OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of
the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in
exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice
also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly
together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being
suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch are
called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency,
we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which
indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have
said, not imagining how these simple ideas CAN subsist by themselves,
we accustom ourselves to suppose some SUBSTRATUM wherein they do
subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call
SUBSTANCE.
2. Our obscure Idea of Substance in general.
So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure
substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all,
but only a supposition of he knows not what SUPPORT of such qualities
which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are
commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the
subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say,
but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that
solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case
than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was
supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on;
to which his answer was—a great tortoise: but being again pressed to
know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied—SOMETHING,
HE KNEW NOT WHAT. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use
words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children:
who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not,
readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is SOMETHING: which in
truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but
that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and
talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are
perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to
which we give the GENERAL name substance, being nothing but the
supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing,
which we imagine cannot subsist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, without something to
support them, we call that support SUBSTANTIA; which, according to the
true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or
upholding.
3. Of the Sorts of Substances.
An obscure and relative idea of SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL being thus made we
come to have the ideas of PARTICULAR SORTS OF SUBSTANCES, by collecting
SUCH combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation
of men’s senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore
supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown
essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man,
horse, gold, water, &c.; of which substances, whether any one has any
other CLEAR idea, further than of certain simple ideas co-existent
together, I appeal to every one’s own experience. It is the ordinary
qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the
true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller
commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever SUBSTANTIAL
FORMS he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what
is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found
in them: only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of
substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have
always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in
which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of
substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as body
is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a
thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to
draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and
the like fashions of speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed
always SOMETHING BESIDES the extension, figure, solidity, motion,
thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.
4. No clear or distinct idea of Substance in general.
Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal
substances, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have of either of
them be but the complication or collection of those several simple
ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the thing
called horse or stone; yet, BECAUSE WE CANNOT CONCEIVE HOW THEY SHOULD
SUBSIST ALONE, NOR ONE IN ANOTHER, we suppose them existing in and
supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name
substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of
that thing we suppose a support.
5. As clear an Idea of spiritual substance as of corporeal substance.
The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking,
reasoning, fearing, &c., which we concluding not to subsist of
themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be
produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other
SUBSTANCE, which we call SPIRIT; whereby yet it is evident that, having
no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many
sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a
substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving,
&c., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit,
as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what
it is) the SUBSTRATUM to those simple ideas we have from without; and
the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the
SUBSTRATUM to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is
plain then, that the idea of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE in matter is as remote
from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE,
or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the
substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we
can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as
rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and
distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit,
because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a
spirit.
6. Our ideas of particular Sorts of Substances.
Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in
general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of
substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas,
co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the
whole subsist of itself. It is by such combinations of simple ideas,
and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to
ourselves; such are the ideas we have of their several species in our
minds; and such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others,
v.g. man, horse, sun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one
who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of those
several simple ideas which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist
together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in and
be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres
not in anything else. Though, in the meantime, it be manifest, and
every one, upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find, that he has
no other idea of any substance, v.g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man,
vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities,
which he supposes to inhere; with a supposition of such a substratum as
gives, as it were, a support to those qualities or simple ideas, which
he has observed to exist united together. Thus, the idea of the
sun,—what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright,
hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance
from us, and perhaps some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the
sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible
qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls
the sun.
7. Their active and passive Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of
Substances.
For he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of
substances, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple
ideas which do exist in it; among which are to be reckoned its active
powers, and passive capacities, which, though not simple ideas, yet in
this respect, for brevity’s sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned
amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of
the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone; and a power to
be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers
pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because every substance,
being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible
qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple
ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible
qualities introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers
which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its
sensible qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately by our
senses perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly
considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in US: we
also by our senses perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal,
whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has
to change the colour and consistency of WOOD. By the former, fire
immediately, by the latter, it mediately discovers to us these several
powers; which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of
fire, and so make them a part of the complex idea of it. For all those
powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration
of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and
so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas, therefore it is that I
have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the
complex ones of the sorts of substances; though these powers considered
in themselves, are truly complex ideas. And in this looser sense I
crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these POTENTIALITIES
among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of
PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES. For the powers that are severally in them are
necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct notions of
the several sorts of substances.
