A SURPRISE FOR COUNT VON LUXBURG
"HERR DOCTOR BRECHT," SPEAKER AT HIS BANQUET IN BUENOS AIRES,
WAS U. S. NAVAL AGENT--NAVAL INTELLIGENCE FRUSTRATED PLOTS OF
GERMANS--FRENCH EXECUTED TWO WOMEN SPIES CAUGHT NEAR ST. NAZAIRE,
GIVING GERMANS INFORMATION REGARDING AMERICAN TROOPS.
Everyone recalls the Count von Luxburg, German Minister to Argentina,
and his famous "spurlos versenkt" dispatch advising his Government
that Argentine steamers, if not spared by the U-boats, be sunk without
leaving a trace. But there is one incident in connection with that
worthy which may, even yet, be news to the Teutons.
One of the speakers at the last big banquet by the Germans in Buenos
Aires, over which Luxburg presided--one of the orators they applauded
vociferously and patted on the back as the cries of "Hoch der Kaiser!"
rang round the festive board, was an agent of the United States
Government. And thereby hangs a tale.
When this country broke relations with Germany, German activities in
South America were redoubled. The large German population in Brazil
not only planned to keep that country from joining the Allies, but
talked boldly of "uprisings," and joining in action with the Germans
in neighbor countries. We needed to find out more about Teuton
activities in that region. An American of varied accomplishments, who
spoke Portuguese and Spanish, as well as German, offered his services
to the Navy. He had spent years in Germany, and though of a Colonial
American family, was a doctor of philosophy of Leipzig University, and
intimately acquainted with German conditions and German character. He
had volunteered to act as a secret agent, in which capacity he had
served the Navy in Spain itself during the Spanish War.
In February, 1917, he was accepted by Naval Intelligence, and on March
3, a month before we declared war, sailed for Brazil. He was no amateur
in securing information, and he welcomed the chance of going to Brazil
and Argentina, the danger to him rather adding zest to the task.
When he reached southern Brazil as a German emissary coming from
Switzerland, he was taken into their clubs and councils, and told what
they planned and plotted. He was with the optimistic Teuton singers as
they roared out "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland über Alles," and
toasted "Der Tag"--the day when Germany would gather in its spoils in
South America. He attended the secret meetings of German intriguers and
learned their secrets. But, suspected at last, he was attacked by burly
Teutons and emerged with a broken head and a badly hurt arm.
Departing for Argentina, he appeared there as "Dr. Ernst Brecht,"
bearing tidings from the Germans in Brazil, which had just declared
war. He was taken into their inner circles, their plots and purposes
were poured into his ears. Not once did they have the faintest
suspicion that he was an American, much less a Government agent.
Members of the German legation staff conferred with him. Plotting
and intriguing there, as they did in the United States, they were
pretending the greatest friendship for Argentina, giving officials and
people to understand that, while the U-boats might be sinking vessels
of other nations without warning, Argentinian shipping was exempt. If
any of its ships were sunk, it was only a regrettable mistake. And
at the very time Luxburg was talking this dear friendliness, he was
sending "spurlos versenkt" messages to the German Government.
"Doctor Brecht" had many adventures, but the most picturesque was the
role he played in Buenos Aires. Joining at once the German "Bund,"
which had branches all over the Argentine, the "Doctor" formed one of
the group of well-known Austrians and Germans which gathered at the
famous round-table in the Bismarck restaurant.
At the annual banquet of the Deutscher Bund, the German event of the
year, Count von Luxburg presided. "Herr Doctor Ernst Brecht" was
called upon to speak on behalf of the Germans of Brazil. Giving a
touching account of the situation of the Brazilian Teutons and their
determination and devotion to the cause of the "Vaterland," he ended
by quoting a bellicose poem written by a well-known German poetess who
lived at Blumenau, the hotbed of Teutonism in Brazil.
He was cheered and applauded enthusiastically, and Count von Luxburg
himself unbent far enough to thank the speaker for his inspiring words
and express the hope that his sojourn in the hospitable Argentine would
prove pleasant and profitable. It certainly did--but in a way that the
Count never suspected.
