INTERCOURSE UNDER THE TREATIES OF 1858 AND 1860.
I. THE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURE.
Spontaneous fulfilment of treaties not to be expected --
Retreating attitude of foreign Ministers -- Repression of
British tourists -- Hostility of Pekingese -- Conciliation
fails -- Chinese refuse to conclude treaty with Prussia --
Glimpse of the real truth -- Rooted determination to keep
out foreigners -- Absence of the sovereign -- Female
regents -- Diplomatic forms in abeyance -- Foreign
Ministers' task complicated by assumed guardianship of
China -- Pleasant intercourse with Manchu statesmen.
When Mr Bruce and M. Bourboulon took up their residence in Peking on
March 22, 1861, diplomacy was as yet a white sheet on which it was
their part to trace the first characters. The treaty--for all the
treaties were substantially one--was their charter; its integral
fulfilment their only safety. For as it had not been a bargain of
give-and-take between equals, but an imposition pure and simple by the
strong upon the weak, there would be no spontaneous fulfilment of its
obligations, rather a steady counter-pressure, as of water forcibly
confined seeking out weak spots in the dam. Moreover, the two parties
to the treaty, foreigners and Chinese, were not acquainted with each
other: aims, incentives, temper and character, and the nature of the
considerations by which they respectively would be influenced, were
all obscure. It was an uncertain situation, calling for vigilance and
caution. There can be no doubt the pregnant importance of the first
steps was realised by the representatives on both sides. The thoughts
of the Chinese on that critical occasion can only be inferred from
their acts. Of what was uppermost in the minds of the foreigners, or
at least of the English Minister, we have some slight indications from
the pen of a member of his staff, who, though not himself in the
diplomatic circle, claims to be the authorised chronicler of the early
days of the mission. This pretension is implicitly indorsed by the
fact that the preface to Dr Rennie's book[45] was written in
Government House, Calcutta, whither he followed Lord Elgin in the
capacity of physician. When the Ministers had only been five days in
Peking Dr Rennie wrote as follows: "Now is commencing perhaps the most
difficult part of a permanent English residency at Peking--namely, the
satisfying the Chinese that we are a tolerably harmless and
well-intentioned people, inclined to live with them on terms of amity
rather than the contrary, and that the desire of our Government is
that its subjects should respect, as much as is consistent with
reason, their national prejudices."
Such an immaculate sentiment placed in the very forefront of an
ambassadorial programme, ushered in at the cost of two wars which
shook the foundations of the Chinese empire, leaves something to be
desired as a justification for being in Peking at all. But Dr Rennie
indicates no other purpose for which foreign legations were
established there. He does not get beyond the mere "residency." A
viceroy of India proclaiming at each stage of a "progress" that he was
a man of peace, a bride hoping to lead a passably virtuous life, would
scarcely be more naïve than a foreign Minister's pious aspiration to
behave tolerably well to the Chinese. For where was the "difficulty,"
one is tempted to ask? It is explained by Dr Rennie.
Two English officers, it appears, had made an excursion to the Great
Wall without the necessary consular and local authorisation, and had
further shown "the bad taste, at a date so recent to its destruction,"
to visit the Summer Palace. A formal complaint of these indiscretions
met Mr Bruce on his arrival, and credit must be given to the Chinese
for their appreciation of the tactical value of what Scotswomen call
"the first word of flytin'." They moved the first pawn, and put the
British Minister at once on the defensive. He responded by an
arbitrary exercise of authority whereby Englishmen were prohibited
from visiting Peking. The restriction possessed little direct
importance, since few persons were then affected by it; but as the
opening act of the new diplomacy, its significance could hardly be
overrated. Though "only a little one," it was a recession from the
right conferred on the subjects of all treaty Powers to travel for
business or pleasure not only to Peking, but throughout the Chinese
empire. It was as the tuning-fork to the orchestra.
It is not permissible to suppose that the British Minister had not
good reasons for swerving from the principle of exercising rights,
great and small, for which, as he well knew, experience in China had
been one long, unbroken, cogent argument. Dr Rennie furnishes his
readers with the reason. "The Chinese," he observes, "would seem to
be very sensitive"; and "taking all the circumstances into
consideration, ... the fear that casual visits on the part of
strangers ... may prove antagonistic to the establishment of a
harmonious feeling at the opening of a new era in our intercourse with
the Chinese," the Minister resolved to keep Englishmen (and only them)
out of the capital.
This explanation, like that of the purpose of the Legation itself,
leaves on us a sense of inadequacy. These hyper-sensitive people had
been engaged, only six months before, in torturing and massacring
foreign envoys and prisoners, for which atrocities the destruction and
sack of Yuen-ming-yuen was thought to be not too severe a reprisal.
That the high officials who had committed these cruelties and endured
the penalty should suddenly become so delicate that they could not
bear the thought of a harmless tourist looking upon the ruins of the
palace seems a somewhat fantastical idea. As for the sensitiveness of
the townspeople, Dr Rennie himself had some experience of it three
days after penning the above remarks. "A good deal of shouting and
hooting," he says, was followed by "stones whizzing past me." Then "my
horse was struck by a stone" and bolted. A similar experience befell
another member of the Legation on the same day in another part of the
city. Dr Rennie believed the stones to have been thrown by boys, which
is probable enough. The favourite Chinese official palliation of
outrages on foreigners is to attribute them to youths and poor
ignorant people, which, however, in nowise softens the impact of the
missile. Let us give the Chinese full credit for the virtues they
possess--and they are many--but no one familiar with the streets of
Peking would consider delicacy their predominant characteristic. View
the diplomatic incident how we please, it cannot be denied that the
Chinese drew first blood in the new contest, and at the same time
practically tested the disposition of the invading force.
Another "straw" from Dr Rennie's journal may be noticed as indicating
the set of the current. _Apropos_ of the first commercial case that
had been sent up from the ports to the Minister, he records the
conclusion that "in almost every dispute which arises between
ourselves and the Chinese we are in the first instance in the wrong;
but, unfortunately [for whom?], the Chinese equally invariably adopt
the wrong method of putting matters right," so that "the original
wrong committed by us is entirely lost sight of." The observation
refers exclusively to mercantile affairs, and it was a rather large
generalisation to make after a month's experimental diplomacy in
Peking.
The Minister soon found that his efforts to placate the Chinese
Government were not producing the intended effect. It was not the
"casual visitor" that in any special way annoyed them, but the
foreigner in all his moods and tenses, most of all Mr Bruce himself,
his colleagues and their staff, medical and other, and all that they
stood for. General Ignatieff had not, after all, conjured away the
foreign plague, nor were the Chinese statesmen entirely reassured even
as to their immunity from the military danger. In the month of April
Admiral Hope, Brigadier-General Staveley, and Mr Parkes visited
Peking, and were courteously received; but Prince Kung was visibly
relieved, Dr Rennie tells us, when assured that the admiral was not to
remain there. As for the general, his presence in the vicinity was
inevitable so long as a considerable British and French force remained
in garrison in Tientsin and Taku. Like the Ministers themselves, he
was an unpleasant necessity to be endured as well as may be. But being
thus obliged to tolerate the greater evil, it would appear to Western
reasoning that an admiral more or less in an inland town need not have
so greatly upset Chinese equanimity. Prince Kung, however, was not yet
able to look on such matters with Western eyes. Every foreigner kept
at arm's-length, no matter what his rank or condition, was a gain, as
every locust destroyed is a gain to the peasant.
So when the Prussian envoy, Count Eulenberg, presented himself, the
British Minister vouching for his respectability, for the purpose of
making a treaty on the lines of those already made and ratified, his
efforts were frustrated by every plausible device. The envoy was
relegated to the most distant point at which it was deemed feasible to
stay his progress--namely, Tientsin, where negotiations were
vexatiously protracted during four months. The first and final
sticking-point was the claim to residence in the capital, which the
Chinese absolutely refused to concede. Eventually they agreed to
compound for a deferred entry ten years after signature. This by
haggling was finally reduced to five years, and the treaty was
thereupon concluded in August 1861. The old Canton tactics were thus
revived, as if nothing had happened since 1857.
