where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the
advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been
laid in at Busseean. Up to the morning of the 12th, the information
from Lahore had not materially varied; but, by the reports received on
that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still
no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved
down to the river. On the 13th, however, Sir Henry Hardinge received
precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was
concentrating a great force on the left bank of the river. Sir Henry
immediately ordered Brigadier Wheeler to march, with 4,500 men and
twenty-one guns, early on the 14th from Ludhiana to Busseean, which
place had been filled with provisions by arrangements made through
Major Broadfoot with the native chiefs--provisions upon which the
British army depended in its advance to Ferozepore. By the afternoon of
the 14th, Brigadier Wheeler was in front of Busseean. The main column,
under the Commander-in-Chief, from Umballa, did not reach Busseean
until the 16th.
The Sikhs had not completed the passage of their heavy guns until
the 16th, and, by the 17th, the advance of the force under the
Commander-in-Chief began to tell upon them, for on the 17th the main
body, consisting, according to the Sikh accounts, of 25,000 regulars
and 88 guns, under Lal Singh, took possession of the wells around the
village of Ferozeshah, whilst Tej Singh with 23,000 men and 67 guns
remained opposite to Ferozepore. Now the only road by which an army can
march from Busseean to Ferozepore (on account of the scarcity of water)
passes through Moodkee, and is about twenty miles, Ferozeshah being
mid-way. Knowing that the Commander-in-Chief must carry these works
before he could relieve Ferozepore, the Sikhs commenced on December
17th to throw up entrenchments around the wells at Ferozeshah in
order to stop the advance of the column under the Commander-in-Chief.
Not knowing the strength of his column, and thinking it was only the
advance guard of the British army, 12,000 Sikhs, chiefly cavalry, and
22 guns, under the command of Lal Singh, left the camp at Ferozeshah,
early on the 18th, and had taken up their position at Moodkee before
the arrival of the British army. No sooner had our troops arrived than
a scout sent by the political agent brought the news that the enemy was
only three miles away.
The British troops hastily got under arms and moved to their positions.
Sir Hugh Gough immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and
cavalry, and directed the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries,
to move forward in support. Sir Hugh's own description is a good one.
He says, "We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy
in position. To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the
infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and
Mactier, rapidly to the front in columns of squadrons, and occupied
the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse
artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position,
having the cavalry then on his flank.
"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low but
in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The
enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such
undulations as the ground afforded; and whilst our twelve battalions
formed from echelon of brigade into line they opened a very severe
cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by
the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon
joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed
fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy;
and as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without
advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry
under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the
enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if
possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons [now
known as the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars], with the second brigade of
cavalry, consisting of the Body-guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a
portion of the 4th Lancers,[A] turned the left of the Sikh army, and
sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns silenced for a
time the latter and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this
movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder
of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry[2] under Brigadier
Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.
"This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of
the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the
cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.
"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly
pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade
was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry
Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines
the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching
darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have
been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long
vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from
their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was
counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the
infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm
soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little
expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position
with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery,
some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing
weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them
from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an
hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the
sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."
Our troops in this battle consisted of 3,850 Europeans and 8,500
natives, making a total of 12,350 rank and file, and 41 guns. Sixteen
officers were killed and 200 men; forty-eight officers wounded and 609
men, of whom 153 died subsequently of their wounds, or were disabled.
Amongst those who fell was the hero of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale;
he had his left thigh shattered by grape-shot, and the wound proved
mortal. Had there been more daylight, the rout of the enemy would have
been more complete; as it was, seventeen of their guns out of twenty
were captured, and their loss in killed and wounded was very severe.
Yet it must be said that, in this battle of Moodkee, our friend the
enemy fought bravely and well--so well that, casting a backward glance
on that day of glorious deeds, we are now proud to claim him as a
friend indeed.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: Native regiments.]
ALIWAL AND SOBRAON
(1846)
Badly beaten at Ferozeshah, the Sikhs naturally expected that the
British troops would at once follow up their advantage by crossing
the Sutlej and advancing on the capital; but in order to do this
successfully it was necessary to wait the arrival of the powerful
battering train now moving upwards with the Meerut force under Sir
John Grey, consisting of the 9th Lancers, the 16th Lancers, and her
Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, with the 43rd and 59th
Regiments of Native Infantry.
