OF MIXED MODES.
1. Mixed Modes, what.
Having treated of SIMPLE MODES in the foregoing chapters, and given
several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to show
what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to
consider those we call MIXED MODES; such are the complex ideas we mark
by the names OBLIGATION, DRUNKENNESS, a LIE, &c.; which consisting of
several combinations of simple ideas of DIFFERENT kinds, I have called
mixed modes, to distinguish them from the more simple modes, which
consist only of simple ideas of the SAME kind. These mixed modes, being
also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be
characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence,
but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are
thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.
2. Made by the Mind.
That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and
receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as
sensation or reflection offers them, without being able to MAKE any one
idea, experience shows us. But if we attentively consider these ideas I
call mixed modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their origin
quite different. The mind often exercises an ACTIVE power in making
these several combinations. For, it being once furnished with simple
ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make
variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so
together in nature. And hence I think it is that these ideas are called
NOTIONS: as they had their original, and constant existence, more in
the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such
ideas, it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and
that they were consistent in the understanding without considering
whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but several of
them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several
simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the
understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of HYPOCRISY,
might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who
made show of good qualities which he had not; or else have framed that
idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For
it is evident that, in the beginning of languages and societies of men,
several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the
constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the
minds of men before they existed anywhere else; and that many names
that stood for such complex ideas were in use, and so those ideas
framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.
3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.
Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words standing for
such combinations, an usual way of GETTING these complex ideas is, by
the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of
a company of simple ideas combined, they may, by words standing for
those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one who understands
those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never
offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may
come to have the idea of SACRILEGE or MURDER, by enumerating to him the
simple ideas which these words stand for; without ever seeing either of
them committed.
4. The Name ties the Parts of mixed Modes into one Idea.
Every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems
reasonable to inquire, Whence it has its unity; and how such a precise
multitude comes to make but one idea; since that combination does not
always exist together in nature? To which I answer, it is plain it has
its unity from an act of the mind, combining those several simple ideas
together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those
parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally
to complete it, is one NAME given to that combination. For it is by
their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct
species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of
simple ideas to make one complex one, but such collections as there be
names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature
to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man’s father; yet,
there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the
name of PARRICIDE to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular
complex idea, nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a
young man, or any other man.
5. The Cause of making mixed Modes.
If we should inquire a little further, to see what it is that occasions
men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as
it were, settled modes, and neglect others, which in the nature of
things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined and make
distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of
language; which being to mark, or communicate men’s thoughts to one
another with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make SUCH
collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as
they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation,
leaving others which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose
and without names that tie them together: they rather choosing to
enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the
particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by
multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they seldom or
never have any occasion to make use of.
6. Why Words in one Language have none answering in another.
This shows us how it comes to pass that there are in every language
many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word
of another. For the several fashions, customs, and manners of one
nation, making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in
one, which another people have had never an occasion to make, or
perhaps so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed
to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation; and
so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus
ostrakismos amongst the Greeks, and proscriptio amongst the Romans,
were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered;
because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the
men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no
notion of any such actions; no use of such combinations of ideas as
were united, and, as it were, tied together, by those terms: and
therefore in other countries there were no names for them.
7. And Languages change.
Hence also we may see the reason, why languages constantly change, take
up new and lay by old terms. Because change of customs and opinions
bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is necessary
frequently to think on and talk about, new names, to avoid long
descriptions, are annexed to them; and so they become new species of
complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means
wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is
thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to
enumerate all the ideas that either REPRIEVE or APPEAL stand for; and
instead of either of those names, use a periphrasis, to make any one
understand their meaning.
8. Mixed Modes
Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at-large when I come
to treat of Words and their use, yet I could not avoid to take thus
much notice here of the NAMES OF MIXED MODES; which being fleeting and
transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short
existence anywhere but in the minds of men, and there too have no
longer any existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much
anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their
names: which are therefore, in this sort of ideas, very apt to be taken
for the ideas themselves. For, if we should inquire where the idea of a
TRIUMPH or APOTHEOSIS exists, it is evident they could neither of them
exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves, being actions that
required time to their performance, and so could never all exist
together; and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions
are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain
existence: and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that
excite them in us.
9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.
There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of
mixed modes:—(1) By experience and OBSERVATION of things themselves:
thus, by seeing two men mixed wrestle or fence, we get the idea of
wrestling or fencing. (2) By INVENTION, or voluntary putting together
of several simple ideas in our own minds: so he that first invented
printing or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever
existed. (3) Which is the most usual way, by EXPLAINING THE NAMES of
actions we never saw, or motions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and
thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those ideas
which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them.
For, having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple
ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those
means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive;
so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us
the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable
into simple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up,
though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also
complex ideas. Thus, the mixed mode which the word LIE stands for is
made of these simple ideas:—(1) Articulate sounds. (2) Certain ideas in
the mind of the speaker. (3) Those words the signs of those ideas. (4)
Those signs put together, by affirmation or negation, otherwise than
the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need
not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie:
what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas.
And it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to
trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple
idea that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he
cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all
our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and
decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all
the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall
we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a
number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple
modes number and figure alone afford us. How far then mixed modes,
which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and
their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily
imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be
afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to
range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas,
received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.
10. Motion, Thinking, and Power have been most modified.
It is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been MOST
modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given
to them. And those have been these three:—THINKING and MOTION (which
are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action,) and POWER, from
whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say,
of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most
modified; and out of whose modifications have been made most complex
modes, with names to them. For ACTION being the great business of
mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it
is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be
taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory,
and have names assigned to them; without which laws could be but ill
made, or vice and disorders repressed. Nor could any communication be
well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them:
and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in
their minds, of modes of actions, distinguished by their causes, means,
objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and
also of their powers fitted for those actions: v.g. BOLDNESS is the
power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or
disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar
name, [word in Greek]: which power or ability in man of doing anything,
when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that
idea we name HABIT; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion
to break into action, we call it DISPOSITION. Thus, TESTINESS is a
disposition or aptness to be angry.
To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v.g. CONSIDERATION and
ASSENT, which are actions of the mind; RUNNING and SPEAKING, which are
actions of the body; REVENGE and MURDER, which are actions of both
together, and we shall find them but so many collections of simple
ideas, which, together, make up the complex ones signified by those
names.
11. Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the effect.
POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances
wherein these powers are, when they *[lost line??] exert this power
into act, are called CAUSES, and the substances which thereupon are
produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by
the exerting of that power, are called EFFECTS. The EFFICACY whereby
the new substance or idea is produced is called, in the subject
exerting that power, ACTION; but in the subject wherein any simple idea
is changed or produced, it is called PASSION: which efficacy, however
various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive
it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking
and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of
motion. I say I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these
two. For whatever sort of action besides these produces any effects, I
confess myself to have no notion nor idea of; and so it is quite remote
from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark
to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man.
And therefore many words which seem to express some action, signify
nothing of the action or MODUS OPERANDI at all, but barely the effect,
with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating:
v.g. CREATION, ANNIHILATION, contain in them no idea of the action or
manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the
thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though
the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies
nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid is become
hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby
it is done.
12. Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas than those of Power and
Action.
I think I shall not need to remark here that, though power and action
make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in
the minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and their several
combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be
necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been
settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the
greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and
politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my
present design, is to show what sort of ideas those are which I call
mixed modes; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions
made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection; which I
suppose I have done.