8. And why.
Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas
of substances; since their secondary qualities are those which in most
of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another,
and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the
several sorts of them. For, our senses failing us in the discovery of
the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which
their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make
use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical notes and
marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them
one from another: all which secondary qualities, as has been shown, are
nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taste of opium are, as well
as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere powers, depending on its
primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations
on different parts of our bodies.
9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Corporeal Substances.
The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances, are of
these three sorts. First, the ideas of the primary qualities of things,
which are discovered by our senses, and are in them even when we
perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and
motion of the parts of bodies; which are really in them, whether we
take notice of them or not. Secondly, the sensible secondary qualities,
which, depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances
have to produce several ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not
in the things themselves, otherwise than as anything is in its cause.
Thirdly, the aptness we consider in any substance, to give or receive
such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered
should produce in us different ideas from what it did before; these are
called active and passive powers: all which powers, as far as we have
any notice or notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple ideas.
For whatever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute
particles of iron, we should have no notion of any power it had at all
to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it: and I
doubt not, but there are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily
handle have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect,
because they never appear in sensible effects.
10. Powers thus make a great Part of our complex Ideas of particular
Substances.
POWERS therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of
substances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find
several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers; as the power of
being melted, but of not spending itself in the fire; of being
dissolved in AQUA REGIA, are ideas as necessary to make up our complex
idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are
also nothing but different powers. For, to speak truly, yellowness is
not actually in gold, but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us
by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we cannot
leave out of our ideas of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than
the white colour it introduces into wax. These are both equally powers
in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its sensible parts,
so on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat; and so on wax, as to
make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.
11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could
discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.
Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies,
and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I
doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us: and that
which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then disappear, and
instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts, of a certain
size and figure. This microscopes plainly discover to us; for what to
our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the
acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and
the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute
parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different ideas
from what it did before. Thus, sand or pounded glass, which is opaque,
and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair
seen in this way, loses its former colour, and is, in a great measure,
pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours, such as
appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies.
Blood, to the naked eye, appears all red; but by a good microscope,
wherein its lesser parts appear, shows only some few globules of red,
swimming in a pellucid liquor, and how these red globules would appear,
if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them a thousand or ten
thousand times more, is uncertain.
12. Our Faculties for Discovery of the Qualities and powers of
Substances suited to our State.
The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted
our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniences of life, and the
business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and
distinguish things: and to examine them so far as to apply them to our
uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigences of this life. We
have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful
effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power and goodness of their
Author. Such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present
condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not that God
intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of
them: that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We
are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover
enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and
the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities
to provide for the conveniences of living: these are our business in
this world. But were our senses altered, and made much quicker and
acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite
another face to us; and, I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with
our being, or at least wellbeing, in the part of the universe which we
inhabit. He that considers how little our constitution is able to bear
a remove into part of this air, not much higher than that we commonly
breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this globe of
earth allotted for our mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our
organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our
sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is, how
would a perpetual noise distract us. And we should in the quietest
retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a
sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in
any man a thousand or a hundred thousand times more acute than it is by
the best microscope, things several millions of times less than the
smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked
eyes, and so he would come nearer to the discovery of the texture and
motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in many of them,
probably get ideas of their internal constitutions: but then he would
be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear
the same to him and others: the visible ideas of everything would be
different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could
discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication
about colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps
such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright
sunshine, or so much as open daylight; nor take in but a very small
part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distance.
And if by the help of such MICROSCOPICAL EYES (if I may so call them) a
man could penetrate further than ordinary into the secret composition
and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by
the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to
the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at
a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with by
those sensible qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to
see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock,
and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion
depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: but if eyes
so framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the
hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what o’clock it was, their
owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it
discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him
lose its use.
13. Conjecture about the corporeal organs of some Spirits.
And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine,
viz. That since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given
to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for) to
imagine, that Spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different
bulk, figure, and conformation of parts—whether one great advantage
some of them have over us may not lie in this, that they can so frame
and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit
them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they
would consider. For how much would that man exceed all others in
knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his
eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees
of vision which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lighted
on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who
could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects, as to see when he
pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and
other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the
shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us, in our present
state, unalterable organs, so contrived as to discover the figure and
motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible
qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God
has no doubt made them so as is best for us in our present condition.
