of cavalry and great parks of artillery, to transport them from
Constantinople to the centre of Hungary, or from Scutari to the
frontiers of Persia, requiring many weeks or months, was to perform
a work of organization of the first order. In the long course of his
reign and the many expeditions led by himself and his generals, the
only failure to supply his armies in the field with food and munitions
of war was in the attack on Vienna. Solyman had also unerring judgment
and success in selecting his generals and other agents in his many
campaigns. The same may be said of his naval campaigns, in which he
took no personal part, and where success turned upon the selection of
competent admirals to command his fleets. What a stroke of genius it
was to go outside the professional men of his naval service, and to put
at the head of his fleets and of his naval administration, such men
as Barbarossa, Dragut, Piale, and others, who had gained experience
and had made their reputation as freebooters and pirates! It was due
mainly to this that the Ottomans acquired a virtual supremacy in the
Mediterranean, that Algiers, Oran, and Tripoli were brought under the
Empire, and that a fleet fitted out at Suez enabled the conquest of
Aden and Yemen.
It was not, however, only in military and naval successes and in the
additions to his Empire that Solyman showed his greatness. His firm and
resolute, yet sympathetic, policy made its mark in every department of
the State. He insisted on impartial justice to every class throughout
his Empire. Governors of provinces, or other high officials, who
erred in this respect, and who were guilty of injustice and cruelty,
or who were corrupt and incompetent, were at once dismissed, and not
unfrequently paid the penalty of death for their crimes. His very first
act on becoming Sultan was to order the dismissal of a batch of unjust
and corrupt officials. Von Hammer’s pages are full of other instances
of the same kind throughout Solyman’s reign. He made no exception for
favoured persons, however near to the throne. Ferhad Pasha, who was
married to one of the Sultan’s two daughters, was dismissed from the
governorship of a province for gross acts of injustice, cruelty, and
corruption. By the urgent entreaties of his wife, and of the Sultan’s
mother, Ferhad obtained another appointment. But on the renewal of his
misdeeds he was again dismissed, and, this time, was put to death by
order of the Sultan.
The finance of the Empire under Solyman was most carefully husbanded.
He fully recognized the strength given to his country by a well-filled
treasury. In spite of his many wars, there were only two years in
which he found it necessary to levy exceptional taxes. In other years
the ordinary revenue sufficed. Taxation was comparatively light. His
wars in part paid for themselves by levies and exactions on the
invaded countries, and by the sale of captives. Janissaries and Spahis,
numbering together about fifty thousand, formed the standing army, and
were well paid. The holders of fiefs throughout the Empire were bound
to military service in time of war, and to bring horses and arms.
They numbered about eighty thousand, and received no pay. Neither did
the horde of irregular cavalry, Tartars, and others who accompanied
his armies, receive pay. They provided for themselves by ravaging the
countries they passed through. Under these conditions, the wars of
Solyman were not burdensome to the State.
Like so many of his predecessors, Solyman had a strong bent to literary
studies and poetry. His poems have a reputation among his countrymen
for dignity. He compiled a daily journal of his campaigns which is of
historical value. He was a liberal patron of science and art. His reign
was the Augustan age of Turkey. He was generous in his expenditure
on mosques, colleges, hospitals, aqueducts, and bridges, not only in
Constantinople, but in all the principal cities of his Empire.
It is to be noted that the sobriquet ‘Magnificent’ was given to
Solyman by contemporaries in Europe. In Turkey, he was known as ‘the
Legislator.’ His reign was conspicuous for great reforms in every
branch of the law—all aimed at justice. The land laws were overhauled.
The feudal system of fiefs, which had been partially adopted on the
model of other countries in Europe, was simplified and improved. The
position of the ‘rayas,’ was ameliorated. Something like fixity of
tenure was secured to them. The condition of the peasantry in Turkey
was distinctly better than that of the serfs in Hungary and Russia.
The Greek population of the Morea preferred Turkish rule to that of
the Venetians. A certain number of Hungarian peasants voluntarily left
their country and settled under the more humane government of Turkey
in Roumelia. A further proof of the general contentment of the people
through the great expanse of the Turkish Empire was that during the
forty-six years of Solyman’s reign there was no outbreak among any one
of the twenty different races which inhabited it—and this in spite of
the fact that the country districts were denuded of troops for the many
campaigns in Hungary and Persia. While giving Solyman full credit for
all these great achievements of his reign, it is necessary to point
out that impartial historians have detected defects in his system of
government, which grew apace under his incompetent successors, and led
inevitably to the decadence of the Ottoman Empire.
