this subject—to write more fully and do so without hesitation. I have
confidence in the British Government. It is not an engagement or
convention which I ask of them; it is a free interchange of ideas in
case of need—the word of a gentleman—that is enough between us.”
In reporting these conversations to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Hamilton
Seymour expressed his own opinion as follows:—
It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign who insists with
such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring State
must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not _of_ the
dissolution, at all events _for_ the dissolution, must be at hand.
In answer to these overtures the British Government, through Lord John
Russell, the Foreign Secretary, disclaimed all intention of aiming at
the acquisition either of Constantinople or any other of the Sultan’s
possessions, and accepted the assurances of the like effect which were
given by the Czar. It combated the opinion that the extinction of the
Ottoman Empire was near at hand and deprecated a discussion based
on this supposition as leading directly to produce the very result
against which it was hoped to provide. Finally, the British Government,
with abundance of courtesy, but in terms very stringent and clear,
peremptorily refused to enter into any kind of secret engagement with
Russia for the settlement of the Eastern question.
Lord Clarendon, who succeeded Lord John Russell as Foreign Minister in
the course of these proceedings, in a final despatch to Sir Hamilton
Seymour (March 23, 1853), expressed the following opinion:—
Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies, and a
determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to
the dignity and independence of the Sultan—that friendly support,
in short, which among States as well as individuals the weak are
entitled to expect from the strong—in order not only to prolong
its existence but to remove all cause for alarm respecting its
dissolution.
It will be seen that the British Government took much too sanguine a
view of the prospects of reformed Government in Turkey, and that the
Emperor of Russia was much nearer the mark.
We have quoted these conversations at length because of their extreme
importance when read by the light of subsequent events. They produced a
bad impression at the time on the British Government, and still more so
on public opinion in England, when later they were made public.[35] It
was thought that they indicated a deliberate intention on the part of
the Emperor of Russia to force the Eastern question to the front, and
to dismember the Ottoman Empire by a partition of the same kind as that
to which Poland had been treated, a few years back, and in which Russia
would have the lion’s share.
A more reasonable view may now be taken of the policy of the Emperor
Nicholas. Subsequent events have conclusively shown that he was fully
justified in describing the Turkish Empire as sick, almost to death,
for since then it has lost almost the whole of its dominions in Europe.
Russia also has acquired but a very small share of the vast territories
that have been taken from it. It is also subject to the reflection
that, although the British Government in 1852 disclaimed any wish or
intention to join in a scheme of partition of the Ottoman Empire, it
has since acquired a considerable part of it, approximating to the
offer of the Czar—namely Egypt, the Sudan, and the island of Cyprus.
Early in 1853 the Czar sent as a special envoy to the Porte Prince
Menschikof, a rude and bluff soldier. He was instructed to insist on
Russia’s claim to the guardianship of the Holy Sepulchre, in opposition
to that of France, and with a further demand, of a more serious kind,
for a protectorate in matters of religion over members of the Greek
Church throughout the Ottoman Empire.
It was no doubt in consequence of the conversations of the Czar with
Sir Hamilton Seymour and of this special mission of Prince Menschikof
that Canning, who had, in 1852, resigned the embassy at Constantinople,
and had been created a peer, with the title of Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, was again sent as ambassador to the Porte by Lord Clarendon,
who was now Foreign Minister in England. Lord Stratford himself
appears to have drawn up the instructions of the Foreign Office. He
was directed to neutralize, by England’s moral influence, the alarming
position opened up by the demands, as regards the Holy Places and other
matters, of Russia and France, and the dictatorial, if not hostile,
attitude they had assumed. He was left unfettered for the settlement
of the Holy Places. His own judgment and discretion might be trusted
to guide him. The Porte was to be told that it had to thank its own
maladministration and the accumulated grievances of foreign nations
for the menacing tone now adopted towards it by certain Powers; that a
general revolt of its Christian subjects might ensue; that the crisis
was one which required the utmost prudence on the part of the Porte,
and confidence in the sincerity and soundness of the advice it would
receive from him, to resolve it favourably for its future peace and
independence. He was to counsel reform in the administration of Turkey,
by which alone the sympathy of the British nation could be preserved.