The Sikhs, mistaking this delay for irresolution, resolved to make
another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the
Sutlej; and for this purpose they began to construct a new bridge
of boats, not very far from the spot where they crossed the river
after having been driven from Ferozeshah. Our Army of the Sutlej was
stationed some distance from the river, and no opposition was offered
by them. The bridge of boats was soon constructed, and works thrown up
in front of it with much military skill, in a position very favourable
to defence. The opposite banks were high, and the river, where the
bridge was laid, made a slight curve inwards, so as to throw those
banks sufficiently forward to afford protection to both flanks of
the advanced position from heavy artillery placed in battery. Above
the bridge, and not far from it, was a good ford, which facilitated
the communications with the forces on the opposite bank. Advantage
had also been taken of the slenderness of our troops at Ludhiana to
effect a passage for a force of about 10,000 men of all arms, in the
neighbourhood of that town. No attack was made either on the town
or cantonment of Ludhiana; the object of this force appeared to be
rather to entrench itself near the place at which it crossed, in order
to obstruct our progress and to cut off the passage of supplies to
Ferozepore, and to intercept the communication between the posts.
As soon as the Meerut force joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp,
immediate measures were taken to reinforce the Ludhiana post and the
station at Busseean. Some native infantry, some light cavalry, and some
guns were sent thither, and the sick, the women, and the children were
removed thence to Umballa. Meanwhile Sir Harry Smith had been detached
to reduce Dhurmkote and keep open the communication for supplies and
ammunition from our rear. Sir Harry was now reinforced, having with him
7,000 men and 24 guns, and it was confidently believed that he could
at one and the same time relieve Ludhiana and protect the whole of our
rear. Dhurmkote was evacuated at his approach. On the way from Jugraon
to Ludhiana he lost a good deal of his baggage, and sustained some
heavy fusilades, which he did not wait to return. His troops were much
harassed when he reached Ludhiana, but his presence put an end to the
consternation which was becoming general in that part of the country.
The Sirdar Runjur Singh had strongly entrenched himself at Aliwal,
about eight miles to the westward of Ludhiana. He had 15,000 men and 56
guns, and on the evening of January 26th he received a reinforcement
of 12 guns and 4,000 regular troops. Sir Harry Smith most gallantly
attacked the Sikhs on January 28th with not more than 16,000 men in
all. The right of the Sikh force rested on Bundree, and their left on
Aliwal. When they had advanced a short distance from their entrenched
camp, they cannonaded the British for half an hour, until our brave
fellows stormed the village of Aliwal, the key of their position. The
whole of the British line then began to advance. Her Majesty's 16th
Lancers charged in the most gallant style, but the Sikhs lay down
on the ground and the Lancers could not easily reach them. In this
position the Sikhs did deadly work with their muskets and keen swords.
The 16th Lancers had upwards of a hundred men killed or wounded. The
great mass of Sikh infantry could be broken only by our artillery. One
Sikh cannon after another was captured. So ably were the orders of
attack conducted, each column and line arriving at its point of attack
to the very moment, that the enemy was soon driven headlong back over
the river, and all their guns were captured or destroyed. Only one gun
was carried by the Sikhs to the opposite bank, and there it was spiked
by Lieutenant Holmes, of the Irregular Cavalry, and Gunner Scott, of
the Horse Artillery, who forded the river in pursuit. The victory was
complete, and great was the confusion among the Sikhs.
After this complete and decisive victory there was a breathing
space in the campaign. The Sikhs at Sobraon went on strengthening
their position, while Sir Hugh Gough waited for his artillery and
reinforcements. From January 14th till the beginning of February the
enemy was industriously employed in building defences, under the
direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer. The army under Sir
Charles Napier, which had been assembled at Sukkar by order of the
Governor-General, consisting of 16,000 men, was moving up to the left
bank of the Sutlej towards Ferozepore, and would have proved, had
the war lasted, a most valuable reinforcement to the Army of the
Sutlej. It had by this time reached Bhawalpur, opposite Mooltan, and
as the Nawab of that place had intimated to the British Government his
intention of remaining neutral, the Governor-General, feeling that the
blow must be struck and the contest decided at Lahore, requested Sir
Charles Napier to come on with his staff in advance of his army, and to
join him without delay, being desirous of having the assistance of that
distinguished officer in the pending struggle. Sir Charles Napier did
not, however, arrive in time to add to the glories of Sobraon, but the
heavy guns from Delhi reached the Commander-in-Chief's camp on February
9th.
