TO BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN

KŌBE, April, 1895.

DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,--The factors of evolution are multitudinous beyond

enumeration, and no one with a ghost of knowledge of the modern

scientific researches on the subject could hold (as you suggest I do)

that heredity is a first cause and "exclusive"(!) Heredity is a result,

and the vehicle of transmission, as well as the "Karma" (which Huxley

calls it). Degeneration, atrophy, atavism, are quite as much factors in

evolution as variation and natural selection and development;--but the

flowing of the eternal stream, the river of life, is heredity,--whatever

form the ripples take. As I have given some twenty years' study

to these subjects, I am not likely to overlook any such thing as

environment or climate or diet. You cannot, however, get a grasp of

the system by reading only a digest of results--a study of biology and

physiology is absolutely necessary before the psychology of the thing

can be clearly perceived. Now you say you will accept anything Spencer

writes on the subject. Well, he writes that "a child" playing with its

"toys" experiences "presentative-representative feelings." What are

presentative-representative feelings? They are feelings chiefly "deeper

than individual experience." What are feelings deeper than individual

experience? Mr. Spencer tells us they are "inherited feelings,"--the sum

of ancestral experiences,--the aggregates of race-experience. Therefore

when I said the child's delight in its toys was "hereditary-ancestral,"

I said precisely what Spencer says, but what you would never acknowledge

so long as "only I" said it.

On this subject of emotions inherited as distinguished from others,

and from those changes in states of consciousness generally which we

call reasoning or constructive imagination, the definite utterances of

Spencer as physiologist are electrically reënforced by the startling

theory of Schopenhauer, by the system of Hartmann, and by the views of

Janet and his rapidly growing school. Indeed, the mere fact that a child

cries at the sight of a frowning face and laughs at a smiling one could

be explained in no other manner.

You are not quite correct in saying that Spencer could not obtain

a hearing before Darwin. Before Darwin, Spencer had already been

recognized by Lewes as the mightiest of all English thinkers, with

the remarkable observation that he was too large and near to be

justly estimated even in his lifetime. Darwin did much, of course, to

illuminate one factor of evolution; but I need hardly say that one

factor, though the most commonly identified with evolution, is but one

of myriads. Natural selection can explain but a very small part of

the thing. The colossal brain which first detected the necessity of

evolution as a cosmic law,--governing the growth of a solar system as

well as the growth of a gnat,--the brain of Spencer, discerned that law

by pure mathematical study of the laws of force. And the work of the

Darwins and Huxleys and Tyndalls is but detail--small detail--in that

tremendous system which has abolished all preëxisting philosophy and

transformed all science and education.

I need scarcely say, however, that I should not be able, as a literary

dreamer, to derive the inspiration needed from Spencer alone: he is best

illuminated, I think, by the aid of Schopenhauer and the new French

school which considers the so-called individual as really an infinite

multiple. These men have said nothing of value which Spencer has not

said much better scientifically,--but they are infinitely suggestive

when they happen to coincide with him. So, after a fashion, is the

Vedantic philosophy (much more so than Buddhism), and so also some few

dreams of the old Greek schools.

Your criticisms also show that you take me as confusing changes

of relation of integrated states of consciousness with inherited

integrations of emotional feeling. These are absolutely distinct. But

don't think that I pretend to be invariably a state of facts: without

theory, a very large part of life's poetry could never be adequately

uttered.

I knew that the music of the "_Kimi ga yo_" was new,--though I did not

know the story of the German bandmaster. But I did not know that the

words once had no reference to the Emperor. I was more careful, however,

than you give me credit for,--since I wrote only "the syllables made

sacred by the reverential love of a century of generations," which,

allowing for poetical exaggeration, seems to be all right anyhow, even

if the words did not refer to the Emperor. Of course the implication to

the foreign reader would, however, be wrong.

Still, on the subject of loyalty, I cannot see that the existence of

the feeling as inborn is invalidated by the fact of transference.

The feeling is the thing,--not the object, not the Emperor nor the

Daimyō,--which, I imagine, must have survived all the changes.

Trained from the time of the gods to obedience and loyalty to somebody,

the feeling of the military classes would not have been instantly

dissipated or annihilated by the change of government, but simply

transferred. Indeed, that strikes me as having been what the Government

worked for. It could not afford to ignore or throw away so enormous

a source of power as the inherited feeling of the race offered, and

attempted (I think very successfully) to transfer it to the Emperor. The

fact in no way affects the truth or falsehood of the sketch "Yūho."

Your criticism is only a re-denial of inherited feeling as a possibility.

Ever very truly,

LAFCADIO HEARN.

The Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn, Volume 2 · 第 186 / 436 题