Empire. He died on July 1, 1839, some writers allege from the effect
of alcohol, though this is doubtful. Creasy and many other historians
are unstinting in praise of Mahmoud. They assign to him a very high
position in the list of Sultans. They bear testimony to his high
civic courage, and to the firm resolution with which he confronted
the many crises of his reign. We must fully admit these qualities.
Few sovereigns in history have had to deal with such a succession of
grave difficulties. Almost alone he bore the weight of Empire. We
must not, however, lose sight of the fact that his administration
and diplomacy were fraught with failure, that his Empire incurred
greater losses than under any previous Sultan, that his armies met
with invariable defeat, not only on the part of numerically weaker
armies of Russia, but also from insurgent Greeks and Serbians, and
even from Egyptians, whose fighting qualities were much inferior to
those of the Turks. His firmness and resolution were very great,
but they failed him at the supreme crisis of his career, when the
Russian army, with quite inadequate numbers, after serious losses in
battle and by disease, threatened Constantinople from Adrianople, and
when it is now quite certain that, if Mahmoud had stood firm and had
refused to come to terms, overwhelming disaster must have befallen the
Russians. At another crisis also his firmness amounted to most unwise
obstinacy when he refused, in 1827, to concede autonomy to Greece at
the instance of the Great Powers—a supreme error from which all his
subsequent misfortunes logically followed. Mahmoud seems also to have
been wanting in magnetism to inspire his generals and soldiers with his
own courage and resolution. He does not compare in this respect with
his contemporary and rival, Mehemet Ali. He had little of the martial
vigour and of the craft of that great vassal. If the Great Powers had
not intervened, it was highly probable, if not certain, that Ibrahim’s
army would, either in 1833 or in 1839, have marched to Constantinople,
have effected a revolution there, and have put an end to the Othman
dynasty. It might have given new life to the decadent Turkish Empire.
In any case, there was no reason why Mahmoud, if he had been endowed
with Mehemet Ali’s genius and administrative capacity, should not
have created an army superior in force and discipline to that of the
Egyptian Pasha, and equal to the task of preventing the Russians from
crossing the Balkans.
XX
THE RULE OF ELCHIS
1839-76
MAHMOUD was succeeded by his son, Abdul Mehzid, a youth of sixteen
years, who proved to be of very different stamp from his father. He
was of mild and gentle nature, without physical or mental vigour,
and wanting in force of character. He was enfeebled early in his
reign by excessive indulgence in his harem. Later he was addicted to
alcohol, like many of his predecessors. His father had monopolized
power, and had frequently changed his ministers, with the result that
he left no statesman behind him who could impose his will on the
young Sultan and govern in his name. Nor was any lady of the harem
ambitious and competent to guide or misguide the ship of State, as had
not infrequently been the case in the past, when the reigning Sultan
was unequal to the task. The main power during this reign as regards
foreign affairs, and to some extent even as regards internal affairs,
seems to have been vested in the ambassadors of the Great Powers.
This power was exercised collectively by them on the rare occasions
when they were unanimously agreed, but at other times by one or other
of them, and chiefly, as will be seen, by the British Ambassador,
Sir Stratford Canning, later Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who, by
his force of character and commanding presence, obtained immense
personal influence over the feeble mind of Abdul Mehzid, and exercised
an almost undisputed sway from 1842 to 1858, with the exception of
brief intervals when he was in England on leave, and when the Russian
Ambassador succeeded in obtaining exclusive influence.
The new Sultan was fortunate, as compared with his father, that in the
thirty-one years of his reign his Empire experienced no serious loss of
territory. It is necessary, however, to advert to the two main events
of it—the one, the suppression of Mehemet Ali’s ambitious projects and
the restriction of his hereditary Pashalic to Egypt; the other, the
Crimean War, as it is known in history—the war with Russia, the effect
of which was to stave off for nearly twenty years the dismemberment of
the Turkish Empire in Europe.
