SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION.
1. Positive Ideas from privative causes.
Concerning the simple ideas of Sensation; it is to be considered,—that
whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our
senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in
the understanding a simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause
of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty,
it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive
idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though,
perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation of the subject.
2. Ideas in the mind distinguished from that in things which gives rise
to them.
Thus the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black,
motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind;
though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them are barely
privations, in those subjects from whence our senses derive those
ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as
distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that
produce them: which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is
in the understanding, but to the nature of the things existing without
us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be
distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of
white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles
they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object
appear white or black.
3. We may have the ideas when we are ignorant of their physical causes.
A painter or dyer who never inquired into their causes hath the ideas
of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and
distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the
philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and
thinks he knows how far either of them is, in its cause, positive or
privative; and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than
that of white, however the cause of that colour in the external object
may be only a privation.
4. Why a privative cause in nature may occasion a positive idea.
If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the
natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a
reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a
positive idea; viz. that all sensation being produced in us only by
different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously
agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must
as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of
it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different
motion of the animal spirits in that organ.
5. Negative names need not be meaningless.
But whether this be so or not I will not here determine, but appeal to
every one’s own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it
consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence
of light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a man
looks on it, cause as clear and positive idea in his mind, as a man
himself, though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a
shadow is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative names, to which
there be no positive ideas; but they consist wholly in negation of some
certain ideas, as SILENCE, INVISIBLE; but these signify not any ideas
in the mind but their absence.
6. Whether any ideas are due to causes really private.
And thus one may truly be said to see darkness. For, supposing a hole
perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one
may see the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I
write with makes any other idea, is a question. The privative causes I
have here assigned of positive ideas are according to the common
opinion; but, in truth, it will be hard to determine whether there be
really any ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined, whether
rest be any more a privation than motion.
7. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.
To discover the nature of our IDEAS the better, and to discourse of
them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them AS THEY
ARE IDEAS OR PERCEPTIONS IN OUR MINDS; and AS THEY ARE MODIFICATIONS OF
MATTER IN THE BODIES THAT CAUSE SUCH PERCEPTIONS IN US: that so we may
not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images
and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of
sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing
without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our
ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.
8. Our Ideas and the Qualities of Bodies.
Whatsoever the mind perceives IN ITSELF, or is the immediate object of
perception, thought, or understanding, that I call IDEA; and the power
to produce any idea in our mind, I call QUALITY of the subject wherein
that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the
ideas of white, cold, and round,—the power to produce those ideas in
us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are
sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas;
which IDEAS, if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves, I
would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which
produce them in us.
9. Primary Qualities of Bodies.
Concerning these qualities, we, I think, observe these primary ones in
bodies that produce simple ideas in us, viz. SOLIDITY, EXTENSION,
MOTION or REST, NUMBER or FIGURE. These, which I call ORIGINAL or
PRIMARY qualities of body, are wholly inseparable from it; and such as
in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be
used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds
in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and
the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less
than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v.g. Take a
grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity,
extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still
the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become
insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities.
For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body,
does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take
away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but
only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that
which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so
many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number.
10. [not in early editions]
11. How Bodies produce Ideas in us.
The next thing to be considered is, how bodies operate one upon
another; and that is manifestly by impulse, and nothing else. It being
impossible to conceive that body should operate on WHAT IT DOES NOT
TOUCH (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not),
or when it does touch, operate any other way than by motion.
12. By motions, external, and in our organism.
If then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce
ideas therein; and yet we perceive these ORIGINAL qualities in such of
them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion
must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some
parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to
produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since
the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable
bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident
some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them; to the eyes, and
thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas
which we have of them in us.
13. How secondary Qualities produce their ideas.
After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are
produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of SECONDARY qualities
are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our
senses. For, it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of
bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses
discover either their bulk, figure, or motion,—as is evident in the
particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than
those; perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water, as
the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or
hail-stones;—let us suppose at present that, the different motions and
figures, bulk and number, of such particles, affecting the several
organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we
have from the colours and smells of bodies; v.g. that a violet, by the
impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and
bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions,
causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower to
be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive that
God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no
similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of
a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no
resemblance.
14. They depend on the primary Qualities.
What I have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also
of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities; which,
whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing
in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in
us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture,
and motion of parts and therefore I call them SECONDARY QUALITIES.
15. Ideas of primary Qualities are Resemblances; of secondary, not.
From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,—that the ideas of
primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their
patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas
produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them
at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies
themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a
power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or
warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the
insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.
16. Examples.
Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna,
white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are
commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in
us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a
mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one
should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire
that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at
a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain,
ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say—that this idea of
warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is ACTUALLY IN THE FIRE;
and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way,
is NOT in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain
not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do
neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid
parts?
17. The ideas of the Primary alone really exist.
The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or
snow are really in them,—whether any one’s senses perceive them or no:
and therefore they may be called REAL qualities, because they really
exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no
more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the
sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ear
hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all
colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, AS THEY ARE SUCH PARTICULAR IDEAS,
vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure,
and motion of parts.