In the event of imminent danger to the existence of the Turkish
Government, the ambassador was authorized to request the admiral in
command of the British fleet at Malta to hold himself in readiness,
but he was not to direct the approach of the fleet to the Dardanelles
without positive instructions from her Majesty’s Government.
Lord Stratford, on arrival at Constantinople, found that his protégé,
Reschid Pasha, had been dismissed from the post of Grand Vizier, at the
instance of the new envoy of Russia, and replaced by a pasha favourable
to that Power. Prince Menschikof, by the use of menaces, and probably
with the aid of bribes, had obtained a commanding influence over the
Sultan’s Government. He insisted that his demands on the Porte should
be kept secret, and threatened to leave Constantinople if they were
divulged to the British Ambassador. Lord Stratford, however, found no
difficulty in obtaining full information as to the Russian demands.
He showed very great diplomatic skill in separating the question of
the Holy Places from the more serious one of the protectorate over the
Greek Church. He contrived to settle between Russia, France, and the
Porte the dispute as to the Holy Sepulchre. There remained, however,
the more serious one of the protectorate. This was aggravated by
personal rivalry and hate between the Czar Nicholas and Lord Stratford.
The real question in dispute became largely whether Russian or British
influence was to predominate in Turkey, and whether reforms, so
essential for the security and well-being of its Christian population,
were to be carried out under a protectorate by Russia or by England.
It is impossible to read the able biography of Lord Stratford by Mr.
Lane Poole, or Mr. Kinglake’s well-known chapters on the causes which
led to the Crimean War, without concluding that the policy of England
at this crisis was virtually directed, not by the British Cabinet in
London, but by Lord Stratford at the Embassy at Constantinople. Prince
Menschikof, in the struggle which ensued at the Porte, was little
competent to contend against so practised and wary a diplomat as
Stratford, and was completely worsted in the attempt.
Early in May, after the arrival of Stratford, a reconstruction of
the Turkish ministry was effected at his instance. The nominee of
Russia was dismissed. Ref’at Pasha took his place as Grand Vizier,
and Reschid, Lord Stratford’s main ally, was reinstated in office as
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
By Stratford’s advice the Porte determined to resist the Russian
demands. The claim to protect the members of the Greek Church was
pronounced to be inadmissible. Prince Menschikof was informed to this
effect, and on May 21st he broke off diplomatic relations with the
Porte, and left Constantinople in high dudgeon. This was followed,
on May 31st, by an arrogant despatch to the Porte from the Russian
Government, insisting on the acceptance of the Menschikof demands.
At the instance of Stratford, the Porte again refused, and thereupon
a Russian army crossed the Pruth, on July 3rd, and occupied Moldavia
and Wallachia. In a manifesto, issued a few days later, the Czar
disclaimed any intention of conquest, and justified his occupation of
the provinces as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of his demands
on behalf of the Christian population of Turkey.
That there was ample cause for the complaints of the Russian Government
of the maltreatment of the Christian population in Turkey cannot
be disputed. On July 22, 1853, Lord Stratford himself, in a formal
communication to the Porte, forwarded reports from the British Consuls
at Scutari, Monastir, and Prevesa, which detailed “acts of disorder,
injustice, and corruption of a very atrocious kind, which he had
frequently brought to the notice of the Ottoman Porte.” He complained
that the assurances given by the late Grand Vizier of remedies for
such evils had not been carried out, and he observed, with extreme
disappointment and pain, the continuance of evils which affected so
deeply the welfare of the Empire.
Again, on July 4th of the same year, in a further communication to the
Porte, Lord Stratford wrote:—
The character of disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with
truth to be in general that of Mussulman fanaticism, excited by
cupidity and hatred against the Sultan’s Christian vassals.
