generals, Wallis and Niepperg. They were now as anxious to make peace
as they had been boastful and bellicose at the commencement of the
campaign. The French Ambassador, Villeneuve, was with the Turkish army.
His mediation was accepted by the Austrians, and terms of peace were
agreed to, without consultation with the Russian generals. Belgrade and
all the parts of Serbia and Bosnia which had been ceded to Austria by
the treaty of Passarowitch and a great part of Wallachia were restored
to the Ottoman Empire. The victory of the Ottomans at Krotzka and,
still more, the treaty of Belgrade which followed, caused dismay and
indignation to the victorious Russians in Moldavia. It was obviously
impossible for their army at Jassy to make any further advance into
Turkey, or even to hold its own in Moldavia, when an Ottoman army of
two hundred thousand, fresh from victory over the Austrians, was on
their flank on the Danube. Munnich’s grandiose scheme for the capture
of Constantinople was extinguished. It became necessary for the
Czarina to follow the example of the Austrians and to make peace with
the Turks. Terms were ultimately agreed to, under which the Russian
conquests in Moldavia and the Crimea and the city of Oczakoff were
given up. Russia retained only a narrow strip of land on the shores of
the Black Sea. The city of Azoff was to be demolished and its territory
was to form a belt of borderland, uncultivated and desert, between the
two Empires. The Russians were prohibited from maintaining a fleet
either in the Black Sea or the Sea of Azoff.
The two treaties, as a result of the campaign of 1739, were a triumph
for Turkey. They were more due to the imbecility and incapacity of the
Austrian generals than to the valour of the Ottomans, for it was no
great feat of arms for two hundred thousand Turks to defeat fifty-seven
thousand Austrians at the battle of Krotzka. But the strategy of the
Porte in concentrating their main force against the Austrians on the
Danube, while making little resistance to the Russians in Moldavia, was
fully justified.
XVI
TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI
1739-74
THE campaign, and the resulting treaty of Belgrade, saved the Ottoman
Empire from further shrinkage for many years. There followed a long
period of peace. This was due not merely to the fact that the Porte
pursued a policy of peace, but because the two great Powers in Europe,
Russia and Austria, who were bent on the dismemberment of Turkey,
were not in a condition to prosecute their aims, and were not able
to enter into any combination for the purpose. In 1740 the Emperor
Charles VI died. This event led to a scramble among the neighbouring
Powers for his inheritance, and to the war known as that of the
Austrian Succession, which was brought to an end by the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. This was followed later again by another war,
known as the Seven Years War, which was concluded in 1763. In neither
of these great wars did the Porte take any part, and it is to its
credit that it did not take advantage of them to attempt the recovery
from Austria of any of its lost dominions in Hungary. Till war broke
out with Russia in 1768 there was profound peace.
Sultan Mahmoud died in 1754 and was succeeded by his brother, Othman
II, who reigned for three years only. He was deformed—a hunchback. He
does not appear to have made any change in the foreign policy of his
government. In his three years of reign there were six Grand Viziers,
and it seems probable that the real power of the State was exercised by
the successor to the Kislaraga Bashir, from behind the curtain of the
harem.
Mustapha III succeeded his brother at the age of fifty. He had spent
his life up to this time in seclusion, in the Cage of the Seraglio,
cut off from all contact with, or even knowledge of, public affairs.
For the first six years of his reign he left matters very much in the
hands of his Grand Vizier, Raghab Pasha, the last of the many who had
filled this post under Mahmoud. Raghab proved to be a most wise and
competent statesman, not far behind Sokolli and the Kiuprilis, and,
like them, devoted to a policy of peace.
After the death of Raghab in 1763 Mustapha gradually took into his own
hands the reins of government. Though well-intentioned and with a sense
of public duty, he was feeble, hasty, and impatient, and was wanting
in the most essential faculty of a ruler, that of selecting competent
men as generals and administrators. He abandoned the policy of peace
and allowed himself to be drawn into war, with the most unfortunate
results to his Empire. It was his misfortune that his reign coincided
with those of two such able and unscrupulous neighbouring potentates as
Catherine II of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia.
