occupied by her armies. The Crimea was not, indeed, restored to the
Turks. The independence of the Tartars there and in Bessarabia up to
the frontier of Poland was recognized under a native prince, in whose
election Russia and Turkey were forbidden to interfere. Neither Power
was thenceforth to “intervene in the domestic, political, civil, and
internal affairs of this new State.” There was, however, a grave
reservation pregnant of future aggrandizement to Russia. She was to
retain the fortresses of Kertch, Yenikale, and the cities of Azoff and
Kilburn. These would necessarily give access to and virtual command
over the Crimea to Russia at any future time. For the present, however,
the Crimea, though lost to the Turks, was not acquired by Russia. It is
probable that the ulemas would not have assented to the transfer of a
Moslem province to a Christian Power, and that the war would have been
continued if Russia had insisted on this. Oczakoff, on the opposite
side of the Dnieper to Kilburn, was retained by the Porte. But the two
Karbartas on the shores of the Euxine, though inhabited by Moslems,
were retained by Russia. With these exceptions, all the Ottoman
territories in the hands of Russia as a result of the war—Wallachia,
Moldavia, Bessarabia, Georgia, and Mingrelia—were restored to the
Sultan. In the case of Wallachia and Moldavia, this retrocession
was subject to the condition that free exercise of the Christian
religion was to be secured to their population, and that there was to
be humane and generous government there for the future. The right of
remonstrance in these respects was secured to the ministers of Russia
at Constantinople on behalf of these provinces.
Another most important clause, full of danger for the future to the
Ottoman Empire, related to its Christian subjects. “The Sublime Porte,”
it ran, “promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and
churches and allow the ministers of Russia at Constantinople to make
representation on their behalf.”
This most important provision gave to Russia a preferential right of
protection of the Christian rayas not conceded to any other Christian
Power. Provision also was made for the full access of Russian subjects
to the holy city of Jerusalem. Free navigation was provided for Russian
ships on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, but nothing was said as
to a right of access through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. There was
no mention of Poland in the treaty, though it had been the original
cause of the war. Two secret clauses provided for the payment by the
Porte of four millions of roubles within three years and for the
withdrawal of the Russian fleet from the Archipelago.
The importance of this treaty, moderate though it was in many of its
terms, has always been recognized by historians as the starting-point
for further and greater dismemberments of the Turkish Empire. The
treaty of Carlowitz had secured the deliverance of the Christian
population of Hungary from Ottoman rule. But this treaty now, for the
first time, tore from the Empire a Moslem province and gave to Russia
a right of intervention on behalf of all the Christian population—an
immense innovation, humiliating to the Turks, and fraught with the
gravest peril to their Empire in the future.
There can be no doubt that the Grand Vizier was fully authorized by the
Porte to agree to the terms of this treaty. He was, however, recalled
and deposed immediately after its signature, and he died from the
effects of poison on his way to Constantinople. It was probably thought
by the ministers of the Sultan that Mouhsinzade, if called to account
for concluding so humiliating a treaty, would be able to show their
full responsibility for it. It remains only to state that the Russian
plenipotentiaries at Kainardji delayed the signature of the treaty
for four days in order that it might synchronize with the anniversary
of the treaty of the Pruth, which had been the cause of so much
humiliation to Russia.
XVII
TO THE TREATY OF JASSY
1774-92
EIGHTEEN years elapsed between the peace of Kainardji, 1774, and the
treaty of Jassy, 1792, the next conspicuous event in the downward
course of the Ottoman Empire. The first thirteen of these years were a
period of external peace to the Empire under the rule of Abdul Hamid I.
The country had been completely exhausted by the late war with Russia,
and the Sultan—or, rather, his ministers, for he appears to have been
little competent himself to carry on the government—were strongly in
favour of maintaining peace, and did so in spite of great provocation
from the Empress Catherine. That able and unscrupulous woman pursued
her designs for the complete subjection of the Crimea with relentless
resolution and activity. It was an essential condition of the peace
of Kainardji that the Crimea was to be an independent State under the
rule of a native Tartar prince. The breach of it, by the assumption
of sovereignty, direct or indirect, on the part of Russia, would
undoubtedly be a just cause of war to the Turks. The Porte, however,
was not in a position to take up a challenge of the Empress. The
knowledge of this was doubtless the main motive for her proceedings
during the next few years.
