serious questions affecting the integrity of his Empire. In 1875 an
outbreak had occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the result not merely
of misgovernment by the Turkish pashas and officials, their rapacity
and exactions, and of the system of farming the taxes, but of a vicious
agrarian system. The great majority of landowners, though of the same
Slav race as the rayas, the cultivators of the soil, were Moslems by
religion. Their forbears had become so when the Ottomans conquered
their State in order to save their property. They were as rapacious and
fanatical as any landowners of Turkish race in any part of the Empire.
No Christians were employed in the administration of these provinces.
The evidence of the Christian rayas was not admitted in the courts of
law. Justice or injustice could only be obtained by bribes. The police
and other officials lived by extorting money from those whom it was
their duty to defend.
The bad harvest of 1874 was the immediate cause of the outbreak, for
the farmers of the taxes refused to make any concessions. It was, in
the first instance, directed rather against the Moslem landowners
and the local Turkish officials than against the Sultan, but it
rapidly developed into a general insurrection against the Sultan’s
government. Every effort was made by Austria and Russia to localize
it and to induce the Porte to make concessions. Count Andrassy,
the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, drew up a scheme for the
pacification of the two provinces. It proposed that the system of
farming the taxes should be abolished, that the taxes raised in the
provinces should be expended locally for their benefit, that complete
religious equality should be established, and that a mixed commission
should be appointed to supervise the carrying out of these reforms. The
scheme was agreed to by Russia, Great Britain, and the other Powers,
and was presented to the Sultan, who acquiesced in it. But it proved,
like other promises of reform in Turkey, to be a dead letter. Not a
single step was taken to give effect to any part of it. The rebellion
in the two provinces continued. The insurgents increased their demands.
They insisted that one-third of the land should be given up to the
rayas. The movement soon extended to Bulgaria, which was seething with
disaffection.
On April 21, 1876, an outbreak of Bulgarians occurred on the southern
slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, of which Batak was the centre. It
was put down without difficulty by a small Turkish force sent from
Constantinople, under Achmet Agha, with little loss of life to the
troops engaged, but with relentless cruelty, not only to the actual
insurgents who surrendered on promise of life, but to the whole
population of the district. Bands of Bashi-Bazouks, consisting of
Tartars from the Crimea who had been planted in Bulgaria, were let
loose on them. Indiscriminate murders, rapes, and rapine took place.
Sixty villages were burnt. Twelve hundred persons, mostly women and
children, took refuge in a church at Batak and were there burnt
alive. In all about twelve thousand persons perished in these brutal
reprisals. Achmet Agha received a high decoration from the Sultan for
this performance. There was nothing new in this method of dealing with
an outbreak by the Porte. It was in accord with its traditional system
and policy to wreak vengeance on those revolting by orgies of cruelty,
which would strike terror among subject races and act as a warning to
them in the future.
What was new in the case of the Bulgarians in 1876, and was fraught
with misfortune to the Turkish cause, was that full and graphic
accounts of the horrors committed at Batak, written by Mr. Edwin Pears
(now Sir Edwin), the correspondent at Constantinople of the _Daily
News_, appeared in the columns of that paper. They produced a profound
impression on public opinion in England. Discredit was thrown on the
story in the House of Commons by Mr. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, but
it was fully confirmed by Mr. MacGahan, another correspondent of the
same paper, who visited the district, and later by Mr. Walter Baring, a
member of the British Embassy at Constantinople, who, by the direction
of the Government, made full personal inquiries on the spot. He
described what had taken place as “perhaps the most heinous crime that
has stained the history of the present century.”
It was also unfortunate for the Turks that Mr. Gladstone, the only
survivor in the House of Commons of the British statesmen responsible
for the Crimean War, who had recently retired from the leadership of
the Liberal party, was fired by the description of these horrors in
Bulgaria to emerge from his retirement and to take up the cause of the
Christian population of European Turkey, for which he held that the
treaty of Paris had made his country responsible.
Meanwhile the horrors at Batak had also aroused the indignation of
Russia and the fears of Austria. A fanatical outbreak of Moslems at
Salonika resulted in the murder of the Consuls of France and Germany.
Serbia and Montenegro, impelled by sympathy for their fellow Slavs
in Bosnia, declared war against Turkey. A Turkish force defeated the
Serbians, who appealed to Russia for assistance. At this stage another
effort was made by Russia and Austria, supported by Germany, to avert a
general conflagration, and a scheme was embodied in what was known as
the Berlin Memorandum for compelling the Porte to carry out the reforms
which it had admitted to be necessary. The British Government, however,
very curtly refused to be a party to the scheme, on the ground that
they had not been consulted in framing it and did not believe in its
success. About this time also the British fleet in the Mediterranean
was ordered to Besika Bay, a step taken avowedly for the purpose of
protecting British subjects in the turmoil which had arisen, but which
seemed to the Porte to indicate an intention to support them against
the demands of the other Powers.