As the echo of Mr Bruce, Dr Rennie's comment on the proceeding is
worth noting. "Looks very like merely gaining time, in hopes that,
before that period expires, _all foreign residence in the capital_
will be at an end." Here we catch a glimpse of the fundamental truth
underlying all Chinese diplomacy from first to last--the purpose,
never relaxed for an instant, of some day expelling foreigners from
the country. No foreigner could hope to unravel the tangle of Chinese
reasoning so as to comprehend in what manner the exclusion of one
State was to assist in the eviction of the representatives of four
Great Powers already established in the capital; but it may be
inferred from the above remark that Mr Bruce was beginning to perceive
that good behaviour towards the Chinese was not the be-all and end-all
of the functions of a British representative in China. There was
another side. We know, in fact, though Dr Rennie does not record it,
that Mr Bruce began to see the necessity of making a stand against the
reactionary pressure of the Chinese; that he was resolved on bending
the Ministers of the Yamên to his will--being satisfied he could do
it--instead of yielding to theirs in the vain hope of gaining their
confidence.
The grand desideratum had been at last obtained, access to the
capital; but how different the realisation from the anticipation!
There was no sovereign and no Court, only the shell of the nut without
the kernel. And as diplomacy began so it continued, in successive
illusions, partially dispelled, yet clung to with slow-dying hope.
At first sight, no doubt, the task of the foreign representatives
seemed an easy one: they had but to lay down the law to a defeated
Power, to hammer the softened metal. This course would have been as
simple in fact as it was in principle had they been united, and had it
been possible for them to take a simple view of their mission; but
from the first their duty to their respective countries was
complicated, and in varying degrees, by what they conceived to be
their duty towards China. It was inevitable that the attempt to follow
two lines of policy divided by such cleavage should result in a fall
into the crevasse. China, in fact, was too large a subject for either
the treaty Powers or their agents to grasp. She made huge demands on
the humanity, the indulgence, and the protection of the Powers who had
broken down her wall of seclusion, and she had nothing in kind to
offer them in return--neither gratitude nor co-operation, nor even
good faith. For this China could be blamed only in so far as her own
welfare was hindered by her irresponsiveness, for her statesmen were
not far wrong in attributing to any motive rather than pure
philanthropy the obtrusive solicitude of the Western Powers.
International relations even between kindred peoples are in the nature
of things selfish, or worse; and the more they assume an altruistic
mask the more they lie open to suspicion. In this cynical view of the
attitude of her neighbours China has never wavered.
Yet it was not all illusion and Dead Sea apples. Something had been
gained by diplomatic access to the capital. The elaborate insolence of
the Chinese mandarin had been exchanged for the urbanity of the
well-bred Manchu. It became possible to converse. Foreigners were
listened to with attention, and answered with an open countenance. The
change was incalculable. It recalled the days of Lord Macartney and
the Emperor Kienlung, of Sir John Davis's pleasant intercourse with
Kiying, and of the agreeable impression left by the Manchu statesmen
who were concerned from 1841 onwards in the conduct of war or the
conclusion of peace. If to the kindly personal relations which
characterised the earlier years of Peking diplomacy no permanent
tangible result could be definitely ascribed, who can tell what evils
were staved off or calamity averted by these friendly amenities?
In order, however, to appreciate the state of affairs in Peking in
1865, it is necessary to fill the gap in our narrative by an outline
of events following the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin and
Convention of Peking in October 1860.
II. NEW PORTS AND OPENING OF THE YANGTZE.
Seven new coast ports -- Admiral Hope's Yangtze expedition
-- His relations with Taiping rebels -- Hankow, Kiukiang,
and Chinkiang opened to trade -- Panic in Hankow, and
exodus of population for fear of rebels.
The new ports opened to trade--Tientsin, Newchwang, and Chefoo in the
North; Swatow, and two Formosan ports; Kiungchow in Hainan--added
considerably to the range of foreign commerce, and necessitated a
large extension of the foreign customs and of the consular services.
But the most important feature in the new arrangements was the
effective opening of the river Yangtze. It was interesting, as giving
access to the commercial centre of the empire; and as bringing
foreigners into direct contact, possibly conflict, with the Taiping
rebels. For the banks of the great river were at the time checkered
with the alternate strongholds of rebels and imperialists. Trade must
therefore either be carried on on sufferance from both, or be
efficiently protected from the interference of either belligerent.
Obviously this was a matter to be gone about discreetly.
The course and capabilities of the great waterway, and the disposition
of the military forces on its banks, had been well reconnoitred by
Lord Elgin himself in 1858; and the ports to be opened, which were
left unnamed in the treaty, were pretty definitely indicated in the
survey then made. There were to be three in all. Chinkiang, which had
been recently recovered from the rebels, situated at the intersection
of the Imperial Canal and the Yangtze-kiang, was definitely fixed. The
two others farther up river remained to be selected.
The opening of the river was by treaty made contingent on the
restoration of imperial authority on its banks; but as there was
nothing more likely to accelerate that consummation than commercial
traffic on the river, the Chinese Government acquiesced in the British
authorities making the experiment, at their own risk as regarded
possible trouble with the insurgents. The object was to "throw open
the general coasting trade of the river"; and Lord Elgin, on his
departure from China, left the undertaking in the hands of Admiral
Hope, to whom he attached Mr Parkes, withdrawn for the occasion from
his duties as commissioner in Canton.
[Illustration: FIRST BRITISH CONSULATE AT KOLENGSOO, AMOY, 1844.]
The admiral started from Shanghai in advance of Mr Parkes, with a
squadron of light-draught steamers, on February 11, 1861. He carried
an exploring expedition composed of Colonel Sarel, Captain Blakiston,
Mr Shereshewsky, and Dr A. Barton, whose proceedings are reported in
Blakiston's 'Five Months on the Upper Yangtze'; several American
missionaries; two Frenchmen, afterwards distinguished, MM. Eugène
Simon and A. Dupuis, the latter proving the means of eventually giving
Tongking to France; a French military attaché; Lieut.-Colonel
Wolseley, D.A.Q.-M.G.; and a delegation from the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, with several private persons. Whether the pilots presumed
upon light draught and steam power, or whether the course of the river
had changed so much since the previous surveys were made, the vessels
got stranded, one after another, in the estuary; and as each grounded
a companion was told off to stand by her, so that before they had got
clear of what is known as the Langshan Crossing (the home of the
famous breed of black poultry) the admiral's tender, the Coromandel,
was the only vessel left in a mobile condition. Not to lose time, the
admiral determined to push on in that non-combatant craft to Nanking,
the rebel capital, and test the temper and intentions of the Taipings.
As the steamer slowly approached the landing-place, in bright sunshine
and a still atmosphere, the batteries on the river front were crowded,
but remained silent.
"What will you do, sir, if they fire?" the admiral was asked.
"Oh, I will just drop down out of range, and send and ask them what
they mean by it," he replied, with deep deliberate utterance, not
unlike Beaconsfield's.
An officer was sent ashore to parley, some rebel officers came on
board, and the prospect of an amicable understanding appeared to be
satisfactory. It was a critical juncture in the history both of the
Taiping movement itself and of foreign relations with it and with
China. Without exaggeration, it may be said that the proximate fate
of the Taipings then lay hidden within the brain of Sir James Hope,
and each occasion of contact between him and them during the next few
months added its definite contribution to the data on which the
momentous decision was ultimately taken. Although he had then no
higher opinion of the Taipings than that they were "an organised band
of robbers," the admiral was resolved to give them fair play; and
since no diplomatic intercourse could be held with insurgents, he
determined to take relations with them under his own supervision
(March 8, 1861). "The principle I shall adopt being that in the
district of country of which they hold possession the Taiping
authorities must be regarded as those of the _de facto_ Government,
... and this principle being likely to lead to the payment of double
duties (to rebels and imperialists) on all trade conducted at places
in their possession, I am desirous of definite instructions on the
subject."
