reason for the non-success of the Peking diplomacy was, that it was
not founded on fact. It assumed that the Government of China was
centralised instead of decentralised; that the administration of the
empire hinged on the initiative of Peking, from which distant point
the resident Ministers could protect their respective national
interests throughout the empire. This hypothesis, which might have
graced an academic debate, was acted upon as if it was a reality, and
the struggle to make it so has absorbed the resources of diplomacy for
forty years. The real fact, however, was quite otherwise. The
distinctive character of Chinese Government is not autocracy, but
democracy and provincial autonomy. The springs of action work from
below, not from above, and to reverse this order of the ages was to
convert a court of appeal into a court of first instance: to sue for a
tradesman's debt before the Lord Chancellor, requiring the legal
machinery to be first turned upside down. Diplomacy in China has thus
been a disheartening effort to drive in a wedge by its thick end
without adequate leverage. It is possible, indeed, that force might
have accomplished even as much as that, but force was the one thing
the use of which was proscribed.
The redress of grievances being sought not where it could have been
exacted, at the point affected, but in the capital, the Central
Government was called on to exercise over the provincial officials a
kind of control which had never been exercised before. The provincial
officials, relieved from the local pressure which they respected,
easily evaded the novel and unconstitutional interference of the
capital, and violated the treaties with an impunity unknown in the
days before the admission of the foreign Ministers to Peking. The
treaties, no doubt, had become the "law of the land" so far as a mere
barbarian phrase could make them so, but a full-grown tree of Western
legality could not so easily transplant itself to an alien and
refractory soil. The argument from legality appealed, therefore, to
the ear only. The practical conclusion to which Sir Frederick Bruce
was led is very simply stated in two paragraphs of his letters to
Prince Kung: "My object has been to seek redress through the Imperial
Government, and to do away with the necessity of seeking redress by
forcible demonstrations at the ports. But it is evident that the
reluctance of your Imperial Highness to enter frankly into this policy
renders my efforts ineffectual." "Either the Imperial Government is
unwilling to use its influence to cause the treaties to be fairly
carried out, or it has not the power to cause its orders to be
obeyed." Sir Frederick would have hit still nearer the mark if he had
omitted the "either," "or," and said simply the Imperial Government
was _both_ unwilling and unable.
Notwithstanding these definite views, the experiment of forcing a
centralisation which would have been a revolution on the
unintelligible Government of China had to be continued through many
weary years that were to follow, during which time the rights
conferred by treaty on foreigners fell more and more into abeyance.
The progress in that direction made in the two first years is thus
summarised by Mr H. N. Lay, the first Inspector-General of Customs, on
his return to China in 1863:--
When I left China the emperor's Government, under the
pressure of necessity, and with the beneficial terror
established by the Allied foray to Peking in 1860 fresh in
their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be
guided, grateful for help, and in return for that help
prepared to do what was right by the foreigner. What did I
find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed.
There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical
language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties....
In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had
been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the
position we occupied before the war,--one of helpless
remonstrance and impotent menace; ... the labour of years
lost through egregious mismanagement. The Foreign Board
looked upon our European representatives as so many _rois
fainéants_.... Prince Kung was no longer accessible.... He
professed to be engaged with more important matters.
FOOTNOTES:
[45] Peking and the Pekingese.
[46] Kunshan or Quinsan.
APPENDIX I.
NOTE ON OUR PRESENT POSITION AND THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS
WITH CHINA, BY CONSUL ALCOCK, JANUARY 19, 1849.
_Section I._
The lesson of the past is very legibly written in the history of our
relations,--oppression in the Chinese, increased by submission in the
English. Resistance of the latter followed by concession in the former
may be read in every stage, and the influence of the late war, beyond
the tangible effects embodied in the provisions of the treaties, has
been limited very much to outward forms: there is reason to suspect
that the policy of the Chinese has been masked, not changed.
The same arrogant and hostile spirit exists, and their policy is still
to degrade foreigners in the eyes of the people, and to offer every
obstacle which may _with safety_ be interposed to any extended
intercourse,--objects which they seek to carry out by various covert
and indirect means. In this sense the letter of the treaty is often
quoted, but any large interpretation can only be secured under a moral
compulsion, as the least objectionable alternative. This may not,
perhaps, be wholly owing to bad faith, for distrust and fear of
foreigners probably influences the result. Hence all the principal
advantages enjoyed under the treaty are only held by a species of
personal tenure of precarious character, and a consul at one of the
ports may lose more in a week than her Majesty's Government may find
it easy to recover with costly and embarrassing efforts in a year. Our
present relations consist in a never-ceasing struggle, under veiled
appearances of amity; and the treaty extorted by force is generally
sought to be eluded by cunning. They have no objection to the foreign
trade as one of the elements of their own prosperity, though they
much underrate its importance; but to make it wholly acceptable [to
them], the former humiliating conditions are wanting.
The whole effort of the Chinese rulers seems to be limited to
preserving peace as the first object, and, so far as may be compatible
with this, to assimilate our present to our ancient position as the
second.
From the general bearing of our relations in connection with the past
and the future, the nature and extent of the disadvantages under which
we labour may be easily deduced:--
1. Local insecurity to person and property at Canton.
2. Want of access to the first markets and of the means of
pushing and verifying the consumption of our manufactures
in the interior.
3. Ill-adjusted rates of duty on several important
articles.
4. Want of reciprocity and equality in our political
relations, and a certain inferiority in our position social
and political.
By the first we are menaced with perpetual danger of fatal collision
and interruption to our commerce, while our general position is at the
same time prejudiced. By the second we are deprived of any large
market for our goods, and pay dearer for native produce. By the third
the Straits, Indian, and the native carrying trade are all impeded in
their growth and dwarfed in their proportions; and by the fourth
insuperable difficulties in remedying abuses or amending our relations
are encountered, our only means of action being upon Canton and its
governor, acting as an imperial commissioner.
The full and rapid development of our commerce, a new and profitable
field for our manufactures, and a better guarantee for the maintenance
of our friendly relations, are the chief advantages to be sought in
the removal of these disabilities.
The practicability of maintaining our relations on their present
unsatisfactory footing in the south must be very doubtful, nor is
there much hope that any of the essential advantages above specified
may be gained incidentally in the natural progress of time, and still
less that the grounds of alarm should of themselves disappear. The
causes of all that is bad in our position spring from too deep a
source, and may be traced too far back, to admit of any such hope: a
rooted conviction in the minds of a whole population, derived from
traditional knowledge of the humiliating and derogatory position
voluntarily accepted by foreigners, cannot be effaced by a treaty, or
even a short successful war which passed over the city that was the
offending cause almost harmless. How far it may be possible to convert
popular contempt and dislike into respect and fear, we cannot judge
from experience: hitherto, in the steps taken to that end, either too
much or too little has been attempted.
There are practical difficulties of a peculiar and altogether local
character [it is obvious] to any immediate amelioration of our
position at Canton which do not exist elsewhere. Setting aside these
considerations, it will be found that all that is most valuable and
important in the advantages to be desired are of a nature to be
granted by the sole exercise of the emperor's will: greater freedom of
access, the modification of half-a-dozen items in the tariff, even the
exchange of envoys between the two Courts, if this were deemed
expedient, are all matters to be decided by a stroke of the vermilion
pencil. No hostile populations interpose a practical negative to
concessions such as these. The grounds upon which we may claim the
revisal of some of the provisions of existing treaties are derived
from the well-established conditions of all permanent relations of a
friendly and commercial character between sovereign States in the
civilised world.