The steps by which Catherine attained her object bore a striking
resemblance to those by which other annexations were carried into
effect by Russia, and might well have been predicted. A member of the
princely Tartar family of Gherai, Dewlet, was elected by the Tartars
of the Crimea as their Khan. The agents of Russia thereupon supported
the claims of a rival Gherai, Schahin. They fomented disaffection and
revolt against Dewlet. While sedulously disclaiming any project of
annexation, Catherine then sent an army into the peninsula with the
ostensible purpose of restoring order. It compelled the abdication
of Dewlet and the election of her nominee, Schahin. This prince,
raised to the throne by Russian arms, found it necessary to follow
the advice of the Russian agent, and soon made himself most unpopular
with his subjects. A revolt took place against him. He appealed to the
Empress for assistance. A Russian army again appeared in the guise
of pacificator. The Tartars who opposed were slaughtered or driven
from the country. Schahin was compelled to resign his throne, and
the Empress thereupon proclaimed the annexation of the Crimea, with
professions of acting only for the benefit of its people and to save
them from misgovernment. The wretched tool Schahin was imprisoned for a
time in Russia, and later was expelled the country into Turkey, where
he was speedily put to death. The Porte was unable to undertake a war
on behalf of the independence of the Tartars, and in 1784 a new treaty
was made between the two Powers, recognizing the sovereignty of Russia
over the Crimea and a district along the north of the Euxine inhabited
by Tartars.
Later, there were many indications of the intention of Catherine to
exploit her wider project of driving the Turks from Europe. In 1779,
when a second grandson was born to her, the name of Constantine was
given to him. Greek women were provided for him as nurses, and he was
taught the Greek language. Everything was done to stimulate the hope
that there would be a revival of a Greek Empire at Constantinople, in
substitution for that of the Ottomans.
Meanwhile there was a succession of grave internal troubles in Turkey,
fomented in part by emissaries from Russia. The brave old Hassan of
Algiers, now Capitan Pasha, who had the complete confidence of the
Sultan, was continually being called upon to put down revolts. Thus in
1776 he defeated the Sheik Jahir, who had revolted in Syria. In 1778
he was engaged in expelling from the Morea the rebellious Albanians,
who had been employed against Orloff in his invasion of that province,
and who, after his defeat, had remained in the Morea, establishing
themselves in a lawless ascendancy there, oppressing, plundering, and
slaughtering Turks and Greeks alike without discrimination. Hassan
succeeded in defeating and expelling these wild ruffians. Later,
Hassan was employed in putting down a rebellion of the Mamelukes in
Egypt. He led an army there, and succeeded in restoring the authority
of the Sultan. In 1787 he was again recalled to Constantinople, on
the imminence of war with Russia, and at the age of seventy-five was
employed for a time in command of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea
and later as commander-in-chief of the army. It will be seen that for
the first time in his life his good fortune deserted him and that he
met with serious defeats.
It has already been shown that the Empress Catherine was very
provocative in her policy and action to Turkey. In 1787 an agreement
was arrived at between Catherine and Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, for
common action against the Turks, and with the deliberate intention of
driving them from Europe. A partition was to be made of their European
provinces between the two Powers and a Greek Empire was to be set up at
Constantinople.
The Empress made a triumphal progress through the Crimea, under the
auspices of her favourite and paramour, Prince Potemkin, to whose
efforts its annexation had been mainly due. The Emperor Joseph met her
on the way there at Kherson, and hatched with her a scheme of war with
Turkey. A triumphal arch was erected, with the inscription, “This is
the way to Byzantium.” Emissaries were sent to stir up rebellion in
Wallachia and Moldavia. Claims were raised officially against Turkey
for the province of Bessarabia and the fortress of Oczakoff, on the
ground that they had formerly been part of the domains of the Khans of
the Crimea. These claims greatly irritated the Turks. The few years
of peace had renovated them. They were now ambitious of recovering
the city of Kilburn, and even had hopes of regaining the Crimea.
Popular feeling was aroused, and at the instance of the Divan, and
without waiting to make preparations for the defence of the frontier
fortresses, the Sultan declared war against Russia on August 15, 1787.