The first point to be settled with the rebel authorities at Nanking
was the non-molestation of British traffic passing up and down the
river within range of their batteries or otherwise, to secure which
object it had been determined to station a ship of war abreast of the
city. The sanction of the Taiping chiefs was wanted to this
arrangement, which, however, without such sanction, it would have been
all the more necessary to insist upon. The second point affected the
general relations between foreign trade and the rebel movement. The
next aim of the admiral was to arrive at an understanding with the
leaders for the neutralisation of Shanghai and Wusung within an area
of thirty miles round these two places.
Not being prepared to enter into definite negotiations until the
arrival of Mr Parkes, who had not yet joined the expedition, Sir James
Hope returned to the squadron which he had left aground in the lower
reaches of the river. But thinking the time and the opportunity might
be usefully employed in gathering some acquaintance with the Taipings
at their headquarters, he landed three volunteers at Nanking, whose
presence he ascertained would not be unwelcome to the authorities
there. They were to remain in the city as the guests of the rebels
till the admiral's return. The party consisted of Lieut.-Colonel
Wolseley, Mr P. J. Hughes, vice-consul designate of Kiukiang, and one
of the Shanghai delegates. They were joined on shore by the Rev.
William Muirhead, missionary, who had reached Nanking by land from
Shanghai. The party was thus a thoroughly representative one. On the
return of the admiral a week later, accompanied by Mr Parkes, the
arrangements for a guard-ship were satisfactorily settled after some
puerile obstruction, and the expedition proceeded on its way up the
river to Hankow, where, as also at Kiukiang and Chinkiang, consular
officers were established; and the Yangtze was declared open by
notification in Shanghai on March 18, 1861.
The expedition was fruitful in information concerning the rebels, all
tending to confirm the purely destructive character of the movement.
Certain incidents of the voyage were also most instructive to the
visitors. While the expedition was still at Hankow the Taipings had
captured a walled city, fifty miles distant, which had been passed by
the squadron on its way up a few days before. The news created a
universal panic throughout the three cities, Wuchang, Hanyang, and
Hankow, and the scene which followed could not be paralleled. It is
thus laconically referred to in the report of the delegates of the
Chamber of Commerce: "The abandonment was most complete, not a house
nor a shop was open, and it became equally impossible to purchase
goods, to check quotations, or pursue inquiries."
One day the deep Han river was so packed with junks that one might
almost walk from bank to bank over their mat coverings. The next day
everything that could float was crowded with fugitive families with
their household stuff huddled precariously on the decks, and such a
fleet as, for number and picturesqueness, was probably never seen,
covered the broad bosom of the Yangtze, making slow headway under sail
against the current.
Mr Parkes, eminently a man of fact, thus describes what he was witness
to:--
Darkness fell upon crowds of the people lying with their
weeping families, and the _débris_ of their property, under
the walls of Wuchang, anxious only to escape from defences
that should have proved their protection.... The noise and
cries attending their embarkation continued throughout the
night, but daylight brought with it a stillness that was
not less impressive than the previous commotion. By that
time all the fugitives had left the shore, and the river,
as far as the eye could reach, was covered with junks and
boats of every description bearing slowly away up-stream
the bulk of the population of three cities, which a few
days before we had computed at 1,000,000 of souls.
Of what came of this and many such another melancholy exodus of
humanity, without resources, ready to brave any death rather than fall
into the hands of the destroyers, there is no record; and the scene
at Hankow, magnified a hundred times, would give an inadequate
conception of the havoc of the fifteen years of the Taiping rebellion.
III. ADMIRAL HOPE'S POLICY TOWARDS INSURGENTS.
Devastation only to be expected of them -- Enforces
neutrality and respect for foreign property -- Thirty-mile
radius round Shanghai -- Hesitancy of British Minister and
Foreign Office -- Overcome by firmness of Admiral --
Capture of Ningpo by rebels -- Arrangements for trade there
-- Bad faith of rebels -- Shanghai to be defended -- Its
dangerous position -- Ravages of rebels -- Offensive
movements against them -- Clearing of the thirty-mile
radius -- Cordial relations between English and French
admirals -- Mr Bruce won over -- The campaign -- Recapture
of Ningpo -- Chinese raise foreign force -- Ward --
Burgevine -- Chinese statesmen who organised the
suppression of the rebellion -- General Gordon takes
command of the "Ever-Victorious Army."
None of the spectators was more profoundly impressed than Admiral
Hope, and the spectacle undoubtedly helped to mature his views on the
demerits of the rebellion. On April 6 he wrote to the Admiralty: "A
period of anarchy, indefinite in duration, appears likely to ensue, in
which the commercial towns of the empire will be destroyed, and its
most productive provinces laid waste. For this state of things, so
destructive to foreign trade, I see no remedy except the recognition
by both parties, if practicable, of the neutrality of the consular
ports, which would then become places of security in which the Chinese
merchants and capitalists could take refuge." And towards the
realisation of this scheme the first step was the obligation laid upon
the rebel Government at Nanking that their forces should not approach
within thirty miles of Shanghai or Wusung. This idea, however, was but
slowly assimilated by her Majesty's Minister at Peking and by the
Government at home, and Lord Russell, while approving generally of the
admiral's policy, stipulated that no force be used except in direct
defence of British property. Mr Bruce wrote able despatches from
Peking, in which the pros and cons, the contingencies and risks, of
alternative courses were so well balanced, that the only practical
conclusion that could possibly issue therefrom was that eventually
arrived at,--to leave the decision to the admiral with a promise of
support, whatever course he might adopt. The Foreign Office and the
Peking Legation, in fact, faithfully represented the orthodox view of
affairs, whereby national policy is primarily reduced to a game of
safety for officials, and to the application of theories and general
principles often having little bearing on the actualities of the case.
The admiral's mind was cast in a different mould. To him the
exigencies of the situation were everything, the official balance very
little, the fear of responsibility nothing. The man on the spot,
seeing clearly the right thing to do and resolved to do it, was bound
in the end to gain the Government to his side, for Governments like a
strong arm to lean on. With men like Sir James Hope there was no risk
of complications arising, for complications arise mostly from the
nervous dread of them, never from going straight and clear to the
objective point. It needed a visit of the admiral to Peking, however,
and the best part of a year's correspondence, to convert the British
Government point by point to his views.
Meantime the Taiping rebels advanced to Ningpo, the defence of which
Mr Bruce had refused to sanction, and they captured the city on
December 9, 1861, after engaging not to do so. The leaders there were
interviewed by the French Admiral Protêt and the English Captain
Corbett with a view to gaining a comprehension of their plans, and "to
prevent the atrocities of which they have hitherto been guilty, and to
endeavour to effect an arrangement by which trade can be conducted
from the town. The French Rear-Admiral Protêt will act in concert with
me," wrote Admiral Hope to Corbett, December 7.
After the capture of the city the admiral instructed Captain Corbett
that if the rebels wished to levy any duties, he was to see that in
amount they did not exceed those stipulated in the imperial tariff.
Arrangements were also made by the three treaty Powers for the
protection of foreign life and the safety of the foreign quarter. The
position was, however, a very difficult one, as the rebels had no idea
of order or of keeping faith. Indeed the problem of protecting British
subjects while observing Lord Russell's neutrality instructions was
fast becoming impossible, for the conventions made with the Taiping
authorities in Nanking were disregarded by them, and Shanghai itself
was threatened.
The admiral's conception of what was required for the protection of
British interests was all the while undergoing steady development, and
in January he wrote that Kiukiang and Hankow had become as essential
to our trade as Shanghai. Writing a month later, he pressed his plans
still more definitely upon the Admiralty. "On every occasion," he said
on February 21, 1862, "on which I have reported the state of Shanghai
since my return here, it has been my duty to bring the devastation and
atrocities committed by the rebels in its immediate vicinity very
prominently under their Lordships' notice. These proceedings have been
conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the
respect due to the occupation of the town by French and English
forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and native trade
unaffected."
The tension was at length relieved by the relaxation of Earl Russell's
restrictions. He had already said that "it might be expedient" to
protect the treaty ports, and that he was "of opinion that we ought to
defend Shanghai and Tientsin as long as our forces [the garrison left
from the Peking campaign] occupied these ports." But now, on March 11,
1862, he took a more practical view of the whole situation, and issued
her Majesty's commands that "Admiral Hope should not only defend
Shanghai and protect the other treaty ports, but also the British flag
and the Yangtze, and generally that British commerce is to have the
aid of her Majesty's ships of war."
