CHAPTER XXII

RADIO GIRDLED THE GLOBE

IF GERMANS HAD CUT EVERY CABLE, WE COULD STILL HAVE TALKED TO

EUROPE--FROM ONE ROOM IN NAVY DEPARTMENT FLASHED DESPATCHES

TO ENGLAND, FRANCE AND ITALY--CAUGHT GERMAN AS WELL AS ALLIED

WIRELESS--QUEER "NEWS" FROM BERLIN--U. S. NAVY BUILT IN FRANCE

RADIO STATION WHOSE MESSAGES ARE HEARD AROUND THE WORLD.

If the Germans had cut every cable--and their U-boats did cut some of

them--we would still have been able to keep in touch with Pershing and

the Army in France, with Sims in London, Rodman and Strauss in the

North Sea, Wilson at Brest, Niblack at Gibraltar, Dunn in the Azores,

with all our forces and Allies.

A spark, flashing its wave through the air, would in an instant cross

the Atlantic. Caught by the Eiffel tower in Paris or the Lyons station,

by the British at Carnarvon, by the tall Italian towers in Rome, it

could be quickly transmitted to any commander or chancellery in Europe.

That was the marvel wrought by radio.

President Wilson and Secretary Baker in Washington were, so far as

time was concerned, in closer touch with Pershing and his forces

than President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton were with the

battle-fields a few miles away in Virginia, during the Civil War. It

was infinitely easier for me to send a message or hear from our vessels

3,000 or 4,000 miles distant than it was for Gideon Welles, when he

was Secretary of the Navy, to communicate with the Federal ships at

Charleston or with Farragut at Mobile.

Vessels at sea could be reached almost as easily as if they had been at

their docks. Submarine warnings, routings, all kinds of information and

orders were sent to them, fifty or sixty messages being transmitted

simultaneously. At the same time radio operators were intercepting

every word or signal sent out by ships. Sometimes, as the operators

remarked, "the air was full of them."

"ALLO! ALLO! SOS!" When that call came naval vessels went hurrying

to the scene, for it meant that a ship was attacked by submarines.

Sometimes in the war zone the air seemed full of "Allos," for ships

approaching the European coast could catch the wireless for hundreds

of miles, hearing signals one moment from a vessel off Ireland and the

next from some craft being attacked in the Bay of Biscay.

From one room of the Navy Department--the "Trans-Ocean Room," we called

it--we communicated with all western Europe. Messages went direct to

the high-power sending stations at Annapolis, Sayville, Long Island;

New Brunswick and Tuckerton, N. J., which flashed them overseas. At the

same time dispatches were pouring in at receiving stations, coming into

Washington from abroad without interfering with the volume going out.

Stations at San Francisco, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, and Cavite spanned

the Pacific, keeping us in touch with the Far East, with China, Japan,

the Philippines, and Eastern Russia. North and south from Panama to

Alaska were wireless stations, from Darien, on the Isthmus, to far

up into the Arctic. These were the "high-powers." At various points

along the coast were shore-to-ship stations that communicated with

shipping several hundred miles from shore. And there were radio compass

stations, which could determine a ship's position at sea.

The United States Navy not only built up this vast system in our own

territory, but it erected in France the most powerful radio station in

existence. Located near Bordeaux, at Croix d' Hins, it is named the

Lafayette, and a tablet on the main building bears the inscription:

Conceived for the purpose of insuring adequate and uninterrupted

trans-Atlantic communication facilities between the American

Expeditionary Forces engaged in the World War and the Government of

the United States of America.

Erected by the United States Navy in conjunction with and for the

Government of France.

Planned in 1917, in response to the earnest desire of our military

authorities that steps be taken to insure ample wireless communication,

in case cables should be cut or otherwise interrupted, and to

supplement the inadequate cable service, this immense plant was fast

approaching completion when the armistice was signed. Then work was

suspended for a time, but on agreement with the French government was

resumed, and pushed to completion.

