and thirty aghas of Janissaries were killed; four hundred and twenty
standards were captured. The Sultan, who had witnessed the battle
from the other side of the river in comparative safety, was able to
escape with some of his cavalry to Temesvar, and thence he returned to
Belgrade and Constantinople. This experience satisfied his military
ardour, and he never again appeared at the head of his army. An
immense booty fell into the hands of the Austrians. All the Turkish
guns were captured. What remained of the army defeated at Zenta found
its way to Belgrade, and thence returned to Adrianople, while Prince
Eugène crossed the Danube into Bosnia and made himself master of the
greater part of that province. This great victory of the Austrians,
after fourteen years of almost uninterrupted success, decided not only
the campaign but the war in their favour, and marked irrevocably the
decadence of the military power of the Ottoman Empire.
Six days after the battle the Sultan, in his peril, turned once more
to the Kiuprili family for help. In place of the Grand Vizier, who had
been killed at Zenta, he appointed Hussein Kiuprili, a son of the elder
brother of Mahomet Kiuprili, and therefore a cousin of Ahmed. Until
the siege of Vienna he had given himself up to a life of pleasure, but
after that grave defeat of the Turks he filled with great distinction
many high posts in the government. He was the fourth member of his
family to hold the position of Grand Vizier, and showed himself fully
capable of bearing the burden.
In the course of the following winter of 1697-8, many efforts were
made to bring about peace. Lord Paget, the British Ambassador, offered
the mediation of Great Britain and Holland on the principle of _Uti
possidetis_—that each of the Powers concerned, Austria, Venice, and
Poland, were to retain what they had wrested from Turkey. Hussein
Kiuprili summoned a great Council of State to consider this. He
had personally fought at St. Gotthard and other battles, and fully
recognized the superiority of the Austrian army. The Ottomans, since
the siege of Vienna, had been defeated by them in nine great battles,
and had lost by siege nine fortresses of the first rank. He felt that
if the war were prolonged there would be further reverses of the same
kind. At his instance, it was decided by the Council to accept the
mediation of Great Britain and Holland. The other Powers, with the
exception of Russia, were equally willing. The Czar, Peter the Great,
alone objected, and warned the other Powers not to trust in Great
Britain and Holland, who, he said, were only thinking of their own
commercial interests. In spite of his efforts, it was decided to hold a
Peace Congress, at which all these Powers, including Russia, eventually
were represented. It was held at Carlowitz, not far from Peterwardein,
on the Danube, and after seventy-two days’ discussion and negotiation
it resulted in peace on the basis suggested by Lord Paget. Austria,
it was finally agreed, was to retain possession of Transylvania and
Sclavonia and of all Hungary north of the River Marosch and west of
the River Theiss. This left to the Ottomans only about one-third of
their previous dominions in Hungary. The Emperor also was relieved
from payment of tribute in respect of Hungary and Transylvania. The
Republic of Venice was to retain the Morea and Albania, but was to give
up its conquests north of the Isthmus of Corinth—the only departure
from the principle of _Uti possidetis_. The Republic was also relieved
from payment of tribute to the Porte in respect of the island of
Zante. Poland was to retain Podolia. Russia was to have Azoff and
the districts north of the Sea of Azoff which were actually in her
occupation. The Czar Peter was dissatisfied with this and refused
to enter into a treaty upon these terms. He would only agree to an
armistice for two years on this basis. The other three Powers concerned
entered into treaties of peace for twenty-five years.
This treaty of Carlowitz was of supreme importance in the international
relations of Europe. It recognized for first time that the status of
the Ottoman Empire was a matter for the concern of all the Powers
of Europe, and not only of those at war with it. It established the
principle of equality of the Powers concerned, and rejected finally
the pretensions of the Ottoman Empire, founded on its long career of
conquest. Thenceforth there was no longer any fear of the invasion of
Central Europe by the Turks. The settlement was not so ignominious to
them as the later treaties of Passarowitch, Kainardji, Adrianople, and
Berlin, but not the less it was a great triumph for the Christian
Powers of Europe. In view of the long series of defeats of the Ottoman
army and the exhausted state of the Empire, Hussein Kiuprili acted
the part of a wise statesman in assenting to the treaty. If his
advice and that of other members of his family had been followed, and
the Christian subjects of the Empire had been treated with justice,
later humiliations might have been avoided, and the Empire might have
survived intact to a much later date.