Mr. Gladstone, fearing that these actions indicated the intention of
the British Government to withdraw from the concert of Europe and to
renew the separate policy which had led to the Crimean War, made a
vehement attack on it in the House of Commons for refusing to agree
to the Berlin Memorandum. Later, in September 1876, he published
his well-known pamphlet on “the Bulgarian Horrors,” in which, with
passionate language, he dwelt at length on the massacres at Batak
and denounced the Turkish Government. He protested that he could no
longer bear his share of responsibility for the Crimean War. Otherwise
he might be accused of “moral complicity in the basest and blackest
outrages upon record in that century.”
Those [he wrote] who opposed the Crimean War are especially bound to
remember that the treaty of Paris made Europe as a whole, and not
Russia alone, responsible for the integrity and independence of the
Ottoman Empire, which had given this licence to Turkish officers
to rob, murder, and ravish in Bulgaria.... As an old servant of
the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more
than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and
insist that our Government, which has been working in one direction,
shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour, in common
with the other States of Europe, in obtaining the extinction of the
Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away
their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off
themselves. Their zapties and their mudirs, their bimbashis and
their yuzbashis, their kaimakans and their pashas, one and all, bag
and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have
desolated and profaned.[42]
The pamphlet produced an immediate and profound effect on public
opinion in Great Britain. It was followed up by speeches of the same
force and eloquence on the part of the veteran statesman. Meetings took
place in every part of the country, at which sympathy was expressed
for the Christian populations of Turkey. The Turks were denounced
for their cruelties and bad government. Resolutions were unanimously
passed in accord with the policy recommended by Mr. Gladstone. Lord
Stratford himself expressed sympathy with the movement, differing only
in this from Mr. Gladstone, that England, in his view, should exert
its influence not only for the Bulgarians, but for all the oppressed
subject races in Turkey. Many of the most cultivated men in England
joined in the movement quite irrespective of party politics.
Mr. Disraeli, who was created Earl of Beaconsfield in the course of
these events, on his retirement from the House of Commons, showed great
courage and persistence in resisting the movement. His sympathies lay
wholly in the opposite direction. His Eastern policy was in accord
with that of the previous generation of statesmen, such as Palmerston,
and, indeed, Gladstone himself in his earlier stage of opinion, who
believed that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire was essential
to the integrity of the British Empire. He saw no reason for change.
He dreaded the further advance of Russia. He did not believe in the
honesty of the professions of its Emperor. He enforced his views at a
public meeting at Aylesbury on September 20th, and endeavoured to stem
the movement. He scoffed at the Bulgarian horrors. He declared the
perpetrators of them were not so bad as those who made them the subject
of agitation for their political purposes. He was evidently prepared to
support the Turks against any invasion of their country by Russia, and
to renew the policy of the Crimean War. But it was in vain.
Though the agitation promoted by Mr. Gladstone did not result in
inducing the Government to join the other Powers in compelling the
Turkish Government to concede autonomy to its Christian provinces,
or to carry out reforms, it had two effects of great historical
importance, which must be our justification for referring to the
subject. It made impossible the renewal of the policy of the Crimean
War—the armed support by Great Britain to the Turks against an invasion
by Russia on behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans. It
paralysed the hands of those, like Lord Beaconsfield, who desired
to support the Turks and the _status quo_. On the other hand, it
doubtless stimulated Russia to armed intervention, by making it clear
that there would be no resistance on the part of Great Britain. Lord
Beaconsfield’s Cabinet was divided on the subject. A majority of its
members evidently concurred with Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, in
opposition to war with Russia on behalf of Turkey.
On September 21st, the day after Lord Beaconsfield had delivered
his fiery pro-Turkish speech at Aylesbury, Lord Derby, on behalf of
the Government, in a despatch to the Ambassador at Constantinople,
directed him to inform the Porte that the atrocious crimes of the
Turkish authorities and troops in Bulgaria had aroused the righteous
indignation of the British people, and that Great Britain, as signatory
to the treaty of Paris, could not be indifferent to them. He demanded
that examples should be made of the perpetrators of these crimes.
On October 30th Lord Derby further informed the Russian Government,
through the ambassador at St. Petersburg, that, however strong the
feeling in England against the Turkish cruelties, it would be
superseded by a very different sentiment if it were believed that
Constantinople was threatened, or that British interests in the Suez
Canal were in any danger. This message to the Emperor could only be
interpreted as meaning that the British Government would not interfere
with any action that Russia might take against Turkey, provided it
did not involve the conquest of Constantinople or endanger British
interests in Egypt. It was evidently so understood by the Emperor, for
immediately on receipt of the above despatch, on November 2nd, he gave
his word of honour to the British Ambassador that he had no designs on
Constantinople and no intentions whatever to annex Bulgaria.