As regards the first of these events, it has been shown that, in
the last year of Mahmoud’s reign, Mehemet Ali was in a position of
great strength, which might have enabled him to overthrow the Othman
dynasty. He had destroyed the main Turkish army in Asia, at Nazeb, on
the frontier of Syria, and by the infamous treachery of Achmet Pasha
he had obtained possession of the Turkish fleet. He comported himself,
however, with moderation at this stage. He informed the Porte that he
was willing to come to terms if they would recognize the Pashalics of
Egypt, Syria, Tripoli (in Asia Minor), Adana, and Crete as hereditary
in his family. He had no intention, he said, to use the Turkish fleet
against his suzerain, the Sultan. He would give it back to the Porte,
if his terms were agreed to. If Sultan Mahmoud had been alive, it may
be confidently assumed that he would have rejected these terms with
contumely, and would have fought it out with his rebellious vassal.
But Abdul Mehzid was wanting in courage to meet the crisis. The two
disasters caused the greatest alarm at Constantinople. The majority
of the Divan were ready to concede the demands of Mehemet Ali. They
were prevented from doing so by an unprecedented occurrence. The
ambassadors of the five Great Powers—England, France, Russia, Austria,
and Prussia—met in conclave and came to the conclusion that it was
contrary to the interests of their respective Governments that Mehemet
Ali’s demands should be acceded to. They informed the Porte that their
Governments desired to discuss the questions raised by Mehemet Ali,
and invited the Sultan to suspend a definitive arrangement with him.
This was agreed to by the Divan. The settlement of the relation of the
rebellious pasha to the Sultan fell into the hands of the ambassadors,
and a kind of tutelage was established over the Turkish Empire.
The conduct of the Emperor Nicholas on this occasion was most
conciliatory to the other Powers. He intimated to them that, if they
were united on a scheme to settle the Egyptian question, he would
not insist on the special right which he had acquired under the
treaties of Bucharest and of Akermann to exclude the ships of war of
other Powers from the Dardanelles, and that he would withdraw his
few remaining troops from Constantinople and the Bosphorus. Lord
Palmerston, on behalf of Great Britain, expressed his admiration of
this attitude of the Russian Emperor. As a result, a conference took
place in London between the representatives of the Great Powers, at
which Lord Palmerston, on behalf of England, and Baron Brunnow, on
behalf of Russia, took the leading part. Grave difference soon arose at
the conference on the part of France. Its Government, though strongly
opposed to Russia obtaining possession of Constantinople, had always
been favourable to the claim of Mehemet Ali to an hereditary Pashalic
in Egypt and Syria, and had secretly encouraged him to make himself
independent of the Porte. It now supported him against the veto of the
other Powers. Eventually England, Russia, and Austria, finding that
they could not come to agreement with France, decided to act without
its concurrence, and to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria and to
restore to the Porte the Turkish fleet. After long discussion between
these three Powers, a convention was agreed to on July 15, 1840. They
presented an ultimatum to Mehemet Ali, calling upon him to submit
himself to the Porte. They promised that if, within ten days of the
receipt of the ultimatum, he would give orders for the withdrawal of
his army from Syria, and would give up the Turkish fleet to the Porte,
he would be recognized as hereditary Pasha of Egypt and as Pasha of
Syria for his own life; but, if not, the offer of the life Pashalic
of Syria and the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt would be withdrawn, and
he would have to content himself with the Pashalic for life of Egypt.
It was also intimated to him that if there was refusal or delay the
fleets of the three Powers would at once institute a blockade of Egypt
and Syria. This ultimatum of the three Powers, when it became known in
France, caused the most profound indignation; the more so when, on the
refusal of Mehemet Ali to accede to the ultimatum, the British fleet,
supported by war vessels of the two other Powers, made its appearance
on the coast of Syria. This was thought to be an insult to France.
War between that country and England was imminent. There were violent
scenes in the French Chambers, and most bitterly hostile articles
in the French papers. There were threats of war on the part of the
Government of France. But prudent counsels ultimately prevailed, when
it was discovered that France was not prepared for a naval war, and
that its fleet could not hope to contend with the British fleet in the
Mediterranean or to land an army in Syria.
