land companies, for the use of such citizens of Georgia as chose

to subscribe in the original terms of the purchase. The price paid by

the citizens who did subscribe was two cents and one-third per acre,

it being the price then supposed to have been paid by the companies,

according to the statement originally made of the whole quantity of land

contained in the purchase, which, as I have before said, proves to be

very near double the land companies would receive from the citizens of

Georgia, who clearly had a right to subscribe on the original terms; a

price per acre nearly double to that which they themselves would have to

pay, and thus have a profit on the citizens of Georgia for the difference

in the quantity of acres contained in the purchase arising from the false

statement; which reduces, with respect to the speculators, the actual

price of the land to little more than one cent per acre, while it remains

at two cents and one-third with respect to the citizens of Georgia.

However great may have been the departure of the Legislature of Georgia

from the interest of their constituents on this occasion, it appears

evidently, that by the expression, “original term,” they understand that

their citizens should subscribe, if they chose, to the amount of two

millions, upon terms similar to those of the land companies. It appears

evidently they did believe they were selling the land of the State at the

rate of two cents and one-third per acre, whilst, in fact, they received

but one cent and one-sixth, which, upon the whole, is a consideration

merely nominal.

To the multiplicity of the radical defects with which the title of

the companies claiming under the act of 1795 abound, the advocates of

the claim of the New England Mississippi Land Company answer, that

none of those who compose their company had any participation in the

fraud; they are said to be _bona fide_ purchasers, perfectly ignorant

of the fraud which may have been practised by those of whom they

bought. They are represented in their memorial and vindication as plain

farmers, mechanics, &c., who have made what they possess by the closest

application and industry.

Sir, I stand among those who are the most ready to acknowledge that the

inhabitants of New England are conspicuous for their industry; but I am

likewise of opinion, that they are not less noted for their sagacity,

in their attendance to their interest; and in the art of making good

bargains, I view them as being fully competent to cope in dealings with

the inhabitants of the Southern States. That they should not have heard

of the notorious fraud which has taken place at the passing of the act

of 1795, is a great cause of astonishment to me; that they should have

made a purchase to the amount of eleven millions of acres, without

making inquiries sufficient to discover what almost every body knew

throughout the United States, if possible, increases my astonishment. For

my part, having never thought of purchasing any land from the Georgia

land companies, I made no inquiry about the acts of the Legislature of

Georgia; yet the corruption was so flagrant, the fraud so notorious, that

it reached my ears soon after it was passed. A gentleman from Virginia

(Mr. RANDOLPH) has justly observed, yesterday, that the President of

the United States had, in his address to the two Houses of Congress,

at the beginning of the session of 1795, taken a most direct notice of

the act of Georgia, passed in January of the same year, as tending to

dangerous consequences. Certainly such solemn communications of the

first Magistrate, at the beginning of a session, contain matters that

are an object of national concern, and generally sought for. There is

not a paper in the Union that omits publishing those communications. It

would be possible, however, that this communication would have escaped

the notice of plain industrious farmers, such as are able, perhaps, to

purchase two or three hundred acres of land; but that a company of sober

and discreet speculators, and of New England too, being about purchasing

an immense quantity of land for a great sum of money, should be ignorant

of what every body knows, and of what they ought to know sooner than

any body else, is a circumstance too unaccountable and extraordinary

for me to believe that it really exists. I should rather think that the

speculators of New England, sober and discreet as they style themselves

to be, found the bargain so good and so tempting, the means of pleading

ignorance of fraud committed in the original purchase so easy, the means

on the part of the State of Georgia, or its vendee, to prove the notice

so difficult, that the sober and discreet speculators of New England

thought it advisable to make a gambling bargain, expecting that the two

extremities of the United States being engaged in the same speculation,

they would combine their force and influence to press hard upon the

centre, and save through the conflict their speculation, either in whole

or in part. Other strong circumstances lead still more to believe, that

the New England Company were well aware of the danger which did exist in

making a purchase from the Georgia land companies; and that they were

taking unusual risks upon themselves; this appears clearly from the face

of their deeds; not only the covenant of warranty is special, instead

of being general, but another extraordinary covenant is entered upon by

which the Georgia Mississippi Company “is not liable to the refunding

of any money in consequence of any defect in their title from the State

of Georgia, if any such there should hereafter appear to be.” Was not

such covenant smelling strongly of the fraud which the Georgia grant was

impregnated with? Could the New England Company take more clearly every

risk upon themselves? Could they more expressly preclude themselves from

every remedy in law or equity in case of eviction?

Mr. BOYD.--The question before the House is not whether we are to do a

good or an injury to the class of men who are denounced as a band of

speculators; but it is whether we shall agree to or reject the amendment

to the resolution offered yesterday to the House by a gentleman from

Virginia, (Mr. CLARK.) Yesterday was taken up in reading the laws of

Georgia, and of the United States, and various other papers, which have

been long in the hands of the members, and which no doubt had been so

attentively perused by them as to have rendered the reading at this day

not indispensably requisite. Mr. B. said, that if papers were to be read

for the instruction and edification of the members as to well-known

facts, he thought it would have been of more consequence to have read the

Declaration of Independence, and the Treaty of Peace of 1783, in which

the independence of the United States was acknowledged by the only Power

on earth who contended against it. We were then free, sovereign, and

independent States, to all intents and purposes, and as sovereign States,

each and every State in the Union had full power and authority to dispose

of their lands to whom they pleased, and under what conditions they

pleased. And if the State of Georgia, in the exercise of her sovereignty,

have conveyed to the Mississippi Land Company the right of soil to the

land in question, and that company have transferred the same to the New

England Mississippi Land Company, the right is vested in them; unless we

have arrived at that stage of political depravity that what was yesterday

acknowledged as a right shall to-morrow be declared a wrong.