A Turkish historian, Kotchi Bey, who wrote on the decline of the
Ottoman Empire in 1623, about sixty years after the death of Solyman,
and who has been described by Von Hammer as the Turkish Montesquieu,
attributed the decline in great part to the following causes:—
1. The cessation in Solyman’s time of the regular attendance of the
Sultan at the meetings of the Divan, or great Council of State.
Solyman had a window constructed in an adjoining room opening into
the council chamber, where, hidden behind a veil, he could listen
to the discussions of the Divan without taking a part in them. His
successors ceased even to listen from behind the veil. This absence of
the Sultan from his Council added to his arbitrary power and belittled
the influence of his ministers. So long as a very competent man like
Solyman was on the throne, this new practice may not have produced the
worst results, but in the case of his incompetent successors it led to
immense evils. The Sultan was finally swayed in his decisions not by
his responsible ministers or his Grand Council, but by the inmates of
his harem or by other irresponsible and corrupt outsiders.
2. The habit introduced by Solyman of appointing men to high office
who had not passed through the grades of lower offices. The first and
most conspicuous case of this kind was the promotion of Ibrahim, the
favourite companion of Solyman, from the post of Master of the Pages in
the Sultan’s household to that of Grand Vizier. Numerous other cases
could be quoted of a less conspicuous character. Solyman, in fact,
appointed outsiders to every kind of office, however important. Eunuchs
and renegades of all kinds were elevated to the highest posts. Solyman
himself appears to have been a very good judge of men, and rarely
made mistakes in his appointments, but his successors had no such
discernment, and appointments were conferred at the caprice, or under
the influence of the harem or otherwise, on the most unfit persons.
3. The venality and corruption first practised by Roostem Pasha, who
was Grand Vizier for fifteen years, and who was married to Solyman’s
daughter. The principal merit of Roostem in the eyes of his master was
his skill in replenishing the treasury. Among the means he adopted of
raising money was the exaction of large payments from persons on their
appointment to civil offices in the State. These payments in Solyman’s
time were fixed in a definite proportion to the salaries. They were
not adopted in the military and naval services. Under later Sultans
they became arbitrary and exorbitant, and were extended to the army
and navy. Practically appointments of all kinds were put up to auction
and given to the highest bidder. In order to meet these payments on
appointment, governors of provinces and all officials, down to the
lowest, were induced to adopt corrupt practices of all kinds and the
sense of public duty was destroyed.
4. The evil practice introduced by Solyman of heaping favours on his
favourite viziers, or of allowing them to amass wealth by selling their
favours to those below them in the official hierarchy. Ibrahim, who was
Grand Vizier for thirteen years, and Roostem for fifteen years, amassed
enormous fortunes. They set up a standard of extravagant life, which
was followed by other viziers and high officials. Roostem on his death
was possessed of 815 farms in Anatolia and Roumelia, 476 watermills,
1,700 slaves, 2,900 coats of mail, 8,000 turbans, 760 sabres, 600
copies of the Koran, 5,000 books, and two millions of ducats. His
example in gaining wealth was followed by others in a minor degree
according to their opportunities. High office came to be regarded as a
means and opportunity of acquiring great wealth, and this evil rapidly
spread throughout the Empire and led to corruption and extortion.
There was a corrective, or perhaps it should be called a nemesis to
this, in the fact that when an official was put to death, by order
of the Sultan, his property was confiscated to the State. Ibrahim’s
immense wealth was thus dealt with, and even in Solyman’s time, and
much more so in those of his successors, the confiscated fortunes of
viziers, governors, and other officials sentenced to death formed an
important item in the annual income of the State. There can be little
doubt that not a few pashas were put to death by the successors of
Solyman in order that the State might benefit from the confiscation
of their fortunes. It was perhaps thought that the mere fact of
accumulation of wealth by an official was sufficient proof that it had
been improperly acquired, and that the holder deserved to lose his life
and fortune.