The three Powers, on their part, mainly at the instance of Lord
Palmerston, declined to submit their policy to the threats of France,
and persisted in their demonstration of force against Mehemet Ali. War
was averted between England and France, and Louis Philippe (then King
of the French) contented himself with the cynical observation that
there was all the difference in the world between threatening war and
actually going to war.
Meanwhile the British fleet, under Admirals Stopford and Napier,
appeared before Beyrout and bombarded and destroyed its forts. Two
thousand men were landed, under Napier, and defeated the Egyptian
forces. The same operation was repeated a few days later at Acre. The
powerful defences of this fortress were demolished by the guns of the
British fleet, and six thousand men were landed, under Napier, and
defeated Ibrahim’s army. It was in these attacks on Beyrout and Acre
that steamships made their first appearance in maritime war. The allies
were greatly assisted by the revolt of the people of Syria against
Mehemet Ali’s oppressive government. Desertion also was very rife in
the Egyptian force, and Ibrahim’s army, which had originally consisted
of seventy-five thousand men, had dwindled down to twenty-five thousand.
After these operations on the coast of Syria, Napier and his squadron
appeared before Alexandria and threatened bombardment. But Mehemet
Ali, by this time, had realized that he could not hope to make war
successfully against the three Great Powers as well as the Sultan. He
entered into negotiations with Admiral Napier. He agreed to evacuate
Syria and to give up the Turkish fleet to the Porte, provided that
the Sultan would recognize him as hereditary Pasha of Egypt. In the
meantime the Sultan of Turkey had issued a firman deposing Mehemet Ali
from all his Pashalics. This did not necessarily mean much, for the
Porte on four previous occasions had publicly deposed the rebellious
pasha, but without any result. Eventually, on September 20, 1841,
agreement was arrived at between Mehemet Ali and the three Powers. In
spite of his deposition by the Sultan, Mehemet Ali was confirmed in
the position of hereditary Pasha of Egypt, but was deprived of all
his other governments. He was to pay tribute to the Porte equal to
one-fourth of the revenue of Egypt—later fixed at an annual sum of
£400,000. He was to withdraw his army from Syria and to maintain no
larger force in Egypt than eighteen thousand men.
The intervention of the three Great Powers, taking the matter out
of the hands of the Sultan, brought about an arrangement much more
favourable to him than the Divan were willing to agree to. Syria
was relieved of the government of Mehemet Ali and was placed again
under the control of the Porte. Egypt, on the other hand, was made
practically independent, subject only to a fixed tribute in recognition
of the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. This result was achieved
not by the force of arms of the Sultan, but by the action of the
three Great Powers, directed chiefly by the able diplomacy of Lord
Palmerston, who steered this concert through all its difficulties and
against the violent opposition of France. The final settlement thus
imposed on Mehemet Ali, which extinguished his ambitious projects and
reduced his rule to Egypt alone, is said to have broken the heart of
the old man. He lived on for eight more years, but they were spent
in gloom and depression, aggravated by the death of his able and
distinguished son Ibrahim. It should be added here that in 1841, as
a sequel to the arrangement about Egypt, a convention was agreed to
between the Great Powers, including Russia, and Turkey by which the
vessels of war of all countries except Turkey were forbidden to pass
through the Straits to and from the Black Sea.
The settlement of these grave questions, in 1841, was followed by
twelve years of comparative repose in Turkey, broken only by occasional
revolts of pashas, or of subject races driven to desperation by chronic
misgovernment. These were put down by the Seraskier, Omar Pasha, who
proved to be a very competent general for this purpose. It was during
this period that Sir Stratford Canning, as British Ambassador to the
Porte, attained a personal influence over the Sultan, Abdul Mehzid, of
an unprecedented character, such that he may be said to have virtually
ruled the State.