Hussein Kiuprili retained the post of Grand Vizier for three years
after the treaty of Carlowitz. During this time he showed that he
had most of the qualities of his more distinguished relative, Ahmed
Kiuprili. He was a man of high culture and public spirit. He did his
best by wise and salutary reforms to stem the growing evils of the
State. He aimed at curbing the mutinous power of the Janissaries. He
endeavoured in many ways to improve the deplorable condition of the
rayas. His reforms met with violent opposition from reactionaries. His
health broke down under the stress and he was compelled to resign his
post. He died within a few weeks, in 1702. His reforms did not survive
him. His successor, Daltaban Pasha, was a man of a totally different
type, a savage Serbian, who could neither read nor write, and who had
acquired a reputation for gross cruelty which he fully justified in his
more exalted position.
Once again, in 1710, another member of the Kiuprili family, Nououman
Kiuprili, was appointed Grand Vizier, but though he had many of the
virtues of his race he did not prove to be equal to the post. He
insisted on attempting to do too much. He interfered with every detail
of the State and accumulated the hostility of all his subordinates. The
affairs of the government fell into confusion and he was in consequence
deposed after a very few months. The names of five other members of the
same family appear in the history of the next few years as generals and
governors of provinces.
It may be doubted whether in the annals of any country a single family
has produced so many distinguished men, owing their position, not to
personal favour, but to their own merits and to the exigencies of the
State. The case is unique in the history of Turkey, where it would be
difficult to find another instance where two members of any family rose
to distinction.
XIV
TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH
1702-18
MUSTAPHA did not long survive as Sultan the death of his great Vizier,
Hussein, the fourth of the Kiuprilis. He had not fulfilled the early
expectation of his reign, when, against the advice of the Divan, he
took command of his army in the field. Disappointed and discouraged
by his failure, he fell back on a life of indolence and debauchery.
After the death of Hussein Kiuprili there was widespread discontent
throughout the Empire, and in most parts imminent danger of rebellion.
Mustapha had not the courage to cope with it. He abdicated the throne
and retired voluntarily to the Cage. He was succeeded by his brother,
Achmet III, at the age of thirty, who reigned for twenty-seven years
till he was deposed at the instigation of the Janissaries.
Achmet had not been subjected by his uncle to the customary seclusion.
He came to the throne, therefore, with greater knowledge of the world.
He was not a warrior. He did not attempt to lead his armies in the
field. But he did not allow the affairs of State to fall into the hands
of women of his harem. Neither did he permit ambitious Viziers to
monopolize power. He changed them so often that this was impossible.
During the first fifteen years of his reign there were twelve Grand
Viziers. It was imputed to him that these frequent changes were due
to his want of money and the extravagances of his harem. It was the
custom for Grand Viziers, on their appointment, to make very large
presents in money to the Sultan, and Achmet looked on this as a source
of income. But during their short tenures of office he interfered very
little with them. He was, however, personally in favour of a policy
of peace, and supported his Viziers in its maintenance. The first six
years and the last twelve years of his reign were periods of almost
unbroken peace to the Empire. In the other nine years there were many
important events bearing on the extension or reduction of his Empire.
Territory formerly in the possession of the Ottomans was reconquered,
and provinces long held by them were lost. The city of Azoff and its
adjoining territory—important for the protection of the Crimea—were
recovered from Russia. The Morea and Albania were reconquered from the
Republic of Venice. By agreement with Russia a partition was made of
important provinces belonging to Persia, some of which had formerly
been in the possession of the Porte. On the other hand, as the result
of war with Austria, the remaining part of Hungary, not included in
the cession made by the treaty of Carlowitz, and considerable parts of
Serbia and Wallachia were lost to the Empire. The gains in territory
exceeded in area the losses. But there can be little doubt that the
loss of prestige by the Ottomans from the defeats of their armies by
the Austrians under Prince Eugène was not compensated for by victories
over the Venetians and Persians, or over the very inferior army of
Peter the Great.