The Empress Catherine was invested with supreme power in Russia in the
year 1762, in place of her worthless husband, after a military revolt.
At her instance, Russia embarked on a policy of aggrandizement against
both Poland and Turkey. Frederick the Great also, who had very recently
favoured an alliance with the Porte with the object of checking the
advance of Russia, now reversed his policy. In 1764 he made a treaty
with the Russian Empress reciprocally guaranteeing their possessions,
and promising assistance to one another, if the territories of either
of them were invaded. But if France were to attack Prussia, or Turkey
to attack Russia, assistance was to be given in money. Very soon
after this an agreement was arrived at between these two Powers for
the dismemberment of Poland and the partition between them of part of
its territory. The Empress of Austria, Maria Theresa, also, though
most unwillingly, became a partner in this scheme. The Porte was much
opposed to this Polish policy of the three conspirators. It protested
strongly but in vain against the occupation of Poland by Russian and
Prussian troops and against all the infamous proceedings which led to
the first partition of Poland. The Russian Government made no effort
to avert war. On the contrary, it showed by many actions a deliberate
intention to drive the Turks into war. It fomented and encouraged
rebellion against the Sultan in the Crimea, the Morea, Montenegro,
and Georgia. It violated the neutrality of Turkey by pursuing Polish
refugees across the frontier of Bessarabia into territory belonging to
the Khan of the Crimea, a vassal of the Sultan, and destroying there
the town of Balta.
At a Divan held at Constantinople in October 1768 it was decided that
Russia, by its proceedings against Poland, had broken the treaty
of Belgrade, and that war against her would be just and necessary.
The only opposition to this came from the Grand Vizier, Mouhsinzade
Pasha. He did not, indeed, object in principle, but he maintained
that it was most unwise to declare war until full preparations had
been made for it. He pointed out that the frontier fortresses were in
a most unprepared state, and that as military operations could only
be commenced by the Turks in the next spring, Russia would be placed
in an advantageous position by an immediate declaration of war. For
this advice, which the sequel fully justified, the Grand Vizier was
dismissed from his office. In his place Emen Mahomet was appointed—a
most incompetent man, knowing nothing about military matters, by his
own admission. As a result of this premature declaration of war, Russia
had full notice, and entered on the campaign of 1769 in Moldavia
before the Porte was ready to send an army to defend that province.
The Empress put into the field three armies. The principal one, under
command of Prince Galitzin, invaded Moldavia and laid siege to Khoczim.
It was not till May 1769 that the Grand Vizier was in a position to
issue from his camp at Babatagli and march to Isakdji, near Ismail.
He there summoned his generals to a council of war and opened the
proceedings by an astounding admission of incompetence. Asking for
their opinion as to what direction his army should be led, he said, “I
have no experience of war. It is for you to determine what operation
shall be undertaken and what are the most favourable chances for the
army and the Sublime Porte. Speak without hesitation and enlighten me
by your counsel.”
The generals were struck dumb with astonishment at this confession of
ignorance and impotence. Eventually a discussion arose. There was great
difference of opinion. As a result, the only decision arrived at was
to cross the Danube into Moldavia, and then proceed as circumstances
might suggest. In fact, there was no definite plan of campaign. The
army, in accordance with this, crossed the Danube. It was then decided
to march to the River Pruth. It reached a point about half-way between
Khoczim and Jassy. But already it suffered greatly from want of food,
for which no preparations had been made. The soldiers also were
harassed by swarms of mosquitoes in the marshes of the Danube and the
Pruth. It was unable to prevent the capture of Khoczim by the Russians.
It was ultimately forced to retreat before coming into serious contact
with the enemy, and it found its way back to the Danube; and thus
concluded the campaign of 1769.
The Russians did little in the early part of 1770. Prince Galitzin was
almost as imbecile and incompetent as the Grand Vizier. The Empress
recalled him and appointed in his place General Romanzoff, a most able
and determined soldier. The Sultan, on his part, recalled Emen Pasha
and gave orders for his execution.