When, after elaborate tests, the plant was put into operation, on

August 21, 1920, I received this radiogram:

This is the first wireless message to be heard around the world,

and marks a milestone on the road of scientific achievement.

LAFAYETTE RADIO STATION.

The Navy takes a just pride in having brought into being that great

plant with its eight towers, each 832 feet high, nearly 300 feet higher

than the Washington Monument--the first station to girdle the globe by

wireless.

During the war the Navy controlled all radio in the United States and

its possessions, taking over and operating 59 commercial stations.

These fitted easily into the extensive system which the Navy itself had

developed, for on January 1, 1917, it owned and operated 55 stations

at various points from Panama to Alaska, and from our Atlantic coast

across the continent and the Pacific to the Philippines. This had been

the work of years.

In August, 1914, immediately after the outbreak of war, Commander

S. C. Hooper was sent to Europe to study the latest developments in

radio and war communications, and spent six months in England, France,

Ireland, Holland and Belgium. His report proved of decided value. A

special board, headed by Captain Bullard, was appointed, and this led

to the expansion of Navy Radio and the creation, in 1916, of the Naval

Communication Service.

Nearly a year before we entered the war, May 6th to 8th, 1916,

naval communications, wire and wireless, of the entire country were

mobilized, under the supervision of Captain (later Rear Admiral) W.

H. G. Bullard, Superintendent of Radio Service. All the apparatus

necessary for country-wide communication by radio or telephone was

provided, by the Bureau of Engineering, specially marked, and placed in

readiness for operation on twenty-four hours' notice.

Inaugurating war service was, therefore, comparatively simple, and,

under the supervision of Captain D. W. Todd, Director of Naval

Communications, was easily accomplished. Trans-ocean service with

Europe was improved by increasing the power of Tuckerton, N. J., and

Sayville, L. I., the German-built stations we had taken over, and

placing improved apparatus at New Brunswick, N. J. Work was pushed on

the big new station at Annapolis, Md.

At Otter Cliffs, near Bar Harbor, Maine, a receiving station was built

that more than doubled the capacity of the existing ones at Chatham,

Mass., and Belmar, N. J. Sending and receiving stations were connected

by wire with the Navy Department, and use of high speed apparatus,

automatic senders and receivers enabled us to handle an immense amount

of traffic. Speed in transmission increased from 30 to 100 words a

minute in actual practice, and 300 words in pre-arranged tests, and

there was almost as marked progress in receiving.

In 1916, experts considered it a very creditable record when 125,000

dispatches were transmitted or received. In the twelve months following

April 6, 1918, when traffic was at its height, a million dispatches,

averaging 30 words each, were handled from the Navy Department alone.

The Naval Communication Service in a single year handled, by wire and

wireless, 71,347,860 words.

American merchant ships, as well as naval vessels, were equipped with

modern apparatus and furnished competent operators. Thousands of radio

operators were required, and 7,000 were enlisted and trained. At

Harvard University we established the largest radio school that ever

existed. Beginning with 350 students in 1917, the number grew to 3,400

and operators were graduated at the rate of 200 a week.

Air, surface and undersea craft were linked by radio, easily

communicating with each other at long distances. Battleships received

four messages and transmitted three simultaneously.

During the flight of the Navy planes across the Atlantic, in May,

1919, a message was sent from the Navy Department to the NC-4 far out

at sea. An immediate reply was received from the plane, and this was

transmitted to London, Paris, San Francisco and the Panama Canal Zone,

and its receipt acknowledged by these stations, thousands of miles

apart, all in three minutes after the original message left Washington.

When President Wilson went to France on the _George Washington_ to

attend the Peace Conference in Paris, we kept in touch with the ship by

wireless all the way across the Atlantic. On the return voyage we made

a test with the wireless telephone and from an instrument much like the

'phone in your home or office, I talked with the President when he was

1,700 miles at sea.