The first of the wars thus referred to was that with Russia, then under
the rule of Peter the Great. He was ambitious of extending his Empire
by the acquisition of the Crimea, and of thus getting access to the
Black Sea. It was only after the defeat of Charles XII, the King of
Sweden, at the battle of Pultowa in 1709, and the consequent conquest
of Livonia, that his hands were free for aggression elsewhere. Russia
was already in possession of the important fortress of Azoff, on the
north-east shore of the sea of that name. The Czar had also fortified
Taganrog and other places threatening the Crimea. The Porte was alarmed
by these manifest preparations for war. The relations of the two
Governments were also embittered by the fact that the Swedish King,
Charles XII, after his defeat at Pultowa, sought refuge in Turkey,
and that the Sultan accorded a generous hospitality to him, and with
great magnanimity refused the demand of Peter for his extradition. It
followed that, in 1711, the Porte anticipated the undoubted hostile
intention of the Czar, and declared war against Russia. An army was
sent by the Sultan across the River Pruth into Moldavia, under command
of Grand Vizier Baltadji. This pasha had risen to his post from the
humble position of woodcutter at the palace, through the intrigues of
his wife, who had been a slave in the Sultan’s harem. The Czar, on his
part, had collected his forces in the south of Poland and marched into
Moldavia. The two armies met on the River Pruth. The Russian army,
already greatly reduced in number by want of food and disease, numbered
no more than twenty-four thousand men. The Ottomans, who had been
reinforced by a large body of Tartars, under the Khan of the Crimea,
were at least five times more numerous. The Czar Peter, unaware that
the Ottomans had crossed the Danube, advanced rashly on the right bank
of the Pruth, and was posted between that river and an extensive marsh
not far from Zurawna. The position was dominated by hills, which the
Grand Vizier occupied in force, and his numerous and powerful guns
swept the position of the Russians, cut off their access to the river,
and completely hemmed them in. Their plight is best described in a
letter which the Czar wrote to the Russian Senate at Moscow from his
camp at this point:—
I announce to you that, deceived by false intelligence and without
blame on my part, I find myself shut up in my camp by a Turkish army.
Our supplies are cut off, and we momentarily expect to be destroyed
or taken prisoners, unless Heaven should come to our aid in some
unexpected manner. Should it happen to me to be taken prisoner by the
Turks you will no longer consider me as your Czar and Sovereign, nor
will you pay any attention to any orders that may be brought to you
from me, not even if you recognize my handwriting; but you will wait
for my coming in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well
confirmed intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose
as my successor him who is most worthy among you.
There can be no doubt that the Russian army was completely at the mercy
of the Ottomans, and might have been entirely destroyed or captured.
It was saved from either fate by the Czar’s wife, Catherine. She was
the daughter of a peasant, married in the first instance to a dragoon
in the Russian army, and later the mistress of Prince Menschikoff.
Peter, smitten by her beauty and wit had recently married her, and
she was with him on this campaign. This lady, with great presence of
mind, collected what money she could, to the value of a few thousand
roubles, and sent it and her jewellery with a letter to the Kiaya of
the Grand Vizier, suggesting a suspension of hostilities with a view
to terms of agreement. In this way relations were established between
the two generals, and a treaty of peace was agreed to. Its terms were
very humiliating to Russia. Azoff and its surrounding district were to
be surrendered to the Porte. Taganrog and some other fortresses were
to be dismantled. The Russian army was to withdraw from Poland. The
King of Sweden was to be allowed safe conduct through Russia to his
own country. There was to be no Russian ambassador in the future at
Constantinople. In return for these great concessions the Russian army
was to be permitted to retreat without molestation.
The preamble to the treaty contained the following remarkable admission
of the predicament in which the Czar and his army were placed:—
By the grace of God, the victorious Mussulman army has closely hemmed
the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the
River Pruth, and the Czar has asked for peace, and it is at his
request that the following articles are drawn up and granted.