He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us,
and we have to do with; and though we cannot, by the faculties we have,
attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well
enough for those ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment.
I beg my reader’s pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy
concerning the ways of perception of beings above us; but how
extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine anything about
the knowledge of angels but after this manner, some way or other in
proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though we
cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame
creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things
without them than what we have, yet our thoughts can go no further than
our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond
the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection. The
supposition, at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs
not startle us; since some of the most ancient and most learned Fathers
of the church seemed to believe that they had bodies: and this is
certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.
14. Our specific Ideas of Substances.
But to return to the matter in hand,—the ideas we have of substances,
and the ways we come by them. I say, our SPECIFIC ideas of substances
are nothing else but A COLLECTION OF CERTAIN NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS,
CONSIDERED AS UNITED IN ONE THING. These ideas of substances, though
they are commonly simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple
terms, yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an
Englishman signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red
beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with
a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise,
and perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds, some
other properties: which all terminate in sensible simple ideas, all
united in one common subject.
15. Our Ideas of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily
Substances.
Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances, of
which I have last spoken,—by the simple ideas we have taken from those
operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as
thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning
motion, &c., co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the
COMPLEX IDEA OF AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT. And thus, by putting together the
ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves
and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of
immaterial substances as we have of material. For putting together the
ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting
corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct
idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together
the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved joined
with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the
idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other:
the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct
ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our
idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all, in both: it is
but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call
accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that
our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation,
when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature,
the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing,
&c., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that
sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being
within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the
action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an
immaterial thinking being.
16. No Idea of abstract Substance either in Body or Spirit.
By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other
sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from
the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor
after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have
with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive
and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that
they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body, than
they have belonging to immaterial spirit.
17. Cohesion of solid parts and Impulse, the primary ideas peculiar to
Body.
The primary ideas we have PECULIAR TO BODY, as contradistinguished to
spirit, are the COHESION OF SOLID, AND CONSEQUENTLY SEPARABLE, PARTS,
and a POWER OF COMMUNICATING MOTION BY IMPULSE. These, I think, are the
original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the
consequence of finite extension.
18. Thinking and Motivity
The ideas we have belonging and PECULIAR TO SPIRIT, are THINKING, and
WILL, or A POWER OF PUTTING BODY INTO MOTION BY THOUGHT, AND, WHICH IS
CONSEQUENT TO IT, LIBERTY. For, as body cannot but communicate its
motion by impulse to another body, which it meets with at rest, so the
mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases.
The ideas of EXISTENCE, DURATION, and MOBILITY, are common to them
both.
19. Spirits capable of Motion.
There is no reason why it should be thought strange that I make
mobility belong to spirit; for having no other idea of motion, but
change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest;
and finding that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where
they are; and that spirits do operate at several times in several
places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits:
(for of the Infinite Spirit I speak not here). For my soul, being a
real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing
distance with any other body, or being, as body itself; and so is
capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain
distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may
certainly conceive a distance and a change of distance, between two
spirits; and so conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one
from another.
20. Proof of this.
Every one finds in himself that his soul can think, will, and operate
on his body in the place where that is, but cannot operate on a body,
or in a place, an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine
that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at
London; and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it
constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and
London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and I think may be
said to be truly all that while in motion or if that will not be
allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being
separated from the body in death, I think, will; for to consider it as
going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its
motion, seems to me impossible.
21. God immoveable because infinite.
If it be said by any one that it cannot change place, because it hath
none, for the spirits are not IN LOCO, but UBI; I suppose that way of
talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not
much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such
unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any
sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present
purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then
from thence draw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not
capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God; not
because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.
22. Our complex idea of an immaterial Spirit and our complex idea of
Body compared.