Unless some powerful means be applied without further delay, it
is to be feared that the authority of the central Government will
be completely overpowered and that the people, despairing of
protection, will augment the disorder by resorting to lawless means
of self-preservation.
Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Minister, also, in a communication to the
British Ambassador, showed that he was fully alive to the serious
character of the disorders in the Turkish Empire. He wrote:—
It is impossible to suppose that any true sympathy for their rulers
will be felt by the Christian subjects of the Porte, so long as
they are made to experience in all their daily transactions the
inferiority of their position as compared with that of their
Mussulman fellow-subjects; so long as they are aware that they will
seek in vain for justice for wrongs done either to their persons
or their properties, because they are deemed a degraded race,
unworthy to be put into comparison with the followers of Mahomet.
Your Excellency will plainly and authoritatively state to the Porte
that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian
Powers. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous
principle and the loss of sympathy and support of its allies.
In spite, however, of the experience of the futility of all past
promises to carry out the most elementary reforms in favour of the
Christian subjects of the Porte, both Lord Stratford and Lord Clarendon
appear to have based their policy largely on the belief that the Porte
would be more amenable in the future.
The occupation of the Danubian principalities by a Russian army did not
of itself necessarily involve war with Turkey. Though the Sultan was
suzerain of these provinces, they enjoyed complete autonomy under the
protection of Russia. Under certain conditions that Power was entitled
to send its army there. But the continued occupation of them was
clearly antagonistic to the sovereign rights of the Sultan and would
ultimately lead to war.
With a view to avoid war, a conference was held by the representatives
of all the Powers except Russia at Vienna, and an agreement was arrived
at for the settlement of the question between Russia and Turkey by
England, France, Austria, and Prussia. This was agreed to by Russia.
It was commended to the Porte by the Powers, and Lord Stratford was
instructed by Lord Clarendon to use all his efforts to obtain its
consent.
Officially, Lord Stratford performed his task in due accord with
the instructions of Lord Clarendon. But his biographer and, still
more, Mr. Kinglake admit that the rejection of the Vienna demand was
mainly due to the British Ambassador. After quoting the words of Lord
Stratford, in which he described his efforts to induce the Porte to
accede to it, Kinglake writes:—
These were dutiful words. But it is not to be believed that, even
if he strove to do so, Lord Stratford could hide his real thoughts
from the Turkish ministers. There was that in his very presence which
disclosed his volition; for if the thin, disciplined lips moved in
obedience to constituted authorities, men who knew how to read the
meaning of his brow, and the light which kindled beneath, could
gather that the ambassador’s thoughts concerning the Home Governments
of the four Great Powers of Europe were little else than an angry
_quos ego_; the sagacious Turks would look more to the great signs
than to the terms of formal advice sent out from London, and if they
saw that Lord Stratford was, in his heart, against the opinion of
Europe, they could easily resolve to follow his known desire and
to disobey his mere words. The result was that without any sign of
painful doubt the Turkish Government determined to stand firm.
This is the view of a panegyrist of Lord Stratford. We have quoted it
for the purpose of showing that it was practically Lord Stratford who
guided the Turkish Government in this matter.
After the failure of the settlement prepared at the Vienna Conference,
the Porte, on October 1st, by the advice of Lord Stratford, made
a formal demand on Russia for the evacuation of the Danubian
principalities, and in default of this, a fortnight later it declared
war. The Turks then boldly took the initiative. Their army, under Omar
Pasha, crossed the Danube in November, 1853, and fought two battles
successfully against the Russians at Oltenitza and Citale in Wallachia.
Meanwhile, on October 22nd, when Russia and Turkey were already
at war, the fleets of England and France entered the Dardanelles.