We may claim of right a modification of the basis of our relations on
the injury resulting to our interests from the bad faith or
impuissance (it matters little which) of the Chinese Government in
giving execution to the treaties in force. We may insist upon
prejudicial limits being abolished, since they have plainly failed in
their ostensible object to secure freedom from molestation or injury
which was the condition of their acceptance.
If it be the traditional policy of the Tartar dynasty to keep
foreigners at the outer confines of the empire and in a degrading
position, it may with better justice be the policy of Great Britain to
obtain a direct action upon their centre, and freedom from idle and
vexatious restrictions. The right of a nation to interdict intercourse
and commerce, and therefore to determine upon what conditions it shall
exist, is but an imperfect right, and subject to such modifications as
the rights of other nations to the use of innocent objects of utility
dictate; and the refusal of a common right is an abuse of the
sovereign power, and an injury to be resisted.
China, however disposed its rulers may be to deny the fact, is one of
a community of nations with common rights and obligations, and any
claim to exemption from the recognised terms of national intercourse
is inadmissible in the interest of all other countries. To admit such
a right of exemption would be to allow the arrogated superiority in
power and civilisation, and to pamper the hostile conceit of her
people.
So long as the sovereign States of Europe will permit so obvious an
inference it cannot be matter of surprise, and scarcely subject of
reproach, to the Chinese, that they should be so ready to assert and
so pertinacious in acting upon it.
But even if exclusion from the territories, from all trade and
intercourse, were an absolute right in the first instance, the Chinese
have forfeited all claim to its exercise--first, by voluntarily
entering into relations political and commercial in ages past with
other States and people, by exchange of embassies, by opening their
ports and territories and encouraging trade; and secondly, by
aggressive wars and invasion of the territory of Europe by the Tartar
and Mongolian races who have ruled the country.
China preserves her undoubted right of self-preservation as a
political society and an empire, but this does not involve the
incidental right of interdicting intercourse, because her own history
shows that danger does not necessarily follow unlimited access, since
as late as the seventeenth century such free communication existed
with foreigners; and secondly, because the right of decision must be
shared by the interdicted party.
_Section II._
It is not enough, however, to determine the abstract principles upon
which a policy may be founded--that which is just may not always be
most expedient, and if both the one and the other, it may not be
practicable.
The chief difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to place our
relations on an improved basis may be traced to three principal
sources:--
The Canton popular traditions and hostility.
The treaties in force.
The contraband trade in opium.
The characteristic features of our position at Canton and their origin
are too well known to require illustration. To our political relations
before the war, and the humble and in every way derogatory attitude
assumed towards the Chinese, is clearly to be traced their present
insolence, assumed superiority, and hostility on finding it
questioned.
The principle of narrow boundaries and restricted limits confirmed by
the Treaty of Nanking virtually sanctioned the tradition of the past,
which no mere verbal assertion of equality thus practically
contradicted can modify. The repudiation of this principle and the
establishment of a different footing seem to be essential to our
political equality, which would form the best foundation of an
improved social and commercial position, most especially in the south.
Were our chief political relations with the Chinese Government not
centred at Canton, it is very evident that that port would lose much
of the importance which now attaches to the sayings and doings of its
turbulent mob and impracticable authorities. Were the centre of our
political action anywhere else, the local difficulties, troublesome as
they are, must soon merge into comparative insignificance, and such a
measure as this would seem an easier task to accomplish than to change
the habits and the prejudices of a whole population.
If we turn from Canton and its unsatisfactory history of oriental
insolence and presumption on the one side, and undue submission to
their exigencies on the other, and consider the exemption from all
such characteristics at Shanghai, the respective influences of the
treaties and of local circumstances may be deduced by a comparison of
the two chief ports.
The various concurring circumstances terminating in the Tsingpu
outrage, which threatened to approximate the position of the British
at Shanghai to that occupied at Canton, have been detailed in the
correspondence of the period. The position was seriously affected by
the comparative immunity of whole villages participating in the
murders at Canton in the previous year, by the atrocious features of
the crime itself, and by the assumed necessity of the consul's
inaction pending a reference to her Majesty's plenipotentiary,
occupying several weeks.
Prompt redress was imperiously demanded by the interests at stake and
the sinister aspect of affairs, and to enforce this coercive means
were employed, leaving nothing to be desired.
The most important of the results obtained was the demonstration of a
power to shift the centre of action from a port where no progress
could be made to a vulnerable point nearer to Peking where immediate
attention could be commanded, and this was supplied by the mission to
Nanking.
From these two circumstances--the serious deterioration of our
position, and the prompt and efficacious remedy provided--an important
conclusion may be drawn as to our means of effecting any required
change in our relations.
In an empire vast in area as China, with an overflowing population, it
is no slight advantage to be enabled, without a single battle, to
invest and vigorously blockade the capital; and this it is in our
power to effect by a small squadron at the mouth of the Grand Canal in
the early spring, when Peking is dependent for its supplies for the
year on the arrival of the grain and tribute junks by that channel. A
more effective means of coercion this than the destruction of twenty
cities on the confines of the Chinese territory or on the coast. With
a starving Court and population around him, flight or concession
appears to be the emperor's only alternatives.
The facility and the certainty with which this object may be attained
are important considerations. The insurmountable obstacles to the
advance of a European army into the interior are rendered nugatory and
altogether unimportant by the knowledge of this highroad to the heart
of the empire.
The maintenance of our present relations is probably in no slight
degree due to the secret consciousness of their weakness at this
point.
In any future policy that may be adopted, therefore, these facts and
views are calculated to supersede the necessity for active
hostilities, and must tend to avert from a peaceful and industrious
population all the worst calamities of war, at the same time that they
free her Majesty's Government from the embarrassment of a costly and
protracted war _in prospectu_.
A simple and ready resource for commanding attention to any just
demands is indeed invaluable in China, and without it there is every
reason to believe the Chinese rulers would still be the most
impracticable of Orientals. With such a power, no insuperable
obstacles exist to the satisfactory solution of difficulties without
either costly effort or interruption to the trade of the five ports;
and it was the long-matured conviction of our powerful action, by
means of a command over the necessary supplies for Peking, that
dictated the course followed in the Tsingpu affair.
The Chinese view of the opium trade and our agency in it forms perhaps
the chief obstacle to our taking that high ground with the rulers, and
good position with the people, which the extension of our commercial
interests demands. Let us look, then, to this opium traffic and the
influence it actually exercises upon our position in China.
It is no question here whether opium should be classed in the category
of medicines, stimuli, or fatal poisons; the Chinese have decided that
for themselves, and regard it only as a poison, and the British as the
great producers, carriers, and sellers of the drug, to our own great
profit and their undoubted impoverishment and ruin. Nor does their
conviction end here: they believe to maintain this traffic we made war
and dictated a humiliating peace, and that we are prepared to do so
again, if they ventured on any interference to its prejudice.
These opinions may be false or true in their foundation, that is not
the question, but, What is the influence they are calculated to
exercise? Hostility and distrust can alone be traced to this source.
No other feelings flow from it, and the consequences will meet us at
every turn of our negotiations, in our daily intercourse, and every
changing phase of our relations. As it overshadows with a sinister
influence the whole field of our political action, so must it be
seriously taken into account and calculated upon as an adverse element
in all we attempt in China.