Although on the first intelligence of the battle of Aliwal, and at
sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the neighbourhood of
that battlefield down to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, the Sikhs
seemed much shaken and disheartened, they now appeared to be as
confident as ever of being able to defy us in their entrenched position
and to prevent our passage of the river. The soldiers were chiefly
those who had been trained by the French and Italian officers. They had
strong walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, which afforded
a secure protection for triple lines of musketry. In all they were
34,000 men with 70 pieces of artillery; their position was united by a
good bridge to a reserve of 20,000 men on the opposite bank, on which
was a considerable camp and some artillery, commanding and flanking our
field-works.
Sir Hugh Gough's forces consisted of 6,533 Europeans and 9,691
natives, making a total of 16,224 rank and file, with 99 guns. Sir
Hugh ordered this force to march at half-past three, on the morning of
Tuesday, February 10th, when his men would be fresh and there would be
a certainty of many hours of daylight. The troops began to move out
of camp at the very moment appointed, and they marched in silence to
their destination. Sir Hugh was now strong in cavalry and very strong
in artillery. He at once put his battering and disposable artillery in
position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the works
of the Sikhs.
It had been intended that the cannonade should commence at daybreak,
but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river that it was necessary
to wait. It was half-past six before the whole of the artillery was
developed. Dr. Macgregor, in his "History of the Sikhs," gives a
graphic description of the opening of the action. He says: "Nothing
could have been conceived grander than the effect of the batteries when
they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutlej to Little
Sobraon in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and
anon, the rocket like a spirit of fire winged its rapid flight high
above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchments.
Well might the Commander-in-Chief call the opening of the cannonade
'most spirited and well directed.' The Sikh guns responded with shot
and shell, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter were
seen bursting in mid-air ere they reached the British batteries, while
some of the shot passed over Rhodawala, and struck the ground in
front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery
concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a
certain degree of interest, somewhat allied, however, to vexation,
lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves. The
Commander-in-Chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm
which he had not possessed to an efficient extent in other hard-fought
battles. It was reported that the guns were to play for four hours at
least; but there is some reason to believe that the rapid firing had
nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed,
and it was once more to be proved that the British Infantry were not
to remain mute spectators of a battle. 'Notwithstanding,' wrote the
Commander-in-Chief, 'the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and
howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served, and aided
by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they
could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed
batteries of earth, planks, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered
either by redoubts or epaulements or within a treble line of trenches.'"
The utmost ingenuity of the Sikhs and their European advisers had been
exerted to render the works at Sobraon vastly superior to those at
Ferozeshah. They had aimed at absolute impregnability, and a French
officer assured Tej Singh that it was utterly impossible for the
British to make good their entrance. But it may be said they reckoned
without the small host opposing them. The British were now about
to try with the musket and the bayonet. At nine o'clock, Brigadier
Stacey's brigade, supported on either flank by Captain Horford's and
Fordyce's batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop of horse
artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and
guns aided each other correlatively. The former marched steadily on
in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary, while the
latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until at length they
were within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs.
But notwithstanding the regularity and coolness, and the scientific
character of the assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so
hot was the fire of cannon and musketry kept up by the Khalsa troops
that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchments could
be won under it. This fire was all the more formidable from the fact
that the Sikhs employed zumburuks--guns mounted on camels and carrying
pound shot.
There was a temporary check or pause, but, soon, persevering gallantry
triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction of seeing Brigadier
Stacey's gallant soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them
within the area of their encampment. Every impediment was cleared,
the entrenchments were passed, and our matchless infantry stood
erect and compact within the Sikh camp. Said the Commander-in-Chief:
"Her Majesty's 10th, 53rd, and 80th Regiments, with the 33rd, 43rd,
59th, and 63rd Native Infantry, moving at a firm and steady pace,
never fired a shot until they had passed the barriers opposed to
them--a forbearance much to be commended, and most worthy of constant
imitation, to which may be attributed the success of their first
effort, and the small loss they sustained."
This attack was crowned with all the success it deserved, and, led
by its gallant Commander, Major-General Sir Robert Dick, obtained
the admiration of the army, which witnessed its disciplined valour.
