the Turks entrenched their army behind earthworks and redoubts with
great engineering skill, and where they maintained an obstinate and
memorable defence for nearly five months, the most striking incident
of the campaign of 1877. Three unsuccessful assaults were made by the
Russians, assisted by a Roumanian army, in which great losses were
incurred. Thereupon, by the advice of General Todleben, the hero of
the defence of Sebastopol in the Crimean War, the attempt to take
these works at Plevna by assault was given up, and it was subjected
to a close investment. The occupation of the Shipka Pass by Gourko
prevented the advance of a Turkish army in relief of Plevna, in spite
of successive attacks by the Turkish army under Suleiman Pasha. As
a result, after five months of heroic resistance, Osman Pasha found
himself in great straits for want of food for his army. He determined
to make a great effort to break through the lines of the investing
army. The sortie failed, and Osman and his whole remaining army of
thirty-two thousand men were compelled to surrender on January 9, 1878.
This had the effect of releasing the Russian army in front of Plevna.
General Gourko and the main part of the Russian army thereupon marched
to Sofia. General Skobeleff, in command of another army, determined
to force his way across the Balkan range. An army of ninety thousand
Turks under another Pasha was stationed at the southern end of the
Shipka Pass and barred his way. Directing a part of his army to make a
feint attack along the Shipka Pass, Skobeleff led the remainder by two
sheep tracks distant about six miles from the pass, and crossing the
mountains, was able to attack the enemy on the flank at Shenova. The
Turks were defeated and their whole army was compelled to surrender.
By this brilliant manœuvre of Skobeleff, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in
nominal command of the whole Russian army, was able to advance without
further opposition to Adrianople. He took possession of it on January
28th. Meanwhile the Turks met with further defeats from the Serbians
and Montenegrins. The former captured the important town of Nisch. The
latter captured Spizza, in the bay of Antivari, and Dulcigno, in the
Adriatic.
In Asia the Turks were no more fortunate than in Europe. Their army
under Muktar Pasha was little inferior in numbers to that of the
Russians, but it was divided between Kars, Ardahan, and Erzerum.
The Russians in the course of the campaign of 1877 succeeded in
successively capturing these important fortresses and in getting
possession of nearly the whole of the districts inhabited by Armenians.
By the middle of January 1878 the resistance of the Turks was
practically at an end in both continents. They were compelled to sue
for peace and to appeal for the mediation of the other Powers of
Europe. On January 31st an armistice was agreed on.
The capture of Adrianople and the fact that there was no Turkish
army capable of resisting the further advance of the Russians to
Constantinople caused great alarm to the British Government. Opinion
in England, which had not supported Lord Beaconsfield in his desire to
renew the policy of the Crimean War, and to assist the Turks against
the invasion of Bulgaria by the Russians, now veered round, at least
among the wealthier and a large section of the middle class, and
declared itself vehemently opposed to the occupation of Constantinople,
which appeared to be imminent, even if it should be only of a temporary
character.
The British fleet at Besika Bay was ordered to enter the Dardanelles.
The House of Commons was asked to vote six millions for war
purposes. Every preparation was made for war. Russia replied to
these demonstrations by advancing its army nearer to Constantinople.
The headquarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas were established at San
Stefano, a village on the shore of the Marmora, within sight of
Constantinople. A portion of the British fleet then took up a position
near to Prince’s Island, also within sight of the capital. The position
between the two countries, England and Russia, was therefore most
critical.
Meanwhile negotiations took place directly between Russia and the
Porte. Terms of peace were offered and agreed to, and on March 3,
1878, a treaty was signed between the two Powers at San Stefano. It
was in accord with the promises which had been made to the British
Government by the Czar. Constantinople, the province of Thrace, and
Adrianople were left in possession of the Turks, and the capital was
not even to be temporarily occupied by the Russian army. Bulgaria was
not to become a Russian province or even an independent State. But a
great Bulgaria from the Danube southward, with frontiers on the Black
Sea and the Ægean Sea, and including the greater part of Thrace, was
constituted as an autonomous State, subject to the nominal suzerainty
of the Sultan, under a prince to be elected by its people and approved
by Russia. As thus constituted, it would cut off the Porte from direct
junction and communication by land with its remaining possessions
in the Balkan peninsula, such as Macedonia, Epirus, and Albania.