Meanwhile, the Empress Catherine was engaged in carrying out another
part of her ‘Oriental project,’ as it was called. She had sent numerous
emissaries disguised as priests to various parts of Greece with the
object of stirring up rebellion against the Sultan. Under the belief
that a general rising would take place, she sent a great fleet from the
Baltic to the Mediterranean for the purpose of giving support to the
insurgents. It consisted of twelve ships of the line, twelve frigates,
and numerous transports conveying a military force. The expedition was
under the supreme command of Alexis Orloff, the brother of her then
lover, who had led the military revolt which placed her on the throne.
He had expectations that a throne would be found for himself at the
expense of the Turks. The fleet was under virtual, though not nominal,
command of an Englishman, Admiral Elphinstone, who was supported by
numerous other British officers. It was said that every vessel in the
fleet had one of these officers on board. This must have been with the
cognizance and approval of the British Government, which at that time
favoured the aggrandizement of Russia. This fleet left Cronstadt at
the end of 1769, and arrived off the coast of the Morea in February
1770. It was welcomed by a large body of insurgent Greeks (Mairotes)
and a Russian force was landed. The insurgents perpetrated the most
atrocious acts of cruelty on the comparatively few Turks resident in
the district.
The ex-Grand Vizier, Mouhsinzade Pasha, now Governor of the Morea,
showed great vigour. Collecting a force of Albanians, he succeeded in
defeating the insurgent Greeks, fifteen thousand in number, and their
Russian allies. The Russians were compelled to re-embark in their
fleet. The Greeks who remained on shore were subjected to ruthless
slaughter, as were also the inhabitants of the district. The whole
countryside was devastated by the Albanians. The Russian fleet, after
ineffectual attempts to capture Modon and Coron, sailed away. It came
in contact, off the island of Scios, with the Ottoman fleet, not very
unequal in number and size of vessels. A naval battle took place on
July 7, 1770, in which the Turks were worsted. The defeat would have
been the more serious if it had not been for the extraordinary bravery
of one of their captains, Hassan of Algiers, who had gained experience
as a corsair. Laying his vessel alongside of that of the Russian
admiral, he fought with the utmost desperation till both vessels were
blown up.
The defeated fleet sought refuge in the small harbour of Tchesmé, where
it was blockaded by Admiral Elphinstone. The British officers devised a
scheme for destroying the Turkish fleet. Lieutenant Dugdale volunteered
to pilot a fire-ship against them. Before coming to close quarters the
Russian sailors deserted the vessel, and Dugdale alone remained on
board. He steered the vessel against a Turkish ship and set fire to it.
The fire spread to the other vessels, closely packed in the harbour,
and the whole of the Ottoman fleet was burnt and destroyed with the
exception of a single frigate. A more gallant and successful attack has
never been recorded in the annals of naval warfare.
Elphinstone, who had fortunately escaped death—as did also Hassan
the Algerian, when their warships were blown up in the recent naval
battle—then advised that the Russian fleet should sail without delay
to the Dardanelles and force its way through the Straits to the Sea of
Marmora and Constantinople. But Orloff hesitated and delayed, with the
result that the Turks, getting wind of the intention, hastily erected
four batteries at the Dardanelles, two on either side of it, crossing
their fire. These were sufficient to make it impossible for the
Russian fleet to force its way through the Straits.
Orloff and the Russian fleet then proceeded to the island of Lemnos,
where it landed troops and besieged the chief fortress. It was
evidently hoped to secure a base for the fleet in the Ægean Sea. After
sixty days of siege the garrison gave in, and terms of capitulation
were agreed upon with Orloff. In the meantime, however, Hassan had
persuaded the Porte to allow him to make a desperate effort to save
Lemnos. He enlisted four thousand ruffians at Constantinople for this
purpose. When it was pointed out what a hazardous enterprise it was,
the reply was that it mattered little whether it was successful or not.
If successful, Lemnos would be saved; if unsuccessful, Constantinople
would be rid for ever of four thousand of its greatest blackguards.
