On Otto’s left the Duke of York’s column was as dangerously

dispersed. The Guards, with the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons,

under Abercromby, were at Mouveaux; four Austrian battalions and

the Sixteenth Light Dragoons were at Roubaix; the Fourteenth,

Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third were on the road between Roubaix and

Lille, in order to repel any attack from the garrison of the latter

place; two Hessian battalions lay at Lannoy, and four squadrons of

Austrian hussars were engaged in patrolling. The Duke’s right was

indeed covered, but his left was exposed to attack not only by the

garrison of Lille but by Bonnaud’s superior force about Flers; and

thus both his column and Otto’s practically passed the night pent in

on three sides by forces of thrice their strength. To the left, or

southward, there was a gap of four miles between the Duke’s troops and

the nearest of Kinsky’s detachments, which lay at Pont-à-Tressin and

Chereng, with the main body still further south at Bouvines; while the

Archduke Charles, with nearly one-fourth of the whole army, lay over

against him at Sainghin on the other side of the Marque, with advanced

detachments pushed far to the south-west at Seclin. Finally, Clerfaye,

with rather more than a fourth of the entire Allied force, was still on

the western side of the Lys at Wervicq. Certainly the dispositions lent

themselves to a plan of annihilation.

◆May 18.◆

At three o’clock on the morning of the 18th, while Coburg was signing

the orders for his troops, the French army began its march to the

attack. On the south Osten’s division was left about Flers and

Lezennes, to watch the Archduke Charles and Kinsky; while Bonnaud,

dividing his eighteen thousand men into two columns, directed

them northward, the one by L’Hempenpont upon Lannoy, the other by

Pont-à-Breug upon Roubaix. Simultaneously Malbrancq’s brigade marched

south from Roncq upon Mouveaux; Macdonald’s from Mount Halluin upon the

western front of Turcoing; Compère’s from Mouscron upon the northern

front; Thierry’s, also from Mouscron, together with Daendels’s from

Aelbeke, upon Wattrelos; while Jardon’s brigade moved from Belleghem

towards Dottignies to hold the Hanoverians in check. Excluding this

last brigade, sixty thousand men in all were thus turned upon the six

posts in which the eighteen thousand men under Otto and the Duke of

York were dispersed.

Otto’s force, being nearer to the enemy, was the first to feel

the weight of the attack. General Montfrault, who commanded at

Tourcoing, perceiving the overwhelming strength of the enemy, begged

reinforcements from the Duke of York, who sent him two Austrian

battalions from Roubaix, but with strict orders that they should return

in the event of their arriving too late to save the town. As a matter

of fact they did arrive too late, for the garrison had already been

driven from Tourcoing; but none the less they attached themselves,

as was perhaps natural, to Montfrault, who stood fast on the eastern

skirts of the town and held back the enemy for a time, until a

French battery unlimbering on ground to the north of him, forced him

to retire. Seeing himself threatened by large bodies of cavalry,

Montfrault formed his troops into a large square, with four battalions

and light artillery in front, one battalion on each flank, and the

cavalry in the rear. In this order he fell back, his heavy artillery

and waggons being enclosed in the centre of the square, and his light

troops skirmishing on all four sides. It was about half-past eight when

he began his retrograde movement; but already Wattrelos, the first

post on his rear, was in possession of the enemy. The garrison, two

Hessian battalions, had manfully resisted an attack of six times their

number until eight o’clock, when, finding themselves in danger of being

surrounded, they retired, and, with the help of two companies sent

forward by General Otto, withdrew successfully to Leers. Montfrault

thereupon found himself compelled to leave the main road for a by-way,

which ran between Wattrelos and Roubaix, in order to continue his

retreat.