The radio compass, used first for locating enemy submarines, became

a most important aid to navigation. Any ship out of its course or

uncertain of its reckoning has only to transmit the signal, "Give me my

position." The operator at the radio compass station turns the wheel

now this way, then that, until he finds from what point the wireless

comes strongest. At the same time other stations along the coast are

doing the same thing. Triangulating the directions reported, the

master out at sea is told the position of his vessel, the latitude and

longitude and, if in danger, is told what course to steer to get out of

his predicament.

The saving in life and property has more than compensated for the cost

of this system. Beginning with a few on the Atlantic, there are now

some 75 of these compass stations all along our coasts.

The necessity of a single control of wireless was shown by an instance

that occurred one night in the Navy Department. A message was being

received from Darien, in the Panama Canal Zone, when some one broke in

on its wave-length and mixed up words and letters in a hopeless jumble.

The operator had to stop Darien until he could find out where the

trouble was. At last they found it was a station in Nova Scotia, that

was testing its apparatus. It had unintentionally "broken" into the

wave-length our operators were using, and caused interference clear to

Panama.

American news was spread throughout the world by Navy radio. Every

night the "Navy Press" was broadcasted, and received by ships far out

at sea. Our boys in the army were quite as eager to hear the news

from home, and a complete service, compiled by the Committee on Public

Information, was sent to Europe each night, and distributed through the

Allied countries, including Russia. Regular reports were sent to South

America and the Orient, the latter being distributed throughout China,

Japan and Siberia.

Germany had a big Cryptographic Bureau in Berlin, with experts

in deciphering languages and codes, which often secured valuable

information from intercepted radio messages. With the assistance of

able civilians, we built up a corps of code and cipher experts who

compared well with those of any country. Frequent changes in codes kept

Germany guessing, and afforded a high degree of secrecy to our official

communications.

"Listening in" on Nauen, the largest of German stations, Navy operators

in America took down nightly the latest news from Berlin. And the

"news" the Germans sent out for home consumption and foreign effect was

weird and startling. One night in July, 1918, the Germans announced:

Vaterland sunk! Largest German vessel used by Americans as troop

transport, named by them "Leviathan," was torpedoed and sent down

today by German submarines!

By wireless, telegraph, bulletins and newspapers, the report was spread

all over Germany, and there was general rejoicing throughout the empire.

I did not believe the report and felt it could hardly be true, but I

must confess that the dispatch gave me a start. Our latest reports

showed that the big transport had sailed from Brest three days previous

and was nearly half way home. My anxiety was not relieved until we

got positive assurance of her safety. The British radio next day

broadcasted the following statement:

The German wireless and German newspapers have asserted that the

former German liner the _Vaterland_, now in use as an American

transport, had been torpedoed and sunk. The statement is false.

The _Vaterland_ has not been sunk. The Vossische-Zeitung says that

the Americans had intended to bring over a dozen divisions in the

course of a year in this ship. If so the intention may be carried

out, for the _Vaterland_ is afloat and is in the finest possible

condition.

There was bitter disappointment in the "Fatherland" when the German

Government gradually broke the news that it was not the _Vaterland_,

but another steamer, "almost as big," which had been sunk. It was, in

fact, the _Justicia_, a British vessel which had been carrying troops,

but was returning empty--and she was nothing like so large as the

_Leviathan_, not by 20,000 tons.

That report was only one of the thousand queer things we heard from

Germany.

There was laid on my desk every morning a daily newspaper--I suppose

it was the only "secret" daily ever gotten out in America--which,

compiled and mimeographed by the Naval Communication Service and marked

"confidential," was sent in sealed envelopes to officers and officials

whose duties compelled them to keep in touch with all that was going on

abroad. This contained not only all that Germany was sending out, but a

digest of all that was sent out by the British, French and Italians.

We certainly heard some strange "news" from Berlin--things that were

news to us. One report, received July 25, 1918, when our troops were

proving their valor in Foch's great drive, informed us:

The American army is lacking in the one essential, the will to

fight. In any case, it will not be numerous enough to play any

important part until 1920, and then only provided the transport

difficulty is got over and the munition industry developed from its

present nursery stage. Our submarines will see to the transports,

and America will find it impossible to create a gigantic industry

and a gigantic army at the same time. Ammunition perhaps, but guns

cannot be cast in sewing-machine factories. At present the American

soldiers are without either rifles or artillery.