Mr. CLARK said he was still in favor of the amendment on the table,

and which he yesterday had the honor of submitting. He did not wish it

to be understood that the amendment was intended to give a preference

to any description of claims under the different acts of the State of

Georgia, and provided for by the general resolution, but intended it

should meet directly those which have excited the most public attention,

have been the most ardently pursued, the most zealously advocated, and

attended with the most extraordinary circumstances. If the facts which

have accompanied this monstrous business from its origin to the present

moment were publicly known, or if it could be retraced through all its

cunning and wily mazes, the claims would sink beneath the weight of

honest indignation, and instead of now being urged before the Congress

of the United States, would be gladly withdrawn from public view, and

buried in perpetual silence. He peculiarly wished on this occasion a cool

and temperate discussion, to divest ourselves of all feelings, either of

improper compassion or prejudice, that equally tend to inflame the heart

and mislead the judgment. It should be his humble province to endeavor a

fair investigation of the naked question, disrobing it of those tinsel

habiliments which have been artfully thrown around it for the purpose of

concealing its real deformity.

The claims the amendment goes to reject, are derived by a pretended

law of the State of Georgia, said to have been passed in the month

of January, 1795. He would contend this law was absolutely void, _ab

initio_, not only because the Legislature had no power to make such

a law, but from the circumstances under which it was made. That the

grantees under this law could have no title to the land, either legal

or equitable; and that there have been no circumstances attending the

subsequent sales, that place the sub-purchasers under superior equitable

advantages. It will be particularly necessary, Mr. Speaker, to be

attentive to dates; that of the law under which the claims are made,

and generally known by the name of the “cession law,” has already been

noticed. Let us now see how this law passed. It stands characterized by

circumstances unparalleled in the annals of pollution--of which we have

the most conclusive evidence before us. The whole State of Georgia has

borne testimony to the fact, and it is now deposited in the archives of

the Government, that a majority of the Assembly which passed the law were

corrupted and bribed. Some had money given them; others, shares in the

lands they were effecting the sale of. This is so universally admitted

and detested, that the most enthusiastic friends of the present claimants

cheerfully allow the original grantees had no titles, and he believed

there was not one now before Congress with his claim. But it is contended

the sub-purchasers had no notice of the fraud in the original contract,

but are _bona fide_ purchasers for a good and valuable consideration

actually paid. This he never could agree to. The evidence before him was

the contrary, and he would here take a review of at least a part of that

evidence, a great portion of which, no doubt, has been destroyed by the

lapse of nine years, but a sufficiency remains when brought together,

irresistibly to carry conviction to the mind of the most skeptical. The

law itself is almost enough for this purpose. The simple object was

to sell to four companies the vacant western land; but to delude the

people and lull inquiry, it is called, “An act supplementary to an act,

entitled ‘an act for appropriating a part of the unlocated territory

of this State, and for the payment of the State troops, and for other

purposes, and the protection and support of the frontier;’” and the

same fascination is kept up through the enacting clauses, and it is the

longest act in the statute book. It goes into a lengthy examination of

the State title, of extinguishing the Indian title, and appropriating the

money, directing it to be laid out in bank stock. Where, Mr. Speaker,

will you find such a law as this? If the object of the Legislature had

been correct, would there have been a necessity for clothing the law in

such delusive colors? No, sir! fraud and infamy were to be cancelled, and

the covering must be thick. They were, however, disappointed in their

aim, for honesty and integrity had yet their residence in the State,

and as soon as it was known, the whole country was feelingly alive to

the abuse, and a general effervescence pervaded the public mind; this

was manifested in the only possible way that remained. The Assembly had

adjourned, not to meet again in a twelvemonth. Presentments of the grand

juries, in almost all the counties of the State, were made in terms of

bitter disapprobation of the law. It was also denounced in the public

prints, from one end of the continent to the other. In the month of May,

1795, a convention was held in the State; the grand jury presentments,

petitions, and remonstrances from all parts of the country were sent

up; these were, by the convention, remitted to the next Legislature

as the only competent authority to remedy so enormous an evil. In the

month of February before, as has been so ably stated by my valued friend

and colleague, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) had this subject been the substance of

a communication of the President of the United States to Congress, and

a resolution and a bill passed the House of Representatives on the

subject. Shall I, after this, be told the sub-purchasers had no notice?

Impossible; no historical event so notorious. But the evidence does

not stop here. The Georgia Legislature again assembled in the month of

November, 1795. The subject of this nefarious and wicked speculation,

that covered the country with shame and disgrace, was taken up, and if

a doubt had remained of the corruption, it was then removed by a number

of affidavits proving incontestably the fact; and on the thirteenth day

of February, 1796, a law was passed, not repealing the act of 1795,

but with honest and laudable indignation declaring it null and void,

as being bottomed upon fraud and perjury, and unveiling to the world

the most flagitious conduct that ever disgraced a legislative assembly.