Let us compare, then, our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our
complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in
one than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of BODY, as I think,
is AN EXTENDED SOLID SUBSTANCE, CAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING MOTION BY
IMPULSE: and our idea of SOUL, AS AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT, is of A
SUBSTANCE THAT THINKS, AND HAS A POWER OF EXCITING MOTION IN BODY, BY
WILLING, OR THOUGHT. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and
body, as contradistinguished; and now let us examine which has most
obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know that people
whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their
minds to their senses that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them,
are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a THINKING thing which perhaps
is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more
comprehend an EXTENDED thing.
23. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body as hard to be conceived as thinking
in a Soul.
If any one says he knows not what it is thinks in him, he means he
knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I,
knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Further, if he says
he knows not how he thinks, I answer, Neither knows he how he is
extended, how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to
make extension. For though the pressure of the particles of air may
account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser
than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of
air, yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be
a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the
pressure of the aether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite,
and hold fast together, the parts of a particle of air, as well as
other bodies, yet it cannot make bonds for ITSELF, and hold together
the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that MATERIA
SUBTILIS. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by
showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the
pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of
the aether itself; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the
parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the
aether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and
union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the
cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the aether itself: which we
can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible,
nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion
which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.
24. Not explained by an ambient fluid.
But, in truth, the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can
be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter.
For, though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished
superficies, one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in
the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never in the least
hinder the separation by a motion, in a line parallel to those
surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed
in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a
motion of bodies, so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of
that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no
other body; and therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion,
all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding
motion. For if the pressure of the aether be the adequate cause of
cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion.
And since it cannot operate against a lateral separation, (as has been
shown,) therefore in every imaginary plane, intersecting any mass of
matter, there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces,
which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid,
easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea
soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but
the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his
mind, may have reason to conclude, That it is as easy for him to have a
clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended. For, since body
is no further, nor otherwise, extended, than by the union and cohesion
of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body,
without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its
parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking,
and how it is performed.
We can as little understand how the parts cohere in extension as how
our spirits perceive or move.
25. I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should
find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not
see (will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly
together? Is there anything more common? And what doubt can there be
made of it? And the like, I say, concerning thinking and voluntary
motion. Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves, and
therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess;
but when we would a little nearer look into it, both in the one and the
other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as
how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly
explain to me how the parts of gold, or brass, (that but now in fusion
were as loose from one another as the particles of water, or the sands
of an hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so
strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men’s arms cannot
separate them? A considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to
satisfy his own, or another man’s understanding.
26. The cause of coherence of atoms in extended substances
incomprehensible.
The little bodies that compose that fluid we call water are so
extremely small, that I have never heard of any one who, by a
microscope, (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to ten
thousand; nay, to much above a hundred thousand times,) pretended to
perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion; and the particles of
water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least
force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual
motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and
yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate; these
little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He
that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies
together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them
stick so fast one to another, would discover a great and yet unknown
secret: and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making
the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts)
intelligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union, or
consolidation of the parts of those bonds or of that cement, or of the
least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears that this
primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found, when
examined, to be as incomprehensible as anything belonging to our minds,
and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking
immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.
27. The supposed pressure [*dropped word] explain cohesion is
unintelligible.
For, to extend our thoughts a little further, the pressure which is
brought to explain the cohesion of bodies [*dropped line] considered,
as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the
extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what
bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure
together; from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a
diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite, it
must have its extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from
scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw
himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him
consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body, and
whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it
into a supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all
other: so far is our extension of body (which is nothing but the
cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, when we
would inquire into the nature, cause, or manner of it, than the idea of
thinking.
28. Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally
unintelligible.
Another idea we have of body is, THE POWER OF COMMUNICATION OF MOTION
BY IMPULSE; and of our souls, THE POWER OF EXCITING MOTION BY THOUGHT.
These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day’s
experience clearly furnishes us with: but if here again we inquire how
this is done, we are equally in the dark. For, in the communication of
motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got
to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other
conception, but of the passing of motion out of one body into another;
which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move
or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The
increase of motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes
to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience
clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought; but
the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension: we are equally
at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion, and its
communication, either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to
spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we
consider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, motivity, it
is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one
another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to
move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind every day
affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore
it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper
attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be
conjectured that created spirits are not totally separate from matter,
because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is
only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both
active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it
will, I think, we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit
as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally
unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit, as clear as of
extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we
attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe
to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both these, though
our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For, when the mind
would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or
reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production,
we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.