Though this was not an infraction of the treaty of 1841, it was a
distinctly hostile act on the part of these Powers against Russia. But
negotiations still continued. Whatever hopes, however, there were of a
favourable issue were destroyed when, on November 30th, a Russian fleet
of six battleships, issuing from Sebastopol, attacked and completely
destroyed a Turkish squadron of eleven cruisers and smaller vessels
lying at anchor in the port of Sinope, on the coast of Asia Minor.
Four thousand Turkish sailors perished in this engagement. This was
an act of war, as legitimate as the attack by the Ottoman army on the
Russian force north of the Danube, the more so as the Turkish vessels
were believed to be carrying munitions of war to arm the Circassians
against Russia. It caused, however, an immense sensation in England
and France. It was denounced as an act of treachery and as a massacre
rather than a legitimate naval action. The fleets of the two Powers
then lying in the Bosphorus were at once instructed to enter the Black
Sea and to invite any Russian ships of war they might meet there to
return to their ports. They were to prevent any further attack on
Turkey. This made war inevitable. But negotiations were still for
a time continued, and it was not till March 28, 1854, that war was
actually declared against Russia by England and France. Armies were
then sent by these Powers to Constantinople, and thence to Varna,
in the Black Sea, with the object of protecting Turkey against the
attack of a Russian army and of assisting the former in compelling the
evacuation by the Russians of the two Danubian provinces.
Meanwhile, early in the spring of this year (1854), a Russian army had
crossed the Danube and had invested Silistria, the great fortress which
barred the way to the Balkans and Constantinople. It was defended with
the utmost bravery and tenacity by a Turkish army under Moussa Pasha,
assisted by two British engineer officers, Butler and Nasmyth. On June
25th the Russians recognized that they could not capture the fortress.
They raised the siege and retreated across the Danube, after incurring
immense loss of life and material.
All danger of an advance by the Russians across the Danube and the
Balkans was now at an end. The Turks unaided had effectually prevented
any such project. The Russian army thereupon retreated from the
Danubian principalities. Their place there was taken by an Austrian
army, with the consent of both Russia and the two Western Powers. No
reason existed, therefore, why the war should be continued, so far as
England and France were concerned. There was no longer any necessity
for their armies to defend the frontiers of Turkey. But a war spirit
had been roused in the two countries and was not to be allayed without
much shedding of blood. The two Powers decided to use their armies
which had been collected at Varna for the invasion of the Crimea and
the destruction of the naval arsenal at Sebastopol, which was regarded
as a permanent menace to Turkey.
Thenceforth, the part of the Turks in the war became subordinate and
even insignificant. The war was fought _à outrance_ between the two
allied Powers and Russia. The successful landing of the two armies
at Eupatoria, in the Crimea, their splendid victory over the Russian
army at the Alma, their flank march to the south of Sebastopol, the
commencement of the long siege of that fortress, the famous battles
of Balaklava and Inkerman and the terrible sufferings of the British
army in the winter of 1854-5, the memorable defence of Sebastopol
under General Todleben, the capture of the Malakoff by the French on
September 8th, 1855, and the consequent evacuation of the city and
forts of Sebastopol, on the southern side of its great harbour, are
events of the deepest interest in the histories of the allied Powers
and Russia, but have comparatively little bearing on our present theme.
Very little use was, in fact, made of the Turkish army by the Allies
in the course of the war. A division of seven thousand men was sent to
the Crimea in the autumn of 1854, and was employed for the defence of
Balaklava. It was led by most incompetent officers, and when attacked
by the Russians on the morning of the Battle of Balaklava, the men
precipitately fled. This exposed the flank of the allied army to
great danger. Later, another Turkish force under Omar Pasha was sent
to Eupatoria. It was attacked there by a much superior Russian army,
early in 1855, and fighting behind earthworks it made a very effective
resistance and completely repulsed the Russians. It was said that the
humiliation of this defeat of his troops by the despised Turks was the
immediate cause of the death of the Emperor Nicholas.