It is there ascertained and declared, that the land had been sold for

three hundred thousand dollars less than what had been offered for it,

and the quantity of land much greater than it had been represented. The

lands contained in the grants to the four companies were estimated at

twenty-one millions of acres, which, at five hundred thousand dollars,

the price given, is twelve and a half cents per acre; the real quantity

is about thirty-five millions of acres; this reduces the price of the

garden of the world to nearly one and one-third cents the acre. Take

notice, Mr. Speaker, that the law of 1796 does not pretend to repeal the

act of 1795, but proclaims, to every body, that to be void which was in

reality so before, and with an honest zeal provides that the money which

had been paid should be repaid to the purchaser. This annulling law was

so precious to the people, it was a monument so honorable to the State,

that when afterwards the citizens of that State arose in the majesty of

their strength, resuming all those rights, and acted in convention, this

very law was ingrafted in their constitution.

Mr. EUSTIS.--If the position taken by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.

CLARK) could be established, it would not in my opinion justify the

amendment which he has proposed to the resolution under consideration;

because the amendment renders the resolution null and void, and the

resolution neither affirms nor admits the legal title. Still, I should

be willing to rest the whole merits of the case on the single question,

whether the claimants, at the time of making their purchases, had or

had not a knowledge of the fraud? In the autumn of 1795, when the sales

were generally made in New England, there was no knowledge or suspicion

of fraud--the contracts were made in full confidence of the act of a

sovereign and independent State--and I know they could have had no

knowledge of any fraud in the Legislature of Georgia. We are told by

the gentleman that there was “a great uproar throughout the State of

Georgia.” Whatever might have been the nature or extent of this uproar,

I am confident that a knowledge of it had not reached New England at the

time the contracts were made. But the proof that there was no knowledge

of any fraud depends not on the opinions or assertions of individuals--it

is founded on a circumstance which removes all doubt on the subject--it

is founded on the price which the purchasers paid for the land. They

paid, as they have stated in their memorial, as much per acre for these

lands as the State of Massachusetts had received, a few years before,

for lands lying in the State of New York. And is it probable that the

purchasers who have been represented by a gentleman from Pennsylvania as

possessing so much sagacity, and looking so well to their own interests,

would have paid or contracted to pay such a price, with a knowledge that

the original grant had been fraudulently obtained?

THURSDAY, January 31.

_Georgia Claims._

The House resumed the consideration of the resolution reported the

twenty-ninth instant, from the Committee of the Whole, on the Georgia

Claims.

Mr. JACKSON.--Mr. Speaker, I rise with some degree of reluctance to

address you on the present occasion, not because I fear to give publicity

to my sentiments on the question before the House, but from the assurance

that the length of time which this subject has occupied at the last, and

during the present session of Congress, renders it most certain that no

new view can be given; and more especially that the opinions already

formed cannot be changed. I would not now have risen but for the wish

that inasmuch as a most extraordinary course has been pursued, and a

general denunciation of every man who dares to favor the report on your

table has been made, my reasons may accompany my vote, and I am willing

that they together may form the criterion by which my political existence

shall be decided. The reluctance I felt in rising is somewhat removed

by the reflection that the arguments urged on this floor are declared

not intended to influence the judgment of this House, but to control the

public mind, by an avowed appeal to the people of the United States.

Let the appeal be fairly made, and I fearlessly await their decision.

For that purpose, I deem it proper to offer my sentiments, in order that

they may accompany those of my two colleagues who have preceded me.

Sir, I am decidedly in favor of the report of the Committee of Claims,

and of course opposed to the amendment under consideration. I do not on

this occasion regret the absence of party spirit from these walls, which

has been invoked by my colleague, (Mr. RANDOLPH.) That party spirit

which has been the bane of all government; that party spirit which,

disregarding all the forms of justice, tramples its most sacred laws

under foot, and presides without check or control over questions relating

solely to private property; or which was displayed in the conduct of

Jeffries, who servilely prostrating his sacred functions to the purposes

of ministerial vengeance, has justly excited the reproach and execration

of posterity: and which, if cherished upon occasions like the present,

will tend to demolish the fair fabric of our Republican Government. I

will not admit that because a majority of this House are in favor of the

claims, and desire a prompt decision without debate, it is evidence that

“unprincipled men have acquired the ascendency, and knowing themselves

to be in the commission of wrong they are silent.” Is my colleague aware

of the extent of this doctrine? When unprincipled men, said he, acquire

the ascendency, they act in concert and are silent--silence and concert,

then, are to him proofs of corrupt motive. Is this always a correct

position? Does the gentleman recollect that measures were adopted a few

years past without discussion, by my political friends, in conjunction

with him, who were _silent, and united_? I am unwilling to believe that

such an inference can result from a union of sentiment. In some instances

we are unanimous in our decision of questions, on which no debate takes

place; but I have never thought this was proof of the prostration of

principle; nor can I suppose that the gentleman himself thinks so; even

now we adopt measures advocated by him, and are nevertheless told that

to act in concert is proof of corruption. Having premised that the

inferences made by the gentleman were not correct, I will proceed to the

investigation of the question before the House, viz: Are the claims under

the act of 1795, entitled to reference to commissioners for compromise

and settlement, or are they not? My colleague (Mr. RANDOLPH) says the

persons who obtained the land from the Legislature of Georgia were guilty

of a most detestable fraud; and the present claimants, pretending to be

innocent purchasers without notice of fraud, are a set of hypocrites,

undeserving the attention of Congress, or the commiseration of mankind.

In support of this assertion he has quoted the Message of the President

of the United States, in 1795, to Congress, describing in terms of

approbation the high character of its author--WASHINGTON--whose memory I

revere, and whose name I will teach my children to lisp, and venerate

as the father of American freedom, and who with Liberty were the two

best gifts bestowed by Heaven upon our favored country! WASHINGTON,

my colleague says, gave notice to the nation, and published the rape

of unhallowed hands upon the property of the State of Georgia. But,

sir, if we examine the Message, and the proceedings of Congress upon

the occasion, it will be discovered that no knowledge of fraud in the

transactions of the Legislature of 1795, was even known, or suspected;

because, if any such information had been received, the known integrity

of that virtuous man assures me, he would have communicated it; he would

have opposed it with his best exertions, and give me leave to say,

deprecated it as much as any man can.