Serbia and Montenegro were to be greatly enlarged and both were to be
independent States. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be endowed with
autonomous institutions while remaining subject to the Porte. Reformed
administration was to be secured for the remaining Balkan provinces. No
extension was conceded to Greece, but Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete were
included in the provision of reformed administration. The Roumanians
were very shabbily treated after the valuable assistance they had
rendered to the Russian army. The part of Bessarabia, inhabited largely
by Roumanians, which had been taken from Russia by the treaty of Paris
and added to Moldavia, was to be restored to the Czar, together with a
small strip which brought Russia up to the Danube as a riverain State.
In exchange, Roumania was to be content with the barren Dobrudscha,
sparsely inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. Roumania was to be an
independent State. In Asia, Kars, Ardahan, Bayezid, and Batoum, and
their districts were to be ceded to Russia. Erzerum was to be restored
to Turkey. An indemnity for the war of twelve millions sterling was to
be paid by Turkey.
The publication of these terms did not allay the apprehensions of
the British Government. They were regarded, in the first instance,
as meaning the complete dismemberment of Turkey in Europe. Lord
Beaconsfield and the Turkophil members of the Government believed that
a great Bulgaria would be completely under the influence of Russia,
and would be used as a stepping-stone for the ultimate acquisition of
Constantinople by that Power. They could not understand, what was often
insisted upon by Mr. Gladstone in his speeches, that the best barrier
against the advance of Russia, in the Balkan peninsula, would be a
self-governing, contented, and prosperous State, and that the larger it
was the better it would serve that purpose. The Government, under these
misapprehensions, determined to resist the creation of a big Bulgaria,
even at the risk of war with Russia. They maintained that the treaty
of San Stefano was completely at variance with the treaty of Paris
of 1856, and must be revised by a new Congress of the great Powers of
Europe.
The Russian Government would not agree to submit the whole treaty to
a Congress, but only some parts of it. A collision between Russia
and England seemed to be imminent. War preparations were continued
by the latter, and Indian troops were sent to Malta. Lord Derby, the
Foreign Minister, and Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, who were
opposed to war, resigned, and the war party in the Cabinet prevailed.
But the Czar was very averse to war, whatever might be the wishes of
his generals at the front before Constantinople. At the last moment
terms of reference to a Congress were agreed upon between the two
Governments, and war was averted. By an agreement which was intended
to be secret, but which was divulged to the Press in England by an
unscrupulous employé at the Foreign Office, the British Government
promised to support, at the Congress, the main clauses of the treaty
of San Stefano, subject to a concession, on the part of Russia, as to
Bulgaria. Under this agreement, the intended big Bulgaria was divided
into three parts. That between the Danube and the Balkan range was to
be dealt with as proposed in the San Stefano treaty. It was to be an
autonomous State under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a prince
elected by its people. A second part of it, immediately south of the
Balkan range, to be called Eastern Roumelia, was to be an autonomous
province more directly under the control of the Porte. A third, the
part bordering on the Ægean Sea and containing a mixed population
of Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and (in parts) Moslems, was to be
restored to the Porte subject to conditions for better administration
equally with other Turkish provinces in Europe. This part has since
been generally spoken of as Macedonia.
The Congress of the Powers met at Berlin on June 13, 1878, under the
presidency of Prince Bismarck. It was the most important gathering
of the kind since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Great Powers
were represented by their leading statesmen. England, by Lord
Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury; Russia, by Prince Gortchakoff and
Count Schouvaloff; France, by its Prime Minister, Waddington; Italy,
by Count Corti, its Foreign Minister; Austria, by Count Andrassy.