In Asia Minor another Russian army invaded Turkish territory and laid
siege to the fortress of Kars. There followed the memorable defence of
this stronghold by the Turks, assisted, if not commanded, by General
Williams, later Sir Fenwick Williams, and Colonel Teesdale. It was
ultimately, after a four months’ siege, compelled by want of food and
munitions to capitulate. The failure to relieve it was due to the
grossest and most culpable negligence of the Turkish Government. In
this siege and in that of Silistria and the defence of Eupatoria, the
Turkish soldiers gave ample proof that when well led they had lost none
of their pristine valour in defence of earthworks. The allied Powers,
however, seem to have been quite ignorant or unmindful of the military
value of the Turkish soldiers and made little or no practical use of
them. An army of fifty thousand Turks led by English or French officers
would have been of the utmost value in the earlier part of the war.
It was only towards the close of it that twenty thousand Turks were
enrolled under British officers. But this action was too late, and they
took no part in the war.
The writer, as a young man, spent a month in the Crimea in 1855, and
was present as a spectator on Cathcart’s Hill on the eventful day when
the Malakoff was captured by the French, and the British were repulsed
in their attack on the Redan. He well recollects the prevalent opinion
among British officers, whom he met, that the Turkish army was a
negligible force and of no military value in the field. This opinion
was abundantly shown in the attitude of British and French soldiers to
the Turkish soldiers whenever they met, and must have been very galling
to the pride and self-respect of the latter.
The capture of the Malakoff, a great feat of arms on the part of the
French army, was the last important event in the campaign of 1855.
Early in 1856 there were strong indications that the Emperor of the
French was weary of the war. Public opinion in France declared itself
unmistakably against its continuance. France had nothing to gain by
its prolongation. Its military pride had been satisfied by success in
the capture of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian fleet.
Its army in the Crimea was suffering severely from disease. With the
British it was otherwise. Their army before the enemy was in greater
force than at any previous period of the war. It was eager to retrieve
its prestige, which had been somewhat impaired by the failure at the
Redan. The British Government was as anxious for another campaign as
was the army. But without their French ally they could obviously do
nothing. The French Emperor entered into secret negotiations with the
Emperor Alexander, who had succeeded Nicholas. The success of the
Russian army in the capture of Kars and the valour it had shown in
defence of Sebastopol made it easy to negotiate peace without slur
on its military fame. It is impossible for us, who now look back on
these times, to perceive what possible object could have been gained
by England in prolonging the war. The projects of completing the
conquest of the Crimea, and of sending an army to the Caucasus in aid
of the Circassians, and another army to the Baltic to free Finland
from Russia, were fantastic and perilous. England was saved from these
adventures by the wiser policy of the French. The British Government
against its will was compelled to enter into a negotiation for peace.
This was effected through the mediation of Austria. Terms were
provisionally agreed to, and a Congress of the Great Powers was held in
Paris in 1856, at which a treaty of peace was finally concluded.
Under the terms of this treaty all the territories conquered by Russia
in Asia or by the allied Powers in Europe were restored to their
former owners. The small part of Bessarabia conceded to Russia by the
treaty of Bucharest and giving access to the Danube was reannexed to
Moldavia. The exclusive protectorate of Russia over the two Danubian
principalities was abolished, and they were placed under the joint
protection of all the Great Powers. The suzerainty of the Sultan over
them was recognized. But the Porte engaged to preserve for them an
independent and national administration, with full liberty of worship,
of legislation, and of commerce. They were to be permitted to organize
national armed forces. Serbia was accorded the same treatment, except
as regards a national army, but the armed intervention of the Porte
was to be permitted only with the consent of the Powers who were
signatories to the treaty. The Black Sea was neutralized. It was thrown
open to the mercantile marine of all nations, but was interdicted
to the war vessels of either Russia or Turkey, and these two Powers
engaged not to establish or maintain any military maritime arsenals on
its coasts.
As regards the internal administration of Turkey and the treatment of
its Christian population, the treaty contained the following clause:—