A large force was then sent by the Porte to Oczakoff, the fortress
on the embouchure of the Dniester, with the intention of attacking
Kilburn on the opposite side. A fleet was sent, under Hassan, to
co-operate with it, and to convey the army across the river to
Kilburn. Unfortunately for the Turks, the Russian force at Kilburn
was under the command of Suvorov, a military genius of the first
rank. He allowed the larger half of the Turkish army to be conveyed
across the river and then attacked it by land, while a flotilla of
gunboats from Nicholaif engaged the Turkish fleet. This strategy was
completely successful. The Ottoman force of eight thousand men landed
on the Kilburn side was overwhelmed and slaughtered. Nearly the whole
of Hassan’s fleet was destroyed. The attack on Kilburn was completely
defeated.
Nothing more was effected by either of the two combatants in 1787.
At the beginning of the next year, 1788, the Emperor of Austria, on
February 10th, declared war against Turkey without any provocation.
He had been delayed fulfilling his agreement with Catherine by
disturbances in his own dominions. He was now free to carry out his
undertaking. The Turks, therefore, found themselves confronted by two
formidable enemies. Fortunately for them, Russia was prevented putting
forth its full strength in the south, in consequence of war having
broken out with Sweden. The Empress was unable on this account to carry
out her engagement with the Emperor to send an army into Moldavia in
support of that of the Austrians. Nor was she able to send a fleet into
the Ægean Sea, as had been promised. But Joseph took command himself
of an army of two hundred thousand men with which to attack the Turks.
He soon proved himself to be the most incompetent of generals. The
only defeat he was able to inflict was upon his own soldiers, under
circumstances unprecedented in war.
The Turks, when they found that there was no danger of any advance
on the part of the Russians, sent a great army across the Danube,
which encountered and defeated an Austrian army, under Wartersleben,
at Mendia. Joseph then marched to relieve this defeated force and
to protect Hungary. He took up a position with eighty thousand men
at Slatina, within easy reach of the Grand Vizier’s army. At the
last moment, when all the preparations had been made to attack the
Ottomans, the Emperor took alarm. He abandoned his project of attack,
and retreated in the direction of Temesvar. The retreat was begun at
midnight. Great confusion took place. An alarm was spread that the
Turks were close at hand and were about to attack. The wildest panic
occurred. The Austrian artillery was driven at full speed in retreat.
The infantry mistook them for the enemy. They formed themselves into
small squares for defence, and began to fire wildly in all directions.
In the early morning, when the sun rose, it was discovered that these
squares had been firing into one another, with the result that ten
thousand men were _hors de combat_. The Turks now came up and made a
real attack. They defeated the Austrians and captured a great part of
their artillery and baggage. No other engagement took place in this
direction in the course of this year. The Emperor lost thirty thousand
men in his attempted manœuvre and forty thousand by disease. He never
again ventured to command an army.
Little was attempted in 1788 by the Russians till August, when
Potemkin found himself in a position to invest Oczakoff. The siege was
protracted till December, when Suvorov was called in to assist. Under
his spirited advice, an assault was made on the fortress, and, in spite
of enormous losses, the Russians overcame all opposition and entered
the city. A frightful scene of carnage then occurred. The city was
given over to the Russian soldiers. Of a population of forty thousand
only a few hundreds escaped death, and twenty thousand of the garrison
were slaughtered. In spite of this great loss, the campaign of 1788
had not been altogether to the detriment of the Turks. Though they
lost Oczakoff, and all hopes of recovering Kilburn and the Crimea had
vanished, they had successfully resisted Austria. Joseph’s attack had
ignominiously failed.
The campaign of the following year was far more disastrous to the
Turks. Early in 1789 Sultan Abdul Hamid died, and was succeeded by his
nephew, Selim III, a young man of twenty-seven, of vigour and public
spirit. He had not been subjected by his uncle, Abdul Hamid, to the
debasing seclusion which had for so long been the fate of heirs to the
throne. He had been allowed much freedom. His father, Mustapha, had
left him a memoir, pointing out the dangers of the State, and advising
extensive reforms, and the young man had deeply studied this. He was
fully conscious of the necessity for radical changes, and though he
very wisely did not attempt to lead his troops in the field, he spared
no effort to improve the condition of the army and to stimulate the
warlike zeal of his subjects. He sent the immense accumulation of plate
in his palace to the Mint, and he persuaded the ladies of the harem
to give up their jewellery in aid of the treasury. He was ardently in
favour of reforms in all directions. He deserved a better fate than was
in store for him. It will be seen that his reign was one of most bitter
reverses.