During the winter of 1861-62 matters had become very critical in
Shanghai. The rebel chiefs sent an intimation to the foreign consuls
that it was their intention to capture the town, and they proceeded to
burn the villages and ravage the country on both sides of the river
within gun-shot of the military lines. Special local measures of
defence were adopted by the residents, and fugitives in thousands
flocked into the only asylum where their lives were safe. The pressure
of these events led to yet more definite action on the part of Sir
James Hope, who perceived that the effective defence of Shanghai and
its sources of supply involved aggressive movements against the rebels
in order to drive them out of all the places they occupied within the
thirty-mile radius. In all these proceedings the admiral went hand in
hand with his French colleague, and with the commanders of the French
and British military forces. An agreement signed by the four on
February 13, 1862, settled the immediate question of the defence of
the city of Shanghai. An appeal to the British Minister completed his
conversion to a "forward policy." "I strongly recommend," wrote the
admiral on February 22, "that the French and English commanders should
be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon to free the country from
rebels within a line"--specified; and the reply was as hearty and free
from ambiguity as could be wished: "We can no more suffer Shanghai to
be taken by famine or destroyed by insurrection than we can allow it
to be taken by assault; and it requires but little experience in China
to be assured that the effect of remaining on a strict defensive
within the walls is to convince our assailants that we are unable to
meet them in the field."
The plan of campaign was settled in an agreement signed by Sir James
Hope, Admiral Protêt, and Brigadier Staveley, April 22, 1862, and was
carried out to the letter during the early summer and the autumn
following. At an early period of the operations Admiral Protêt was
killed: his loss was deeply lamented, most of all by his British
colleague, with whom relations of exceptional intimacy had sprung up.
"The extent to which I enjoyed his confidence and regard will ever
prove a source of unmingled satisfaction to me," wrote Sir James Hope
on the day of the admiral's death, May 17, 1862, himself at the time
confined to his cabin by wounds.
The rebel forces in Ningpo, who had been on their good behaviour for a
short time, became aggressive and insulting, even going the length of
offering rewards for foreign heads in the good old mandarin fashion.
It is well to remember that even in their unkempt condition, and with
everything to gain from the goodwill of foreigners, the Taiping rebels
lacked nothing of the most arrogant of Chinese assumptions. The
pretensions of the chief far exceeded those of the Emperors of China.
The Taipings required foreigners to be subject to their jurisdiction,
and they habitually applied derogatory terms to foreign countries.
Such things were regarded much as the eccentricities of a lunatic
might be. Nevertheless they were a faithful reflex of what is rooted
in the Chinese mind.
The position of foreigners and the foreign ships there having thus
been rendered intolerable, the city was recaptured from the rebels by
Commander Roderick Dew in the same month--a brilliant feat of arms.
After the capture he wrote: "In the city itself, once the home of half
a million of people, no trace or vestige of an inhabitant could be
seen.... The canals were filled with dead bodies and stagnant filth."
The recapture of Ningpo was the beginning of an Anglo-Franco-Chinese
campaign against the rebels in Chêkiang which was carried on
simultaneously with that round Shanghai.
It is needless to follow in detail the operations which culminated two
years later in the final suppression of the Taiping rebellion; but the
relations which grew up between the British and French commanders on
the one side, and the Chinese military forces which were being
organised on the other, were so fruitful in results as to merit their
being held in particular remembrance. Though the history has been many
times written, it may still not be considered supererogatory to trace
some of the points of contact between the native and foreign motives
and plans of action, and the evolution of the defensive idea which was
the product of the combination.
The Taiping rebellion had devastated the central and southern
provinces many years before the Chinese Government roused itself to a
serious effort to resist it. The movement of repression originated
with the Governor-General of the Hu provinces, whose chief lieutenant
and successor was Tsêng Kwo-fan, Governor-General of Kiangnan at the
time of which we now speak. His brother, Tsêng Kwo-chuan, the Governor
of Chêkiang province, was the military leader, and Li Hung-chang, the
most capable and energetic of them all, was governor of the province
of Kiangsu. The imperialist forces had been gradually closing on
Nanking, and it was thought probable that this hemming-in process
forced the rebels to seek outlets and new feeding-grounds in the
populous districts of Kiangsu and Chêkiang. The rebels had enlisted a
number of foreigners in their ranks, and made great efforts to supply
themselves with foreign arms and ammunition, for which purpose, among
others, communication with the sea was most important for them. Li,
_futai_ (governor), also began to enlist foreigners and raise a
special corps, drilled and armed in foreign fashion, and led by
foreign officers. The foreign agent in this enterprise on the
imperialist side was Frederick Ward, to whom Mr Bruce referred in May
1861 as "a man called Ward, an ex-Californian fillibuster." Within a
year Mr Bruce wrote, "In the Chinese force organised and led by Mr
Ward I see the nucleus of a military organisation which may prove most
valuable in the disturbed state of China." The truth is, "Ward's
force," which became known by its high-flown Chinese title of the
"Ever-Victorious Army," was seized on from its origin by Sir James
Hope, whose encouragement and support were essentially serviceable to
it in its early days. The admiral treated Ward as a comrade, fighting
by his side, and thus giving the new levy a military status. While the
Chinese troops were yet raw he co-operated with them by capturing
positions from the rebels and trusting Ward's men to hold them, on the
assurance of their leader that they were equal to that duty. Ward
himself was an unpretentious, cool, and daring man, reckless of his
own life. During his brief campaign he was riddled with bullets, one
of which entering his mouth destroyed the palate and impaired his
speech, and before long the fatal missile reached its mark. He was
succeeded in the command by his second, Burgevine, who, though a good
soldier, lacked Ward's tact and moderation, and got into trouble with
his paymasters, to whom he used violence and threats. He was deposed
from the command by Governor Li, which brought about a serious crisis,
for the disciplined force of foreigners and Chinese was left without a
head. In this emergency Li applied to the British authorities for the
loan of an officer to command the disciplined force. The
responsibility of the British representatives, naval and military,
became thus extended to finding a suitable Englishman to replace
Burgevine. Their first selection was Captain Holland, R.M., who held
the post for a short time, and was succeeded by Captain C. G. Gordon,
R.E.
Gordon had arrived in China in 1860 in time to share in the last act
of the Peking campaign; he passed the year 1861 at Tientsin, where he
was highly esteemed as a model man and meritorious officer. In the
winter of 1861 he had conferences with Mr Bruce and Prince Kung on the
question of suppressing the rebellion; but none of their ideas, nor
the policy of the British Government, were then sufficiently advanced
to lead to any practical result. Gordon accompanied his corps to
Shanghai in the spring of 1862, and was engaged in the operations for
clearing the thirty-mile radius under General Staveley, who spoke
warmly of his daring reconnoitring services, for which Gordon had been
already distinguished in the Crimea. In the following winter he was
busy surveying and mapping the country which had been reconquered from
the rebels, and in the spring of 1863 he was offered by his chief the
leadership of Ward's force. Gordon's was no doubt the best selection
that could have been made, having regard only to the abilities which
were then recognised in him; for though General Staveley knew him well
both in Tientsin and Shanghai, it is not claimed for him, or any one
else, that he had prescience of those transcendent qualities and that
magnetic power which the subsequent campaign against the rebels was
the means of bringing to light. When Gordon took command of the
"Ever-Victorious," the force had had two years' training and regular
campaigning, and the men were entitled to rank as veteran troops.
Gordon, however, was to infuse new life into the corps by his dynamic
personality and by the diligent use of the regenerative agency of
"Sergeant What's-his-name." The number of foreigners actually employed
in the force is doubtful, but detailed returns of killed and wounded
in the course of a year's operations gave a hundred names. Gordon's
faculty of control was probably more severely tested by his management
of that motley foreign crew than of the whole indigenous force; but
the best of which it was capable was got out of this fortuitous
concourse of men, and under the inspiration of the commander several
names of distinction emerged from the cosmopolitan group.