Canning on three previous occasions had represented the British
Government at Constantinople during the reign of Mahmoud. In 1812 as
Minister Plenipotentiary, when quite a young man, he had gained immense
credit by inducing the Sultan to come to terms with Russia, by the
treaty of Bucharest. The effect of this was to free the hands of the
Czar and to enable him to withdraw his army from the Danube and to use
it on the flank of Napoleon’s army in the celebrated Moscow campaign.
This largely contributed to the defeat of the invasion of Russia.
Later he had been engaged in the delimitation of Greece, after the
recognition of its independence, and had shown himself a Philhellene.
In 1842 Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Minister of England, sent him again
as ambassador to the Porte at the age of fifty-seven. He remained
there, with two short intervals, till 1858. He acquired, during these
sixteen years, the title of “The Great Elchi,” the ambassador _par
éminence_. By the Christian rayas of the Ottoman Empire he was known
as the Padishah of the Padishahs. He was the most distinguished envoy
ever employed in the British Diplomatic Service. He belonged to an old
school of diplomats, when communications with the Home Government were
long in reaching their destination, and when ambassadors necessarily
took much responsibility upon themselves, and dictated rather than
followed the policy of their Governments. He held himself to represent
his sovereign rather than the transient ministers of the day. His
mien was such as greatly to impress the Turks. It was stately and
dignified. His countenance was noble and spirituelle. His eyes seemed
to penetrate the minds of those with whom he transacted business,
and made it difficult for them to conceal their intentions. His own
methods were always honourable and straightforward. Though he was well
versed in the arts of diplomacy and could meet mine by countermine,
he never resorted to trickery. The Turks learned that his word was
implicitly to be trusted, and that he wished well to their country.
He treated the Turkish ministers with the utmost hauteur. With some
of them, whose hands were known to be stained with blood, he refused
to have any communication. If his demands were refused at the Porte,
he went direct to the Sultan and fairly bullied that weak, gentle,
and well-intentioned sovereign into acquiescence. He entered on his
work in this embassy with two main convictions, one might almost say
obsessions—the one that it was the interest of England, and therefore
his own duty, to oppose the schemes of Russia at every turn; the other
that it was his duty to urge, and even to compel, the Porte to carry
out internal reforms, and to come into line with other civilized
countries in Europe, in default of which he fully recognized that the
Ottoman Empire could not be maintained. He had a firm belief that this
was possible, and that he was himself the appointed man to effect it.
For this purpose he freely made use of threats of force from England if
his behests were refused, and of promises of protection against Russia
if they were agreed to. An envoy of this character, great as were his
qualities and personal merits, was a cause of embarrassment to British
policy, for the Government could not control him. One might say of him,
in the words of Shakespeare:—
If great men could thunder as Jove himself does,
Jove would ne’er be quiet.
Canning used the thunder of his country freely in pursuance of his own
policy. He was undoubtedly the main cause of the war which soon ensued
between Great Britain and Russia.
Meanwhile the reform of its administration and its laws had long been
recognized by the very few honest and capable statesmen of Turkey as
indispensable to the maintenance of its Empire. Mahmoud himself, in the
latter part of his life, had appreciated this necessity, and had given
his sanction to a scheme of reform. But death came to him before it
was issued. He must have instructed his son as to this policy, for one
of the first acts of Abdul Mehzid, by the advice of his Grand Vizier,
Reschid Pasha, was to issue the important declaration of reform which
had been prepared by Mahmoud, and was known as the Hatti-Scheriff of
Ghulkané. It promised equally to all his subjects, without distinction
of creed or race, security of life, of honour, and of property, the
equitable distribution of taxes, the public trial of all prisoners,
the right of all to hold and devise property, and the systematic
recruiting of the army. It appointed a council to elaborate the details
of administrative reform to give effect to these principles. But
this great charter of reform lacked the will of a Mahmoud to enforce
it. There ensued a dangerous reaction. Reschid Pasha was compelled
to resign. Riza Pasha, who succeeded him, and his colleagues, were
reactionary, fanatical, and anti-Christian. The Hatti-Scheriff, like
almost every other promise of reform in Turkey, became a dead letter.