In spite of this explicit announcement on the part of the Emperor,
in response to the despatch from the British Foreign Minister, Lord
Beaconsfield, a few days later, on November 9th, at the annual civic
banquet at the Guildhall of London, delivered himself of a most
bellicose speech on behalf of Turkey, practically threatening war with
Russia, without any reference to the pacific assurance of the Czar,
which, as we now know, was in his hands at the time when he made this
speech. There could not well be a clearer intimation on the part of the
British Premier that he had no belief in the good faith of the Emperor.
This menacing speech of the British Prime Minister was telegraphed to
Russia, with the result that the Czar was greatly incensed, and on the
next day, November 10th, he made a public pronouncement at Moscow to
his people of the gravest importance, to the effect that, if he could
not obtain adequate guarantees from the Porte for the protection of its
Christian subjects, he would act independently of other Powers, relying
on the loyalty of his people to support him.
In the meantime, through Lord Derby’s efforts, it had been arranged
with Russia and the other Great Powers that a Conference should be held
at Constantinople of representatives of all the Powers, for the purpose
of deciding what administrative changes should be proposed to the
Sultan, with a view to the common purpose—namely the better protection
of his Christian subjects in Europe.
Lord Salisbury, as a member of the British Cabinet and Secretary of
State for India, represented England at this Conference. It met at
Constantinople on December 23, 1876. On the day before the meeting
of the Conference at Constantinople a firman was published by the
Sultan, at the instance of Midhat Pasha, promulgating a scheme of
constitutional reform, which had been agreed to by the ministers of
the Porte in the short reign of Murad, but which Abdul Hamid on his
accession had refused to sanction. A National Assembly was convoked,
to be elected by universal suffrage, without distinction of race or
religion, throughout the Empire. It was hoped to anticipate the demands
of the Conference by a scheme of reform wider than they were likely
to advise. This was effected with perfect good faith by Midhat, who
was earnestly in favour of reform. But subsequent events showed that
the Sultan adopted this course for the purpose only of throwing dust
in the eyes of the Conference, and with the full intention of setting
aside the Constitution as soon as the Conference had broken up. The
Conference might perhaps have acted more wisely in treating this act of
the Sultan as an honest proposal, and in making it the basis of a wide
reform of the Ottoman Empire. They held it to be a sham. They proceeded
with their discussions as if it had not been issued. They preferred
an alternative scheme of providing autonomous institutions for the
Christian provinces of Turkey, and for the appointment of governors
subject to the approval of the Great Powers. There was practically no
difference of opinion at the Conference between the British and Russian
delegates, Lord Salisbury and General Ignatief. The Conference, at
their instance, reduced its demands on the Porte to the most moderate
minimum.
The Sultan refused point-blank to entertain the proposals of the
Conference, on the ground that they interfered with his sovereign
powers. He pleaded the new Constitution which he had just accorded
to the Empire. There never was any intention on his part to make any
concessions. He was under the belief that if war resulted with Russia
from his refusal to agree to reforms his country would not stand alone.
He took the policy of England from the speech of Lord Beaconsfield
at the Guildhall; and not from Lord Derby or Lord Salisbury. Lord
Beaconsfield had, in fact, thrown over his colleague, Lord Salisbury,
in that unfortunate utterance and had insured the failure of the
Conference at Constantinople.
A few days after the break-up of the Conference, Midhat Pasha was
ignominiously dismissed from office. The new Constitution did not
long survive its author. In May, 1877, Abdul Hamid suspended it and
dismissed the National Assembly which had been convoked. During the
two months of its existence its members had shown a determination to
expose the scandalous abuses of the Hamidian system. Later Abdul Hamid
trumped up a charge against Midhat of having been responsible for the
murder of Sultan Aziz. Two men employed by that Sultan, a wrestler and
a gardener, were suborned to confess that they strangled Aziz at the
instance of Midhat. Midhat was tried by corrupt judges and was not
allowed to cross-examine these men. He was found guilty and condemned
to death. At the instance mainly of the British Government the sentence
was commuted to banishment to Arabia. Midhat was there strangled
by order of Abdul Hamid in 1882, and his embalmed head was sent to
Constantinople, in order that the Sultan might be assured of his death.
The two men who had confessed to the murder of Aziz were released
and were pensioned by the Sultan. Sir Henry Elliot, who was British
Ambassador at Constantinople at the time of the death of Sultan Aziz,
put on record his conviction that it was a case of suicide, that the
charge against Midhat was trumped up, and that the whole proceedings
are an indelible stain on Abdul Hamid.