Hassan landed unexpectedly in Lemnos, and, declining to recognize the
capitulation, attacked the Russians and defeated them, and compelled
them to take to their ships again.
Hassan, after this successful exploit, was made Capitan Pasha of the
Ottoman navy. He managed to collect together another fleet, and engaged
the Russian fleet again off Mondreso. Both fleets claimed victory, but
it would seem that the Russians had the worst of it, for they sheered
off and left these waters. When next heard of, the Russian fleet was
engaged in giving support to Ali Bey, the head of the Mamelukes of
Egypt, who had risen in rebellion against the Turkish pasha there,
and who was now invading Syria. Orloff landed four hundred soldiers
in Syria in support of this rebel. But Ali Bey soon found himself in
difficulties. An outbreak took place in his own army against him,
fomented by his brother-in-law. Ali Bey was defeated and put to death,
and the four hundred Russians were slain in battle. The Porte for a
time recovered its hold on Egypt.
The story of Orloff’s expedition has been told as it is a good
illustration of the use of a naval force which can command the sea in a
war of this kind, and of its inability to undertake operations on land,
or to force its way against land batteries, unless supported by an
adequate army. Orloff’s fleet remained in the east of the Mediterranean
till the close of the war in 1773, but it did not effect anything of
importance.
Reverting to the military operations on the Danube, the autumn campaign
of 1770 was very unfavourable to the Ottoman cause. Khalil Pasha, who
was now in command, proved himself to be no more competent than his
predecessor. Romanzoff, in command of the Russian army, overran the
whole of Moldavia. Khalil led thirty thousand efficient soldiers and a
host of Tartar irregulars against him. The two armies came in contact
at Karkal, where Khalil entrenched himself in front of the Russians,
while his Tartars ravaged the country behind them and threatened their
communications. Romanzoff then stormed the Turkish line. The Turks
fled in panic. Their camp and guns and immense stores fell into the
hands of the Russians. The surviving Turks recrossed the Danube. At the
close of the campaign of 1770 all the Turkish fortresses north of the
Danube were in the hands of the Russians. The Grand Vizier’s army was
practically destroyed. Only two thousand men were left to him under
arms.
In the following year, 1771, still greater disasters attended the
Turks. Prince Dolgorouki, at the head of eighty thousand Russians and
sixty thousand irregular Tartars, invaded the Crimea after storming
successfully the lines of Perekop. The whole province was overrun.
Kertch and Yenikale were captured. Wallachia and Moldavia successively
fell into the hands of the Russians. Khoczim and Jassy were captured.
The only gleams of success to the Turks in this campaign were the
recovery of Giurgevo on the Danube and the successful defence of
Oczakoff and Kilburn on the shores of the Black Sea. In the Caucasus
the Russians were also successful and drove the Turks from Georgia and
Mingrelia.
These repeated successes of the Russians began to cause alarm
to Austria and Prussia, who by no means wished for the undue
aggrandizement of their neighbour. They therefore attempted
negotiations with Russia for mediation on behalf of the Ottoman
Empire. But the Empress Catherine obstinately resisted anything in
the way of interference by other Powers, and made it known to the
Sultan that terms of peace must be settled with herself alone. In his
desperation the Sultan proposed to Austria a joint partition of Poland
as a bribe for assistance against Russia, oblivious of the fact that
he had entered upon war with Russia on behalf of Poland. The offer
was declined by the Emperor, not because he had any objection to a
scheme of plunder, but because he did not consider the Porte to be in a
position to become an effective partner in such a scheme. As a matter
of fact, Austria, Russia, and Prussia were continually negotiating
schemes for the dismemberment either of Poland or Turkey, as might be
most convenient to them.
