thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore
themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were
killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just
exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth
and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men,
the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather fewer than three
hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost
each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot,
Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of
the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed
or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in
particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the
British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The
loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least
equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no
great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of the
prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel
in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery,
remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a
mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within
pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they
discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces,
repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy
cannonade, retired for some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire,
advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and
flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil, repelled
another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly
under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British
commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding of his orders and his
failure to capture the Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby
was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however,
acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was no
question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry
in its advance with his own detachment and was severely wounded. It is
customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in
attempting such an attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical
blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the salient had been
carried. But he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad
luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on
the other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near to give him
the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would
attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland
is blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d’Eu or Fontenoy
after he had penetrated into the French camp. This charge is less
easy to rebut, for the French always know when they are beaten, and
seeing their left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in
flank and rear would probably have given up the game for lost, and
that the more readily since their ammunition in Fontenoy was for the
moment nearly exhausted. Even so, however, Saxe’s reserves were always
at hand at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in check.
Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland did not make greater
use of his artillery in the action, is answered by the fact that the
contractors for the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early
in the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, and yet it
never happened to Marlborough, not even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the
conclusion seems to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat
of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his troops with bravery
equal to his own, was not a General of sufficient capacity to turn his
success to account.
At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to Ath and encamped
under the guns of that fortress, leaving his wounded to the mercy of
the French, who, by a strange perversion of their usual chivalry,
treated them with shameful barbarity. Among the wounded, strangely
enough, were a few of the new sect of Methodists founded by John
Wesley, who faced death and wounds with the stern exultation that had
once inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote to Wesley
that, even after a bullet in each arm had forced him to retire from the
field, he hardly knew whether he was on earth or in heaven, such was
the sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of his kind probably
helped their fellow-sufferers through the misery of the days following
the battle, until Cumberland’s furious remonstrances with Saxe procured
for them better treatment.
From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and drew out such British
corps as were in garrison in Flanders, to replace those which had
suffered most heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very shortly
after the battle, fell by treachery into the hands of the French; and
Saxe’s field-army being thus raised to a force nearly double that of
the Allies, Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The mischief
of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the loss of men, for the
British did not consider themselves to have been beaten, but in the
destruction of all confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which
had harassed Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland,
notwithstanding his inferiority in strength, was expected somehow to
defend Flanders, Brabant, and above all Brussels, and yet
simultaneously to keep an active army in the field. Worse than this,
he attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better judgment he
weakened his force still further by detaching a force for the garrison
of Mons,[83] after which, instead of taking up a strong position on
the Scheldt to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure
of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to protect Brussels.[84]
Halting too long between two opinions he at last sent off a detachment
for the defence of Ghent, half of which was cut off and driven back
with heavy loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough usage
on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town surprised by the
French on the following day. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ Four British
regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise and suffered severely,
while the Royal Scots and the Twenty-third, which had been despatched
to Ghent after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.[85] Moreover, a
vast quantity of British military stores were captured in Ghent,
although Cumberland had a week before ordered that they should be
removed.[86] After this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little
to the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that city and
Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications both with Germany and
with the sea. Here again he sacrificed his better judgment to the
clamour of the Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure
Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, and he was
keenly alive to it.[87] Just when his anxiety was greatest there came
a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that invasion of
England was imminent, and hoping that troops could be spared from
Flanders without prejudice to his operations. “What!” answered
Ligonier indignantly; “are you aware that the enemy has seventy
thousand men against our thirty thousand, and that they can place a
superior force on the canal before us and send another army round
between us and Antwerp, to cut off our supplies and force us to fight
at a disadvantage? ◆August.◆ This is our position, and this is the
result of providing His Royal Highness with insufficient troops; and
yet you speak of our having a corps to spare to defend England!”[88]
Saxe’s plan for reducing the Allies was in fact uniformly the same
throughout the whole of the war, namely to cut off their
communications with the sea on one side and with Germany on the
other. Even before he began to press Cumberland northward toward
Antwerp, he had detached a force to lay siege to Ostend, which was the
English base. Cumberland, on his side, had advised that the dykes
should be broken down and the country inundated in order to preserve
it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that this should be
done; but as usual it was not done, and before the end of August
Ostend had surrendered to the French. ◆Aug. 13/24.◆ The English base
was then perforce shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests
for the return of troops to England had become urgent and imperative
orders. ◆Sept.–Oct.◆ First ten battalions were recalled, then the rest
of the foot, and at last practically the whole of the army, including
Cumberland himself.[89] The cause was the Jacobite rebellion which was
stamped out by the victory of Culloden in April 1746.