Mr. FINDLAY said that he claimed the attention of the House for a short

time; but from viewing the unusual turn some of the arguments had taken,

and the nature of the subject, he found it a matter of some delicacy to

know how to proceed. He was opposed to the amendment under debate, and in

favor of the resolution, but he observed some members, with whom he had

generally voted, and for whose talents he had a high esteem, and in whose

integrity he had the utmost confidence, take the other side with such

ardent zeal, and in a mode of argument so unusual in public bodies, that

on observing this, he had hesitated and had voted in the last session for

the postponement which took place. He had done this in hopes that the

House would in this session meet the case in a temper more becoming their

own dignity and the importance and delicacy of the subject.

He said he would begin with the Message of the President near the close

of the session in February, in the year 1795, informing Congress of the

two laws made in Georgia, one in December and the other in the month of

February, 1795, (the same Message mentioned by the member from Virginia,

Mr. RANDOLPH.) The Message was referred to a select committee, of which

he had the honor of being a member, with other very intelligent members

from both South and East, (Mr. NICHOLAS, Mr. AMES, &c.) It had long been

the opinion of men well informed, that the title of Georgia to the extent

of territory she claimed was doubtful, and that it was too great for

any one State to possess in connection with the Federal Union. The old

Congress frequently called on Georgia to make a cession of her unsettled

territory, agreeably to the stipulations on which the Confederation was

agreed to, but when Georgia did propose a cession, the terms on which it

was made were rejected. Other States made cessions of lands to which they

had no title, or else had appropriated the lands to individuals before

the cession was made; so that, on the whole, but a small quantity of land

unencumbered came to the benefit of the United States. But to return: the

committee in February, 1795, examined the title of Georgia as far as they

had information, the bounds not being certainly known; the unsettled

territory of Georgia was believed to be larger than France or Germany,

or any other European nation, except Russia, whose Asiatic dominions

extend to the Pacific Ocean; hence they concluded that such an extent of

territory possessed by one State, at the extremity of the United States,

and bordering its whole length on the Spanish dominions, with which we

were then in danger of a serious contest, it was the opinion of the

committee that every proper means should be used to induce Georgia to

cede, in a peaceable manner, a proportion of that territory; and, as a

first step towards obtaining this object, the committee reported that the

Attorney-General should examine the titles of the State of Georgia and of

the lands claimed by the company from the law of 1795; and they further

reported that the President should be authorized to obtain a cession from

the State of Georgia of the whole or part of the territory.

It was not certainly known that there was a defect in the title of

Georgia, but from the circumstances of the small extent of that

colony at the beginning, and in various extensions by different royal

proclamations, &c., the title of Georgia was held in doubt. It is well

known that the State of Georgia at first was pitched into the State of

South Carolina, which for a considerable time granted titles for land

south of the State of Georgia, and one degree of latitude which the

United States claimed from the definitive treaty with Britain, was yet

in the possession of Spain; but this the members of Georgia considered

also as within the jurisdiction of that State. This being the case,

the committee thought it prudent to make no mention of the supposed

defect of the title of Georgia. The committee, and particularly himself,

suspected that different laws enacted by that State for the sale of land,

and particularly the recent sale of 1795, were encouraged by their own

suspicion of a defective title, but they knew nothing of the bribery and

corruption assigned as a reason in the year following, for annulling

the contract; therefore it was, that no notice to the contractors that

Congress doubted the title of Georgia was given. There was no precedent

in the United States of a contract authorized by a constitutional

legislative act being declared null and void by a succeeding legislature.

The power of decisions on frauds and corruptions, or the validity of

titles being vested in the courts of justice in all civilized countries,

such a decision could only be looked for from that department; but

neither a judge who is stated to have been corrupted was impeached, nor

any of the members indicted.

Mr. F. said, while the case was so situated, the New England purchasers,

or long-legged speculators, did not, as his colleague (Mr. LUCAS) had

said, go to Georgia, but the long-legged contractors or speculators

of Georgia, went above a thousand miles to Massachusetts, an old,

thick-settled country, the citizens of which needed land for their

families, (a country which annually sent forth numerous emigrants, who

generally purchased in large quantities and settled in large bodies

together,) and sold the land at seven or eight times the original price,

by which they gained near $1,000,000 advance. They went with the patents

from the State of Georgia, and the law, and probably the constitution

of that State, in their hands. This, alone, was sufficient to encourage

purchasers among a people who needed land; but this was not all. The

respectability of the characters of the settlers was such as would

reasonably induce an opinion, that they could not themselves be deceived,

and would not deceive others. Among these were a very respectable _judge

of the Supreme Court of the United States_, who had been a member of the

old Congress from almost its commencement till its dissolution, for as

long a period as the State constitution would permit, and had been an

efficient member of the Convention which prepared the Constitution of

the United States, and several State conventions, and a gentleman who

was then, and both before and after that time, a SENATOR of the United

States, and many other very respectable characters--who, however, he

acknowledged, had by that act forfeited the character they had formerly

enjoyed, and yet, strange to tell, neither before nor after the annulling

act, he could not call it a law, as no such law could be made under

the Constitution of the United States. The sale was annulled; but the

judge said to have been corrupted, nor the federal judge, was impeached,

nor any of the members of whom it was testified that they had received

bribes, or were sharers in the spoil, were indicted, but still enjoy the

confidence, as much as they otherwise would have done, of that State. Not

one of them was removed from office, or in any official manner consigned

to infamy, by the courts of that respectable State, or by impeachment.