18. The secondary exist in things only as modes of the primary.
A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea
of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to
another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it as it
really is in manna moving: a circle or square are the same, whether in
idea or existence, in the mind or in the manna. And this, both motion
and as figure, are really in the manna, whether we take notice of
primary, them or no: this everybody is ready to agree to. Besides,
manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a
power to produce the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute
pains or gripings in us. That these ideas of sickness and pain are NOT
in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when
we feel them not; this also every one readily agrees to. And yet men
are hardly to be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are not
really in manna; which are but the effects of the operations of manna,
by the motion, size, and figure of its particles, on the eyes and
palate: as the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly
nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts, by
the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts, (for by nothing
else can a body operate, as has been proved): as if it could not
operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind
particular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well as we
allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, and thereby produce
distinct ideas, which in itself it has not. These ideas, being all
effects of the operations of manna on several parts of our bodies, by
the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts;—why those produced
by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the
manna, than those produced by the stomach and guts; or why the pain and
sickness, ideas that are the effect of manna, should be thought to be
nowhere when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness,
effects of the same manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally
as unknown, should be thought to exist in the manna, when they are not
seen or tasted, would need some reason to explain.
19. Examples.
Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry. Hinder light
from striking on it, and its colours vanish; it no longer produces any
such ideas in us: upon the return of light it produces these
appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are
made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light; and that
those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphryry in the
light, when it is plain IT HAS NO COLOUR IN THE DARK? It has, indeed,
such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by
the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, to
produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of
whiteness; but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such
a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.
20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a
dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration
can the beating of the pestle make in an body, but an alteration of the
texture of it?
21. Explains how water felt as cold by one hand may be warm to the
other.
Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give
an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea
of cold by one hand and of heat by the other: whereas it is impossible
that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the
same time be both hot and cold. For, if we imagine WARMTH, as it is in
our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the
minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, we may understand how
it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the
sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other; which yet FIGURE
never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which
has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of
heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion
of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any
other body, it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater
in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands,
which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one
of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase
the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other; and so cause the
different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.
22. An excursion into natural philosophy.
I have in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a
little further than perhaps I intended. But, it being necessary to make
the nature of sensation a little understood; and to make the difference
between the QUALITIES in bodies, and the IDEAS produced by them in the
mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to
discourse intelligibly of them;—I hope I shall be pardoned this little
excursion into natural philosophy; it being necessary in our present
inquiry to distinguish the PRIMARY and REAL qualities of bodies, which
are always in them (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number, and
motion, or rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the
bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned), from those
SECONDARY and IMPUTED qualities, which are but the powers of several
combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being
distinctly discerned;—whereby we may also come to know what ideas are,
and what are not, resemblances of something really existing in the
bodies we denominate from them.
23. Three Sorts of Qualities in Bodies.
The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered are of
three sorts:—
FIRST, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their
solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and
when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these
an idea of the thing as it is in itself; as is plain in artificial
things. These I call PRIMARY QUALITIES.
SECONDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible
primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our
senses, and thereby produce in US the different ideas of several
colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called SENSIBLE
QUALITIES.
THIRDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular
constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the
bulk, figure, texture, and motion of ANOTHER BODY, as to make it
operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun
has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid.
The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called
real, original, or primary qualities; because they are in the things
themselves, whether they are perceived or not: and upon their different
modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.
The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things:
which powers result from the different modifications of those primary
qualities.
24. The first are Resemblances; the second thought to be Resemblances,
but are not, the third neither are nor are thought so.
But, though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and
nothing but powers, relating to several other bodies, and resulting
from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they
are generally otherwise thought of. For the SECOND sort, viz. the
powers to produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon
as real qualities in the things thus affecting us: but the THIRD sort
are called and esteemed barely powers, v.g. The idea of heat or light,
which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun, are commonly
thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than
mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax,
which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness
produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced
by powers in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of
light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or
enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes
made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They
are all of them equally POWERS IN THE SUN, DEPENDING ON ITS PRIMARY
QUALITIES; whereby it is able, in the one case, so to alter the bulk,
figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes
or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in
the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion
of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in
me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.
25. Why the secondary are ordinarily taken for real Qualities and not
for bare Powers.
The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the
other only for bare powers, seems to be because the ideas we have of
distinct colours, sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of
bulk, figure, or motion we are not apt to think them the effects of
these primary qualities; which appear not, to our senses, to operate in
their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity
or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward as to
imagine, that those ideas are the resemblances of something really
existing in the objects themselves since sensation discovers nothing of
bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reason
show how bodies BY THEIR BULK, FIGURE, AND MOTION, should produce in
the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But, in the other case in the
operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly
discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with
anything in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare
effect of power. For, through receiving the idea of heat or light from
the sun, we are apt to think IT is a perception and resemblance of such
a quality in the sun; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive
change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine THAT to be the
reception or resemblance of anything in the sun, because we find not
those different colours in the sun itself. For, our senses being able
to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two
different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production
of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power,
and not the communication of any quality which was really in the
efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that
produced it. But our senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness
between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object
producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of
something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed
in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary
qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.
26. Secondary Qualities twofold; first, immediately perceivable;
secondly, mediately perceivable.
To conclude. Beside those before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies,
viz. bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of their solid parts;
all the rest, whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them
one from another, are nothing else but several powers in them,
depending on those primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either
by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different
ideas in us; or else, by operating on other bodies, so to change their
primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us
different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may
be called secondary qualities IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVABLE: the latter,
secondary qualities, MEDIATELY PERCEIVABLE.