AUTHORITIES.—The official account of Fontenoy was drawn up by
Ligonier in French and translated into English, with some omissions,
for publication. The French version is far the better and will be
found in the State Papers. The account in the _Life of the Duke of
Cumberland_ is poor, though valuable as having been drawn up from the
reports of the English Generals. Of the French accounts Voltaire’s is
the best known, and, as might be expected from such a hand, admirably
spirited. More valuable are the accounts in the _Conquête des Pays
Bas_, in the _Mémoires du Maréchal de Saxe_, where Saxe’s own report
may be read, in the _Campagnes des Pays Bas_, and in Espagnac. The
newspapers furnish a few picturesque incidents of some value.
VOL. II BOOK VII. CHAPTER VII
◆1746.◆
The virtual evacuation of the Low Countries by the British, in
consequence of the Jacobite Rebellion, was an advantage too obvious to
be overlooked by the French. At the end of January, though
winter-quarters were not yet broken up, they severed the communication
between Antwerp and Brussels, and a week later took the town of
Brussels itself by escalade. The citadel, after defending itself for a
fortnight, went the way of the town, and the capital of the Spanish
Netherlands was turned into a French place of arms.[90] The
consternation in Holland was great, and was increased when the French
presently besieged and captured Antwerp. ◆May 20/31.◆ Meanwhile the
British Commander, Lord Dunmore, who had been left in the Netherlands
with a few squadrons of cavalry, could only look on in absolute
helplessness. It was not until June that the Hessian troops in British
pay and a few British battalions could be embarked, together with
General Ligonier to command them, from England; and it was not until
July, owing to foul winds, that they were finally landed at
Williamstadt. The change of base was significant in itself, for, since
the capture of Ostend and Antwerp, there was no haven for British
ships except in the United Provinces. Even after the disembarkation
these forces were found to be still unready to take the field. The
Hessians had not a grain of powder among them, and there were neither
horses for the artillery nor waggons for the baggage. Again, to add
small difficulties to great, the Austrian General, Batthyany, having
no British officer as his peer in command, denied to the British
troops the place of honour at the right of the line. It was a trifling
matter, but yet sufficient to embarrass counsel, destroy harmony, and
delay operations.[91]
While the Allies were thus painfully drawing their forces together, the
activity of the French never ceased. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ The Prince of
Conti was detached with a considerable force to the Haine, where he
quickly reduced Mons and St. Ghislain, thus throwing down almost the
last relics of the Austrian barrier in the south. ◆July 13/24.◆ Thence
moving to the Sambre, Conti laid siege to Charleroi. It was now
sufficiently clear that the plan of the French campaign was to operate
on the line of the Meuse for the invasion of Holland. Maestricht once
taken, the rest would be easy, for most of the Dutch army were prisoners
in the hands of the French; and, with the possession of the line of the
Meuse, communication between the Allied forces of England and of Austria
would be cut off. But before Maestricht could be touched, Namur must
first be captured; and the campaign of 1746 accordingly centred about
Namur.
For the first fortnight of July the Allies remained at Terheyden, a
little to the north of Breda, Saxe’s army lying some thirty miles
south-westward of them about Antwerp. ◆July 6/17.◆ On the 17th of July
the Allies at last got on the march, still with some faint hopes of
saving Charleroi, and proceeded south-eastward, a movement which Saxe at
once parried by marching parallel with them to the Dyle between Arschot
and Louvain. Pushing forward, despite endless difficulties of transport
and forage, through a wretched barren country, the Allies, now under
command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, reached Peer, turned southward
across the Denier at Hasselt, and by the 27th of July were at Borchloen.
◆July 16/27.◆ They were thus actually on the eastern side of the French
main army, within reach of the Mehaigne and not without good hope of
saving Namur if not Charleroi. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ On the 1st of August
they crossed the Mehaigne, only to learn to their bitter disappointment
that Charleroi had surrendered that very morning. Saxe meanwhile, with
the principal part of his army, still lay entrenched at Louvain, with
detachments pushed forward to Tirlemont and Gembloux. The Allies
continued their march before the eyes of these detachments to Masy on
the Orneau, and there took up a position between that river and the
head-waters of the Mehaigne, fronting to the north-east. This was the
line approved through many generations of war as the best for the
protection of Namur.[92]
Saxe now drew nearer to them, and the two armies lay opposite to each
other, in many places not more than a musket-shot apart, both entrenched
to the teeth. The Allies so far had decidedly gained a success, but they
were outnumbered by the French by three to two, and they were confined
within a narrow space wherein subsistence was extremely difficult;
while, if they moved, Namur was lost. Ligonier, who was most uneasy over
the situation, longed for five thousand cavalry with which to make a
dash at Malines and so to call the enemy back in haste to defend
Brussels and Antwerp.[93] Prince Charles, however, was averse from
operations of such a nature. His hope was that Saxe would offer him
battle on the historic plain of Ramillies, where, notwithstanding the
disparity of numbers, he trusted that the quality of his troops and the
traditions of victory would enable him to prevail. But Saxe had no
intention of doing anything of the kind. He did indeed shift his
position farther to the north and east, with the field of Ramillies in
his rear, but it was not to offer battle. ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Pushing out
detachments to eastward he captured Huy, and cutting off the Allies’
communications with Liège and Maestricht forced them to cross the Meuse
and to fall back on Maestricht from the other side of the river. Cross
the Meuse the Allies accordingly did, unmolested, to Ligonier’s great
relief, by twenty thousand French who were stationed on the eastern bank
of the stream. They then opened communication with Maestricht, five
leagues away, while Saxe extended his army comfortably with its face to
the eastward along the line of the Jaar from Warem to Tongres, waiting
till want of forage should compel the Allies to recross the Meuse.
◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Back they came over the river within a fortnight, as he
had expected, and the Marshal, without attempting to dispute the
passage, retreated quietly for a few miles, knowing full well that his
enemy could not follow him from lack of bread. Ligonier never in his
life longed so intensely for the end of a campaign.[94]
On the 17th of September the Allies advanced upon the French and
offered battle. ◆Sept. 6/17.◆ Saxe answered by retiring to an
impregnable position between Tongres and the Demer. There was no
occasion for him to fight, when his enemies were short of provisions
and their cavalry was going to ruin from want of forage. So there the
two armies remained once more, within sight of each other but
unwilling to fight, because an attack on the entrenchments of either
host would have led to the certain destruction of the attacking
force.◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ But meanwhile the trenches had been opened
before Namur by a French corps under the Prince of Clermont, and
within nine days the town had fallen. Ligonier again urged his design,
for which he had prepared the necessary magazines, to upset Saxe’s
plans by a dash upon Antwerp, but he could find no support in the
council of war; so there was nothing for the Allies to do but to wait
until some further French success should compel them to move. Such a
success was not long in coming. The castle of Namur surrendered after
a miserable defence of but eleven days; Clermont’s corps was released
for operations in the field, and the Allies were forced to fall back
for the protection of Liège. ◆Sept. 27./Oct. 7.◆ Accordingly, on the
7th of October they crossed the Jaar, not without annoyance from the
enemy, and took up a new position, which gave them indeed possession
of Liège, but placed them between the Meuse in their rear, and an army
of nearly twice their strength on the Jaar before their front.[95]
[Illustration:
ROUCOUX
Sep. 30th/Oct. 11th 1746
]
◆Sept. 29./Oct. 10.◆
Now at last Saxe resolved to strike a blow. On the 10th of October he
crossed the Jaar with evident intention of an attack, and the Allied
army received orders to be ready for action before the following dawn.
The Allies’ position faced very nearly due west, the army being drawn
up astride of the two paved roads leading into Liège from Tongres and
St. Trond. Their extreme right rested on the Jaar and was covered by
the villages of Slins, Fexhe, and Enick, all of which were strongly
entrenched and occupied by the Austrians. South of Enick extended an
open plain from that village to the village of Liers, and in this
plain was posted the Hanoverian infantry and four British battalions,
the Eighth, Nineteenth, Thirty-third, and Forty-third Foot, with the
Hessian infantry on their left, in rear of Liers. The Hanoverian
cavalry prolonged the line southward to the village of Varoux, and the
Sixth and Seventh Dragoons and Scots Greys continued it to the village
of Roucoux, from which point Dutch troops carried it on to the village
of Ance, which formed the extreme left of the position. Ligonier did
not like the situation, for he did not see how the turning of the left
flank could be prevented if, as would certainly be the case, the French
should seriously attempt it. Prince Charles, knowing that, if his right
were turned, his retreat to Maestricht would be cut off, had taken
care to hold the right flank in real strength and dared not weaken it;
but the position, with the Meuse in its rear, was perilously shallow,
while the convergence of two ravines from the Jaar and Mehaigne into
its centre allowed of but one narrow way of communication between the
right and the left of the army. The defects of the Allies’ dispositions
were in fact not unlike those which had proved fatal to King William
at Landen; and Ligonier’s anxiety was proved to rest on all too good
foundation.
◆Sept. 30./Oct. 11.◆
The morning of the 11th of October opened with bad news for the Allies.
The French had been admitted into Liège by the inhabitants behind the
backs of the Dutch, so that the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded on the
left, was obliged to withdraw eight battalions from Roucoux and post
them _en potence_ on his left flank, with his cavalry in support. Thus
the defence of Roucoux, as well as of Liers and Varoux, was left to
eight battalions of British, Hanoverians, and Hessians only. This made
the outlook for the Allied left the worse, since it was evident that
the brunt of the French attack would fall upon it. Saxe gave Prince
Charles little time for reflection. He had one hundred and twenty
thousand men against eighty thousand, and he knew that of the eighty
thousand at least one-third were tied to the Austrian entrenchments
about the Jaar. He opened the action by a furious assault upon the
Dutch on the left wing, his infantry being formed in dense columns,
so that the attack could be renewed continually by fresh troops.