Accepted as _un fait accompli_, the best means of neutralising and
counteracting its bad effects are alone to be considered, since the
enormous capital, large revenue, and inseparable connection of our
legitimate trade with opium, as a means of laying down funds in China,
involved in the traffic, precludes all idea of its cessation or
removal.
The effective protection lent to the chief opium-dealers, in their
capacity of British merchants, resident at the ports under the
provisions of the treaty, and the manifest inability of the Chinese
either to bring the legal proof we should require against these
principals, or of attacking by force their agents in the glaring
infraction of the Chinese laws, at the opium stations, no doubt flings
an air of insincerity over all our protestations of non-intervention,
while there is mockery in the invitation to assail large fleets of
heavily-armed European vessels. Even if the Chinese for a single
moment believed in the honesty of our declarations, they know the
utter futility of any means of attack they possess against such
superior force as the opium fleets present. This is the view taken by
the Chinese, who, though they do not confess their own weakness, do
not disguise or deny it to themselves.
The obstacles which these opinions create and fling in our path
whenever advantages are sought at the hands of the Chinese in
furtherance of our national interests are to be overcome before any
progress can be made. There are three modes of dealing with them:--
1. By arguments to prove the fallacy of their assumption that we were
either the original cause of this traffic, or have now the power to
put an end to it, or finally, that it is an unmixed evil.
2. By a modification in the demands we should, without this
consideration, be entitled to insist upon.
3. By a mixture of kindness and decision, of instruction and
intimidation, and, in last resort, by coercion for the attainment of
all just and necessary concessions.
And as we should naturally begin with the first, and may eventually
find ourselves compelled to resort to the last, so no doubt it will be
expedient many times to combine all the different methods of
overcoming the active or inert resistance we encounter in the Chinese
rulers.
As to any remedy to be applied to the evils of the opium trade, there
seems to be none open to either Government but its legalisation, which
would strip it of its contraband character, and remove from the
emperor the open reproach to his authority, while it might be made to
yield a large revenue to his treasury.
If on a question of national policy or morality, this measure, as the
lesser of two evils, is declined, there seems to be no help for the
mischief which must accrue to us from being the chief agents in the
traffic. But it is useless to disguise from ourselves the injurious
influence it will unfailingly exercise upon our political action, when
any rights on our part are weighed, and it is this which may entail
the necessity of our flinging the weight of the sword into the
opposite scale--sheathed it may be, but not the less significant and
compulsory in its effect.
The opium grief and the Canton hostility thus work together and
dovetail into each other to our manifest prejudice, that port
continuing to enjoy its old privilege of being the great exponent and
centre of both. There we meet in their least veiled form the national
adverseness to foreigners concentrated and localised--the conviction
of injury and loss at our hands from opium, heightened into asperity
and bitterness by the arrogance of their tempers and the consciousness
of their weakness.
In no other port does it seem likely the same overt expression and
concentration of adverse feelings will ever be experienced. It would
appear the more important, therefore, to modify the virulent form they
assume at Canton, and remove the bad precedent and example incessantly
furnished by the Cantonese.
The entrance into the city is obviously a question of principle, not
of any _direct_ practical advantage in a _commercial_ sense. The
freedom from annoyance, and security to property, are more truly so,
and of these two the latter, by far the most essential and important
to our interests, seems only to require more storage room for goods,
away from a dense Chinese suburb which renders insurance from risk of
fire impossible, and entails upon our merchants all the additional
danger of fraud in the Chinese warehouse-keepers, who are of necessity
the custodians of our goods.
We cannot hope that any effort of ours or of the emperor will suffice
to change at once the character and habits of a people, or even of the
population of a city. But the last war has shown that with us it rests
to bring at any time the pretensions of the Chinese rulers down to a
nearer level with their military power; and if they cannot from
inherent weakness do all that may be desirable, neither are they in a
position to refuse any concession, clearly at their option to grant,
and such are these which it would seem most important to Great Britain
to secure: the nature of our demands and the circumstances under which
they shall be preferred are considerations of policy and expediency.
But the real question, and by far the most important, it will be
obvious, is rather what it may be wise to demand, than what it may be
possible to obtain. The danger of collision between the rival
civilisations of the East and West has long been foreseen,
instinctively felt by the Chinese, and more clearly discerned by
Europeans in the result of the late war; and the larger commercial
interests growing up under, and in spite of, the present system of
restrictions, has only tended, by partially extending the points of
contact without placing our relations on a plain basis of reciprocity
and equality, to increase the chances. It can only be hoped that the
gradual introduction of European arts and ideas and their
fructification may in some degree fuse and harmonise the discordant
elements before the course of events which otherwise tend to
precipitate a violent and disastrous collision are beyond our control.
To such a peaceful and beneficial termination of the difficulties
which unavoidably beset our relations with China, the efforts of all
Western Powers should in the common interest be directed.
These considerations must act as the most powerful checks to any
initiative measures of a large and comprehensive character for the
improvement of our position and the more rapid development of our
commerce.
In this point of view the two greatest obstacles to any advance are
the large commercial interests and national revenue at stake, and the
danger of being followed by the envoys of other foreign Powers who,
having no such great interests to jeopardise, are without this
beneficial and most needful check, and may therefore be induced to
repeat at a semi-barbarian Court the intrigues and counter-projects
for the destruction of our influence and the injury of our trade in
the East which are at work in our own times in every capital in
Europe, as formerly in India and the Eastern Archipelago.
Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, with their
several jealousies and united rivalry with England, their missionary
enterprises or commercial and political schemes clashing in their aim
and development, are all capable of creating such turmoil, strife, and
disturbance throughout the empire, if free access to the Court and the
provinces were insisted upon by Great Britain, as could only end in
the ejection of Europeans from China as formerly from Japan, or an
intestine war in which European power would probably be involved on
opposite sides, and to their mutual destruction as States with
commercial interests in the country. These, again, might lead to
attempts at territorial possession, suggested in the first instance,
as in India, in self-defence, and afterwards continued from
necessity. With Russia spreading her gigantic arms to the north and
east, Great Britain on the south and west, Spain, Holland, and
Portugal with their colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a
struggle for superiority on the soil of China for exclusive advantages
or predominant influence might be centred in Peking and embroil the
whole of Europe in hostile relations. The same objection applies to
all efforts to enlarge our intercourse and remove limitations, and has
ever prevailed. It was recognised as an objection to the last war. The
course of events urged on by the opium trade left but little
alternative at the last, or there can be no doubt, with the additional
fear of the uncertain result of a struggle with a vast empire like
China, the resources of which were so imperfectly known, the British
Government would have been deterred from any onward step, as these
motives did in effect prevent any hostile aggression, so long as it
was possible to avoid it, without the sacrifice of our trade.