At that moment there were a million American soldiers in France and we

were turning out munitions at a rate the Germans could not believe was

possible.

[Illustration: THE STATION WHOSE MESSAGES ARE HEARD AROUND THE WORLD

The Lafayette radio station, the most powerful in the world. Inset: a

radio operator at work.]

The more evident it was that U-boat warfare had failed, the more

vehement were the German naval authorities in asserting its success.

Admiral Holtzendorff, head of the Admiralty, announced on July 29, that

they were taking into consideration the counter measures--(that meant

the mine barrage, the destroyers, patrol boats and all the things we

were using to defeat them); that the Germans were building many more

submarines, and that "final success is guaranteed."

[Illustration: THE TABLET ON THE MAIN BUILDING OF THE LAFAYETTE RADIO

STATION]

After submarine crews had mutinied and U-boat warfare had ended with

the recall of their submarines in October, the German chiefs were still

bluffing their own people. As late as November 5, less than a week

before the armistice, we caught this bulletin from Berlin:

English wireless service reported, and this report was circulated

also in neutral newspapers, that German submarines had passed

Norwegian coast on their way home with a white flag at the

mast-head. This is a pure invention. English wireless has thus

again circulated a lie.

At that very time the U-boats were all hurrying home, some of them

passing so close to the Norwegian coast, to avoid mines and destroyers,

that they could be plainly seen from shore.

When the French and Americans by terrific attacks drove the Germans

across the Marne, Berlin announced:

The excellent execution of the movement for changing to the

opposite bank of the wide River Marne, which took place unnoticed

by the enemy, demonstrates today the splendid ability of the German

command and troops.

When the Americans won their notable victory at St. Mihiel we heard

from Berlin that the Germans had only "evacuated" the "bend" there to

improve lines, and that on the whole, the French and American attacks

had failed. And General Wrisberg assured the trusting Teutons back in

the fatherland:

The American army also can not terrify us, as we shall settle

accounts with them.

Even in November, with total collapse only a few days away, they were

still talking of the failure of the Americans and the "victorious

repulse" of the French.

After the mutiny at Kiel and other ports, where sailors took possession

of the ships and started the revolution, they sent out this bulletin,

on November 7:

Concerning situation in Kiel and uprisings in other harbor towns;

military protection of Baltic has been carried out without a break

by navy. All warships leaving harbor fly war flags. Movements

among sailors and workmen have been brought back to peaceful ways.

The surrender of the German High Seas Fleet was gently termed, the

"carrying out of armistice conditions at sea!"

But through the secret service of the Allies, we were kept well

informed of all that was going on in the German navy.

The denials of mutinies and revolts were merely amusing to us. We knew

the facts. We knew their morale was shattered, that the Allies had "got

their nerve."

I do not know any dispatch that amused me more than the one we picked

up from Berlin November 16. This showed that the U-boat crews had to be

reassured that their lives were safe, even after the armistice; that

they had to be coaxed and bribed before they would venture out to take

the submarines to England for surrender. Here it is:

Pr. 143. W522--Trans-ocean Press. Berlin, November 16.

German armistice commission has directed to Chancellor Ebert for

immediate communication to all submarine crews letter in which it

states that English Admiral Sir Roslyn Wemyss has given unreserved

and absolute assurance that all crews of submarines to be handed

over will be sent back to Germany as soon as possible after their

arrival in the harbor appointed by England. Commission therefore

requests crews to hand over in good time the submarines.

In connection with this, workmen and soldiers' council of

Wilhelmshaven states that all men of ships which are brought into

an enemy port are insured for 10,000 marks in case of death. A

corresponding special pension has been provided for accidents.

Besides, the married men who are concerned in bringing the

submarines receive a premium of 500 marks, and finally are to be

immediately discharged after their return home.

Our Navy at war · 第 22 / 36 章