Unfortunately for the Turks, ill-health prevented the Emperor Joseph
from again taking the field in command of the Austrian army. He
was replaced by Marshal Loudon—a veteran of the Seven Years War, a
Scotsman by race, who had risen from the ranks and had deservedly
won great reputation. It was said of him that he “made war like a
gentleman.” He was noted for his quick decision on the field of
battle, and though over seventy-five was still in full vigour. A
new spirit was infused into the Austrian army. A part of it under
Marshal Loudon invaded Bosnia and Serbia, where it met with brilliant
success. In Bosnia it was stoutly resisted by the Moslem population.
In Serbia it met with cordial co-operation of the rayas, who detested
their Moslem oppressors. The greater part of these two provinces was
occupied. Another Austrian army, under the Prince of Coburg, was
directed to Moldavia to act in concert with the Russian army, under
Suvorov. The Sultan, on his part, appointed Hassan as Grand Vizier
and commander-in-chief of the army. Hassan was not equal to the task
of confronting such a general as Suvorov. He advanced with a large
army against Coburg, who was stationed at Fokshani, on the frontier
of Moldavia. Coburg would have been overwhelmed by the superior force
of the Turks had it not been for the wonderful activity of Suvorov,
who marched sixty miles through a difficult and mountainous country in
thirty-six hours to relieve the Austrians. Suvorov, immediately on
arrival, late in the afternoon, made preparations for attacking the
Ottoman army. Two hours before daylight the next day he assaulted the
fortified camp of the Turks. Never was a bold course more completely
justified. The camp was carried by the Russians with the bayonet. The
Turks lost all their artillery and immense stores. Another great army
was sent by Selim and was also utterly defeated by Suvorov on the
River Rimnik in September of the same year.
These two serious defeats caused panic at Constantinople. To allay this
the Sultan, to his infinite discredit, gave orders for the execution
of the brave old Hassan—the victor in so many battles, whose advice
for the better training of the Janissaries had been cruelly neglected.
But it was the habit of the Turks to attribute every defeat to the
treason of the general and to put him to death, just as the Convention
at Paris, during the revolutionary wars, sent to the guillotine the
generals who failed—not, it must be admitted, without some result in
stimulating others to better efforts.
Farther to the west, Belgrade and Semendria were captured by the
Austrians in this campaign of 1789. In the following year the tide of
victory on the part of the Russians and Austrians was stayed by two
events. The one was that the Emperor Joseph found it necessary, in
consequence of outbreaks in almost every part of his own dominions,
caused by his hasty and ill-considered measures of centralization, in
defiance of all local customs, to hold his hand against the Turks, and
withdraw his conquering armies in order to employ them in putting down
revolution at home. His death occurred early in 1790. Leopold, who
succeeded, a wise and sagacious ruler, the very opposite to Joseph,
reversed the policy of his brother. He did not favour a Russian
alliance against Turkey.
Another cause of Austria withdrawing from the war was the entry into
the field of politics in the east of Europe of England, Prussia,
and Holland. These Powers had formed a close defensive alliance,
and had already exercised great influence by joint action. They had
extinguished French influence in Holland. They had intervened with good
effect between Russia and Sweden and had brought about peace between
them. They now proposed mediation between Austria and Turkey, not
without threats of stronger action. An armistice was agreed to between
these Powers. The death of Joseph greatly facilitated an arrangement.
Terms were agreed upon with the Turks, and were ultimately embodied
in the treaty of Sistova, on the principle of the _status quo_ before
the war, under which all the territory which Austria had occupied in
Bosnia, Serbia, and Wallachia, including the fortresses of Belgrade and
Semendria, were given back to Turkey, with the exception of a small
strip of land in Croatia and the town of Old Orsova. The acquisitions
by Austria were of very small importance and made but a poor return for
the great effort put forth in the war. But the new Emperor, Leopold,
did not think that Austria had anything to gain by the dismemberment
of either Turkey or Poland. Had he lived, subsequent events might have
turned out differently, and Poland, in all probability, would not have
been victimized.