The war over, it again prevailed, and we are once more in a position
to accept as final the increased but limited advantages resulting, or
to try for more, and by our policy to avert or provoke disturbing
causes which must lead to change. The moderation which marked, and the
policy which dictated, our treaties carried us back to the old ground
of a nation trading by sufferance, under limitations and restrictions
which kept us at the boundaries of the empire, and with us the rest of
the Western world, the only difference being enlarged facilities and
better guarantees for the pursuit of trade on the coast-line, and
within the restricted limits of the five ports selected. It is now for
the British Government to determine whether we should rest content
with the revenue derived from an import of some 60 million lb. of tea
and the export from India of 40,000 chests of opium, netting together
some 7 millions sterling to the British and Indian Government,
together with the incidental advantage of the raw produce of silk,
promising to render us independent of Europe and the adjoining markets
for the supply of this staple of an important branch of our
manufactures at a cheaper rate, and the market for Indian cotton, the
circumstances which lend to China nearly all its importance; or take
measures, not free from danger and difficulty, of great prospective
magnitude, both in a political and commercial sense, to make China a
great market for our manufactures also. At present the Chinese take
considerably less than 2 millions sterling in annual value out of an
aggregate production of some 70 millions. In this respect they are of
less importance to us as customers than the West India colonies, the
Italian States and islands, or one of the larger European States, so
small a fraction do they absorb. The prospect that would urge us on
should be the hope of seeing China take of our manufactures as large a
share as all Europe, and instead of a couple of millions, create a
demand for more than twenty. The produce of tea and silk we have, the
market for opium and Indian cotton is ours. We want an equally large
and beneficial market for our manufactures--our cotton fabrics,
woollens, linen, and cutlery, for which our powers of production are
all but unlimited.
Two questions suggest themselves, therefore, on the solution of which
the decision should depend, it being assumed as unquestioned that
something of risk and danger to that which we have must attend all
effective efforts to win that which is as yet wanting.
To the first four great commercial objects involved in our relations
with China, as above specified, shall we sacrifice the fifth?
Or shall we peril all for the attainment of the fifth, by the
endeavour to create a market for our manufactures which at present
exists only in its rudiments, and to a small fractional value?
If the extreme exiguity of the market for manufactures be not held to
justify the voluntary incurrence of great risk or danger to our tea,
silk, opium, and raw cotton trade, which form the great bulk of our
commerce as it exists at the present day, British and Indian, it will
only remain to be determined what are the various secondary means at
our disposal for the improvement of this fifth or manufacturing branch
as the primary object, and their respective chances of success on the
one hand and dangers attending their adoption on the other. For the
dangers, it must be well understood, are of two kinds--those attending
failure, and those which may be consequent upon, and the ulterior
results of, success in the first instance.
It being borne in mind that whatever we ask and obtain will be claimed
and enjoyed by others, it is necessary to consider to what use they
are liable to be turned by foreign Powers over whom we can exercise no
control, and whose interests or national jealousies may clearly be
adverse to our position in China and the advancement of our commerce.
To these various heads of a subject in every point of view great and
important, and surrounded by doubts and difficulties of the most
embarrassing character, the best information that can be brought by
any one individual is insufficient for a perfectly satisfactory
solution of the questions which must be discussed. All that can be
attempted is to throw some additional light upon the general bearing
of the whole, and to contribute such data and practical inferences,
illustrative of our present position and its future prospects, as may
help to suggest a safe conclusion as circumstances develop new phases
in our relations and call for action.
_Section III._
Assuming the present basis of our relations to continue, the best
course to be pursued in actual circumstances, more especially for the
maintenance of our advantageous position in the north, is worthy of
consideration. The instructions lately received from her Majesty's
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are of a nature to suggest
inquiry under the three heads to which they refer:--
1. Recourse to the authorities by British subjects in danger of
popular violence.
2. Reference in all cases to her Majesty's plenipotentiary for
instructions.
3. The verification of the punishment awarded to Chinese offenders.
In reference to the instructions under the first of these heads, it is
to be observed that even with such unusual facilities as some of the
older missionaries possess who speak the dialect, and are often
familiar with the localities they visit, the resource indicated cannot
be counted upon as available.
In the Tsingpu affair, as soon as they actually became sensible of
danger, it was clearly impossible, nor in one case in a hundred is it
probable, that such a resource will be in their power.
In these cases the authorities keep out of the way, they and all their
ragged staff of runners and police; and if otherwise, moved by a fear
of worse consequences from the acts of the nearest British authority,
the means they take to rescue a maltreated foreigner are miserably
ineffective and uncertain in their results. Whoever will read the
details of the species of rescue effected in the Tsingpu business will
see that it was by the merest chance the three Englishmen had not
their brains beaten out, either before the arrival of the disguised
runners or while they were waiting an opportunity of stepping in to
render the unfortunate sufferers any service.
It must be clear, therefore, that access to the authorities in
emergencies of this nature must always be difficult and generally
impracticable for a foreigner. Retreat to a boat or other place of
safety is as little likely to be attainable.
A salutary dread of the immediate consequences of violence offered to
British subjects, the certainty of its creating greater trouble and
danger to the native authorities personally than even the most
vigorous efforts to protect the foreigner and seize their assailants
will entail, seems to be the best and only protection in this country
for Englishmen. When the Chinese authorities of all ranks, from the
viceroy at Nanking to the lowest police runners, are thoroughly imbued
with this feeling, it will not only rouse them to greater energy but
find its way to the populace by certain steps, and render such
exertion unnecessary, and the nationality of an Englishman will become
his safeguard. Hence the impolicy, not to say impossibility, of
treating instances of personal outrage such as that of Tsingpu as
police cases, and leaving redress to the ordinary administration of
Chinese laws. Where justice exists only nominally, and her image
should be represented not only blind but deaf, deplorable consequences
would result from such a course. There seems to be a democratic spirit
among the Chinese which renders the authorities especially averse to
risk collision with the populace or any popular feeling. The
Chih-hsien is himself exposed to insult and violence if he attempt to
enforce the collection of the taxes in a bad season, and but lately he
was besieged here in his own _yamên_. Not ten days ago the Taotai paid
1600 taels of silver to secure a piece of building-ground at the
urgent demand of the French consul, rather than exert his authority to
compel the owners to take the fair value of $400 offered, and upon the
posts put up to mark the boundaries these parties did not hesitate to
prohibit its appropriation. The principal check upon the people, and
safeguard for the authorities in cases of popular disturbance, seems
to be the conviction under which every Chinese quails, of the
terrible vengeance that may pursue them and their families, the tumult
once over, if they should have been marked or recognised. In
proportion as the magistrate is helpless before numbers, is his power
large of wreaking summary and vengeful punishment upon each of the
individuals that may form the mob, once separated from each other.
Considerations such as these necessarily influence her Majesty's
consul on the spot, who each day has under his eyes these significant
details, national and administrative. Where danger threatens to
involve the persons or the property of British subjects, his sole
direct resource is to fall back upon the treaty, and to cover with the
ægis of national inviolability individual interests. By any other
course he falls inevitably into the hopeless condition of one waiting
for such redress as the common course of justice in China usually
affords, where everything assuming its form is venal and arbitrary.
The result of all efforts made to secure the apprehension of thieves
or the recovery of property stolen from foreigners is conclusive as to
the kind of security to be obtained for British subjects where
infractions are dealt with as affairs of police in which justice is to
take its ordinary course. In scarcely one instance has any redress
been obtained since the port was opened. If thieves are overtaken, it
is only that they may disgorge their booty for the benefit of the
police sent after them, and the larger the amount the less chance is
there of either apprehension or restitution. Witness Mr Hubertson's
robbery, where his servant went off with nearly $10,000 in gold and
silver, and he was promptly traced and pursued.
Then in reference to the standing orders that, in case of difficulty
arising, reference shall invariably be made to her Majesty's
plenipotentiary for instructions. Instances have been very numerous
showing the nullity of any means of action on the local authorities
here through the Imperial Commissioner at Canton, not only in these
matters, but in those treated on higher grounds, and affecting our
political position. Last year (1847) not only a list of cases where no
satisfactory exertion had been made to obtain redress for property
stolen was forwarded, but the consul urged upon Sir John Davis, her
Majesty's plenipotentiary at the time, the urgent necessity for the
removal of the then acting magistrate at Shanghai, who had openly
reviled a consulate servant for taking the service of the barbarians,
and dismissed him without redress. The only answer to be obtained from
his Excellency Kiying was to the effect that the Chih-hsien, as a
territorial officer, was not under his jurisdiction. Fortunately he
was removed very shortly for misconduct in the management of Chinese
affairs,--for however injurious his proceedings to the British, it was
obvious neither redress nor assistance was to be obtained from Canton
and the Imperial Commissioner.