The lands sold at Boston were yet in possession of the Indian tribes,

and the Indian war but lately extinguished, while, at the same time,

the lands in Pennsylvania were sold, the first rate at one shilling and

sixpence; the reputed second rate--but in fact equal if not superior in

quality and situation--at one shilling the acre; and what remained unsold

to the old settlements, at sixpence; and, in New York, still cheaper the

acre; when the Georgia purchase, with all its disadvantages, is stated

and admitted to have been sold, rough and smooth, good and bad, and of

which a large proportion is allowed to be bad, at something above fifteen

pence an acre on the amount reserved. Certainly such a speculation, if it

was one, was such as he would not have had any share in, and therefore

no proof of the superior cunning ascribed to them by his colleague and

others.

Mr. F. said that, so far, the bargain and sale were fair and legal;

whether it was a good bargain or a bad one, was the look-out of the

purchasers; if it was a bad one Government would have given them no

relief. Had nothing extraordinary, or out of the common road, taken

place, he believed the attention of Congress would never have been

called to the subject. Soon, however, after this contract was made,

the Legislature of Georgia declared the contract, and the law under

which it was made, to be void or annulled; and in a short time after, a

convention of that respectable State disapproved of the constitutional

act of the Legislature; but as long as we pay respect to constitutional

obligations and the distribution of the powers of government, and as long

as we respect the Federal Constitution, which expressly asserts that

no _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,

shall be made, we must agree that one session of a legislature cannot

annul the contracts made by the preceding session. If that could be

done, the patent for his own plantation might also be set aside, for

he acknowledged it is worth more now than the price that he paid for

it. This doctrine had never been entertained even in the Revolutionary

period. At that solemn period, all contracts were protected.

Mr. F. said that he cheerfully acknowledged that the amount of land

sold under the law of Georgia of 1795, was so enormous as that, if

that State had been a separate and wholly independent government,

would have justified, in some degree, an agrarian law; and if the

fraud and corruption attested by _ex parte_ testimony was true, would

have justified the most exemplary punishment of those who suffered

themselves to be corrupted, or who defrauded the commonwealth, and this

would have proved a defect in the contract itself; but no such thing

appears to have taken place. The judge, who is said to have received

$13,000 for his vote, was not impeached, nor the members who are said

to have given, or received bribes, indicted. It appears to have been

so contrived that the State or citizens of Georgia, should suffer no

loss--that the loss and reproach should be transferred to people at the

greatest possible distance. He gave credit, however, to the Legislature

of Georgia, which met in the year 1796, for making an extraordinary

exertion to free themselves from an extraordinary evil. It was a laudable

testimony against corruption and fraud, but no court of justice had yet,

by deciding on it, acknowledged it to be law, and it was too slow for

warning others at a distance against titles originating under the law of

1795.

The annulling law of 1796 had all the effect that any citizen, at that

period, could have wished. Congress took possession of the government of

the western parts of Georgia, the parts in which the lands in question

lay, and erected a territorial government, without the consent of that

State, and passed a law authorizing the President to enter into a

negotiation with Georgia on the principles of compromise, for the right

of soil. The compromise eventually succeeded, and an act of cession

took place between the United States and the State of Georgia. In this

act of cession, or convention, it was provided that the claims in the

counties of Bourbon and Washington, bordering on the Mississippi river,

&c., should be protected, and that five millions of acres, or part

thereof, should, by the United States, be applied to satisfy, quiet, or

compensate, the claims now before the House, and that if they were not so

applied, they should revert to the State of Georgia.

On these conditions, Mr. F. said, did Georgia surrender her right of

soil. Agreeably to these conditions were the Commissioners of the United

States authorized to make and receive proposals, but the commissioners

were not authorized to conclude the agreement, they did report to

Congress, and in that report, they state that the claimants cannot, in

their opinion, recover by law. This is well founded, because no action

can be brought against the United States, nor, since the amendment

made to the constitution respecting the suability of States, against a

State. Therefore this fund, viz: the five millions of acres, set apart

by the Convention of Georgia, to quiet, satisfy, or compensate these

claims, must be either applied to that purpose, or revert to the State of

Georgia, or the faith of the United States must be sacrificed.

Mr. F. said, that from this view of the subject, he had made up his

mind to vote in favor of the report of the Committee of Claims. That

he had not made up his mind lightly, that he had been prepossessed

against it, but it becoming his duty to decide, he had thrown aside

these prepossessions, and examined the case with all the coolness and

deliberation of which he was capable, and would give his vote, as he

had made up his mind, without consulting or relying on the opinions of

others, for he was responsible only for his own opinion.

Mr. GREGG.--I rise, Mr. Speaker, to congratulate the House, on the

question being at length brought within such narrow limits. The validity

of the title appears to be nearly abandoned, and the advocates of the

resolution seem now disposed to rest its defence almost entirely on the

ground of expediency. For my own part I have always felt satisfied with

the report of the commissioners, so far as it respects the question

of title. They have investigated the subject with more diligence and

attention than can well be bestowed on it by members of this House,

and being men distinguished for their abilities and of high official

standing, their opinion, certainly, should have great weight. That

opinion, as recorded in their report, is, that the title of the claimants

cannot be supported. In this opinion I most heartily concur, for I

can never be induced to believe that an act so marked with fraud and

corruption as the act of Georgia, under which the claimants pretend to

derive their title, has been fully proved to be, can vest a title either

in law or in equity.