When Gordon took over the command in March 1863 it was six months
since the thirty-mile radius had been entirely cleared of rebels, and
the first duty of the "Ever-Victorious" was to keep that area clear;
its second to carry the war as far as it was able into the regions
beyond. Its efficiency, especially for this latter purpose, depended
on the support and co-operation of the British and French commanders,
whose troops remained in occupation of the treaty port of Shanghai.
For a time there was danger of a lapse in this co-operation. The
dismissed General Burgevine carried his grievances to Peking, and made
such an impression by his plausible address on the American and
British Ministers there, that Mr Bruce espoused his cause and wrote
strong despatches to the British commander, Staveley (April 10, 1863),
urging the reinstatement of Burgevine and the suppression of Gordon,
to whom it was to be explained that the step was no reflection on him,
&c. Again and again the Minister returned to the charge, both to the
commander in Shanghai and to the Foreign Office at home; but the
Governor Li was firm, and adduced such cogent reasons for the
dismissal of Burgevine that Major-General Brown, who had just
succeeded to the British command, joined Li in resolutely protesting
against the removal of Gordon, whom, it may be remarked, the English
general had never yet seen. The men on the spot prevailed against the
man who was theorising from a distance, and on the worst data
conceivable, the culprit's own account of himself. Mr Bruce, who, as
we have seen, was well acquainted with Gordon, must have had reasons
for his policy not given in his official despatches, for these were
inadequate and narrow for a man of his large capacity.
We have said Major-General Brown had not then seen Gordon. He had
arrived from India in April to relieve General Staveley of the command
of the British troops in China. He was a wiry man and of an active
temperament, and rapidly mastered the situation. Probably to him is
due the credit of the first true perception of what manner of man this
young engineer officer was. General Brown was for a few days after his
arrival a guest in one of the spacious _hongs_ in the Shanghai
settlement, which had a wide verandah, giving access to all the
bedrooms. One morning very early the general, excited by a message
that had just reached him, rushed round in _déshabillé_ calling for
his host with a piece of coarse Chinese paper in his hand. "Do you
know Major Gordon?" he said. "Why, yes, a very nice fellow, and
reported to be a first-rate officer." "But," exclaimed the general,
"he is a genius! Just look what I have received from him from the
front," and he unfolded the whitey-brown paper with some rough
diagrams, and a few not very legible pencil notes indicating his
position and plan of attack on Taitsan (where Captain Holland had been
repulsed) and Kuensan,[46] both cities on the line of communication
with the provincial capital, Soochow. "The man is a genius,"
reiterated the general, "and must be supported." A few days later
another of these cryptic missives arrived, when a similar scene was
repeated with redoubled emphasis. "I tell you that man is a military
genius; that's what I call him, a military genius," said the dapper
little soldier in his vivacious reiterative manner. "I'll support him
for all I am worth." And then he developed his own plan of relieving
the "Ever-Victorious" of garrison duty, leaving the whole
force--secure of its base--free to engage in aggressive operations.
This plan of giving effective support to Gordon's force was carried
out to the letter, as subsequently described by the general in his
official despatches reporting the capture of Taitsan and Kuensan: "I
had a field force acting in conjunction, as a support, moving on the
extreme edge of our boundary, ... which was of great assistance to
Major Gordon in his operations." He adds: "Kuensan having fallen,
Major Gordon now proposes to make it his headquarters; ... and as the
_futai_ intends to make Taitsan his headquarters, I shall bring it
within the boundary, thus giving the imperialists every confidence to
hold it, knowing they could receive support from me at any moment."
How vital to the fortunes of the "Ever-Victorious Army" was this
decided action of General Brown's was seen when, three months later,
General Burgevine had gone over, with a certain following of
malcontents, to the Taipings, a movement which suggested to Gordon
serious misgivings as to the loyalty of the foreigners remaining in
his own force. Burgevine, however, had no success in the rebel camp,
and soon, in a secret interview with Gordon, sued for safe-conduct and
amnesty. Improving his acquaintance, however, with the new commander
of the "Ever-Victorious," Burgevine's next proposal was the bold one
of eliminating as between themselves all questions of conflicting
loyalty to the respective belligerents by throwing over both, and by
joining forces on their own account, to capture Soochow, and there
raise an army to march on Peking. It was a partnership which did in
nowise commend itself to Gordon, but the proposal served to show how
shrewd Li Hung-chang had been in his estimate of the deposed leader.
IV. THE LAY-OSBORN FLOTILLA.
Orders sent through Mr Hart to Mr Lay -- Fleet equipped
under Captain Osborn, R.N. -- Ratification of their
agreements refused in Peking -- Government would not place
foreigners in a position of authority -- Misunderstandings
and final sacrifice of Mr Lay -- Ships paid off and sold --
Crucial question the recapture of Nanking.
The invincible distrust of foreign auxiliaries which dominates Chinese
policy and prevents the empire from ever having an army or a navy,
received another signal illustration in the same year in the great
fiasco of the Lay-Osborn flotilla. Mr H. N. Lay, Inspector-General of
Chinese Maritime Customs, was in England on leave in 1861, his _locum
tenens_ in Peking being Mr (now Sir) Robert Hart. Conferences with the
Chinese Ministers on the naval weakness of the empire resulted in a
very important decision, in consequence of which Mr Hart was empowered
to send to Mr Lay orders for certain armed vessels to be officered and
manned by Englishmen. Mr Lay executed the rather "large order"
according to his lights, engaging Captain Sherard Osborn to command
the fleet, which was equipped on a war-footing. The foreign enlistment
difficulties of the British Government were overcome, as the
Government was by that time ready to go to any length in assisting the
Government of China. The fleet duly arrived in China, and Mr Lay and
Captain Osborn presented themselves in Peking to obtain ratification
of their agreements from the Imperial Government. This was refused,
the force was disbanded, and the ships sold, at a heavy pecuniary
sacrifice to the Chinese, for they made no demur about payment.
The rock on which the scheme seemed to split was the contention of Mr
Lay that the fleet was imperial, and that the commodore should take no
orders from viceroys or provincial authorities, but only from the
emperor, and through Mr Lay himself. This was a shock to the very
edifice of Chinese Government, conceived of as feasible only under the
belief that in its helpless condition the Government must accede to
anything. But the scheme was really impossible. So also, however, was
the alternative of provincialising the naval force, as has been shown
by subsequent failures in the attempt to use the services of British
officers in the Chinese navy. Such an instance of reckoning without
your host was never heard of before or since. It was like a practical
joke on a titanic scale. The ships were actually there, manned,
officered, and armed. It was a dangerous knot, which had to be
promptly cut or untied. Following the line of least resistance, Mr Lay
was made the scapegoat, on whose head the Minister "laid both his
hands"--rather heavily--"confessing over him the iniquities of all,"
and sending him away into the wilderness. In the general interest the
sacrifice of Mr Lay was perhaps the safest way out of the imbroglio,
for he was a pugnacious little man in whose hands despotic power might
have been attended with inconvenience. Nevertheless, the blame of the
failure belonged to all the parties concerned--to Prince Kung,
Wênsiang, Mr Hart, Mr Bruce, and the British Government. They each
entered into the scheme with different ideas, more or less vague,
except Mr Lay's own, which had perforce to be reduced to the definite
when he came to draw up contracts with British naval officers, and to
meet the strict requirements of British law. The Chinese Ministers of
course could have no conception what a foreign-equipped navy really
meant, nor had they probably fully divulged what was really in their
mind; Mr Lay and Mr Hart were young men with large ideas, but without
experience; Mr Bruce was a man of the world who had seen service, and
was, from his position, the most responsible of them all, and
therefore the most culpable in deceiving himself, and allowing the
British Government to be misled. He approved of the project, or it
could never have been carried out. But what was it precisely that he
approved of? He "saw with pleasure that Captain Osborn was about to
reorganise the preventive service" (October 6, 1862), and as late as
February 8, 1863, he wrote to Prince Kung of the "speedy arrival of
the steam flotilla which your Imperial Highness has so wisely
ordered"--as if it were a pair of official boots! Yet on the arrival
of the flotilla it was found that everybody concerned was at
cross-purposes, and the question naturally suggests itself, what steps
her Majesty's Minister had taken to satisfy himself as to the real
intentions of Prince Kung, whether they had been properly transmitted
by Mr Hart and correctly interpreted by Mr Lay and fully communicated
to her Majesty's Government. It appears that Mr Bruce had, in fact,
undergone a change of mind--induced, no doubt, by cogent
considerations--during Mr Lay's final sojourn in Peking. Having
received a message from the Minister urging a stiff attitude with the
Chinese Government and promising the full support of the Legation, Mr
Lay proceeded to the Yamên and laid down the law strongly, as his
manner was, in the full assurance that he had the British Minister at
his back. But after thus burning his boats he found himself abandoned,
for reasons of State which he was unable to appreciate. Such was the
account of the crisis given at the time by Mr Lay himself to a
confidential friend then residing in Peking. For the Chinese
Government the scheme was necessarily a leap in the dark. For the
British Government it involved a violent reversal of recently declared
policy, and on a most important issue. It was consequently a case
where extreme and minute precautions against possible misunderstandings
would not have been superfluous, yet--so far as has yet been made
public, for there is doubtless a missing link in the record--such seem
to have been wholly absent from the inception of the enterprise.