It was also declared in the treaty by the Grand Vizier “that he made
the peace by virtue of full powers vested in him, and that he entreated
the Sultan to ratify the treaty, and overlook the previous evil conduct
of the Czar.”
The signing of the treaty of the Pruth was vehemently opposed by the
King of Sweden, who was in the Ottoman camp, and by the Khan of the
Crimea. They doubtless had good reasons of their own for wishing the
war with Russia to be prolonged. It was due to their intrigues at
Constantinople that violent opposition was roused to the ratification
of the treaty. Baltadji found on his return that, instead of being
received with acclamation for having recovered Azoff and other
territory, of which the Porte had been deprived a few years previously,
he was dismissed from his office with disgrace. The Kiaya Osman and the
Reis Effendi Omer, who were believed to be largely responsible for the
treaty, were put to death by order of the Sultan.
The Porte refused to ratify the treaty, and preparations were made
for a renewal of the war with Russia. But wiser counsels ultimately
prevailed, largely through the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir R.
Sutton; and two years later, after long negotiation, another treaty was
concluded with the Czar, which embodied all the terms of that effected
by Baltadji which had been so much objected to.
Many historians have found fault with Baltadji for having neglected
the opportunity of destroying or capturing the Russian army and the
Czar Peter himself, and for having allowed them to escape by concluding
the treaty. It has been suggested that he was bribed by the Empress
Catherine. It is, however, inconceivable that one in the high position
of Grand Vizier, where there were such immense opportunities for
enrichment, could have sold himself and his country for so small a
price. It is more probable that the presents of the Empress were made
to the subordinate of the Grand Vizier for the purpose of opening
negotiations with him. It is also more reasonable to conclude that
Baltadji was convinced that no better terms could be obtained by a
prolongation of the war. The destruction of the Russian army or its
capture, together with the Czar, would have roused the Russian people
to a great effort to avenge such a disaster. It is significant that the
Sultan, while putting to death the Kiaya and Reis Effendi, spared the
life of Baltadji, who was mainly responsible, and simply dismissed him
from the office of Grand Vizier. This seems to indicate that the Sultan
had given authority in advance to Baltadji, as stated in the treaty, to
agree to terms such as were actually obtained. It seems to be unlikely
that Sultan Achmet desired to extend his Empire beyond the territory
of Azoff into the heart of Russia. What better terms, then, could have
been obtained by prolonging the war?
It has also been contended by some historians that it was unwise
policy to impose such a humiliation on the Czar as that embodied in
the treaty; that it was certain to lead to a renewal of the war for
the purpose of avenging it. But the Czar himself did not apparently
take this view of the case. After the escape of his army from disaster
he showed no inclination to renew the war. He was willing, two years
later, to re-enact the treaty, in spite of its humiliating terms. He
did not break peace with the Turks in the remaining ten years of his
reign. He did not bear a grudge against them and after a few years he
entered into an arrangement with the Sultan for the partition of a
large part of Persia.
On a review of the whole transaction, we must conclude that the Grand
Vizier Baltadji was fully justified in effecting the treaty of the
Pruth, and that it was no small achievement, by the skilful manœuvring
of his army and without the loss of a single life, to impose terms
on the Czar, under which the Ottoman Empire recovered Azoff and its
district, the key to the Crimea, and obtained the other valuable
concessions embodied in the treaty.
