posts, consisting of redoubts and fortified pagodas, were speedily
constructed, connecting the great Golden Dagon Pagoda by two distinct
lines with Rangoon and the river, and leaving a disposable force for
moving to the support of any point that might require such support. The
post at Kemmendine was also strongly occupied, and was supported on
the river by his Majesty's sloop _Sophie_, Captain Ryves, a Company's
cruiser, and a strong division of gunboats.
On November 30th Bandula's great army assembled in and behind the
dense forest; and his line, extending from the river above Kemmendine
in a semicircular direction towards Puzendown, might be distinguished
by a curved line of smoke rising above the trees. During the ensuing
night the low, continuous murmur and hum of voices proceeding from the
enemy's encampment suddenly ceased, and were speedily succeeded by
the distant but gradually approaching sounds of a multitude in slow
and stealthy movement through the woods. Our troops soon became aware
that the enemy's masses had approached to the very edge of the jungle,
within musket-shot of the pagoda, apparently in readiness to rush from
their cover to the assault at the break of day.
The day had scarcely dawned on December 1st when hostilities commenced
with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon at Kemmendine, the reduction
of that place being a preliminary to any general attack upon our
line. The firing continued long and brisk, and from their commanding
situation at the Great Pagoda, though nearly two miles distant from the
scene of action, our men could distinctly hear the yells and shouts of
the infuriated assailants, occasionally returned by the hearty cheer of
the British seamen as they poured in their heavy broadsides upon the
resolute and persevering masses. The thick forest which separated us
from the river shut out all sight of what was going forward; and, when
the firing ceased, we remained. There was a short period of anxiety,
though little doubt as to the result of the long and spirited assault.
At length, however, the thick canopy of smoke which lowered over the
fierce and sanguinary conflict gradually dissolved, and there could
be seen the masts of the vessels lying at their old station off the
fort--a convincing proof that all had ended well on that side.
Meanwhile the enemy had been seen on the west side of the river,
marching across the plains of Dalla towards Rangoon. They were formed
in five or six different divisions, and moved with great regularity,
led by numerous chiefs on horse-back--their gilt umbrellas glittering
in the rays of the sun--with a sufficiently formidable and imposing
effect. Opposite Rangoon the leading column of five or six Burmese
divisions began entrenching and throwing up batteries, while their main
body was stockading in the jungle. In the course of the day several
heavy columns issued from the forest, and successively took up their
ground along a woody ridge, gently sloping towards Rangoon. Here they
commenced operations with their entrenching tools, and with such
activity and good will that in the course of a couple of hours their
whole line was covered; their flags and banners, which had been flying
in profusion, all disappeared, and nothing was seen but a parapet of
fresh-turned earth, gradually increasing in height. The moving masses,
which had so very lately attracted anxious attention, had sunk into
the ground; and, by anyone who had not witnessed the whole scene, the
existence of these subterranean legions would not have been credited.
The occasional movement of a chief with his gilt umbrella from place to
place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing
that now attracted notice. By a distant observer the hills, covered
with mounds of earth, would have been taken for anything rather than
the approaches of an attacking army. Even to those who had watched the
whole strange proceeding, it seemed the work of magic or enchantment.
But, thus working like moles in the earth, the Burmese could no more
see than they could be seen; and, in the afternoon, Major Sale, with
his Majesty's 13th Regiment and a regiment of Madras Native Infantry,
moving rapidly forward upon the busily employed and too confident
enemy, fell upon them before they were well aware of the visit, and
drove the whole line from their earthworks with considerable loss.
These Burmese trenches were found to be a succession of holes, capable
of containing two men each, and excavated so as to afford shelter both
from the weather and the fire of any enemy; even a shell lighting in
the trench could at most kill but two men. As it was not the Burmese
system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole
contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel for its
inmates; and under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood was
prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When
one line of trench was completed, its occupiers, taking advantage
of the night, would push forward to where the second line was to be
opened, their places being immediately taken up by fresh troops from
the rear, and so on, progressively. The Burmese understood this art of
warfare, but our men--especially our Native Infantry--also understood
that art, and the enemy's weaknesses as well.