29. Summary.
To conclude. Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended
substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience
assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a
power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot
doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear
ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as
received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we
would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we
perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If
we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and
there is no more difficulty to conceive how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT
should, by thought, set body into motion, than how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW
NOT should, by impulse, set body into motion. So that we are no more
able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than
those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that
the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the
boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it
would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any
discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of
those ideas.
30. Our idea of Spirit and our idea of Body compared.
So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea
we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirits is unknown to
us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary
qualities or properties of body, viz. solid coherent parts and impulse,
we have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise we know, and have distinct
clear ideas, of two primary qualities or properties of spirit, viz.
thinking, and a power of action; i.e. a power of beginning or stopping
several thoughts or motions. We have also the ideas of several
qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear distinct ideas of
them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the
extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise
the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz. believing, doubting,
intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of
thinking. We have also the ideas of willing, and moving the body
consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shown,
spirit is capable of motion.
31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it than that of
Body.
Lastly, if this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some
difficulties in it not easily to be explained, we have therefore no
more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we
have to deny or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body
is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to
be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced
anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a
contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the
divisibility IN INFINITUM of any finite extension involving us, whether
we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or
made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater
difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than anything can follow from
the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.
32. We know nothing of things beyond our simple Ideas of them.
Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few
superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from
without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself
within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal
constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties
to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves
knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we
experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and
separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies;
we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial
spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as
well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking
should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a
contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from
thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from
another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of
solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing
without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without
thinking, i.e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to
conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter
should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas
we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature
of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness
and difficulties, and can discover nothing further but our own
blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be
clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the
simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received
from sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas of
substances, even of God himself.
33. Our complex idea of God.
For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme
Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way; and that the
complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made of
the simple ideas we receive from reflection; v.g. having, from what we
experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of
knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other
qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without;
when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme
Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so
putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind
has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from
sensation and reflection, has been already shown.
34. Our complex idea of God as infinite.
If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all,
perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many;
which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus
enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all
things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them
more perfectly; i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences,
and relations, &c., till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can
any way relate to them: and thus frame the idea of infinite or
boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come
to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence,
without beginning or end, and so frame the idea of an eternal being.
The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and
all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that
sovereign Being, which we call G-d, being all boundless and infinite,
we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is
done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the
operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our senses, from
exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.
35. God in his own essence incognisable.
For it is infinity, which, joined to our ideas of existence, power,
knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to
ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For, though in his own
essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence
of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and
uncompounded; yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him, but a
complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c., infinite
and eternal: which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being
relative, are again compounded of others: all which being, as has been
shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the
idea or notion we have of God.
36. No Ideas in our complex ideas of Spirits, but those got from
Sensation or Reflection.
This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to
God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of
other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas,
belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we
receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to
spirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the
difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is
only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power,
duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as
of other things, we are restrained to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION
AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits,
how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to
that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein
they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily
conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter
knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a
perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are
fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are
therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are
capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in
ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how
spirits, which use not words, can with quickness; or much less how
spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and
communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but
necessarily suppose they have such a power.
37. Recapitulation.
And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of SUBSTANCES OF ALL
KINDS, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I
think, it is very evident,
First, That all our ideas of the several SORTS of substances are
nothing but collections of simple ideas: with a supposition of
SOMETHING to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of
this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.
Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common
SUBSTRATUM, make up our complex ideas of several SORTS of substances,
are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection.
So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted
with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged
conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those
which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely
surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection; or
discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but
those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or
reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and
particularly of God himself.
Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas
of substances, when truly considered, are only POWERS, however we are
apt to take them for positive qualities; v.g. the greatest part of the
ideas that make our complex idea of GOLD are yellowness, great weight,
ductility, fusibility, and solubility in AQUA REGIA, &c., all united
together in an unknown SUBSTRATUM: all which ideas are nothing else but
so many relations to other substances; and are not really in the gold,
considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and
primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a
fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other
substances.