There may be added to these causes of ultimate decadence pointed
out by the Turkish historian another which must occur to those who
closely study the reign of Solyman—namely the growing influence in
State affairs of the Sultan’s harem. The fall and death of Ibrahim,
the murder of Prince Mustapha, and the rebellion and consequent death
of Prince Bayezid were mainly due to intrigues of the harem. Great
as Solyman was, he fell under the evil influence of his favourite
Sultana, the Russian Ghowrem, better known in history as Roxelana.
Ghowrem was not only a most seductive concubine; she was a very clever
and witty woman, with a great gift of conversation. She retained her
influence over Solyman when age had reduced her personal charms. By the
entreaties of the Sultan’s mother, who perceived the malign influence
of this woman over her son, she was for a time got rid of from the
Seraglio. But Solyman could not forget her, and insisted on her recall.
Ghowrem celebrated her triumph by getting the consent of the Sultan
to many executions. Thenceforth till her death her influence was
unbounded. “I live with the Sultan,” she said, “and make him do what I
wish.” Appointments to the highest offices were made at her instance
and abuses of all kinds arose. But worst of all was the precedent that
was set for the interference of the harem in matters of State.
With Solyman’s successors the influence of the harem was continually a
growing one, and was generally, though not always, as will be seen, a
danger to the State. It became increasingly necessary for a minister
who hoped to retain his post to secure personal support in the Sultan’s
harem. The harem itself became the centre of intrigue and corruption,
with fatal effect on the interests of the State. But worst of all
dangers to the Empire was the possibility—nay, the probability—that
the succession of the great man at the helm of State able to restrain
the lawlessness of the Janissaries, the fanaticism of the mullahs, and
the corruption of pashas might not be maintained. Solyman never did a
worse deed for the future of the Empire than when he put to death his
eldest son, who had proved himself to be in every way fit to succeed
him as Sultan, and when later, at the instance of Ghowrem, he secured
the succession of his son Selim. He knew that Selim was a worthless and
dissolute drunkard. He is said to have remonstrated with his son and
endeavoured to induce him to reform his conduct. It will be seen that
it was in vain. The succession of Selim was a nemesis for the murder of
Mustapha. He was the first of a long line of degenerates, who ruined
the great work of Solyman and his predecessors.
In spite of this crime and of the base murder of his most intimate
friend and servant, Ibrahim, in spite of the inception of the grave
abuses we have referred to, it must be admitted, on an impartial review
of Solyman’s reign, that Solyman was the greatest of the Othman race
who created the Empire, and that in a generation of famous rulers in
Europe, including Charles V, Francis I, Leo X, our own Henry VIII,
Sigismund of Poland, and others, he excelled them all in the deeds and
qualities which constitute the greatness and fame of a ruler. There is
a Turkish proverb to the effect that “Happy is the man whose faults can
be numbered, for then his merits cannot be counted.”
XI
GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI
1566-78
SOLYMAN was the last and greatest of the first ten Ottoman Sultans
who, succeeding one another from father to son, in rather less than
three hundred years, raised their Empire from nothing to one of the
most extended in the world. They must have been a very virile race, for
their reign averaged about twenty-eight years, far above the ordinary
expectations of life. With one exception they were all able generals
and habitually led their armies in the field. They were all statesmen,
persistent in pursuing their ambitious aims. Many of them were addicted
to literary pursuits, were students of history, and even had reputation
as poets. In spite of these softening influences, there was in nearly
all of them a fund of cruelty. It may be doubted whether, in the
world’s history, any other dynasty has produced so long a succession of
men with such eminent and persistent qualities.
Solyman was succeeded by his third son, Selim, commonly called ‘the
Sot,’ a sobriquet which sufficiently describes him. He was the only
son spared from the bow-string. Selim was followed by twenty-four
other Sultans of the Othman dynasty down to the present time. With the
rarest exception, they were men wholly wanting in capacity to rule a
great Empire. Only one of them was capable of leading his army in the
field. The others had neither the will nor the capacity, nor even the
personal courage to do so. They fell under the influence either of
their viziers, or of the women or even of the eunuchs of their harems.