The question of title being given up, any remarks respecting the weight

that ought to attach to the rescinding act passed by the Legislature of

Georgia, in 1796, will be unnecessary. On that part of the subject I will

only just observe, in reply to one of my colleagues, (Mr. FINDLAY,) who

has stated that act to be without precedent, and that one Legislature

cannot repeal an act of a preceding Legislature where it involves a

contract, that there is one instance at least of such an act, and that

instance is in the State in which he and I live. The case to which

I allude, is an act passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, for

repealing the charter of the Bank of North America. This act, if I am not

mistaken, was passed when my colleague was a member of the Legislature,

and I believe received his support.

But, leaving the question of title, good policy, say gentlemen, requires

us to pass the resolution. In this sentiment, they and the commissioners

appear to unite. The commissioners acknowledge that the title of

the claimants cannot be supported, and yet undertake to recommend a

compromise, by stating “that the interest of the United States, the

tranquillity of those who may hereafter inhabit that territory, and

certain equitable considerations which may be urged in favor of most of

the present claimants, render it expedient to enter into a compromise on

reasonable terms.” Now, I would ask, how is the interest of the United

States to be promoted by giving five millions of acres of land to persons

acknowledged not to have a good title in law, and none in equity? If our

interest is to be promoted in this way, we may soon get rid of all our

land. Claimants will not be wanting, if it is to be got for asking.

With respect to the equitable considerations which have been urged

so strenuously in favor of the present claimants, I must acknowledge

they have not appeared to me so very forcible. The innocence of the

claimants has been painted in strong and glowing colors. They have been

represented, not only as innocent, but innocent through ignorance. One

of my colleagues, in particular, has dilated largely on this idea, and

applied it especially to the New England purchasers. In evidence of

this, he has referred to the case of the Connecticut intruders in the

State of Pennsylvania. But in this allusion he was certainly extremely

unfortunate. The case might be cited to prove a position exactly the

reverse. The fact is, that these intruders have for many years, by their

superior skill and address, held their lands in defiance of the State;

and, from appearance, I believe will continue to hold them, without

making any compensation to the State; and this instance may serve to show

the impropriety and inefficiency of governments pretending to compromise

with individuals. The measures pursued by the State of Pennsylvania

relative to these claimants have generally been of this description. They

have produced no advantage to the State, and have always been converted

by the intruders into arguments in favor of their claims. I do know

of one case that goes far to prove that there are some persons in the

Eastern States extremely uninformed in matters relating to land. The

case to which I allude is recent, having occurred but a few days ago. A

petition was presented by a gentleman from Vermont, signed by a number

of persons, praying to be permitted to form a settlement on the public

lands lying north-west of the river Ohio. On a motion for referring

it to a committee, a member from the same State rose and opposed the

reference, assigning as a reason, that if the petition should so far

receive the countenance of the House as to be referred, the petitioners

would instantly commence the sale of rights. Now, if there are people

so extremely ignorant as to purchase rights of this description, they

certainly ought to be pitied. But will any person say that the present

claimants belong to this class? No, sir; they are men experienced in

business, by all accounts well versed in transactions relating to land,

and as little liable to be imposed on as perhaps any equal number of

persons that could be selected.

But it is said they could not have knowledge of the circumstances under

which the act of Georgia of 1795 was passed; that they became purchasers

before such information could possibly reach them. This certainly cannot

be seriously insisted on. Will gentlemen look at the deeds conveying the

titles, and then say the purchasers had no notice? Evidence, if not of

the fraud, at least that there was something wrong in the business, is

stamped on the very face of all the conveyances.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said, that, as well as his extreme indisposition and

excessive hoarseness would permit, he would lay before the House some

observations on the various objections which had been urged against the

amendment of his worthy and respectable colleague, (Mr. CLARK,) for such

he was in every point of view.

The venerable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. FINDLAY,) when he gave

in his recantation of his last year’s opinions on this subject, told you

that General Washington’s Message had no reference to the fraudulency

of the act of 1795. He considered it as a _caveat_ on behalf of the

United States, who claimed a great part of the territory in question.

Be it so. Was that notice to subsequent purchasers, or not? How will

gentlemen reconcile this inconsistency? Within the disputed limits

between the Federal Government and Georgia, five-sixths of this very New

England Company’s purchase were comprised, besides that valuable part

of the Georgia Company’s grant contained in the fork of the Alabama and

Tombigbee. The United States contended, that the country west of the

Chatahoochee, and south of a parallel of latitude which should intersect

the mouth of the Yazoo River, never constituted a part of Georgia--that

it was within the limits of the province of West Florida, from which

being severed by the peace of 1783, it became vested in the Confederacy,

and not in the State to which it happened to be contiguous. The far

greater part of the grant to the Georgia Mississippi Company is embraced

within these limits: the purchase of the New England Company is stated,

by themselves, to have been made from that company, twelve months after

the President’s Message. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, himself,

considers this Message as a formal annunciation of the adverse claim of

the United States to the land in question, and, in the same breath, avers

that the New England Company, subsequent purchasers of that very land,

were ignorant of any defect of title in the State of Georgia, or the

grantees under her. How will he reconcile this?