The paramount necessity of protecting its subjects in distant
countries is of course well understood by her Majesty's Government,
and in an oriental State this can only be effected by letting it be
known and felt that whoever attacks one of the solitary subjects will
be held to have attacked the sovereign and the nation. By this policy
a firman, far more potent than the Grand Seignior's in his own
territory, is given to every Englishman abroad, ensuring his freedom
from injury all over the world.
The treaty viewed in this light becomes a real and efficient bulwark
against encroachments, and without such safeguard, with Chinese
management, it would at no distant period in all its most important
provisions become null and void. No doubt inconvenience results from
the necessity of treating casualties of collision between subjects of
different countries as infractions of a solemn treaty; but the
oriental, and in some respects very peculiar, character of the
Chinese, and our relations with them, must be borne in mind, and the
lesser of two evils chosen with such discretion and judgment as the
circumstances imperatively demand.
At a distant and isolated port like Shanghai, where a brig of war is
by no means permanently stationed, the consul is left to his own
resources, separated by an interval of many weeks from the assistance
of her Majesty's plenipotentiary. When difficulties and emergencies
supervene, it is only by prompt demands for redress, and firm
resistance to any virtual negation of the rights and privileges
guaranteed by treaty, that he can hope successfully to defend the very
important interests confided to his charge.
As regards the practicability and expediency of verifying the
punishments of any Chinese offender by the presence of a British
officer when a sentence is carried into execution, the instruction
received could only have been partially applicable to the Tsingpu
offenders had it been earlier received, for the most serious
punishment was banishment to a penal settlement in Tartary.
But the whole subject is one of peculiar difficulty, nor can any hope
be entertained of submitting in this place a satisfactory solution. It
has long been felt that of all the provisions of the two treaties,
that which provided for the due administration of the laws on Chinese
offenders was the most nugatory. The chief difficulty consists in a
British officer being present at all during a trial in a Chinese
court, assuming the right were to be granted by treaty. Where the
ordinary mode of questioning is by torture, a process utterly
repugnant to our notions of justice and our sense of what is due to
humanity and truth, are we by our presence to sanction and be made
parties to such proceedings? Or are we to interfere and insist upon
justice being administered not according to their usages, but ours?
The objection to both courses seems equally valid, and yet without the
presence of an efficient officer there is no guarantee whatever for
the due administration of justice.
As regards the presence of an officer at punishments, unless he is in
a position to identify the criminal, which must often from the
circumstances of the case be impossible, it may be questioned whether
our national character is not in danger of being compromised without
the real object of such risk being attained. Nothing could more
effectually tend to lower us in the opinion of the Chinese than to be
imposed upon by the jugglery of a substituted criminal, or the
punishment of an innocent man at our instigation, or even the illegal
and excessive punishment of a real offender. Yet to all these we are
exposed when we take upon ourselves to watch the course of justice and
verify the execution of the sentences. It may finally be observed that
there are punishments recognised in the Chinese code revolting for
their brutality, which an English officer could scarcely sanction with
his presence without discredit to our national feeling. A lesser
objection exists in the frequency of minor punishments for theft and
petty misdemeanours, so that an interpreter would be required for this
duty alone.
These are some of the practical difficulties to the effective exercise
of any check upon the proceedings of the Chinese authorities in
criminal informations against Chinese subjects, and to devise a remedy
may require more consideration than has probably yet been given to the
subject.
From this review of our actual position at the most favourably
situated of the northern ports, and the means by which it has been
preserved from deterioration, and in many essential points materially
improved, a correct inference may be drawn of the injurious
consequences of any retrograde influence from Canton, direct or
indirect.
APPENDIX II.
CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH BY CONSUL ALCOCK TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, JANUARY
13, 1852.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's
confidential despatch of the 17th ultimo, and although the departure
of the Audax within three days of its receipt leaves me but little
time for consideration or inquiry, I have devoted so much time and
thought to the subject during the last five years that I venture to
reply without delay.
On the general scope of coercive measures adapted to ensure success in
any negotiations with the Chinese Government, and more especially on
the blockade of the Grand Canal as a very cogent means, I have already
in my confidential report of January 19, 1849, and subsequently in
another of February 13, 1850, submitted the opinion I had formed after
long and careful study of our position in China; and further inquiries
and experience of the people we have to deal with have only served to
confirm the views contained in those reports.
I took the responsibility of sending Mr Vice-Consul Robertson with the
Espiègle to Nanking in the spring of 1848 with the strong conviction
that at that particular season, with the tribute of grain uncollected
and a thousand of these grain-junks actually under an embargo at
Shanghai, any demonstration of force in the neighbourhood of the Grand
Canal _would command immediate attention_, and the result went far to
establish the accuracy of the conclusion. Circumstances since then
have, however, altered both in a favourable and an adverse sense.
Taokuang, with his humiliating experience of the superiority of our
arms and his known and acknowledged desire to avoid any further
collision during his reign, is no longer on the throne; and his young
successor, untaught by the experience of his father, has given very
unequivocal signs of disposition to enter upon a different policy. On
the other hand, a protracted and serious insurrection in the southern
provinces has drained his treasury, weakened his authority, and now
threatens, unless he finds means by force or bribery to put the
insurgents down, at no distant period to affect the stability of his
throne. If the arrogance of youth in the new sovereign should
therefore dispose him on the one side to venture on a crusade against
Western Powers, his perilous position in regard to his own provinces
cannot fail to impress upon him the prudence of at least temporising
until a more convenient season. I am led to think, therefore, from all
I can learn, that the two contrary forces will go far to neutralise
each other, and that Hsienfêng, with all his hostile feeling, will be
at the _present moment_ as accessible to reason, from the peculiarly
embarrassing position in which he is placed, if backed by coercive
means, as was his predecessor at the conclusion of the war.
From this your Excellency will perceive that I deem the present time,
from the political condition of China, more favourable than any later
period may be for the success of coercive measures. As regards the
season of the year to be selected, both in reference to the navigation
of the Yangtze-kiang and the transmission of the grain tribute, the
blockading should not be commenced later than April. During the summer
the sun melts the snow on the mountains and sends down the freshets,
swelling the river until it overflows its banks with great accession
of violence to the current. When the fleet sailed up in July 1842 many
of the soundings taken were over paddy-fields, and altogether out of
the bed of the river, as the soundings and observations of the
Espiègle clearly demonstrated. The tribute also begins to be sent up
to Peking from some parts as early as April. A fleet of grain-junks
were at the mouth of the canal when the Espiègle made her appearance
at the end of March in 1848.
How far a blockade at the present time would have the desired
effect--that is, if made effective before the month of May--is a
question upon which I cannot feel any doubt. Much would of course
depend upon the suddenness of the descent, and therefore upon the
previous secrecy observed; much upon the available nature of the force
employed. Besides two or three large-class vessels, I am strongly
persuaded there should be at least two small steamers of light draught
of water, and one or two brigs, which would be quite as effective
against any force the Chinese could bring to bear, and far more
manageable and serviceable, as well as less costly, than larger
vessels. If the result aimed at were not very promptly attained, it
might be necessary to retake Chinkiang-fu as a base of operations, and
to detach two or three small-class vessels to watch the entrances of
water-courses and canals nearer the mouth of the Yangtze-kiang, of
which there are at least four, and through them junks with tribute
might otherwise pass to the north and into the Grand Canal at some
point above the Yangtze-kiang, and between it and the Yellow river.