Riza was also corrupt and venal, and robbed the treasury of untold
sums. It became the principal object of Canning to obtain the dismissal
of this man and of the gang of peculators who worked with him, and the
reinstatement of Reschid. Proposals for reform in favour of the rayas
were impossible with ministers who carried their hatred of Christianity
to the length of excluding from the public service every Turk who could
speak a Christian language.
By dint of long and patient efforts Canning obtained such a mastery
over Abdul Mehzid that he was able to bring about a change of
ministers, and to reinstate Reschid Pasha as the only statesman in
Turkey who was capable of carrying out reforms, and who was willing to
be guided by himself as to their main principles.
In 1852 a serious diplomatic dispute broke out at Constantinople,
between the representatives of France and Russia, as to the
guardianship of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem and many trumpery
details connected with it. Early in 1853 there were strong indications
that the Emperor Nicholas intended to take the opportunity of this
dispute to raise a much more serious question against the Porte. He
evidently desired to disarm the opposition of England to his schemes.
In a private conversation at St. Petersburg with Sir Hamilton Seymour,
the British Ambassador at his Court, he opened his mind:—
The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganized condition. The
country itself seems to be falling to pieces. The fall will be a
great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia
should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and
that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not
apprised.... We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man. It
will, I tell you frankly, be a great misfortune if one of these days
he should slip away from us before all necessary arrangements were
made.
With this intimation the conversation appears to have dropped. A few
days later it was renewed at a private entertainment.
You know [the Emperor said] the dreams and plans in which the Empress
Catherine was in the habit of indulging; these were handed down to
our time; but while I inherited immense territorial possessions,
I did not inherit these visions—those intentions, if you like to
call them so. On the contrary, my country is so vast, so happily
circumstanced in everything, that it would be unreasonable in me to
desire more territory or more power than I possess; on the contrary,
I am the first to tell you that our great, perhaps our only, danger
is that which arises from an extension given to an Empire already too
large.
Close to us lies Turkey, and in our present condition nothing better
for our interests can be desired. The time has gone by when we had
anything to fear from the fanatical spirit or the military enterprise
of the Turks, and yet the country is strong enough, or has hitherto
been strong enough, to preserve its independence, and to insure
respectful treatment from other countries.
In that Empire there are several millions of Christians whose
interests I am called to watch over, while the right of doing so is
secured to me by treaty. I may truly say that I make a moderate and
sparing use of my right, and I will freely confess that it is one
which is attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient;
but I cannot recede from the discharge of a distinct duty....
Now, Turkey has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude
that, eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of his life,
he may suddenly die on our hands; we cannot resuscitate what is
dead. If the Turkish Empire falls it falls to rise no more, and I
put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided
beforehand for a contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion,
and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the
catastrophe, if it should occur unexpectedly and before some ulterior
system has been sketched. That is the part to which I am desiring you
should call the attention of your Government.
Now, I desire to speak to you as a friend, and as a gentleman. If
England and I arrive at an understanding in this matter, as regards
the rest it little matters to me. It is indifferent to me what others
do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly that, if England
thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople,
I will not allow it. For my part, I am equally disposed to take
the engagement not to establish myself there—as proprietor, that
is to say—for as occupier I do not say; it might happen that
circumstances, if no previous provisions were made, if everything
should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying
Constantinople.
On the 20th February, in a further conversation, the Emperor said:—
If your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any
element of existence, your Government must have received incorrect
information. I repeat to you, the sick man is dying, and we can never
allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some
understanding.
The next day he added:—
The principalities are, in fact, an independent State under my
protection. This might so continue. Serbia might receive the same
form of government. So again with Bulgaria; there seems to be no
reason why these provinces should not form one independent State.
As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that
territory. I can thus only say that if, in the event of a destruction
of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should
take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I could
say the same thing of Candia. That island might suit you, and I do
not see why it should not become an English possession.
Sir Hamilton Seymour, in reply to the Emperor, said to his Government:—
I simply observed that I had always understood that the English views
upon Egypt did not go beyond the part of securing a safe and ready
communication between British India and the Mother Country.