Between six and seven o’clock, rather later than the opening of the

attack on Tourcoing and Wattrelos, Bonnaud’s two columns came up from

the south upon Lannoy and Roubaix; and shortly afterwards Malbrancq’s

brigade from the north fell upon Mouveaux, while a part of the French

force that had captured Tourcoing appeared also on the north of

Roubaix. The Duke of York despatched urgent messages to recall the

two Austrian battalions which he had sent to Otto, but of course in

vain; and meanwhile he made such head as he could with his handful of

troops against overwhelming odds. The troops at Mouveaux were disposed

in two sides of a square, the left showing a front towards the east

at Mouveaux, the guns stationed in the angle at the northern end of

the village, and the right thrown back to the hamlet of Le Fresnoy. To

the south, the British brigade of the Line under Major-general Fox,

near Croix, sought to bar the way against part of Bonnaud’s division

from Lille; but to defend the rest of the ground there were but three

Austrian battalions. Of these half a battalion was stationed in Roubaix

itself, and the remainder echeloned to the right rear of Fox’s brigade

behind the sources of the Espierres brook, which ran along the southern

skirts of the village. These Austrian battalions seem to have been

the first to give way, and one of them, by Craig’s account, did not

behave as it ought; but they were pressed hard both in front and on

their right flank, which, owing to the absence of the two battalions

sent to Otto, was wholly uncovered. One brigade of Bonnaud’s division

therefore succeeded in forcing its way between Mouveaux and Roubaix

to Le Fresnoy; and the Duke thus saw Abercromby and the brigade of

Guards absolutely cut off from him. Moreover, though he knew it not,

the victorious French of Thierry’s and Daendels’s brigades were coming

down from Wattrelos upon his rear. Seldom has a General found himself,

through no fault of his own, in a more extraordinary position. He had

been assured that the Archduke Charles would join him from the south,

and he had therefore ordered Abercromby to defend Mouveaux to the

last extremity; but not a sign of an Austrian was to be seen whether

to south or north. His first instinct was to ride to the Guards at

Mouveaux; but this was seen to be out of the question. He then tried

to make his way to Fox’s brigade, but found that the French were in

possession of the suburbs of Roubaix, and that he was cut off from

this brigade also. Realising then that, his Austrian battalions being

dispersed, he had not a man left to him except two squadrons of the

Sixteenth Light Dragoons, he took a small escort from them and rode to

Wattrelos, hoping to obtain from Otto the means for extricating the

Guards. Meanwhile he sent orders to Abercromby to retire to the heights

on the east side of Roubaix.

Montfrault, however, had fared ill in his attempt to withdraw. Until he

reached the ground between Wattrelos and Roubaix, his square preserved

good order; but being attacked at that point by overpowering numbers

from the south as well as from north and west, it was broken up, and

fled in disorder towards Leers. Meanwhile General Fox, finding himself

absolutely isolated, at length gave the order for his brigade, which so

far had held its own, to retire. The retreat began in perfect order,

and the brigade, having successfully fought its way to the road at

Lannoy, followed it for some distance, under incessant fire from all

sides, until checked by a battery covered by an abatis, which the

French had thrown up on the road. The first shots from this battery

struck down several men, and Fox for the moment feared that surrender

would be inevitable; but fortunately in the ranks of the Fourteenth was

a French emigrant who knew the district well, and undertook to lead the

brigade across country. It pursued its retreat therefore under constant

fire of artillery and musketry in front and on both flanks, and with

cavalry constantly threatening its rear; but it kept its assailants

at bay, and at one moment made so sharp a counter-attack as to take

temporary possession of some French guns. Thus partly by good luck,

partly by good conduct, partly by the misconduct and mismanagement of

the enemy, the three battalions contrived to reach Leers, with the loss

of all their battalion-guns excepting one, and of nine officers and

five hundred and twenty-five men out of eleven hundred and twenty. The

greatest credit was given to General Fox for the coolness, skill, and

patience with which he extricated his brigade.

Abercromby appears to have begun his retreat from Mouveaux at about

nine o’clock, but of necessity very slowly, having with him a

considerable number of guns. The retirement was conducted in perfect

order as far as Roubaix, the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons

covering the rear with great gallantry. At Roubaix the French, though

in occupation of the suburbs, were not in possession of the little

walled town, which was still held by a dismounted squadron of the

Sixteenth Light Dragoons. The place consisted of a single long street,

the direct continuation of which led to Wattrelos, while, just outside

the eastern gate, the road to Lannoy turned sharply to the right, being

bordered on one side by a deep ditch and on the other by the Espierres

brook. To defile through the town took necessarily much time, but the

guns emerged safely and the Guards also. Next to the Guards were the

Austrian Hussars, still in the street; then in rear of them a party of

the Fifteenth; next to this party were the Sixteenth, who were formed

up in the market-place; and in rear of all were the remainder of the

Fifteenth, holding the pursuing French in check. All was still in order

when a French gun posted on the Wattrelos branch of the street suddenly

opened fire from the edge of the town, sending shot after shot among

the Austrian Hussars. The ordeal would have been a severe one for any

troops, and presently the Hussars dismounted and tried to find a way

out among the houses, but in vain. The trial became unendurable as the

French pressed on and opened fire on all sides upon the horsemen thus

pent in for slaughter; and at last the whole body remounted, galloped

wildly down the road, swung round the corner, where the French infantry

thrust vainly at them with their bayonets, and raced onward for three

or four hundred yards, when the foremost troopers suddenly found

the way blocked by horseless guns. The French had brought a second

gun to enfilade the road to Lannoy, and the drivers of the British

cannon had fled. The shock of this mass of galloping horsemen suddenly

checked was appalling. In an instant the ground was strewn with men

and horses, kicking and struggling in frantic confusion, while a

number of bât-horses dashed into the ranks of the Guards, plunging

and lashing out, with their loads hanging under their bellies. For

a short time the disorder appears to have been beyond remedy, for a

belt of wood surrounding the town gave excellent shelter to the French

sharpshooters, who had a very easy target in the mass of struggling

men and animals. Very soon, however, the Guards recovered themselves,

and cleared a way for the cavalry to pass on beyond the wood to open

ground. There the Light Dragoons rallied, the rear-guard was re-formed,

and the retreat, always under heavy fire, was resumed towards Lannoy.