There was general regret when "Doctor Brecht" announced that he felt
compelled within a few weeks to return to Europe. He had found that
the German officials were planning to send important dispatches they
would not entrust to the mails, and they planned at first to make him
their messenger. But before this was arranged, Luxburg's code messages
regarding the U-boat warfare were published by the United States. The
Count was amazed.
Sent in a complicated code known only to himself and the Berlin Foreign
Office, five thousand miles away; cabled by the minister of another
country among his own private dispatches, he could not understand how
those messages could be captured and deciphered by the Americans. It
was evident that they were not so stupid as he and Captain von Papen
thought they were.
Luxburg's dispatches, when made public, led to uprisings against the
Germans, making it impossible for him to remain in Argentina. The day
the Count got his passports, September 12, 1917, "Doctor Brecht" had
left the Bismarck restaurant and was on his way home with a German
acquaintance when they saw a fire in the distance, and found the German
Club was burning. It had been mobbed and set on fire by pro-Ally
students and others. Seeing the club half destroyed, the Doctor and
his companion returned to the Bismarck to inform their confreres.
But they found that the restaurant had been completely gutted by a
mob, the tables and dishes smashed, and every portrait of the Kaiser,
Hindenburg, and other "heroes" slashed to pieces.
Germany had been astonished a few months before by the publication of
Foreign Minister Zimmerman's note to the German Minister in Mexico,
proposing an alliance of Germany and Mexico to make war against the
United States. There was nothing the Germans guarded more closely than
that.
Yet before Bernstorff reached Europe, that secret dispatch was
published, and the first thing the German Ambassador to Sweden demanded
to know when the Count reached Christiania, was how the Americans ever
managed to get hold of it. The Foreign Office was stunned. Not only had
its plot been exposed, but the exposure had shown that the Allies could
decipher the most secret and puzzling code they could devise.
Captain von Papen, who once called us "those idiotic Yankees," might
have told them that we were more alert than he had supposed, for the
exposure of his dealings in every detail; of the activities of Wolf
von Igel, his aide; of Doctor Albert, of Fritz von Rintelen; of the
ship-bomb plots; the plan to blow up the Welland Canal locks, and
various other German intrigues, must have by that time convinced him
that the Americans had some secret service of their own. When, on
December 4, 1915, our Government demanded the recall of Papen, who was
military attaché of the German embassy, and Captain Boy-Ed, the naval
attaché, it was merely stated that the cause was "improper activity in
military matters." Both protested, declaring that they had done nothing
illegal. But later we published a full account of Papen's activities,
with photographs of his checks, the exact amounts paid to his tools who
did the dirty work, to whom they were paid and for what purpose. It was
shown that Boy-Ed had transactions amounting to millions with German
steamship lines whose officials were, through false manifests, sending
out ships laden with coal and other supplies for German raiders.
Boy-Ed, at that, did not seem to be so deeply involved as Papen was. He
protested that he had no part in conspiring with Huerta, and had never
seen the Mexican "ex-President." But it was known that Rintelen had had
dealings with Huerta, and that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed at
least half a million dollars. The dealings of Captain von Papen with
Huerta were too thoroughly disclosed to admit of denial.
Germany, beginning years before, had built up in this country an
extensive spy system, which kept it informed not only of military
developments, but of what was done in every branch of industry. When
the European war began they used every possible means of preventing the
manufacture of munitions or supplies for the Allies. Nearly every large
factory or plant had in its employ workmen who were paid agents of the
German Government. That they could secure information of what was going
on was not so menacing as what they might do, for one or two men could
damage machinery so as to retard work for months. There were explosions
in munition plants, machinery was at times mysteriously wrecked,
shells were damaged; and while the cause seldom could be definitely
determined, it was the general belief that many of these "accidents"
were the work of German agents.
The Office of Naval Intelligence, whose function in peace times is
to gather naval information from all parts of the world, had a more
difficult task to perform when war came. An Investigation Section was
formed to seek out and take into custody persons who were, by sabotage,
explosion, fomenting strikes or other means, seeking to prevent or
retard the manufacture of munitions; to discover and thwart any attempt
to damage vessels, shipyards, bases or factories; to counteract German
propaganda and, in general, restrain the activities of Germans and
German sympathizers.