There is also a very free communication with all the lowland districts
south of the Yangtze-kiang and the north above Nanking by means of the
_Seu ho_, which runs from Soochow west into the Yangtze-kiang at _Wu
Hu_ and _Taiping_. But from this point northward there does not appear
to be any good water communication leading to the Grand Canal without
descending the Yangtze-kiang as far as _Iching_ and _Kwachow_ on the
two mouths of the Grand Canal at its junction with the Yangtze-kiang
below Nanking. These secured would therefore stop the main traffic by
the _Seu ho_ route to the north for the relief of Peking. My own
impression is that if no warning were given, nor time allowed for
previous preparation, our demands would be granted within one month of
the commencement of the blockade. If from any unforeseen cause,
however, the negotiations were protracted, and the Chinese Government
had leisure to recover from its panic and adopt plans for obtaining
tribute and grain by circuitous routes, it would be in that case that
Chinkiang-fu might be required, together with a good watch on the
various tributaries of the Yangtze-kiang below and eastward of Nanking
already referred to; and perhaps on the coast towards the Yellow river
and the Peiho two or three cruisers might be required to intercept
junks _sent by sea_ with tribute. Such in effect is the intention of
the Chinese Government at the present moment, without any reference
to us. The grain to be collected from the eight provinces, divided
into upper and lower, consists of the common grain and of white rice,
the latter for the consumption of the emperor and his Court, which it
is intended shall be sent this season by sea from _Shanghai_,--a
circumstance peculiarly favourable to the success of any blockading
measures, since, as it would be necessary under any contingencies to
cover Shanghai and our large interests there with an effective force,
the same means would enable her Majesty's Government to lay an embargo
on a large and especially important portion of the tribute already
collected in the port. I do not imagine it would be contemplated to
abandon Shanghai, and I am far from thinking it would be either
necessary or expedient--though at Ningpo, Foochow, and perhaps Amoy,
it might be considered well--to withdraw the few foreigners for a
time. At Canton, no doubt, it would be imperative either to give
adequate protection or to abandon the place. On this point I am
scarcely called upon to offer an opinion. It probably does not enter
into any plans contemplated to strike a blow at Canton, or to adopt
any measure necessarily entailing bloodshed and heavy loss: were it
otherwise, no doubt the fall of Canton and the humiliation of the
Cantonese would in itself go far to read a salutary lesson throughout
the empire, and especially at Peking, where there is reason to believe
they look upon Canton and the Cantonese as affording the great barrier
to our progress, from our inability to make any impression either upon
the city or the people.
I do not, of course, presume to offer these suggestions on the general
measures which might be found needful for the protection of British
interests along the coast, and the distribution and economising of our
forces while a blockade on the Yangtze-kiang was being effected, as
better informed than your Excellency on such points, but merely refer
to them incidentally as necessary parts of any plan for demanding
redress by coercive measures at the mouth of the Grand Canal.
For the better illustration of the points touched upon in this
despatch in reference to the different points of access to the Grand
Canal, either coastwise or by the Yangtze-kiang below Nanking and the
two mouths of the canal, which will have to be borne in mind, I beg to
enclose a very rough and hasty plan of the main channels, taken
chiefly from the elaborate map of the empire published under the
Jesuits, and which Mr Medhurst, when my last confidential report was
in hand, was good enough at my suggestion to work at on an enlarged
scale, availing himself of all the additional information, by
comparison of maps, itineraries, &c., that was accessible.
I shall be glad if in this somewhat hasty reply to your Excellency's
despatch I have been able to afford such information as you have
desired; but if not, or upon any other points it should appear that
further inquiries can be prosecuted advantageously and without
creating suspicion, I shall be happy to give my best efforts to carry
out your Excellency's instructions.
APPENDIX III.
CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, DATED JUNE 17, 1852.
(EXTRACT.)
If I might without presumption express an opinion on our general
policy in China, I should add that it seems in danger of being
paralysed by the two antagonistic forces [alluded to in the preamble],
and by necessities difficult to reconcile. The magnitude and extreme
importance of our interests in the East--in commerce and revenue (for,
as I have shown, the China trade is the connecting-link between Great
Britain and India, and necessary to complete the circle of trading
operations)--suggest on the one hand the necessity of avoiding all
measures that may rashly jeopardise such interests, yet nevertheless
make it imperative on the other to adopt firmly and unhesitatingly
whatever steps may be necessary to prevent loss or deterioration. How
these can best be reconciled is the problem to be solved. As late as
the last war, throughout all our previous intercourse the attempt had
been made to arrive at the solution by a system of temporising and
concession, even to that which was unjust and injurious, and this
steadily carried out, with a few rare and brief exceptions. Our policy
since the treaty has manifested a tendency to an opposite course,
encouraged no doubt by the result of the first determined stand made.
It has, nevertheless, been so hesitatingly developed that we appear
to halt between the two. In words we have asserted resistance to
insult or wrongful treatment, but in acts we have not seldom
temporised and submitted. The fruit of this policy we now are
beginning to reap. Principles of action have sometimes been asserted
and then abandoned, instead of being persisted in until the end was
accomplished. In dealing with the Chinese, however, nothing appears to
be so necessary as to keep the ground once assumed. If this be true,
there cannot be too much caution used in first asserting or contending
for a right; but that step once taken, there is no safe halting-place
between it and full success. A course of alternate opposition and
submission cannot do otherwise than end in defeat; and defeat in this
country is never limited to its immediate consequences. It has
appeared, on looking back through the ten years which have now elapsed
since the termination of the war, that the first half of the period
was passed in comparative security under the strong influence its
events were calculated to exercise on the Chinese mind; but, true to
their invariable policy, they have never ceased to seek by every means
in their power to make the British authorities develop under what
instructions they were acting and to penetrate into their true spirit,
in order to ascertain the limits to which our sufferance would extend
and the nature of the powers of resistance or retaliation her
Majesty's Government were ready to authorise. I think it cannot be
matter of doubt to any one resident in China throughout this period,
that during the latter portion the Chinese have felt assured of the
essentially pacific determination of our Government and the policy of
endurance and sufferance in all cases of minor wrongs. And, assured
under such a system (with the known impossibility of any direct action
in Peking), they have, during the last two years more especially, felt
emboldened, systematically, by a series of apparently small
encroachments and aggressions, to undermine our position, and to
restore, as nearly as may be, the state of things existing before the
war, extending the system to all the ports.
With this conviction I have thought it desirable to bring before her
Majesty's plenipotentiary in detail many illustrations of the
deteriorating influences at work at this port, and now venture to pass
these rapidly in review, that their collective evidence may not be
wanting. And in order that I may be brief, I shall merely note in the
margin the number and dates of various despatches bearing upon similar
matters, without further reference to their contents. By these I think
it will be seen that the general current and tendency of all the
official acts for the last two years upon which I have frequently
commented as they occurred has been distrust, and strongly adverse
alike to our trade and the stability of our position.