The same gentleman has introduced into this debate the names of two

persons; one of them, at that time, _a judge of the Supreme Court of the

United States, the other a Senator from the State of Georgia_; who, he

tells us, were deeply concerned in the transaction of 1795. Both these

gentlemen are no more. Private character, always dear, always to be

respected, seems almost canonized by the grave. When men go hence, their

evil deeds should follow them, and, for me, might sleep oblivious in

their tomb. But if the mouldering ashes of the dead are to be raked up,

let it not be for the furtherance of injustice. In every stage of this

discussion, whilst I have kept my eye steadily fixed on the enormity of

the act of 1795, I have lost sight of the agents. Since, however, some

of them have been mentioned, it may not be immaterial to notice the

interest which they took in this business. It is too true, sir, that

the Senator in question was one of the fathers of the act of 1795. By

the Assembly which passed it he was, at the same session, re-elected to

the Senate of the United States for six years thereafter. It is equally

true, Mr. Speaker, that the notorious British Treaty was ratified by

that Senator’s casting vote. And as the Yazoo speculation then carried

through the British Treaty, now, it seems, the adherents of that treaty

are to drag the Yazoo speculation out of the mire. The connection of

the two questions at that day is too notorious to be denied. That very

Senator, were he now here, would disdain to deny it. With all his faults,

he was a man of some noble qualities. Hypocrisy, at least, was not in

the catalogue of his vices. The coupling together of the British Treaty

and the Yazoo business, cannot surely be unknown to the gentleman from

Pennsylvania. He was a member of the House of Representatives which voted

the appropriation for carrying that treaty into effect, and is understood

to have acted a conspicuous part on the occasion. Can it be matter of

surprise that the same Senate that ratified the British Treaty by the

casting vote of one of the principal grantees of the act of Georgia of

1795, should refuse to co-operate with the House of Representatives,

in measures for obviating the mischiefs of that act? When you see this

corruption extending itself to two great departments of Government, can

you wonder at the bitterness of its fruit? With their leaders in the

Legislature and on the judgment seat, well might the host of corruption

feel confident in their strength; even yet they have scarcely laid aside

their audacity.

A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. EUSTIS) has said, that the claimants

from his State had no notice of the fraud; “that he knows they had not;”

I cannot have mistaken him, for I took down the words. Sir, I would ask

that gentleman whence arises the proverbial difficulty of providing a

negative, but from the difficulty of knowing one?

[Mr. EUSTIS rose to explain. If he had said that he knew the claimants

had not a knowledge of the fraud, he had said too much. It was impossible

that any one should know all that was known or passing in the mind of

another. Without recollecting the precise words used, he had intended

to state his own belief that they had no such knowledge or information.

He was resident and conversant with those concerned in the transaction,

it was the subject of general conversation, and if there had been any

knowledge or report of the kind, he thought it must have come to his

knowledge; but he also recollected to have stated at the time that

this circumstance did not depend on the knowledge or opinion of any

individual--as the price paid for the land precluded any idea or belief,

that the purchasers could have had any knowledge of the fraud.]

Mr. RANDOLPH resumed. The facts which I am about to mention are derived

from such a source that I could almost pledge myself for their truth:

When the agent of the Georgia Mississippi Company (under whom the New

England Land Company claim) arrived in the Eastern States, he had great

difficulty in disposing of his booty. The rumor of the fraud by which

it was acquired had gone before him. People did not like to vest their

money in this new Mississippi scheme. He accordingly applied to some

leading men of wealth and intelligence, offering to some as high as

200,000 acres, to others less, for which they were neither to pay money,

nor pass their paper, but were to stand on his books as purchasers at

so much per acre. These were the decoy-birds to bring the ducks and

geese into the net of speculation. On the faith of these persons, under

the idea that men of their information would not risk such vast sums

without some prospect of return, others resolved to venture, and gambled

in this new land fund, laid out their money in the Yazoo lottery and

have drawn blanks. And these, sir, are the innocent purchasers by whom

we are beset; purchasers without price, who never paid a shilling, and

never can be called upon for one; the vile panders of speculation. And

in what do their dupes differ from the losers in any other gambling

or usurious transaction? The premium was proportioned to the risk. As

well may your buyers and sellers of stock, your bulls and your bears

of the alley, require indemnification for their losses at the hands of

the nation. There is another fact, too little known, but unquestionably

true, in relation to this business. This scheme of buying up the

Western Territory of Georgia did not originate there. It was hatched in

Philadelphia and New York, (and I believe Boston; of this, however, I am

not positive,) and the funds with which it was effected were principally

furnished by moneyed capitalists in those towns. The direction of these

resources devolved chiefly on the Senator who has been mentioned. Too

wary to commit himself to writing, he and his associates agreed upon

a countersign. His re-election to the Senate was to be considered as

evidence that the temper of the Legislature of Georgia was suited

to their purpose, and his Northern confederates were to take their

measures accordingly. In proof of this fact, no sooner was the news of

his reappointment announced at New York, than it was publicly said in

a coffee house there, “then the Western Territory of Georgia is sold.”

Does this require a comment? Do you not see the strong probability that

many of those, who now appear in the character of purchasers from the

original grantees named in the act of 1795, are in fact partners, perhaps

instigators and prime movers of a transaction in which their names do not

appear? Amidst such a complication of guilt, how are you to discriminate;

how fix the Proteus? The Chairman of the Committee of Claims, who brought

in this report, under the lash of whose criticism we have all so often

smarted, that he is generally known as the pedagogue of the House, will

give me leave on this subject to refer him to an authority. It is one

with which he is no doubt familiar, and, however humble, well disposed to

respect. The authority which I am about to cite is Dillworth’s Spelling

Book, and if it will be more grateful to the gentleman, not our common

American edition, but the Royal English Spelling Book. In one of the

chapters of that useful elementary work it is related, that two persons

going into a shop on pretence of purchase, one of them stole a piece

of goods and handed it to the other to conceal under his cloak. When

challenged with the theft, he who stole it said he had it not, and he who

had it said he did not take it. Gentlemen, replied the honest tradesman,

what you say may all be very true, but, at the same time, I know that

between you I am robbed. And such precisely is our case. But I hope,

sir, we shall not permit the parties, whether original grantees who took

it, or subsequent purchasers who have it, to make off with the public

property.