That village, which was enclosed by a low earthen rampart and a shallow

ditch, had likewise been attacked early by one of Bonnaud’s brigades

from Lille, but had been defended with the greatest gallantry by

two battalions of Hessians, who were apparently still in possession

when the British troops approached it, though surrounded on the

west side, and indeed nearly on all sides, by the French.[241] The

British officers, however, could see no sign of a friendly garrison,

and Colonel Congreve was actually wheeling his cannon round to open

fire on the place, when there galloped up to them some blue-coated

horsemen, who, being mistaken for Hessians, were allowed to approach

without molestation, and succeeded in cutting the traces of some of

the guns before they were discovered. The Guards then perceiving

their retreat to be cut off, faced about against their pursuers, and,

leaving the high road, made their way across country as best they could

south-eastward to Marquain. The Hessians in Lannoy, either before or

shortly after this, were forced to evacuate the village, and, finding

the road to Leers blocked by the enemy, were likewise obliged to make

their way across country in disorder, losing out of nine hundred

officers and men some three hundred and thirty, of whom two hundred

were cut off and captured in Lannoy itself.

Meanwhile the Duke of York, conspicuous by the star on his breast,

had been hunted all over the country by the enemy’s dragoons, and

had escaped, as he frankly owned, only by the speed of his horse. On

reaching Wattrelos he found it in the hands of the French, but passing

beyond it under constant fire he came upon a gallant little party of

Hessians still holding the bridge of the Espierres brook. These by a

final attack with the bayonet gained a little respite for him, but

were presently swept away from the bridge, and escaped only by fording

the brook neck-deep. The Duke, thinking apparently that the bridge

was lost, or not knowing of its existence, spurred his horse into the

brook; but the animal rearing up and refusing to enter the water, he

dismounted, scrambled over on foot, and taking a horse from one of

his aide-de-camps, at last succeeded in finding Otto. About Leers and

Nechin the fragments of Otto’s force, together with some of the Duke

of York’s men, rallied upon the few battalions that held these places.

The French did not press their advantage, and at half-past four the

action came to an end. The loss of the Allies was about three thousand

men killed, wounded, and missing, which was relatively slight, for,

with proper management and conduct on the part of the French, not a man

of the Duke’s and Otto’s columns would have escaped alive. The Brigade

of Guards lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and men killed,

wounded, and missing, the flank-companies being the heaviest sufferers;

while the Seventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who by

general admission behaved admirably, lost fifty-two men and ninety-two

horses. The total loss of the British of all ranks was nine hundred

and thirty, besides which nineteen out of their twenty-eight guns were

captured.

It may be asked what the rest of the army was doing on this day, while

these two columns, together less than one-third of the whole, were

in process of annihilation. The answer is that, for some reason, it

observed a conspiracy of inaction. Bussche sat still at Dottignies

exchanging occasional shots with Jardon’s brigade. Clerfaye crossed

the Lys near Wervicq at seven o’clock in the morning, and turning

eastward advanced between Bousbecque and Linselles, where he was met

by Vandamme’s brigade, which numbered eight thousand men against his

sixteen thousand. He engaged the French, overthrew their right wing,

took eight guns, and then remained stationary; until, being informed

of the approach of more French troops about Bondues, he withdrew to

the Lys, which he recrossed on the next day, and thence retreated

northward. The behaviour of Kinsky and of the Archduke Charles was

still more extraordinary. Kinsky, on being asked by one of his officers

for orders at six o’clock in the morning, replied that he was sick

and no longer in command. The Archduke Charles received at five in

the morning the order to move at once upon Lannoy, a distance of six

miles, so that his troops might well have come upon the scene of action

between eight and nine. He did not march till noon, though within sound

of the guns, nor did he strike the road from Tournai to Lille until

three, when he received orders to return to Tournai. The military

renown justly earned later by the Archduke forbids us to believe that

this delay was due to ignorance; and the fact that, though the Duke of

York had early informed the Emperor of his danger, not a word was sent

to hasten the Archduke or Kinsky, shows clearly that their torpidity

was not unexpected nor disapproved at headquarters. Jealousy of the

Duke of York and of Mack are among the reasons assigned to account

for the general paralysis of the Austrian commanders; but possibly

the true reason was that Thugut was sick of the war in Belgium, and

wished the English to sicken of it also. Why he should have chosen the

slaughter of several hundred British and Austrians as the best means

of forwarding his purpose, and how he persuaded Austrian officers to

second him therein, are matters which only an Austrian can determine.