The defection of Austria from the alliance with Russia against the
Turks was a very serious matter for the Empress Catherine. It was
balanced, however, in part, by peace with Sweden, which enabled her
to use her whole force on land and sea against her remaining enemy.
She still adhered to the project of driving the Turks from Europe, and
reconstituting a Greek Empire at Constantinople. She sent numerous
emissaries to Greece to persuade its people “to take up arms and
co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the
countries they had usurped, and in regaining for the Greeks their
ancient liberty and independence.”
Early in 1790 she received a deputation at St. Petersburg from some
leading Greeks. They presented a petition to her.
We have never [it said] asked for your treasure; we do not ask for
it now; we only ask for powder and shot, which we cannot purchase,
and to be led to battle.... It is under your auspices that we hope
to deliver from the hands of barbaric Moslems an Empire which they
have usurped, to free the descendants of Athens and Lacedæmon from
the tyrannous yoke of ignorant savages—a nation whose genius is not
extinguished, which glows with the love of liberty, which the iron
yoke of barbarism has not destroyed.
The Empress, in reply, promised to give the assistance they asked
for. They were then presented to the young Prince Constantine, who
replied to them in the Greek language: “Go, and let everything be done
according to your wishes.”
The wealthier Greeks in the Levant had already fitted out a squadron
of thirteen frigates in support of their cause. These were now, by
order of the Empress, supplied with guns at Trieste and were put under
command of a brave Greek admiral, Lambro Caviziani. This squadron, when
fitted out, made its way to the Ægean Sea, where it made its base in
the Isle of Scios. The Turkish fleet in those waters was at a low ebb.
The best of the Turkish vessels were being employed in the Black Sea.
But seven Algerine corsairs came to the assistance of the Porte, and,
in concert with some Turkish ships, fought a naval battle with the
Greek squadron and sank the whole of its vessels.
The Russian army on land was more fortunate. Their chief operation
in 1790 was the capture of Ismail, a most important fortress on the
northern affluent of the Danube, about forty miles from the Black Sea.
So long as this city was in the hands of the Turks an advance of an
invading army from Bessarabia into Bulgaria was hardly possible. The
fortress was defended by a very large garrison. Suvorov was again put
at the head of a _corps d’armée_ by Potemkin, the commander-in-chief,
with the laconic order, “You will capture Ismail, whatever may be
the cost.” Six days after his arrival before the fortress, Suvorov
ordered his troops to assault it. Speaking to them in his usual jocular
manner, he said: “My brothers, no quarter; provisions are scarce.” At
a terrible cost of life the city was taken by storm. A scene of savage
carnage ensued, unprecedented even in the experience of Suvorov.
Thirty-four thousand Turks perished. Suvorov admitted to a friend that
he was moved to tears when the scene was over. But he was accustomed
to shed these crocodile tears after horrors of this kind, when he had
made no effort to mitigate them. When news of the achievement arrived
at St. Petersburg, the Empress, at her levée, addressing the British
Ambassador, Sir C. Whitworth, said, with an ironic smile: “I hope that
those who wish to drive me out of St. Petersburg will allow me to
retire to Constantinople.”
Meanwhile the allied maritime Powers—England, Prussia, and
Holland—having succeeded in their mediation between Austria and Turkey,
and in restoring peace between them, on the basis of the _status quo_,
were now engaged in efforts of the same kind as between Russia and
Turkey. They offered mediation to the Empress Catherine in the course
of 1790. In a reply to the Prussian King, she indignantly rejected
intervention. “The Empress,” she said, “makes war and makes peace when
she pleases. She will not permit any interference whatever in the
management or government of her affairs.” It was understood, however,
that she was not disinclined to peace upon the terms that Oczakoff
and the district between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, which were in
her full possession, were to be retained by her, and that all other
of her conquests were to be restored to Turkey. The allied Powers
were unwilling to assent to this, and made preparations for an armed
mediation to compel Russia to restore Oczakoff to Turkey.