OF PERCEPTION.
1. Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection.
PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our
ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection,
and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the
propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in
the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with
some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare
naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and
what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.
2. Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is.
What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he
does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any
discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind
cannot miss it. And if he does not reflect, all the words in the world
cannot make him have any notion of it.
3. Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic
impression.
This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if
they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward
parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception.
Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet,
unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of
heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind; wherein consists actual
perception.
4. Impulse on the organ insufficient.
How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is
intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously
surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions
of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same
alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A
sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the
observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the
motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet
no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any
defect in the organ, or that the man’s ears are less affected than at
other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea,
though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the
understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no
sensation. So that wherever there is sense of perception, there some
idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.
5. Children, though they may have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.
Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses
about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas
before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies
that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer;
amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable
of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two: which
probably are some of the first that children have, and which they
scarce ever part with again.
6. The effects of Sensation in the womb.
But though it be reasonable to imagine that children receive some ideas
before they come into the world, yet these simple ideas are far from
those INNATE PRINCIPLES which some contend for, and we, above, have
rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, are
only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and
so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in
their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense, but
only in the precedency of time. Whereas those innate principles are
supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any
accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were,
original characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its
being and constitution.
7. Which Ideas appear first is not evident, nor important.
As there are some ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be
introduced into the minds of children in the womb, subservient to the
necessities of their life and being there: so, after they are born,
those ideas are the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible
qualities which first occur to them; amongst which light is not the
least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the
mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain
accompanying them, may be a little guessed by what is observable in
children new-born; who always turn their eyes to that part from whence
the light comes, lay them how you please. But the ideas that are most
familiar at first, being various according to the divers circumstances
of children’s first entertainment in the world, the order wherein the
several ideas come at first into the mind is very various, and
uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.
8. Sensations often changed by the Judgment.
We are further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we
receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the
judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes
a round globe of any uniform colour, v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it
is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat
circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and
brightness coming to our eyes. But we having, by use, been accustomed
to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in
us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the
difference of the sensible figures of bodies;—the judgment presently,
by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes. So
that from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting
the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself
the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour; when the idea
we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is
evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of
that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the
learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a
letter some months since; and it is this:—“Suppose a man BORN blind,
and now adult, and taught by his TOUCH to distinguish between a cube
and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as
to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the
sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the
blind man be made to see: quaere, whether BY HIS SIGHT, BEFORE HE
TOUCHED THEM, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe,
which the cube?” To which the acute and judicious proposer answers,
“Not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a
cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience,
that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so;
or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand
unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.”—I agree
with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his
answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first
sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe,
which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly
name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the
difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with
my reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be
beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he
thinks he had not the least use of, or help from them. And the rather,
because this observing gentleman further adds, that “having, upon the
occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he
hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he
thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.”
9. This judgement apt to be mistaken for direct perception.
But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received
by sight. Because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses,
conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are
peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space,
figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the
appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring
ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases
by a settled habit,—in things whereof we have frequent experience is
performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the
perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so
that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and
is scarce taken notice of itself;—as a man who reads or hears with
attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or
sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.
10. How, by Habit, ideas of Sensation are unconsciously changed into
ideas of Judgment.
Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we
consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed. For, as
itself is thought to take up no space to have no extension; so its
actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded
into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body.
Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the
pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds,
with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very
well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to
put it into words, and step by step show it another? Secondly, we shall
not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice,
if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a
custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice.
Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to
produce actions in us, which often escape our observation. How
frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without
perceiving that we are at all in the dark! Men that, by custom, have
got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds
which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear
nor observe. And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should
often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and
make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of
it.
11. Perception puts the difference between Animals and Vegetables.
This faculty of perception seems to me to be, that which puts the
distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of
nature. For, however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of
motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do
very briskly alter their figures and motions, and so have obtained the
name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to
that which in animals follows upon sensation: yet I suppose it is all
bare MECHANISM; and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild
oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles of moisture, or the
shortening of a rope, by the affusion of water. All which is done
without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any
ideas.
12. Perception in all animals.
Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals;
though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the
reception of sensations are so few, and the perception they are
received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the
quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals; but yet
it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of
that sort of animals who are thus made. So that the wisdom and goodness
of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric,
and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.
13. According to their condition.
We may, I think, from the make of an oyster or cockle, reasonably
conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick senses as a man, or
several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and
incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be
bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature
that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it
perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an
inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once
placed it, and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or
foul water, as it happens to come to it?
14. Decay of perception in old age.
But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception, whereby
they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be
so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one in whom
decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and
clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and has,
by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a
great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter;
or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made
are scarcely perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one
(notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his
knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or
an oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty
years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three
days, I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual
perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.
15. Perception the Inlet of all materials of Knowledge.
Perception then being the FIRST step and degree towards knowledge, and
the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well
as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions
are that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are that are
employed about them,—the more remote are they from that knowledge which
is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees
(as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the
several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals.
It suffices me only to have remarked here,—that perception is the first
operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all
knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is
perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries
between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention
only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in
hand which way the learned shall determine of it.