At the end of the campaign of 1771 an armistice was agreed to between
Russia and the Porte, and the greater part of the following year was
occupied in discussing terms of peace at a conference or congress at
Bucharest. An ultimatum was eventually presented by Russia, embodying
terms of what might seem to be a very moderate character, in view of
the great success of her armies and the extent of territories which
they had practically conquered. The Sultan himself and his Grand Vizier
and principal ministers and generals were in favour of accepting the
terms as offered, but the Mufti and the whole body of the ulemas were
vehemently opposed to them. The Divan therefore rejected them and war
was renewed. As these terms did not substantially differ from those
which were accepted two years later, it is not worth while at this
stage to explain them.
Meanwhile there had been for more than a year a suspension of
hostilities, and a breathing time had been afforded to the Porte,
during which strenuous efforts were made for another campaign. At the
end of 1772, Mouhsinzade Pasha, who had so distinguished himself in the
defence of the Morea, was again appointed Grand Vizier. He infused new
vigour into the army. In the spring of 1773, when the negotiations at
Bucharest were brought to a conclusion, hostilities were recommenced.
The campaign in Europe, in this year, was confined within the
quadrilateral formed by the fortresses in Silistria and Rustchuk on
the Danube, the city of Varna on the Black Sea, and the great fortress
of Schumla to the north of the Balkan range. There were several
engagements between divisions of the two armies in this district, in
which the Turks were generally worsted, but these victories were not
of much avail to the Russians so long as the three great fortresses of
Silistria, Varna, and Schumla remained in the hands of the Turks.
The two main features of the campaign were the successful defences
by the Turks of Silistria and Varna against overwhelming forces of
Russians. General Romanzoff crossed the Danube early in the year near
Silistria. He defeated a Turkish division and compelled it to retreat
to that fortress, where it added to its garrison. Romanzoff then laid
siege to it. His army stormed the outer defences with the utmost
vigour and succeeded in forcing them. But their difficulties only then
commenced. The Turks, under command of Osman Pasha, maintained an
heroic resistance. The whole male population turned out in aid of the
army. They fought the advance of the Russians street by street. In the
end the Russians were compelled to retreat, after the loss of eight
thousand men. Later, Romanzoff inflicted a severe defeat on the Turks
at Korason. This opened the way to Varna. But here again a successful
defence was offered by the Turkish garrison, supported by the seamen of
the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea. This was the closing scene of the
campaign of 1773. Sultan Mustapha died towards the close of this year,
and was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Hamid, who had been secluded
in the Cage for forty-eight years. As was to be expected, he showed
no capacity for the position to which he was now at last called. He
was, however, favourable to peace, as was also Mouhsinzade, who was
maintained as Grand Vizier.
At the commencement of the campaign of 1774 the Grand Vizier issued
from his camp at Schumla with twenty-five thousand men, with the
intention of taking the offensive and attacking the Russians at
Hirsova, on the Danube. The Russian forces in that district were under
command of Suvorov, who now and later was to show himself the greatest
general Russia had as yet produced. He did not wait to be attacked by
the Turks. He advanced from Hirsova and met the Grand Vizier’s army
at Kostlidji, where he gained an overwhelming victory. The Turkish
camp and all its guns and stores were captured. The defeated army
dispersed, and the Grand Vizier found himself with only eight thousand
men to defend Schumla. The Russians manœuvred so as to cut off the
communications of Schumla with the capital. Mouhsinzade thereupon asked
for an armistice. This was refused by the Russians, but they were
willing to discuss terms of peace. The assent of the Porte was obtained
by the Grand Vizier, and on July 16, 1774, after seven hours only of
discussion between plenipotentiaries at the village of Kainardji, a
treaty of peace was agreed to.
The terms were almost identical with those which had been rejected by
the Porte two years before, after the conference at Bucharest. In view
of the fact that the Ottoman armies had been everywhere defeated during
the war, and that the Russians had obtained actual possession of the
Crimea, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia in Europe, and of Georgia
and Mingrelia in the Caucasus, the terms were distinctly moderate. The
Empress must have been very desirous of peace. There was a serious
rebellion of her southern provinces. Affairs in Poland were causing
her great anxiety. Her losses in the war with Turkey had been very
great, though her victories were many. It was all-important to her that
her hands should be free. These were doubtless adequate reasons for
moderation in her terms to Turkey.