Simultaneously fifty-five battalions in three similar columns were
launched upon Liers, Varoux, and Roucoux. Outmatched though they were,
Dutch, Germans, and British all fought splendidly and repelled more
than one attack. But, to use Ligonier’s words, as soon as two French
brigades had been repulsed in each village, a third brigade ran in;
and the eight battalions, though they still held Liers, were forced
to withdraw both from Roucoux and Varoux. Being rallied, however, by
Ligonier, they advanced again and recaptured both villages; and the
Nineteenth and Forty-third took up a position in a hollow road which
they held to the last. The Dutch now began to retire across the rear
of the position from the left, in good order despite of heavy losses,
while Ligonier checked the enemy in the plain with the British cavalry.
When the Dutch had passed, he ordered his own men to retreat in the
same direction, still covering the movement with the cavalry and with
the Thirteenth and Twenty-sixth Foot, which had been sent to the field
from the garrison of Maestricht. The Austrians formed a rear-guard in
turn when the British and their German comrades had passed; and thus
the whole army filed off, unpursued and in perfect order, and crossed
the Meuse in safety on the following morning.
The action may be looked upon as a fortunate escape for the Allies,
since it was impossible, humanly speaking, that it could have issued
favourably for them. Prince Charles, in seeking to cover both Liège
and Maestricht, had attempted too much. His army thus occupied too
wide a front, the villages in the centre were too weakly held, there
was hardly anywhere a second line of infantry, and the left flank
could not be sustained against so superior an enemy. The total loss of
the Allies was about five thousand men, which was sufficiently severe
considering that but a third of the army was engaged. The casualties of
the British were three hundred and fifty killed and wounded, of whom
no fewer than two hundred belonged to the Forty-third. The French lost
as many men as the Allies, or more, and gained little by the action
except eight guns captured from the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians.
Had not the Allied troops been far better in quality and discipline
than the French, they must have been lost during their retreat with
superior numbers both in flank and rear. Both armies presently retired
into winter-quarters, and the campaign ended far less disastrously than
might have been feared for the Allies.[96]
Unfortunately, however, it was not in Flanders only that discredit fell
upon the British arms. At the end of September a force of six
battalions[97] was sent, under command of General St. Clair, to the
coast of Brittany to attack Port L’Orient and destroy the stores of the
French East India Company there. ◆Sept. 20./Oct. 1.◆ The enterprise
was conducted with amazing feebleness. The troops landed at Ouimperle
Bay practically unopposed, but, being fired at on their march on the
following day, were turned loose to the plunder of a small town as a
punishment to the inhabitants for their resistance. On the following day
they reached L’Orient, which the Deputy Governor of the East India
Company offered to surrender on good terms. His overtures, however, were
rejected and a siege was begun in form; but, after a few days of firing
and the loss of about a hundred men killed and wounded, St. Clair
thought it prudent to retreat; and on the 12th of October the troops
re-embarked and returned to England. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ Anything more
pointless than the design or more contemptible than the execution of
this project can hardly be conceived, for it simply employed regiments
which were badly needed in Flanders and America, in useless operations
which did not amount to a diversion.
◆1747.◆
If the cause of Queen Maria Theresa was to be saved, it was evident
that great efforts were imperative in the coming campaign of 1747.
To meet the vast numbers brought into the field by the French the
Austrians promised to have sixty thousand men at Maseyck on the Meuse
by April; the British contributed four regiments of cavalry and
fourteen battalions of infantry; and it was hoped that the Allies would
take the field with a total strength of one hundred and ten battalions,
one hundred and sixty squadrons, and two hundred and twenty guns,
besides irregular troops, the whole to be under command of the Duke
of Cumberland.[98] Unfortunately the weather was adverse to an early
opening of the campaign; and the French, by the seizure of Cadsand
and Sluys, which were shamefully surrendered by the Dutch, closed the
southern mouth of the Scheldt below Antwerp. This was a sad blow to the
arrangements for the transport of the Allies, since it brought about
the necessity of hauling all the forage for the British overland from
Breda. Had Cumberland been in a position to open the campaign before
the French, he meant to have laid siege to Antwerp; as things were, he
was compelled, thanks chiefly to the apathy of the Dutch, to attempt
to bring Saxe to a general action. His last letter before beginning
operations has, however, an interest of another kind. It contained a
recommendation that Major James Wolfe might be permitted to purchase
a vacant lieutenant-colonelcy in the Eighth Foot, that officer having
served constantly and well during the past two years as a major of
brigade, and proved himself capable and desirous to do his duty.[99]