Meanwhile, in 1877, another attempt was made by the Great Powers to
effect a settlement of the Eastern question. Count Schouvaloff was
sent to London by the Emperor of Russia on a special mission for the
purpose. Agreement was arrived at between the Powers. It was embodied
in a protocol, and was presented to the Porte. It was promptly rejected
on April 10th by the Sultan as inconsistent with the treaty of Paris
by interfering with the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Russia
thereupon declared war against Turkey, justifying it in a dignified
manifesto, on the ground that the Sultan, by rejecting the protocol,
had defied Europe. Russia, therefore, held the strong position of
acting on behalf of Europe. England was the only Power to take
exception to this. Lord Derby, in a despatch to the Russian Government,
said that he and his colleagues regarded the action of Russia as
an obstacle to reform in Turkey, and held that the plight of the
Christian population could not be improved by war—a most unfortunate
prediction, as the result proved. More fortunate was the prediction of
Mr. Gladstone at the close of a speech which he made in the House of
Commons, on April 24, 1877, immediately after the declaration of war
by Russia, when moving a resolution intended to prevent the Government
from taking up a hostile attitude to Russia in the coming war.
I believe, for one [he said], that the knell of Turkish tyranny in
these provinces (the Balkan provinces) has sounded. So far as human
eyes can judge, it is about to be destroyed. The destruction may not
come in the way or by the means that we should choose; but come from
what hands it may, I am persuaded that it will be accepted as a boon
by Christendom and the world.[43]
The answer of the Government to Mr. Gladstone was given in the debate
by the Home Secretary, Sir Richard Cross, later Lord Cross. It showed
that the policy of Lord Derby, and not that of Lord Beaconsfield, had
prevailed in the Cabinet. The Government, he said, regretted the war
which had been declared by Russia, and did not believe that it would do
any good, but it would not give support to either side, unless the Suez
Canal or Egypt or Constantinople were threatened.
It followed from this decision of the British Cabinet that the hopes
which the Sultan had formed from the speeches of Lord Beaconsfield were
not realized. He was left alone to fight against Russia in another
attack on his Empire. Immediately after the declaration of war, on
April 24, 1877, two Russian armies invaded Turkey—the one in Europe,
of two hundred and fifty thousand men, under the nominal command of
the Grand Duke Nicholas, the other in Asia, of a hundred and fifty
thousand men from the Caucasus, under that of the Grand Duke Michael.
The former crossed the Pruth into Roumania, which was still nominally
a part of the Ottoman Empire. But on April 15th the Roumanian Chamber
had given its assent to a convention with Russia providing for the
passage of the Russian troops through the principality and otherwise
giving promise of friendly support. The Porte, as was to be expected,
treated this as a hostile act, and directed the bombardment of Calafat,
a Roumanian fortress on the Danube. The Roumanians thereupon, on May
21st, declared war against Turkey. They gave most effective support to
the Russians throughout the campaign. Indeed, it may be fairly said
from the course of the campaign that the invasion of Bulgaria would not
have been successful without the help of the Roumanians.
The Emperor of Russia had further prepared the way for the invasion of
Turkey by securing the neutrality of Austria-Hungary. At a personal
meeting in the previous year at Reichstadt, he had assured the
Emperor of Austria that he had no intention of taking possession of
Constantinople. He further promised that Bosnia and Herzegovina would
be handed over for occupation by Austria-Hungary as a reward for
neutrality in the event of success in his war against the Turks.
Owing to unprecedented inundations in the valley of the Danube, it was
not till two months after the commencement of the campaign that the
Russian army was able to cross that river. It did so at two points,
the one in the Dobrudscha, the other at Hirsova. In neither case did
it meet with serious opposition. The Turkish army of defence was
little inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, but its general,
Abdul Kerim, proved to be quite incompetent. He spread his forces
in detachments over a front of five hundred miles, and was too late
in concentrating them. The Russians, after capturing Nicopolis, the
Turkish stronghold on the Danube, advanced into Bulgaria and captured
Tirnovo, its ancient capital. Everywhere they were received by the
Bulgarians with rapturous demonstrations of delight at the prospect of
deliverance from Ottoman rule.
General Gourko, with a flying corps, then made a very hazardous but
successful march across the Balkans by the Hainköi Pass, and advanced
into Bulgaria along the Trudja Valley as far as Eski Zagra. Thence,
turning back, he attacked the more important Shipka Pass from the
south, and defeated a Turkish force in occupation of it. Meanwhile,
early in July, the main Russian army from Tirnovo came in contact
at Plevna, twenty miles south of the Danube, with a Turkish army of
fifty thousand men under Osman Pasha, who had been sent in relief of
Nicopolis, but was too late for the purpose.