The Porte, apparently, was unable to find a competent Turk for the
purpose. It was represented by Karatheodori, a Greek, and by Mehemet
Ali, a renegade German. Germany, it need not be said, was represented
by Bismarck, who acted as the ‘honest broker.’ Although apparently
invested with unlimited authority to deal with all questions arising
out of the treaty of San Stefano, the Congress found that its hands
were practically tied behind its back by the agreement between England
and Russia. It had no other option than to cut down the big Bulgaria
under the tripartite scheme already described, which was the essence
of the Anglo-Russian agreement. As regards the artificially created
province of Eastern Roumelia, Lord Beaconsfield, who throughout the
proceedings of the Congress championed the Turkish cause, insisted that
the Porte was to have the right to maintain garrisons in its frontier
fortresses. He threatened to break up the Congress if this was not
conceded. Russia, though strongly opposed to this, ultimately gave way.
This was a triumph for Beaconsfield, the value of which we can now
appreciate, with the knowledge that no advantage was ever taken by the
Porte of this permission to garrison Eastern Roumelia.
The most important point on which the Congress effected a change in
the treaty of San Stefano was in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the instance of Bismarck, these two provinces, instead of being
endowed with autonomous government, were handed over to Austria for
occupation and administration, while remaining nominally a part of the
Turkish Empire. Montenegro was to lose half of the territory conceded
to it at San Stefano.[44] The claims of Greece for a definite extension
of its territory were championed by the representative of France, but
were opposed by Lord Beaconsfield. The Congress contented itself with
a recommendation to the Sultan that the boundaries of Greece should
be extended so as to include Thessaly and a part of Epirus. Organic
reforms of administration and law were to be carried out by the Porte
in the European provinces of the Empire on the recommendation of a
Commission to be appointed by the Great Powers.
The Congress confirmed to Russia the acquisition of the provinces
in Asia above referred to, and the restoration of Erzerum and
Bayezid to the Porte. The Armenians were guaranteed good government
and protection from the raids of Kurds and Circassians. Some other
amendments of the San Stefano treaty of no great importance were
decided upon, and on July 13, 1878, the treaty of Berlin was signed
by the representatives of all the Powers, after exactly a month of
discussion.
After his success at the Congress in respect of the Roumelian
garrisons, obtained by the threat of war, Beaconsfield was able to
return to England with a flourish of trumpets, boasting that he had
succeeded in obtaining ‘peace with honour.’ Though the treaty of
Berlin nullified that of San Stefano as regards the big Bulgaria, it
did, in fact, ratify the virtual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire
in respect of four-fifths of its territory in Europe and freed about
eight millions of people from its rule. This great achievement was due
to Russia alone, and the gains to that Power in Bessarabia and Armenia
were in comparison small and unimportant. The splitting up of Bulgaria,
which constituted the main difference between the two treaties, was due
to British diplomacy, backed by threats of war. But the result obtained
did not stand the test of even a short experience. Two of the Bulgarian
provinces thus torn asunder were reunited seven years later. More
recently, the parts of Macedonia and Thrace restored to full Turkish
rule by the treaty of Berlin have, within the present century, again
been freed from it, and have been annexed to Serbia and Greece in about
equal portion.
It will be seen from this brief statement that by the treaty of Berlin
Great Britain obtained nothing for itself, unless it were that the
division of Bulgaria was of permanent value to it in strengthening the
hold of the Turks on Constantinople, a contention which has not been
confirmed by subsequent events. It did, however, succeed in getting
something out of the general scramble for territory. By another secret
treaty which, to the amazement of the members of the Congress at
Berlin, was made public during their sittings, the Porte agreed to hand
over to the occupation of England the island of Cyprus, on terms very
similar to those under which Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under
the charge of Austria. The occupation of the island was limited to the
time during which Kars and Ardahan should be in possession of Russia.
As a condition of this occupation, Great Britain guaranteed to the
Porte its Asiatic possessions. But this guarantee was conditional on
good government being secured to the Armenian population in the east
of Asia Minor, a condition which has never, in fact, been fulfilled.