In each naval district there was an Aide for Information, reporting
to Rear Admiral Roger Welles, Director of Naval Intelligence, at
Washington. Each district was further sub-divided into sections with
representatives working under the district aid. The activity of these
aides was tremendous, especially in our large ports of entry, New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Arrests of suspects sent
fear into the hearts of any who might be plotting sabotage. In one day
I ordered the arrest of more than a score in one plant.
Ships from countries near Germany were examined from truck to keel for
contraband, or papers or literature that might convey secret messages.
Passengers and crews were carefully scrutinized. Close inspection and
censorship of mails and cables prevented Germany from communicating
with its agents in this country, and also prevented them from sending
out military information.
Outgoing ships were carefully inspected to prevent them from taking
supplies or materials to Germany. Some neutral vessels had been
carrying from America quantities of spare machinery and electrical
parts, especially those composed of copper, brass and zinc. There was
reason to believe much of this was smuggled to Germany and used in the
manufacture of parts for U-boats. Radio apparatus was purchased in
quantities. Ships leaving for Holland or Sweden sometimes sailed with
enough lubricating oil to take them around the world. Much of it must
have "leaked" into Germany. This traffic was greatly reduced, and that
in contraband practically ended.
Military guards were placed around piers, no enemy or suspected aliens
were allowed to work around shipping, and all dock workers were
required to carry identification cards. Vessels were under government
supervision during their entire stay in port.
Not only navy yards and shipyards were kept under surveillance, but
all plants engaged on naval work were constantly inspected. Thus
all sources of production were protected from enemy activity. For
this purpose a Plant Division was created, which also reported any
undesirable working conditions or lack of fire protection. This led
later to the creation of the Fire Prevention Section of the War
Industries Board.
Admiral Welles kept in close touch with the Director of Military
Intelligence, the State and Labor Departments, and the Department of
Justice. Naval attachés abroad obtained a large amount of information
regarding "trading with the enemy" as well as military activities, and
this was transmitted to the War Industries Board, the State and War
Departments. The Bureau of War Trade Intelligence coöperated with the
Navy in holding up undesirable imports and exports.
Information regarding foreign navies and ships and war developments was
compiled and disseminated, in confidential publications, to all our
forces afloat. Fleet, Force and Division commanders were kept informed
of the activities of all fleets, Allied and enemy, of ships sunk, and
tonnage destruction; of the number and tracks of submarines in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean; and of all efforts made by the Allied and
associated powers.
The British had a remarkably complete system which constantly improved,
so that, in the latter part of the war, it was said that they were
informed of the sailing of every submarine sent out from Germany, and
its probable destination. We had the advantage of this, as well as the
information obtained by France and Italy. We had our own agents in most
foreign countries, and maintained quite a force in France.
The most important of these activities was along the coast around
Brest and St. Nazaire, the centers of troop and supply traffic. German
agents, it was reported, were using Belle Ile as a signal station to
advise their submarines.
Convoys reported suspicious lights, and it was believed that these were
informers on shore signaling to U-boats. The submarines used various
disguises. One, submerged with its periscope showing, lay hidden for
hours in the midst of a fishing fleet. Yet the fishermen paid so
little attention to it that the French semaphore station, only a few
kilometers away, was not notified. A Greek merchantman hove in sight,
the U-boat fired a torpedo and the steamship was sunk.
The French authorities welcomed our intelligence officers, and together
they set about developing an efficient service all along the coast. A
U. S. Naval Reserve officer who spoke French fluently was attached to
the staff of the French commander-in-chief in Brittany. That coast is
rugged and bold, with groups of small islands. The most important is
Belle-Ile-en-Mer, twelve kilometers from shore, the first land sighted
by convoys going to St. Nazaire, and the last seen on their way home.