The rigor of the Committee of Claims has passed into a proverb. It has

more than once caused the justice of this House to be questioned. What,

then, was our surprise, on reading their report, to find that they

have discovered “Equity” in the pretensions of these petitioners. Sir,

when the war-worn soldier of the Revolution, or the desolate widow and

famished offspring of him who sealed your independence with his blood,

ask at the door of that Committee for _bread_, they receive the statute

of limitation. On such occasions you hear of no equity in the case.

Their claims have not the stamp and seal of iniquity upon them. _Summum

jus_ is the measure dealt out to them. The equity of the committee is

reserved for those claims which are branded with iniquity and stamped

with infamy. This reminds me of the story of a poor, distressed female

in London applying for admittance into the Magdalen Charity. Being asked

who she was, her wretched tale was told in a few words--“I am poor,

innocent, and friendless.” “Unhappy girl,” replied the director, “your

case does not come within the purview of this institution. Innocence has

no admission here; this is a place of reception for prostitutes; you

must go and qualify yourself before you can partake of our relief.” With

equal discretion the directors of the Committee of Claims suffer nothing

to find support in their asylum but what is tainted with corruption,

and stamped with fraud. Give it these properties and they will give it

“equity.”

I have said, and I repeat it, that the aspect in which this thing

presents itself, would, alone, determine me to resist it. In one of the

petitioners I behold an executive officer, who receives and distributes

a yearly revenue of $300,000, yielding scarcely any net profit to

Government. Offices in his disposal to the annual amount of $94,000, and

contracts more lucrative making up the residue of the sum. A patronage

limited only by the extent of our country. Is this right? Is it even

decent? Shall political power be made the engine of private interest?

Shall such a suspicion tarnish your proceedings? How would you receive

a petition from the President of the United States, if such a thing can

be supposed possible? Sir, I wish to see the same purity pervading every

subordinate branch of the Administration, which, I am persuaded, exists

in its great departments. Shall persons holding appointments under the

great and good man who presides over our councils, draw on the rich

fund of his well-earned reputation, to eke out their flimsy and scanty

pretensions? Is the relation in which they stand to him, to be made the

cloak and cover of their dark designs? To the gentleman from New York,

(Mr. ROOT,) who takes fire at every insinuation against his friend, I

have only to observe, on this subject, that what I dare to say, I dare to

justify. To the House I will relate an incident, from which it may judge

how far I have lightly conceived or expressed an opinion to the prejudice

of any man. I owe an apology to my informant for making public what he

certainly did not authorize me to reveal. There is no reparation which

can be offered by one gentleman and accepted by another, that I shall

not be ready to make him; but I feel myself already justified to him,

since he sees the circumstances under which I act. A few evenings since,

a profitable contract for carrying the mail was offered to a friend of

mine who is a member of this House. You must know, sir, that the person

so often alluded to maintains a jackal, fed, not (as you would suppose)

upon the offal of contract, but with the fairest pieces in the shambles;

and, at night, when honest men are in bed, does this obscene animal prowl

through the streets of this vast and desolate city, seeking whom he may

tamper with. Well, sir, when this worthy plenipotentiary had made his

proposal, in due form, the independent man to whom it was addressed, saw

at once its drift. “Tell your principal,” said he, “that I will take his

contract, but I shall vote against the Yazoo claim, notwithstanding.”

Next day, he was told that there had been some misunderstanding of the

business, that he could not have the contract, as it was previously

bespoken by another!

Sir, I well recollect, when first I had the honor of a seat in this

House, we were members then of a small minority; a poor, forlorn hope;

that this very petitioner appeared in Philadelphia, on behalf of another

great land company on Lake Erie. He then told us as an inducement to

vote for the Connecticut reserve (as it was called) that if that measure

failed, it would ruin the republicans and the cause in that State. You,

sir, cannot have forgotten the reply he received: “That we did not

understand the republicanism that was to be paid for; that we feared it

was not of the right sort, but spurious.” And, having maintained our

principles through the ordeal of that day, shall we now abandon them,

to act with the men and upon the maxims which we then abjured? Shall we

now condescend to means which we disdained to use in the most desperate

crisis of our political fortune? This is, indeed, the age of monstrous

coalitions; and this corruption has the quality of cementing the most

inveterate enmities, personal as well as political. It has united in

close concert those, of whom it has been said, not in the figurative

language of prophecy, but in the sober narrative of history: “I have

bruised thy head, and thou hast bruised my heel.” Such is the description

of persons who would present to the President of the United States an act

to which, when he puts his hand, he signs a libel on his whole political

life. But he will never tarnish the unsullied lustre of his fame; he

will never sanction the monstrous position, (for such it is, dress it up

as you will,) “that a legislator may sell his vote, and a right, which

cannot be divested, will pass under such sale.” Establish this doctrine,

and there is an end of representative government; from that moment

republicanism receives its death-blow.

FRIDAY, February 1.

_Postmaster-General._

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following letter from Gideon

Granger, Postmaster-General of the United States:--

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