Evidence, I think, will be found in these records to establish the
fact that the present Taotai Wu (or Samqua, as he is more familiarly
known, of Canton trading memory) has been especially selected as the
chief agent to initiate, and the fit instrument for carrying out, a
retrograde policy: his character, means, and the general direction of
his efforts to damage our local position, territorial and social--to
cripple and restrict our trade, and to Cantonise the whole of our
relations both with people and authorities in the north--are all in
keeping with this mission, and incomprehensible on any other
supposition.
The steps of his progress have been carefully watched, and in the
despatches noted in the margin traced, together with their
effects--neither very apparent on the surface. These may perhaps best
be considered by aid of a somewhat arbitrary division as to subjects
rather than chronologically, for they have generally run on
conterminous and parallel lines. Starting from the Tsingpu affair, in
the spring of 1848, and his baffled efforts to pluck from us the best
fruit of the risks incurred to vindicate an important principle, from
which date he hung about the place--in the background it is true, but
not the less busy as a spy from Nanking, between which place and
Shanghai, occasionally acting Taotai, at others absent, he oscillated
until the fit time appeared to have arrived. After the accession of
the new emperor, Lin was displaced from the Taotai office, and he was
finally installed by "imperial appointment" to put his hand to the
work before him. His steps may be traced in the sinister influences
and obstruction brought to bear upon all our interests.
The _land tenure and regulations_ under which a foreign colony had
rapidly risen covering more than a hundred acres of land, as an
element of strength and independence to the British more especially,
seems to have excited both the jealousy and the fears of the Chinese
authorities. There seemed no limit to its progress and development;
each year saw more and more land occupied, while houses of a large
and costly description rapidly filled up the vacant spaces.
Before Wu came _ostensibly_ upon the scene some progress had been made
in the creation of difficulties, and the authorities having in the
spring of 1849 granted a large and absurdly disproportionate tract to
the French, over which the French consul claimed a territorial
jurisdiction, the national susceptibilities of the Americans gave the
opportunity of bringing French and Americans, and the latter and the
English, into collision, and they were not slow to profit by it to set
the land regulations practically aside while officially appearing to
uphold them.
The desire of the community to carry out an extravagant and not very
practicable scheme for a new park or exercise-course that should
enclose nearly the whole arable ground and villages within our limits
afforded the next opportunity, and the arrogant humour and
superstitions of the Fukein clans supplied the ready instruments for
inflicting a second blow upon the rights and security of the foreigner
at Shanghai connected with the occupation of land.
These attacks and aggressions have since been perseveringly followed
up--popular commotions, abusive and menacing placards, having all been
used in turns to the damage of our position, and the result has been
discredit, broken regulations, divided and antagonistic pretensions
between the two most numerous classes of foreign residents--the
British and American--and between all foreigners and the Fukein clans,
the most turbulent and aggressive of the native population at the
port,--a result of which, looking to all the present embarrassment and
future danger to our interests it is calculated to produce, I am bound
to say I think Samqua may well be proud. The national vanity of the
French leading them to an absurd and useless acquisition, the love of
exercise of the British leading the equestrians to press an
ill-advised and impracticable scheme for a three-mile racecourse, and
the national susceptibilities of the Americans leading them to dispute
the land tenure which hitherto had been the condition of their own
security,--all have been adroitly turned to the greatest advantage, to
the profit of the Chinese and the serious detriment of the foreigner.
The progress made in creating obstacles to our _commerce_ has been not
less worthy of remark. For a system of total laxity in the
custom-house administration under Lin a capricious alternation of
vigilance and neglect, under which oppressive acts of partiality and
injustice are frequently perpetrated, has been substituted, to the
great derangement of operations in trade. The carrying trade has been
harassed and impeded, and the Taotai is now actively engaged in
efforts to get the cargo-boats under his exclusive control, and to
organise a _cohong_ of five firms on the model of the ancient
establishments at Canton, while already--I believe at his suggestion
(indeed he scarcely denies it)--information has reached me that a new
transit duty of seven mace per picul has been levied at Chung-An on
the produce proceeding thence from the Black Tea districts to
Shanghai. A duty of over 7 per cent, in violation of one of the most
important of our treaty stipulations, with a monopoly of cargo-boats,
a right to levy new transit duties, and a _cohong_--the three leading
advantages secured by the treaty vanish. It is vain to disguise the
fact, for nothing can be clearer or more certain. On these points I
have been collecting detailed information, and shall shortly be
enabled to write more fully on the subject. I beg your Excellency in
the meantime to rest assured that the main facts have already been
placed beyond doubt. In connection with these, freedom of access to
different points in the interior and with Ningpo by the inland route
as advantages long enjoyed have also attracted attention, and some
more feeble efforts have been made to throw obstacles in the way.
In the _administration of justice_ perhaps more than in any other
directions adverse influences have been brought to bear with complete
effect. Redress for any injury inflicted on a foreigner, protection
from frauds, or recovery of debts, are all wholly unattainable. The
action of the Chinese tribunals in our behalf is null and void, and
the course taken by the authorities in all cases referred to there
amounts to a total denial of justice. The act of the Taotai in seizing
and flogging Mr ----'s boatmen was only wanting to withdraw from the
foreigners all protection dependent upon the Chinese laws and their
administration under our treaties.
Under these three heads, therefore, I would sum up the progressive and
evident deterioration in our position here. The tenure of land, the
operations of trade, the administration of justice, have all been
objects of attack, and with serious prejudice. That, however, which is
at present evident as the effect of the steps taken, forms but a
small part of the injury which will in a very short period be too
manifest to be overlooked if no determined steps are taken to reverse
the policy now pursued. The time, I am firmly persuaded, has arrived
for meeting by energetic action these insidious attacks--as the _least
dangerous course_--if our most important interests here are really to
be defended with any effect.
How this may best be done I feel your Excellency is entitled to demand
from the officer who seeks so earnestly to impress you with a
conviction that action is necessary, and I have no wish to shrink from
the responsibility of suggesting measures by which I conceive some
positive good may be effected, to repair the mischief, and much
impending evil at all events averted.
In reference to the land, also, it would seem very desirable that some
understanding should be come to with the United States _chargé
d'affaires_ by which any participation in the advantages of the
British location, consistent with the security of all, should be
freely conceded, while anything incompatible _with this condition_
must be as certainly resisted, in their interest not less than ours.
If Dr Parker prove impracticable I see no resource but a reference
home, when I trust all the real importance of the questions at issue
to the _interests of British trade and the British position at this
port_ will be steadily kept in view; nor should it be forgotten that
in its maintenance all foreign States are deeply interested, whatever
the Americans for the moment may think. Any injury to our position
must recoil with double force upon so weak and small a minority as
they are when left to stand alone.
As regards the measures now in progress for organising a _cohong_,
levying new transit duties, and creating a monopoly of cargo-boats,
all tending in the most serious degree to fetter our trade, in
indirect violation of the express stipulations of our treaty, I
confess there seems to be but one course consistent with the credit of
our Government or the defence of our interests, and that is resolutely
and firmly to resist them as infractions of treaty. Two modes of doing
this, however, suggest themselves. The one is by active
proceedings--prohibiting the payment of any maritime duties by British
subjects until satisfaction is obtained, and a distinct intimation
that if this does not suffice other _and more determined measures
should follow_. The other involves a system of _negation_ that would
be peculiarly embarrassing to the Chinese local authorities, and
eventually to the Government at Peking. This may be carried out by
simply holding the treaty to be _in abeyance_ by their own acts, and
declining to take any steps with British subjects to enforce the
conditions--whether as regarded customs, access to the interior, the
purchase of land, or the administration of justice--so long as the
measures objected to were persisted in.