At the northern end is the famous "Passage de la Tenouse," leading to
the bay of Quiberon. Once through this passage and in the bay, ships
were considered safe from submarines. One group of our first troop
convoys was attacked three miles west of the Point des Poulin, the
entrance to this passage, and several shells fired by the transports
ricocheted and exploded on the rocky bluffs of the island. West-bound
convoys were assembled in Quiberon Bay. Every effort was made to
conceal their departure, but the information that enemy submarines
seemed to obtain at times was startling. When the merchant convoy
system was inaugurated, ships were instructed to anchor off Le Palais,
in the lee of Belle Ile. Two days later a submarine laid mines in the
roadstead. The next night ships were anchored two miles to the north,
but within twelve hours mines were laid there.
Lights and signals were not the only means of enemy communication. Some
fisherman, seeing the transports in the bay, might go out at night and
inform a submarine, which could radio the news to all the U-boats in
the vicinity.
These were the conditions that had to be met. Every report of
suspicious happenings had to be investigated, and the French were quite
willing that the American Navy assume this task, as it was responsible
for most of the convoy work through these waters.
With the greatest care and secrecy, forty-five of the most intelligent
fishermen who had boats of their own were selected, and formed into a
patrol service. Proceeding with their fishing, they were instructed to
watch for any sign of submarines or mines and report it immediately.
Furthermore, they were to report any mysterious behavior of fishermen
or strangers in boats, and any lights or suspicious happenings along
the coast. Experienced detectives were employed, with headquarters at
Nantes, to investigate all reports. A flood of them came in from the
population who, like the French officers, seemed anxious to aid the
Americans.
Hundreds of investigations were made, fishermen and residents ashore
were aroused to the necessity of reporting everything that seemed
likely to aid the enemy, and an intelligence system was built up that
was no small factor in making safe the coast of France.
Women spies were found, now and then; quite as dangerous as the men in
enemy pay. The most remarkable and pathetic instance, perhaps, was the
"Alvarez Case," handled by the French from its beginning to its tragic
end.
In the spring of 1917, French agents in Barcelona, Spain, reported
that two women known as the Alvarez sisters, were associating with a
man strongly suspected of being in the German secret service. Soon
afterward they disappeared, and for two months their whereabouts was
unknown. The Paris authorities directed that all regions in France,
particularly the American zone, be searched for them. They were at
last discovered in the seacoast town of Sables d'Olonne, thirty
miles south of St. Nazaire, where our troop convoys landed. They were
closely watched and when they boarded a train for Bordeaux, evidently
attempting to get back to Spain, they were arrested. Upon trial it
proved that they had come under the influence of German agents in
Spain and had been induced by an offer of 50,000 francs to obtain
information, among other things, concerning the American troops
disembarking in Brittany.
By this trial the mystery of the blowing up of the French destroyer
_Enseigne Roux_ was cleared up. It turned out that the condemned
sisters had been closely associated with a French sailor named Gaitton,
and evidence pointed to him as having mixed dynamite with the bunker
coal on the destroyer. This was not conclusively proved, but Gaitton
had enough counts against him to be sentenced to twenty years in a
naval prison.
The Alvarez sisters were convicted, and were sentenced to be shot.
The execution took place at daybreak in the courtyard of the ancient
Chateau of Anne de Bretagne, at Nantes. In the courtyard were assembled
the officers in charge of the execution, government officials and
witnesses.
The women were led to two posts near the wall of the chateau, and the
last words were spoken to them by the priest. At their trial they had
confessed all, so there was little left to say. One was in a fainting
condition, but the elder of the two proved unusually courageous. She
refused to be blindfolded, and stood her ground.
An army officer read the sentence. There was a volley of musketry, and
the blindfolded woman dropped to the ground. But the sister who had
shown such courage, though mortally wounded, remained erect, and had to
be despatched by a shot from a revolver.
The Naval Intelligence officer who gave Admiral Welles the account of
this pathetic case, from which are taken the particulars recited above,
wrote:
"For years to come, when the American tourists visit the now
historic ports of the American Expeditionary Forces, they will
see, if they look carefully, a few scars on the thick wall of the
Chateau courtyard at Nantes. These are the marks of bullets which
ended the careers of two poor deluded women who attempted to betray
the Allies. * * *"