The crux of the question, no doubt, was the position of Nanking. The
lever Mr Lay employed to secure acceptance of his conditions was the
prospect of the immediate capture of the Taiping capital, against
which the provincial Government, represented by the Viceroy Tsêng, his
brother, and the governor of Kiangsu, Li, were expending their forces.
The temptation was exceedingly strong to close with Lay and secure the
services--probably much overrated for that particular object--of the
new flotilla, were it even by recourse to some ambiguous phrase which
might leave a loophole of escape from the agreement when its immediate
object had been served. Something like this might have been attempted
but for the uncompromising attitude of Li Hung-chang, for it was he
who smashed the flotilla scheme. It was true, he allowed, that the
assistance of the ships would enable the viceroy's forces to capture
the city at once; but, he added confidently, we shall succeed in time
by our own resources, and it were better to lose the city and the
province, and even the empire itself, than to place such power as Lay
demanded in the hands of any foreigner. Burgevine was fresh in the
_futai's_ mind--was indeed at that very time in the rebel camp near
him. Li's arguments clinched the matter. The flotilla was never
commissioned. The whole chapter of experiences of the campaign in
Kiangsu has left a vivid impression on the mind of Li Hung-chang: it
was the most interesting period of his life, but no incident of it
imparts such vivacity to his reminiscences as that of the Lay-Osborn
fleet. Nothing warms him to dramatic locution like a reference to that
episode.
V. THE END OF THE REBELLION.
Gordon's brilliant campaign -- His quarrel with Li
Hung-chang -- And reconciliation -- Other French and
English officers co-operate in suppression of rebellion --
Russian aid offered.
Gordon's campaigning lasted one year: it was marked by great
successes, sundry reverses, more than one crisis, and many
discouragements. The famous quarrel with the _futai_ Li was
illustrative of several points of great utility to be borne in mind in
considering the working relations of Eastern and Western peoples; but
perhaps its chief interest lay in its revelation of the independent
and dominating character of Gordon himself, which was his
distinguishing mark through life. After a confused and scarcely
intelligible bargain with the rebel chiefs at Soochow, by which their
lives were to be spared, they were beheaded by order of Li. Gordon
resented this, and, like another Achilles, withdrew to his tent. For
this he was warmly applauded by General Brown, Mr Bruce, and the
Foreign Office, who all denounced Li as the most odious criminal, with
whom no further communication should be held. When, two months later,
Gordon, without consultation with any of these parties, but not
without friendly advice, changed his mind, resumed his friendship with
the governor and active operations in the field, the same chorus of
approval greeted his action as had previously been pronounced of his
inaction. Mr Bruce wrote on February 10, 1864, to Prince Kung, among
other things, that "Major Gordon is to be relieved from any
communication with Governor Li." Within a week Gordon, of his own
motion, had abandoned that position, leaving to the Minister to
explain the change of attitude in any way he pleased, which he did by
resort to that token coinage of diplomatic fiction which serves the
domestic purposes of the craft, but has no market-value outside its
conventional domain. An able explanatory letter from Mr Hart, the new
Inspector-General of Customs, who investigated the transaction on the
spot, would have afforded to the Minister colourable grounds for
"revision" of the earlier judgment, had he been allowed time to avail
himself of it. But Gordon's action forced his hand, and left him no
choice but to acquiesce first and find his reasons afterwards. The
Foreign Office, however, being at a distance, could not be swung back
again so quickly, and they had, on the impulse of the first advices,
withdrawn their sanction for Major Gordon's serving the Chinese at
all. This order reached him after he had, on his own motion,
definitely resigned the service, so that there was no further clashing
of authorities. Though the force contributed materially to the
suppression of the rebellion, the final act, the capture of Nanking,
was left to the unaided resources of the Viceroy Tsêng.
Not the least of Gordon's successes was the peaceable dissolution of
the force when it had done its work; for the establishment was, for
its size, enormously costly, and it was a two-edged sword in the hands
of the Chinese. The "Ever-Victorious Army" was happy in the
opportuneness of its death. A prolonged existence might easily have
dispelled the wonderful prestige it had gained in its short career and
limited scope. Perhaps, after all, its place in history owes
everything to the personality of its last leader, whose legacy to
mankind is not so much a catalogue of achievements as a
life--immortal.
The renown of Gordon and the brilliancy of his exploits have thrown
unduly into the shade the Anglo-Chinese and Franco-Chinese campaign in
the neighbouring province of Chêkiang, which had Ningpo for its sea
base. In their degree these operations were no less essential to the
ultimate overthrow of the rebellion than those in the province of
Kiangsu, and, among many others, the names of Prosper Giquel, who
afterwards managed the arsenal at the Pagoda anchorage, Foochow, and
of the large-hearted bishop, Mgr. Delaplace, afterwards translated to
the metropolitan see, where he died, deserve to be had in remembrance.
Sundry risings in other provinces caused trouble and apprehension; but
we may, for the purposes of this narrative, consider that the year
1864 witnessed the closing scene of the great rebellion.
It would be impossible, within any reasonable space, to follow even in
outline the course of that stupendous devastation, exceeding in its
wanton waste of human life the horrors of the Thirty Years' War in
Germany: our concern has been only with that side of the movement with
which foreign nations were forced into contact, with its political
bearing, and its influence on the position of the Chinese Government.
It happened that only two of the Powers were directly concerned in
offensive operations against the rebels, but in the task of
suppression they had the moral support of them all. Indeed, but for
the French and English activity it seems probable that Russia was
ready single-handed to undertake the whole business. The Russian
Government from time to time signified its approval of the action
taken by the French and English in assisting the Chinese Government to
put down the rebellion. Russia was included in the thanks of the
Chinese to their foreign allies; she had at least furnished material
in the shape of "10,000 rifles and several cannons." These arrived in
Peking, after a protracted journey, at a time when the Russian
Minister deemed it expedient to explain to his British colleagues that
the arms had reference only to the rebellion. Moreover, Russia had, or
professed to have, serious intentions of sending a large force of her
own to co-operate in its suppression. M. Petchroff, a member of the
Russian Legation, spent a month in Shanghai in the autumn of 1862 in
frequent conferences on this subject with the Chinese authorities, the
report of which he carried in person to Admiral Popoff, who was at the
time in Japan. M. Petchroff called upon the British admiral while in
Shanghai, and informed him of this project. It was not carried out, as
Prince Gortchakoff explained to Lord Napier, because the Russian
Government had not force enough available to render effective
assistance, but they wished to show the Chinese that they were in
hearty sympathy with the Anglo-French policy, and might, for moral
effect, show their flag in co-operation, so far as prudence would
allow.
The importance of putting an end to the rebellion, and the value of
foreign aid in doing so, were fully realised by the Peking Government.
Of this the abortive, but costly, Osborn flotilla furnished proof
enough; and the honours bestowed on Gordon by imperial decree were an
expression of the unspeakable relief which was felt in the palace at
the dispelling of the hideous nightmare. A final decree summing up the
movement, in a tone of restrained sincerity not usual in these
conventional documents, says: "Words cannot convey any idea of the
misery and desolation he [the Taiping chief] caused; the measure of
his iniquity was full, and the wrath of both gods and men was roused
against him."