In 1715 the Porte embarked on another war, this time against the
Republic of Venice, with the object of recovering the Morea, which
sixteen years previously had been conquered by the Republic, when in
alliance with Austria, and the possession of which had been confirmed
to the Republic by the treaty of Carlowitz. Morosini, the Venetian
general by whom this conquest had been achieved, was now dead. It was
thought that Austria would not intervene. A pretext for the war was
found in the assistance which the Republic rendered to the Montenegrins
in an insurrection against the Porte. The army, which had been equipped
for war with Russia, was now available for other purposes. The Grand
Vizier Damad, who was also otherwise known as Coumourgi, son-in-law of
the Sultan, took command of an army of a hundred thousand men. A fleet
of one hundred sail co-operated by sea. The Sultan himself accompanied
the army as far as Larissa, in Thessaly, but no farther. He left the
direction of it wholly in the hands of Damad, who showed great ability
in the conduct of the war. It commenced with the siege of Corinth,
which, after a brave defence of three weeks, capitulated on July 7,
1715, on favourable terms. But a powder magazine blew up during the
evacuation of the fortress, killing six or seven hundred of the Turkish
soldiers. This afforded an excuse for breaking the agreement, and for
a general massacre of Venetians and Greeks, whether of the garrison or
inhabitants—much to the disapproval of Damad. This siege of Corinth
formed the subject of Lord Byron’s well-known poem, in which Damad is
referred to under the name of Coumourgi:—
Coumourgi—can his glory cease,
That latest conqueror of Greece,
Till Christian hands to Greece restore
The freedom Venice gave of yore?
A hundred years have rolled away
Since he refixed the Moslem sway.
With poetic licence Byron attributes to the Venetian governor of
Corinth the setting fire to the powder magazine and the fearful
destruction of life which it caused:—
When old Minotti’s hand
Touched with the torch the train—
’Tis fired.
There seems to have been no more justification in fact for this than
for the statement that the Venetians gave liberty to the Greeks.
Nothing is more certain than that the Greeks hated the rule of Venice
as more oppressive than that of the Turks.
After the capture of Corinth the Ottoman army, in two divisions,
invaded the Morea, and had no difficulty in capturing all the Venetian
fortresses there, such as Modon, Coron, and Navarino. The Greek
inhabitants gave no assistance to their Venetian masters. They welcomed
the Turks as their deliverers from an odious tyranny.
The reconquest of the Morea occupied Damad and his army for only a
hundred and one days. There was no pitched battle with the Venetians.
The campaign consisted of a succession of sieges of fortresses. It
was the intention of the Ottomans to complete the expulsion of the
Venetians by the capture of Corfu and the other Ionian islands, but at
this stage the Emperor of Austria, Charles VI, intervened, and entered
into a defensive alliance with the Republic of Venice. It was too late,
however, to save the Morea. There was much difference of opinion at the
Court of the Sultan whether the action of Austria should be treated as
a _casus belli_. The Grand Vizier Damad vehemently contended that it
was a breach of the treaty of Carlowitz. He was a man of great force of
character and very eloquent. But there was strong opposition to him.
The debates in the Divan, in presence of the Sultan, have been recorded
and are interesting reading. The Mufti, when consulted on the subject,
gave his judgment in favour of Damad. This decided the Council. War was
declared against Austria, and in 1716 an army of a hundred and fifty
thousand was sent, under command of Damad, to attack the Austrians. It
reached Belgrade in September. A council of war was then held to decide
whether to advance towards Temesvar or Peterwardein. There was again
difference on the subject. Damad ultimately gave his decision in favour
of the latter project.
The Turks crossed the River Saave by a bridge of boats, and then
marched along the bank of the Danube towards Peterwardein. Their van
came in contact with that of the Austrians at the village of Carlowitz,
where, sixteen years before, the last treaty had been signed. From
Carlowitz to Peterwardein the distance is only two leagues. The
Austrian army, greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Turks, was
posted in front of the great fortress, behind entrenchments which had
been made by Siawousch Pasha in the last war. It was again commanded
by Prince Eugène of Savoy, who, in the interval, had gathered fresh
laurels in many hard-fought battles for Austria, and who was second to
no living general, save only the Duke of Marlborough, by whose side
he fought so many battles. The two armies came to issue on August
10, 1716. At first the battle went in favour of the Ottomans. Their
redoubtable Janissaries broke the line of the Austrian infantry opposed
to them. Prince Eugène then brought up his reserve of cavalry. They
charged the Janissaries with irresistible force, and retrieved the
fortunes of the day. Damad Pasha, when he saw that the tide of battle
was turning against him, put himself at the head of a band of officers
and galloped into the thick of the battle, in the hope of infusing
fresh courage in his army. He was struck down and was carried from the
field to Carlowitz, where he died.