If the persistency of type and of the high qualities of the first
ten Sultans was remarkable, no less so was the break which occurred
after Solyman, and the almost total absence of these qualities in
their successors down to the present time. One is tempted to question
whether the true blood of the Othman race flowed in the veins of
these twenty-five degenerates. Von Hammer refers to a common rumour
at Constantinople, though he does not affirm his own belief in it,
that Selim was not really the son of Solyman but of a Jew, and that
this accounted for his infatuation for a favourite Jew adventurer, who
obtained a potent influence over his weak mind. Such a break in true
descent might well have been possible in the vicious atmosphere of the
harem, in spite of the precaution that no men but those deprived of
virility were to be allowed to enter it.
Whatever may be the explanation, there can be no doubt that the
degeneracy of the Othman dynasty dates from the accession of Selim
the Sot. But this did not necessarily involve the immediate decadence
of the Empire. The Ottoman Empire could not have been built up by the
energy and ability of a single autocrat in each generation. There must
have been many capable men, statesmen, generals, and administrators,
of all ranks, who contributed in each generation to the achievements
of their rulers. Many such men survived for some years the death of
Solyman, and preserved the Empire from the ruin which threatened it.
The Empire, in fact, did not begin to shrink in extent till some years
later, and for about twelve years, as if from the momentum given to it
by the powerful Sultans of the past, it actually continued to expand.
Selim was the first of the new type of Sultans. He took no interest or
part in the affairs of State. He was a debauchee and a drunkard. He
gave an evil example to all others, high and low. Judges, cadis, and
ulemas took to drink. Poets wrote in raptures about wine. Hafiz, the
most in esteem of them, wrote that wine was sweeter than the kisses
of young girls. The attention of the Mufti was called to this, and he
was asked to censor the poem as contrary to the injunctions of the
Koran. But the Mufti replied that “when a Sultan took to drink it was
permissible for all to do the same and for poets to celebrate it.”
Selim fell completely under the influence of his Grand Vizier, who
had held the post for two years under Solyman. Sokolli, who was a most
capable man, was the virtual ruler of the Empire. He was a man of large
views. He had two important and interesting schemes in his mind. The
one to cut a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, so that the Turkish
fleet might find its way into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, the other
to make a junction by a canal between the rivers Don and Volga. These
two great rivers, which have their sources in Russia, run a parallel
course for a long distance, and at one point approach one another
within thirty miles. They then diverge again, the one flowing into the
Sea of Azoff, the other into the Caspian Sea. By joining these two
rivers by a canal at the point where the distance between them is the
least, it would be possible for a Turkish flotilla to ascend the Don,
and then, after passing through the canal, descend the Volga into the
Caspian Sea, whence it would be able to attack the Persian province
of Tabriz with great advantage. The commercial possibilities of this
junction of the two great water highways were also obvious. The scheme,
however, necessitated taking Astrakan and other territory from Russia—a
country which had of late years largely extended its possessions and
power.
In this view, Sokolli, in 1568, sent an army of twenty-five thousand
Janissaries and Spahis by sea to Azoff. They were there joined by
thirty thousand Tartars from the Crimea, and the combined force marched
thence to Astrakan, at the mouth of the Volga. For the first time,
therefore, the Ottomans came into direct conflict with the Russians.
The expedition was a total failure. The Turks were unable to capture
Astrakan, and a Russian army completely destroyed that of the Tartars.
The main Turkish army was compelled to retreat to Azoff. Later, the
greater part of it was lost in a great tempest in the Black Sea, and
only seven thousand of its men returned to Constantinople. The project
of a Don and Volga canal was consequently abandoned. That for a canal
across the Isthmus of Suez was also indefinitely adjourned, owing to
an outbreak of the Arabs in the province of Yemen, which necessitated
sending an army there under Sinan Pasha. This was thoroughly
successful, and Yemen and other parts of Arabia were completely and
finally brought under the subjection of the Ottoman Empire.
After the reconquest of Yemen, Sokolli determined to attack Tunis,
which since its capture by the Emperor Charles V had been in the
occupation of the Spaniards. The fleet employed for this purpose was
under the command of Ouloudj Pasha, a renegade Italian, who after a
successful career as corsair and pirate was induced to take service
under the Sultan. In 1568 he was appointed governor of Algiers, and in
that capacity led the expedition against Tunis in the following year.
He defeated the Spaniards and occupied the town. But the garrison
retreated into the citadel, which they held till 1574.