When checked by the formidable obstacles and superior numbers to
which the attacking division was opposed, the second division, under
Major-General Gilbert, afforded the most opportune assistance by
rapidly advancing to the attack of the enemy's batteries, entering
their fortified position after a severe struggle, and sweeping through
the interior of the camp. This division inflicted a very severe
loss on the retreating enemy. Together with a portion of Gilbert's
division, the troops advanced immediately the order was received. But,
if intended to support Stacey on the right of the enemy's position,
they missed the object, for they unfortunately came in front of the
centre and strongest portion of the encampment, unsupported either
by artillery or cavalry. Her Majesty's 29th and 1st European Light
Infantry, with undaunted bravery, rushed forward, crossed a dry nullah
and found themselves exposed to one of the hottest fires of musketry
that can possibly be imagined; and what rendered it still more galling
was that the Sikhs were themselves concealed behind high walls, over
which the European soldiers could not climb. To remain under such a
fire without the power of returning it with any effect would have been
madness--the men would have been annihilated. Thrice did Her Majesty's
29th Regiment charge the works, and thrice were they obliged to retire,
each time followed by the Sikhs, who spared none. Similar was the fate
of the 1st European Light Infantry, who, in retiring, had their ranks
thinned by musketry and their wounded men and officers cut up by the
Sikhs. To the latter, the nullah afforded an admirable defence, for the
slope was in their favour, while the Europeans on the high bank were
completely exposed. At length the second division, which at Ferozeshah
had driven the Sikhs before them, capturing their guns at the point of
the bayonet and entering their encampment, were led to the right of the
entrenchment at Sobraon. The second division was followed by the first
division, which, under Sir Harry Smith, dashed against the enemy's
left. Yet it was not until the 3rd Light Dragoons, under Major-General
Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the openings
of the entrenchments in single file, re-forming as they passed them,
and galloped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries
and field-works--indeed, it was not until the weight of three entire
divisions of infantry, with every field-artillery gun which could be
sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale--that victory finally
fell to our troops. The fire of the Sikhs slackened, then almost
ceased; and the victors, pressing them on every side, swept them in
masses over the bridge of boats and into the Sutlej, which a sudden
rise of seven inches had rendered scarcely fordable.
[Illustration: WITH THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1914.]
In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water,
they suffered a terrible carnage from our horse artillery. Hundreds
fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in
attempting the perilous passage.
Thus terminated, in the brief space of two hours, this most remarkable
conflict, in which the military combinations of the Commander-in-Chief
were fully and ably carried into effect. The enemy's select regiments
of regular infantry had been dispersed, and a large proportion
destroyed, with the loss, since the campaign began, of 220 pieces
of artillery taken in action. Over sixty-seven guns, together with
upwards of 200 camel-swivels, and numerous standards were captured
within the entrenchments. Before the hour of noon this great battle
was over. It might, indeed, be well termed a glorious fight and
complete in its results. The battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and
Aliwal had weakened the power of the Sikhs, but the battle of Sobraon
had completely broken it. It was, of course, bought at a dear price.
Her Majesty's 29th Regiment alone lost in killed and wounded thirteen
officers, eight sergeants, and 157 rank and file. The loss of the 1st
European Light Infantry was still heavier. Her Majesty's 31st, which
had fought most nobly at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had seven
officers and 147 rank and file killed and wounded at Sobraon. Her
Majesty's 50th, or Queen's Own, had twelve officers and 227 rank and
file killed and wounded. Her Majesty's 10th Foot lost three officers,
three sergeants, and 127 rank and file. These regiments suffered the
most, but others suffered severely. The total loss was 320 killed,
2,063 wounded. The brave Sir Robert Dick, who led the attack on the
entrenchments, received a mortal wound after he had entered them. Says
the historian: "Thus fell, most gloriously, at the moment of victory,
this veteran officer, displaying the same energy and intrepidity as
when, thirty-five years ago in Spain, he was the distinguished leader
of the 42nd Highlanders" (the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch).
Fearful had been the loss of the Sikhs. Five days after the action, and
when the walls of the entrenchments had been nearly levelled with the
ground, the sandbank in the middle of the river was completely covered
with their dead bodies, and the ground within their encampment thickly
strewn with carcasses of men and horses.