For us it must suffice that the decisive battle of the campaign was

lost by the deliberate design of the Imperial Generals. Before long

they were to learn that those who court defeat for dishonest ends may,

when they least desire it, find defeat thrust upon them.[242]

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XI

◆1794.◆

◆May 19.◆

The entire army of the Allies, with the exception of Clerfaye’s corps,

was gathered into camp about Tournai in the course of the 19th, the

Emperor being received in silence when he rode into the town, while the

Duke of York was loudly cheered by the inhabitants.[243] The condition

of the army was very far from satisfactory. The troops themselves, or at

any rate the British, were not seriously shaken by the rout of the

previous day; but the Emperor and the Austrian commanders were much

discouraged, and the animosity of the various nations towards each other

was dangerously embittered. The British, above all, were furious against

the Austrians for leaving them to be overwhelmed without so much as an

attempt to assist them. “It is impossible,” wrote Craig to the War

Office, “to bring the Austrians to act except in small corps. I lament

that we should be destined as victims of their folly and ignorance. Do

not be surprised at the word ignorance: I am every day more and more

convinced that they have not an officer among them.” These were hard

words, but they were true and just, though the Archduke Charles in later

days redeemed himself from this reproach. ◆May 20.◆ However, for the

moment the commanders laid aside their differences and agreed that the

attack should be renewed, this time with united forces, upon Mouscron;

and meanwhile Coburg dispersed the whole army in a semicircle around

Tournai; the advanced posts running from Camphin on the south by

Baisieux, Willems, Nechin, Leers, Estaimpuis, and St. Legers to

Espierres, while the inner circle of entrenchments ran from the Scheldt

on the north by Froyennes, Marquain, and Lamain to the suburb of St.

Martin and the citadel of Tournai itself.

The French Generals, as already narrated, made no effort to follow up

their victory of the 18th, but awaited the return of Pichegru, who,

on the news of the victory, hastened from the Sambre to turn it to

account. On the 22nd, after a consultation with his officers, Pichegru

decided to make a general attack upon Coburg’s position, and directed

that Souham with four brigades,[244] numbering from thirty to forty

thousand men, should assail it on the right or northern half of its

front from Espierres to Leers, while Bonnaud’s division should fall

upon its left about Templeuve, and Osten’s division should make a

demonstration still further to the south about Baisieux. May 23.◆ On

the following day between six and seven o’clock in the morning the

action began; and after long and hard fighting the Allies were finally

driven from three important points, namely, Blandain and the hill of La

Croisette immediately adjacent to it, a little to the west of Tournai,

and Pont-à-Chin upon the Scheldt, a little below the city. To abandon

to the enemy these posts, particularly Pont-à-Chin, which lay on the

direct road from Courtrai to Tournai and commanded the navigation of

the Scheldt, was impossible; and Coburg decided that they must be

recovered at any cost. Throughout this long day’s fighting the troops

that had borne the brunt of the work on the 18th had been held in

reserve; but at about six o’clock in the evening Fox’s brigade of the

British Line was called out to recover Pont-à-Chin which had already

been taken and retaken three or four times. The brigade went into

this action with fewer than six hundred men, having lost half of its

numbers just four days before; but the three gallant regiments, though

unsupported, carried the village unhesitatingly with the bayonet,

pressed on to the low heights to south of it, swept everything before

them, so far as their front extended, and captured seven cannon.

◆ May 22.◆ The day ended, after a severe struggle of fifteen hours,

in the retreat of the French, with the loss of some six thousand men

and seven guns; the fire, both of musketry and artillery, having been

the heaviest ever remembered by the oldest soldiers present. Both

sides, however, fought for the most part in dispersed formation, and

inflicted, comparatively speaking, little damage upon each other. The

one exception was Fox’s brigade. “Had their order of attack,” wrote

Calvert, “been adopted by the Allies in general, the day would probably

have ended in the ruin of the French.” But the losses of the brigade

amounted to one hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing; and

there are few troops that can be trusted, after losing half their

numbers on Sunday, to storm a position held by a superior force and

lose one-fifth of their remnant on Thursday. Some indeed claim that

but for this handful of British soldiers the day would have been lost

to the Allies;[245] but whether this be true or not, the 22nd of May

should be a great anniversary for the Fourteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and

Fifty-Third.

British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794 Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army" · 第 22 / 28 段