In 1570 another expedition was decided on, this time for the purpose
of capturing the island of Cyprus, which was then in possession of the
Republic of Venice, with which the Porte was at peace. Sokolli, on this
account, was at first opposed to the scheme. But on this occasion, for
the first and, apparently, the only time, Sultan Selim overruled his
minister. He loved the wine of Cyprus and wished to secure a certain
supply of it. He had also, in a drunken orgy, promised to elevate his
boon companion, the Jew, to the position of King of Cyprus. The Mufti,
who had always hitherto given a full support to Sokolli, was consulted
as to whether the treaty with Venice was binding on the Sultan so as to
make an attack on Cyprus unlawful. He issued a _fetva_ to the effect
that, as Cyprus at some distant time had been under Moslem rule, as a
dependency of Egypt, it was the duty of a Mussulman prince to avail
himself of any favourable opportunity to restore to Islam territory
which had been taken possession of by an infidel Power, and that,
consequently, the treaty with Venice was not binding on the Sultan.
In accordance with this ruling of the Mufti, an expedition was fitted
out in 1570 by the Ottoman government, consisting of a hundred thousand
men, including irregulars, under command of Kara Mustapha, who was the
rival of Sokolli, and a fleet under Piale. This force laid siege to
Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, a flourishing Christian city, where
there were said to be as many churches as there are days in the year.
After a siege of seven weeks the city was captured by assault, and
was given up to sack by the Turkish soldiers. Thirty thousand of the
inhabitants were massacred. Many women killed themselves and their
children rather than give themselves up to the maddened soldiers. Two
thousand of the better-looking children of both sexes were sold as
slaves.
Mustapha Pasha then proceeded to invest Famagosta, the principal
fortress in the island. It was heroically defended by a mixed force
of Italians and Greeks, under command of Bragadino, a brave Venetian
general. It successfully resisted attack throughout the winter of 1570.
It was not till August in the following year (1571) that the garrison,
reduced to less than four thousand men, was compelled by failure of
food and munitions of war to surrender. Very favourable terms were
promised to them by Mustapha. The lives of the garrison were to be
respected, and the property and religion of the citizens were to be
secured to them. The garrison were to be conveyed in Turkish galleys
to Crete and there released. In pursuance of these terms the captives
were embarked on board galleys ready to sail to Crete. At this stage an
interview took place between Kara Mustapha and Bragadino and his suite
of twenty officers, at which very hot words passed between them. The
Turkish general complained that some of his men, taken prisoners during
the siege, had been put to death. Bragadino denied this. His language
was considered to be insolent by Kara Mustapha, who at once gave orders
that all Bragadino’s suite were to be strangled in his presence. Their
leader was reserved for a more cruel fate. The men embarked on the
galleys were landed again and were massacred. A week later, Bragadino,
who had been treated in the interval with the greatest cruelty and the
most barbarous indignities, was flayed alive. His skin, stuffed with
hay, was exhibited to the scorn of the Turkish soldiers. The capture
of Famagosta completed the conquest of Cyprus. It remained in the
possession of the Ottomans till, as will be seen, it was handed over to
the British Government, in 1878, in pursuance of a policy devised by
Lord Beaconsfield. The Turks are said to have lost fifty thousand men
in its capture. It was in revenge for this that Kara Mustapha resorted
to the terrible deeds above described.
Meanwhile the Christian Powers had been greatly alarmed by the loss of
Cyprus and the atrocities above described. At the instance mainly of
the Pope, an alliance was formed in 1570 with Spain and Venice, with
the object of opposing the growing strength of the Ottomans in the
Mediterranean. A great fleet was fitted out by these Powers, and was
placed under the command of Don John of Austria, the natural son of the
late Emperor, Charles V, a young man of only twenty-four years, who had
shown his capacity in the measures for the expulsion of the Moors from
Spain, and was already reckoned one of the best generals of the time.
The fleet consisted of two hundred galleys and six powerful galleasses
with heavy armaments. It was manned by eighty thousand soldiers and
rowers, one-half of whom were provided by Spain and one-third by
Venice, the remainder, one-sixth, by the Pope. Don John was in supreme
command. The Spanish division was commanded by the Prince of Parma,
soon to become notorious in the Netherlands under Philip II, and who
was later in command of the Armada fitted out in Spain for the invasion
of England.