In reference to these two courses, I will not hesitate to say that, if
left to my discretion, I should adopt the first; but the condition of
ultimate success would be the certainty that, if the object was not
attained by such means, her Majesty's Government would feel pledged to
send a squadron to the mouth of the Grand Canal next spring with an
imperative demand for the Taotai's disgrace and the reversal of all
this obnoxious policy, and authority to resort to coercive measures if
not listened to.
If, however, it should be deemed preferable to incur the risk of doing
nothing--or what, I confess, appears to me even more dangerous, to
make protests, or demonstrations which there is no serious intention
of following up to their legitimate conclusion--the negative policy is
of course the only one to be attempted. The responsibility of the
initiative would then be thrown upon the Chinese themselves. The
tables would be turned, and the Chinese will be left to right
themselves as they best could, while a large revenue will slip through
their hands and manifold complications and embarrassments in their
relations with foreigners arise to their confusion. The task, in fine,
they now assign to us would devolve upon them, and their sole remedy,
if they did not choose to give way, would be to stop the trade; but as
that would be a plain and ostensible _casus belli_, they will not
attempt it.
If, on the other side, nothing effective be done, I must frankly state
my conviction that our position in the north will rapidly deteriorate,
and our relations be embroiled, if not irreparably injured. I believe
means for the amelioration of both may be safely taken, and have long
been required; but I feel still more strongly convinced that at no
distant period they _must_ be taken, and the longer they are delayed
the greater will be the ultimate cost, and the more imminent the
hazard to our future trade and relations with China.
If I am correct in these inferences, the conclusion of the whole must
be that the time has arrived when it will be no longer safe to defer
strong and effective measures in defence of our interests, and that
there is a clear necessity for present action to avert at no distant
period a costly war and a shock to this empire it is so ill capable of
sustaining, that it must of necessity be attended with great peril not
only to the present dynasty but to the existing social organisation of
the country.
APPENDIX IV.
ACCOUNT OF THE SALT TRADE ANNEXED TO MR PARKES' SUMMARY OF THE NATIVE
MARITIME TRADE OF FOOCHOW, 1846. (EXTRACTS.)
They have constituted the sale of salt a monopoly, which they place in
the hands of a set of merchants whom they hold liable for the payment
of a fixed amount of tax. This, in some instances, falls rather heavy
upon them, but proves an easy measure to the authorities, who have
thus but little trouble or expense of collection. All the supplies of
salt are drawn from the sea-shore, and consequently there is an
appointment of salt inspector in every maritime province, who
superintends everything connected with the _gabelle_: he holds a high
rank and receives good emoluments from the Government, 3000 taels per
annum. It also forms one of the duties of the governor-general of the
province to act as chief superintendent of salt excise.
Most of the supplies from Fukien have to be sent into the interior and
the adjacent province of Kiangsi _viâ_ Foochow. The salt is made all
along the shore to the southward....
The salt is made at these places by people belonging to the various
localities, and the manufacture gives employment to numbers of
individuals, who in those sterile districts have few other means of
subsistence. The general method of manufacture is to collect the
saturated loam from the beach in heaps, and thence to draw off the
brine by drainage into large but shallow-built vats, when
crystallisation is effected by exposure to the natural heat of the
sun. The brine being all extracted from the heap, it is removed to the
beach, and the same earth, having been immersed in the salt-tide, can
again be used. In fine weather great quantities can thus be
expeditiously manufactured, but a succession of rain stops the works,
and a scarcity in the supplies is the consequence. The producers are
exempted from all taxes or charges on the part of the Government, on
the consideration that they are in mean labouring circumstances,
though many of the salt-farms are very extensive, and some of their
conductors possessed of better competence than the merchants, on whom
the whole burden of taxation falls. Junks are despatched to these
places by the salt merchants for freights.
The Government system of exacting a fixed annual amount of _gabelle_
is very defective, and places the trade, which might prosper under
other management, on an unhealthy basis. When the trade is dull, it
becomes still more depressed by the nature of the liabilities that the
merchants have at all times equally to bear, and which then become
burdensome; and again, on the other hand, in case of a thriving
season, the revenue is in no way advantaged. Their wretched executive,
however, prevents any improvement. They therefore content themselves
with fixing a stated sum, upwards of 300,000 taels per annum; and if
they can secure the requisite number of persons to undertake to
dispose of a certain quantity of salt that will yield excise to this
amount, they are content. Thus each merchant is bound to conduct the
sale of the quantity that he undertakes, or rather is held responsible
for the amount of duty due on such quantity, and having once paid this
up, should he be so disposed, he is at perfect liberty to transport
and sell more salt on his own account, duty free; whilst, on the other
hand, should he, from a glut in the market or other circumstances, not
be able to dispose of the quantity of which he had undertaken the
sale, he has still to pay duty on the whole at a fixed unalterable
rate.
It is therefore the imminent risk attending salt speculations that
causes people of property to be so averse towards entering them. They
involve a great outlay of capital, with continual liability but
uncertain remuneration. Thus, if a man embarks the whole or greater
part of his means in speculations which do not succeed, he becomes
instantly embarrassed with the Government, and, with no incomings to
relieve him, may perhaps not succeed in recovering his first failure.
Most of the merchants being men who are selected merely on account of
their capital, the management of their business is entirely in the
hands of those they employ, for whose honesty or capacity they are
mainly dependent for success. The charges and expenses connected with
carrying on a salt business are very great. Yet there are several
instances of old merchants employing good managing men, and possessing
plenty of supporting capital, having amassed large fortunes in the
trade, though, on the contrary, cases are much more numerous of
speculators having suffered losses and contracted debts with the
Government. A debt to the State of no less than 1,450,000 taels by the
salt dealers of Foochow has thus gradually collected.
The nomination of salt merchants is almost invariably compulsory, and
no one can retire from the business without he is totally unable from
want of means to continue in it. In these cases the reflection that
they were obliged to undertake the transactions that led to their ruin
must add increased poignancy to their losses. When once, however, they
have undertaken a transaction, they are much favoured by the
authorities, who give them entertainments and confer honours and
distinctions upon them. There are head merchants appointed, who hold
some control over the proceedings of the others. To be a head merchant
a man must be of known character and not owing anything to the
Government. They are responsible for all the other merchants, who,
however trustworthy, have all to be secured by the head merchants. In
case of any merchant becoming in arrears with the payment of his
duties, the salt inspector orders the head merchants to limit him to a
certain time in which to liquidate all charges. According as the case
needs, the head merchants convene and consult as to whether they
should pray for an extension of the term or require some of the other
merchants in substantial circumstances to lend the necessary amounts,
or perhaps they may proceed to pay it themselves. If also they find
that any of the other merchants are incompetent, from want of means,
to manage their business, they represent the same to the salt
inspector, that they may be allowed to retire. At present there are
four head merchants out of a total of sixty-one....
Smuggling is also carried on to some extent. As this, however, affects
the vital interests of the salt merchants, they show great vigilance
in investigating and reporting to the authorities any instances that
may come within their knowledge, and for this purpose fit up and
maintain several small vessels which keep up a constant watch against
contraband proceedings.
There are a multiplicity of fees and charges which prove very onerous
to the merchants. [Here follows a list of forty-seven separate fees,
dues, and charges, amounting to 15,300 taels, or about £5000 sterling,
on 900,000 lb. weight, or about one-eighth of a penny per lb.]
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.