VI. EVACUATION OF CANTON.
Good feeling and compliments on both sides -- Mr Parkes's
able administration of the city.
An event which passed off without the slightest sensation, because
without hitch, was the evacuation of Canton by the Allied troops in
October 1861. Were it only for one clause in the proclamation issued
by the high Chinese authorities on the occasion, this transaction
would form a valuable historical landmark:--
During the occupation of Canton by the allied troops of
England and France during a period of four years, their
conduct has never been otherwise than friendly towards the
military and people of the whole city, and the military and
people having also corresponded with courtesy and
friendship, harmony has been maintained from first to last.
Now that the troops are being withdrawn, the consuls of
England and France will continue to reside within the city,
while the merchants and people of all nations will
constantly pass in and out, or reside therein at their
pleasure. It remains the duty of yourselves, the military
and people, to continue to them the same respectful and
courteous relations that have prevailed during the
occupation.
Compare this with the state of things existing only three years
before! Much of the success of the occupation and its good permanent
results were unquestionably due to the high qualities of Parkes, the
British commissioner, who thus modestly refers to the matter in his
despatch: "The confidence of the people in a strong and inoppressive
Government, added to their own governable character, materially
facilitated the task of maintaining order in a vast and most intricate
city containing a population of upwards of 1,000,000 inhabitants." The
"Canton question" was thus finally disposed of to the satisfaction of
all parties.
VII. DEATH OF THE EMPEROR.
His flight from the capital -- Succession of his son --
Regency of the two empresses -- Prince Kung's sanguinary
_coup d'état_.
Next in importance to the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, the
death of the Emperor Hsienfêng marked the period we are now
considering. That unfortunate monarch, who deserted his capital
against the strongest remonstrances of his advisers, on the approach
of the Allied forces, died at his hiding-place in August 1861, and his
only son was proclaimed in his stead under the style of Tungchih. The
new emperor was a child, and provision had to be made for a regency.
How this regency fell into the hands of two empresses--one the mother
of the young emperor, the other the true widow of the deceased--was
not very well understood by the foreigners then in the capital. Prince
Kung's _coup d'état_, by which the three male members of the regency
were elaborately arraigned and then assassinated, was not organised to
get rid of any imaginary "anti-foreign faction," as was too easily
assumed at the time, but simply and solely to place the empire at the
feet of himself and the emperor's mother. "Parties" in Peking have
always been, and are to this day, a puzzle to foreigners, who, having
seldom at the moment any trustworthy means of informing themselves,
are apt to be carried away by "cries," sometimes got up for the
purpose of misleading them,--for the Chinese are not at all averse
from turning to account the half knowledge on which foreigners are
prone to form their opinions.
VIII. INFLUENCE OF THESE EVENTS ON PROGRESS OF DIPLOMACY.
Inadequacy of foreign diplomacy -- Absence of sovereign --
Allies committed to protection of China -- Coercion
impossible -- Large outlook of Mr Bruce -- The provincial
_versus_ imperial administration -- Attempt to force
Central Government to coerce provincial -- Contemptuous
attitude of Chinese Ministers -- Sir F. Bruce's despair --
He clutches at various straws -- General reaction of
Chinese.
How did these various occurrences influence the progress of diplomatic
relations with the Government? We have seen that diplomacy in Peking
was a venture launched on imported capital, which, meeting with no
indigenous support, was doomed from the first to feed upon itself.
There was no dialect through which the foreign idea could translate
itself to Chinese comprehension, no medium by which Chinese political
conceptions could be made intelligible to the foreigner. When Gordon
could not get his meaning filtered through an interpreter, he called
for a dictionary and put his finger on the word "idiotcy"--and the
most orthodox interpreting could not get much beyond this point in
establishing a common currency for the interchange of national ideas.
The initial difficulty in imposing foreign forms, foreign terms,
foreign procedure--of revolutionising at a stroke a system of
administration petrified by ancient usage--would have existed even if
the statesmen of China had been sincere converts to the innovation.
The contrary was, of course, the case: they were as much opposed to
the new relations as they had been to the military invasion itself. No
help, therefore, was to be expected from the Chinese side in creating
a workable scheme of international intercourse. They desired nothing
of that kind, their ambition soaring no higher than the creation of a
buffer against which external impulsion might expend its force. That
buffer was the Tsungli-Yamên. Foreign diplomacy, therefore, if it were
to subsist at all, must subsist on its own resources, the foundation
of which was force. The force that brought foreigners to Peking must,
either _in esse_ or _in posse_, for an indefinite time keep them there
and render them efficient. Force no doubt would have enabled the
foreign Ministers to bring about even those structural changes in the
Chinese system which were necessary to clear the ground for the
operation of their diplomacy. But if there was one thing more than
another of which Western Governments were determined to convince
themselves, it was that the law of force was finally abrogated in
China; that on a certain day at a certain hour, coincident with the
signing (by force) of a sheet of paper, the spirit of hostility had
departed from the Chinese mind; and that the law of love and reason
was, without preamble, to take the place of that which had brought
about the new relations. Whether believed in or not, this curious
paradox was to be the rule of all future action.
The game that opens with the "king" off the board, and is afterwards
continued with the "queen" protected, is an obviously impossible one.
The foreign Ministers had to do with a Government of irresponsibility,
and instead of teaching its members from the outset to recognise their
new obligations--training them as children, which as regards foreign
matters they really were--the foreign Ministers began by treating the
Chinese Government rather as an infant too delicate for discipline,
with the familiar results of such treatment. The diplomats betrayed so
much anxiety to lure the sovereign back to his palace, that the
Chinese Ministers soon learned to exploit this feeling for their own
ends. That such and such a concession "would have a good effect at
Jêho" was inducement enough to the foreign representatives to waive
one point after another in the transaction of public business. When
the emperor died, after six months of this _régime_ of indulgence, the
position was changed materially for the worse,--for the diplomats had
now a veritable infant on their hands, with a female regent "behind
the curtain." No prospect thenceforth of even the initial formality of
delivering letters of credence until the child should grow up, by
which time many things might happen. Thus the European scheme of
diplomacy, which was to have been imposed bodily on the Court of
Peking, stumbled heavily on the threshold, and never recovered
itself. But the Chinese recovered. Their fear of the "fierce
barbarians" disappeared as they saw them throw away their weapons, and
the process was resumed by which the fruits of the war and of the
treaties of peace were gradually nibbled away.
And of course the whole idea of coercing the Imperial Government, even
had it ever been entertained, was openly reduced to nullity when the
foreign Powers interfered for the suppression of the rebellion. The
Allies could not knock down with one hand what they were propping up
with the other, and thus the Imperial Government not only enjoyed
immunity, but knew that they possessed it,--that their late conquerors
were now fully committed to the upholding of the integrity of China
and the maintenance of the dynasty. Any liberties might consequently
be taken: remonstrances from the foreigners would be loud in
proportion to their hollowness, but the barbarians could not attack a
citadel full of their own hostages.
Although remoteness from the scene of action and imperfect
acquaintance with local requirements were apt to invalidate his
conclusions on points of detail, and to compel him occasionally to
follow where he might have been expected to guide the action of his
subordinate executive, yet whenever Sir Frederick Bruce delivered his
mind on the position of China and her foreign relations as a whole,
his views were large, luminous, and statesmanlike. He foresaw from the
first what the degradation of the Chinese Government must inevitably
lead to. His outlook is revealed in a brief sentence in one of his
earlier despatches: "The weakness of China rather than her strength
is likely to create a fresh Eastern question in these seas." There
need be little doubt that that idea dominated his Chinese diplomacy.
Severity, or even strictness, may well have seemed on the face of the
matter inconsistent with the pious wish to strengthen China, yet we
now know that what she then most needed was to be braced up to the
fulfilment of her obligations as a necessity of her own wellbeing.