The treaty was justified in the British Parliament on the ground that
Cyprus would be of great value as a _place d’armes_ for the British
army in the event of attack by Russia on the Asiatic provinces of
Turkey or of an attack from any quarter on Egypt. The Porte was
guaranteed by the British Government an annual tribute so long as
the occupation should last, based on the average revenue which it
had received from the island. The proceeds were assigned for payment
of the interest on the loan raised by Turkey during the Crimean War,
guaranteed by England and France. The arrangement was made hastily
and without due inquiry, with the result that the island has been
burthened with a charge far in excess of its past payments to the
Porte, and the British taxpayers have been compelled to bear a part of
the burthen. An occupation such as that of Cyprus was almost certain to
become permanent, and in 1914, during the existing war, the island was
permanently annexed by the British Government.
Looking back at the events which led to the liberation of Bulgaria from
Ottoman rule and to all the other changes sanctioned by the treaty of
Berlin, it must now be fully admitted that the agitation which Mr.
Gladstone promoted against the Turkish Government had a great ultimate
effect. It averted the use of armed force by Great Britain for the
purpose of preventing the intervention of Russia on behalf of the
Christian population of the Balkans. In a great speech in the House
of Commons in review of the treaty of Berlin, Mr. Gladstone delivered
himself of this verdict on it:—
Taking the whole provisions of the treaty of Berlin together, I
must thankfully and joyfully acknowledge that great results have
been achieved in the diminution of human misery and towards the
establishment of human happiness and prosperity in the East.
As regards the conduct of England at the Congress he added these
weighty words:—
I say, Sir, that in this Congress of the Great Powers the voice of
England has not been heard in unison with the constitution, the
history, and the character of England. On every question that arose,
and that became a subject of serious contest in the Congress, or
that could lead to any practical results, a voice has been heard
from Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury which sounded in the tones
of Metternich, and not in the tones of Mr. Canning, or of Lord
Palmerston, or of Lord Russell.... I do affirm that it was their part
to take the side of liberty, and I do also affirm that, as a matter
of fact, they took the side of servitude.[45]
Lord Salisbury himself lived to make the admission that England in its
Eastern policy “put its money on the wrong horse.”
The three years which followed the treaty of Berlin were spent by
the Great Powers in the endeavour to give effect to its provisions,
by settling the boundaries between Turkey and its _disjecta membra_,
and other important details. Two of these questions led to great
difficulty. The Porte, as was to be expected, put every obstruction in
the way and resorted to its accustomed dilatory methods. By the treaty
Montenegro had been guaranteed a port in the Adriatic. It was not till
1880, after the return of Mr. Gladstone to power in England, that
effective pressure was put on the Porte. He induced the other Powers to
join in sending a combined fleet to the Adriatic to blockade its coast
as a demonstration against the Porte. This, however, was not effective
for the purpose. It mattered little to the Porte that its coast in
the Adriatic was blockaded. It was not till the British Government
threatened to send its fleet to Asia Minor, and by seizing some custom
houses there to cut off supplies of money, that the Sultan was brought
to book. Eventually the port of Dulcigno and the district round it
were ceded to Montenegro and its claim for access to the Adriatic was
conceded.
The case of Greece caused even greater difficulty. The treaty of
Berlin, it has been shown, contained no specific promise or guarantee
of a cession of territory to Greece. It merely made a recommendation
to that effect, leaving it to the discretion of the Porte whether
to accede to it or not. As Greece had taken no part in the war of
liberation of the Balkans, it had no special claim, except such as
arose from a wish of the Powers to avoid complications in the future.
It was admitted, however, by the Porte that something should be done
in the way of rectifying its frontier in this direction. Another
conference of the Powers at Berlin reported in favour of drawing the
frontier line so as to include in the kingdom of Greece the whole of
both Thessaly and Epirus. This was gladly assented to by Greece, but
was rejected by the Sultan. The Powers, however, were not willing to
back up their proposals by armed force. The French Government, which
had supported the claim of Greece at the Congress, now drew back.
Eventually, after two years of diplomatic labour, a compromise was
arrived at, mainly at the instance of the British Ambassador to the
Porte, Mr. Goschen, who showed infinite skill and patience in dealing
with the Sultan. A line of frontier was agreed to, which conceded to
Greece the whole of Thessaly and about a third part of Epirus. This
line excluded Janina and other districts inhabited by Moslem Albanians,
and also other districts where Greeks predominated, but under the
circumstances it was the most which could be effected without a
resort to arms. Greece had to wait some years before a more complete
settlement could be secured to her.