The field of diplomacy in the orthodox sense being closed, and there
being no foreign interests in Peking, the subject-matter for the
Ministers' activity was furnished entirely from the trading-ports. Of
these there were fifteen open in 1861. The kind of questions which
arose may be generally defined as claims arising out of breaches of
treaty by provincial officials, for which redress was sought from the
Central Government. This was a reversal of Chinese methods, which,
even had the Government been well disposed, would not have been easy
to effect; and as the Government was hostile, difficulty became
impossibility. The British Minister after a year's trial began to
realise the magnitude of his Sisyphean task. "In a country like
China," he wrote to the Foreign Office in July 1862, "where the
principles of administration differ entirely from those practised by
us, the conclusion of a treaty is the commencement, not the
termination, of difficulties."
To a consul he wrote at the same time: "The important result to be
gained by the establishment of direct relations with the Government of
Peking is the avoidance of local acts of violence.... Time will elapse
before the new system will work smoothly and efficiently, ... but you
must not go beyond pacific efforts to remedy the abuses complained
of." A few months later, in a general circular to consuls, he thus
carefully recapitulated the instruction:--
The object to be attained is that of forcing the local
officials to observe the treaty ... through the pressure
brought to bear upon them by the Peking Government, and
thus escape from the false position in which we have
hitherto been placed of coercing the local authorities and
people, and thus doing the work of the Imperial Government.
To initiate this new system of relations is a task which
can only be effected gradually and patiently; but the
attempt must be steadily and perseveringly made, in order
that the Chinese Government may be forced to teach its
people, &c.
And at the same time he summed up the situation to the Foreign Office
in these words: "Our relations with China cannot be put upon a safe
footing until the Imperial Government itself compels its local
officers to observe treaties"--a matter in which the Central
Government itself most needed compulsion!
But all this about "forcing" the local officials and "forcing" the
Imperial Government, without using any force, recalls the ancient
Chinese maxim of "ruling barbarians by misrule." The world rested
securely enough on the tortoise, but what did the tortoise itself rest
on? With grim satisfaction must the Chinese Ministers have watched the
foreigners entering on a desert campaign where they would exhaust
their strength without reaching the enemy. The warnings and threats
which alone the Minister allowed himself to use to enforce his demands
or his admonitions, as the case might be, were to the Chinese mere
blank cartridge. Prince Kung, replying to one of those minatory
despatches, "imagines that his Excellency uses this outspoken language
for the purpose of stimulating the Chinese Government to activity. His
Highness is sure that it is not his Excellency's desire to act in the
manner indicated." And so on indefinitely. The impression made on the
Chinese Government by the force of foreign diplomacy was likened by an
American Minister twenty years afterwards to "boxing a feather-bed."
The policy above described, inaugurated by Mr Bruce and followed
consistently by the British Government, was pithily termed by Lord
Salisbury, when in Opposition, as an "ideal policy" in pursuit of
which the concrete interests of the country were allowed to lapse.
It would be tedious to trace in detail the process of disintegration
of treaty rights which followed these interesting overtures. It will
be more to the purpose to cite the British Minister's review of the
results twelve months later in a despatch to Prince Kung. This
despatch and the reply to it were deemed so important at the time that
they were separately called for by the House of Commons, and were
published as independent Blue Books (Nos. 6 and 8, 1864):--
Sir Frederick Bruce wished the Prince of Kung to understand
that he had reason to be greatly dissatisfied
1. With the general disregard of treaty provisions
manifested at the ports.
2. With the tone of the Government generally towards
foreigners.
It is entirely due to the exertions of the Allied forces
that Shanghai and Ningpo are not now in rebel possession.
Had Shanghai fallen, the imperial authority would have
received a blow from which it could never have recovered....
Sir F. Bruce did not look for any extraordinary
demonstration of gratitude for these services, but he had
hoped that the Central Government would at least have
insisted on the faithful observance of the treaty at the
ports. He had hoped also that it would have addressed itself
with some increase of vigour to the organisation of a
competent executive.
These expectations have not been realised. At several of the
ports the treaty is daily broken in matters great and small;
and the Central Government, if not unwilling, shows itself
unable to enforce a better order of things. The orders sent
by the Foreign Board, when Sir Frederick Bruce complains,
are not carried out, either because the local authorities do
not stand in awe of the Foreign Board or because they do not
believe the Foreign Board issues them in earnest....
The Foreign Board has gone through the form of issuing
instructions, but the causes of complaint remain as they
were, either because the local authorities do not fear or
because the Foreign Board does not care. Seeing that none of
the authorities complained of have been punished or removed,
that officials notoriously hostile to foreigners have been
appointed to places in which they have increased opportunity
of indulging in their anti-foreign tendencies, while
officials of friendly disposition have been withdrawn, Sir
Frederick Bruce is induced, however reluctantly, to infer
that if the Imperial Government be not adverse to friendly
intercourse, it is, at all events, indisposed to do what is
necessary to teach the people and local authorities that
China is sincerely desirous of friendly relations with
foreign Powers....
It is for the Chinese Government to consider whether it will
listen to these warnings, &c.
_Prince Kung's Reply, 19th June 1863._
With reference to the proposition on which the British
Minister's note insists, that the treaty should rank with
the law, the Prince has to observe that the principle that
the treaty is identical with the laws of the Imperial
Government, and that breach of treaty is the same thing as
violation of the law, is the principle on which the
Government of China proceeds, and its only desire is that
foreign nations should regard the treaty in the same
light....
As regards the cases still undetermined in the provinces,
the Prince hopes that the British Minister will refer to
the record and inform him, case by case, of the particulars
of each, and the Yamên will at once write to the Provincial
Governments concerned to hurry them with the cases
enumerated....
_Sir Frederick Bruce's Reply, July 2, 1863._
Your Imperial Highness states in explicit terms that the
Government of China recognises the treaties as the law of
the empire in its relations with foreigners, and that
breaches of treaty are considered violations of those laws.
But the despatch of your Imperial Highness contains nothing
to show that this principle will be carried out in
practice. I stated instances in which the authorities, in
spite of the remonstrances of her Majesty's consul, had
deliberately set aside the letter of the treaty for no
other object than to curtail the privileges of her
Majesty's subjects. Your Imperial Highness in your reply
does not allude to these cases, nor do you inform me that
any steps have been taken to remedy these grievances or to
prevent a repetition of such conduct. I am simply requested
to send in a list of the grievances complained of; and I am
informed that the local authorities will be urged to settle
them with speed. Such a proposal is entirely
unsatisfactory; for what reason have I to suppose that the
instructions now to be sent by your Imperial Highness will
be attended to, when I see that the orders which I am
assured were given by your Imperial Highness for the
redress of outrages such as ... have been disobeyed?
In these State Papers the relations present and prospective between
China and the outer world are accurately represented. Putting aside
local and temporary questions, the despatches might be dated 1873,
1883, or 1893, for the position remained substantially the same during
the three decades.
The attitude of the British Minister we see to be one of hopeless
pleading and vague admonition; of the Chinese Ministers, elastic
resistance. One wonders how far, under the mask of dull decorum, the
Chinese entered into the real humour of the situation: foreigners
chafing impotently, but with their teeth drawn, occupying themselves
largely with the preservation of China and the dynasty; urging
reforms, military, financial, and administrative, while putting up
with the non-fulfilment of the commonest obligations.
Sir F. Bruce was much too wise a man not to be perfectly conscious of
the negative result of foreign diplomacy in Peking. His private
letters, some of which were published by Mr Lay in 1864, are more
emphatic on the point than his public despatches. He saw it was a case
for desperate remedies, but unfortunately he had no remedy except such
as aggravated the disease. Like a drowning man, Sir Frederick Bruce
clutched at one straw, then another--first at the inspectorate of
customs, then at the collective body of his colleagues--to redress the
balance which lay so heavily against him. We see in the despatch of
June 12, 1863, the inception of what became known as the "co-operative
policy." That was an arrangement by which the cause of one foreigner
was to be made the cause of all, so that the treaty Powers might
present a solid front to the Chinese. Unfortunately such a policy
bears no fruit, since half-a-dozen Powers with separate interests, and
of varying tempers, can only unite in doing nothing. The co-operative
policy, therefore, by tying the hands of all the Powers, rendered the
Chinese more secure than ever from outside interference.