As regards the organic local reforms in administration and law which,
under the treaty of Berlin, were to be carried out in the European
provinces of the Empire, a Commission was appointed by the Great Powers
in 1880. The British representative was Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, later
Lord Fitzmaurice. He took the leading part in drawing up a large and
complete scheme of reform, which was agreed to by the Commission and
was presented to the Sultan for his approval in accordance with the
treaty.
There followed, after these proceedings, a period of twenty-eight
years, up to 1908, during which Turkey, under the rule of Abdul Hamid,
was free from external war, and opportunity was therefore afforded
for giving effect to the promises by the Porte, guaranteed by the
treaty of Berlin, of reforms and improved administration in Macedonia
and other Balkan provinces left in its possession, and also in Crete
and Armenia. Except as regards Crete, not a single step, however, was
ever taken by the Porte to give effect to these promises. The scheme
of organic reform was never approved by the Sultan. It was treated as
waste-paper, like every other promise of reform in Turkey. Disorder and
misgovernment continued unabated.
Several events soon took place which showed that the disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire was still slowly but surely proceeding. The
most important of these was in relation to Bulgaria. The reduced and
mutilated province under that name, as settled by the treaty of Berlin,
chose as its ruler, with the consent of the Powers, Prince Alexander
of Battenberg, a young man of great merit and promise. Eastern
Roumelia, cut off from Bulgaria, was also constituted as a separate
province, more immediately dependent on the Porte, but with autonomous
government, under a Christian governor nominated by the Sultan. But
this ingenious scheme of Lord Beaconsfield did not work in practice.
Economic difficulties, arising from separate tariffs, equally with
national aspirations, necessitated union. The representative chambers
of both provinces were incessant in their demands for this.
The union of the two States was now opposed by Russia. But, strange
to say, it was supported by Great Britain, at the instance of
Lord Salisbury, who had been associated with Lord Beaconsfield at
the Congress of Berlin in insisting on the severance of the two
provinces. He had since been persuaded by the British Ambassador at
Constantinople, Sir William White, a far-seeing statesman who had
intimate knowledge of the Balkans, that a united and strong Bulgaria
would, in the future, be a bar to the ambitions of Russia against what
remained of Turkey.
Fortunately for the Bulgarians, the Sultan arrived at the same
conclusion. When, therefore, in 1885, the two provinces insisted
on union, and a Bulgarian army occupied Eastern Roumelia, with the
full assent of its population, who deported the Turkish governor to
Constantinople, the Sultan made no real opposition. He was persuaded
to accept the union as a _fait accompli_. The diplomatic difficulty
arising out of the treaty of Berlin was evaded by the Sultan in 1886
nominating the Prince of Bulgaria as governor of Roumelia. Thenceforth
the representative chambers of the two States met as one body at Sofia,
and the union was practically effected. This caused great discontent in
Serbia, which was jealous of the aggrandizement of its neighbour and
demanded territorial compensation. War consequently broke out between
Serbia and Bulgaria. After a three days’ battle at Slivnitza, the
Bulgarians, contrary to all expectations, were completely successful,
under the able generalship of Prince Alexander. Belgrade lay open to
the victorious army. But the Great Powers then again intervened and
insisted on terms of peace between the belligerents, based upon the
_status quo_ before the war. The Emperor of Russia deeply resented the
action of his relative, Prince Alexander. The Prince was kidnapped and
was forcibly conveyed out of the country and compelled to abdicate.
There ensued a strong movement in his favour in Bulgaria. He was
recalled from exile. But at this critical moment of his career the
Prince appears to have lost his nerve, and instead of standing firm and
relying on the support of the people, for whom he had done so much, he
gave way to the demands of the Czar, and retired into obscurity as a
cavalry officer in the Austrian army. In his place Prince Ferdinand of
Saxe-Coburg was elected as ruler of the united province, subject to the
nominal suzerainty of the Sultan.