Attacks were made on Kemmendine that day and were all repulsed by our
troops or by the seamen of our little flotilla. But it was not until
night that the Burmese made their last desperate effort to open their
way down the river, and so get possession of the port of Rangoon.
The soldiers had lain down to rest, when suddenly the heavens and
the whole surrounding country became brilliantly illuminated. The
enemy had launched their fire-rafts into the stream with the first
of the ebb-tide, and had now applied the match to those huge masses
of combustible materials, in the hope of driving the _Sophie_ and
our other vessels from their stations off Kemmendine; and as these
fire-rafts came down, it was seen by the light of their flames that
they were followed by a vast fleet of war-boats, whose crew were ready
to take advantage of the confusion which might ensue if any of our
vessels should be set on fire. As the rafts floated rapidly down to
Kemmendine with the ebbing tide, columns of attack moved once more by
land against that well-defended post, with artillery, gingals, and
musketry.
But the skill and intrepidity of British seamen proved more than a
match for the numbers and devices of the Burmese; after gazing for
a while at the red, blue, yellow and green flames of the mighty
fireworks, our sailors leapt into their boats, pushed off to meet the
flaming rafts, secured them with their grappling irons, and conducted
them safely past our shipping or ran them ashore to finish their short
but vivid life of fire and flame upon the river bank without injury to
anyone. If these fire-rafts could have reached the harbour of Rangoon,
which was now crowded with transports and vessels of all kinds, the
effect might have been very tragic; but the British tars said that none
should pass Kemmendine Point, and none did pass. Kemmendine, where
the river makes a sudden turn, was the only point from which the rafts
could have been launched with effect. Fully aware of this, Bandula
ordered attack upon attack to be made, and for seven days no rest by
night or by day was allowed to our troops or to our seamen there. But
every effort of the enemy failed--even their land attack on Kemmendine.
On December 5th, when the stores of the Burmese left wing were brought
forward from the jungle to their foremost entrenchment in front of
Rangoon, and were fairly within our reach, Sir Archibald Campbell
ordered a decisive attack to be made upon their army. Major Sale, with
one column 800 strong, and a troop of British dragoons, who had only
been landed the preceding day, was directed to fall upon their centre;
and Major Walker, with 500 men, was sent to make a vigorous attack on
their left wing. The operations of these two columns of troops were
greatly facilitated by Captain Chads of the navy, who proceeded up the
Creek to a point within gunshot of the rear of the enemy's line, with
the man-of-war boats and a part of the flotilla, and began a heavy
cannonade which distracted the attention of the Burmese and prevented
their strengthening their front. Our two columns broke through the
entrenchments, and completely routed both the centre and the left with
vigorous bayonet charges; but Major Walker and a good many of his
gallant comrades fell. The loss of the Burmese was appalling; they were
driven from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the
ground behind them covered with dead and wounded, with all their guns,
entrenching tools, gilt umbrellas, and a great number of small arms. On
December 6th, Bandula tried to rally his defeated troops, and with some
success. On the 7th the Burmese made their last and grand attack on the
Great Pagoda, but they were beaten, driven back to their entrenchments
by the British bayonet, and finally into the depths of the jungle.
Our troops at that post, worn out by seven days and nights of incessant
fighting and watching, could not pursue the flying enemy, who left in
the trenches a great number of dead--nearly all stout, tall, athletic
fellows, who might almost have measured with English grenadiers,
and who had evidently belonged to the flower of Bandula's army.
During these seven busy and fiery days the Burmese, in addition to a
prodigious loss of life, had lost every gun and their entire stores.
The survivors fled towards Donoopew, but they were stopped in their
flight by some great and terrible chiefs, who had been sent down with
numerous reinforcements, and they rallied at Kokeen, about four miles
beyond the Great Pagoda.
It is said that when Bandula counted his forces he found them reduced
from more than 60,000 fighting men to less than 25,000. Nevertheless,
this favourite of the Lord of the White Elephant was allowed to retain
the chief command. His first move was to entrench and stockade himself
at Kokeen, after which he employed incendiaries to burn the invaders
out of Rangoon, and destroy all their stores and powder magazines.
On the night of December 12th the cry of fire resounded through the
town of Rangoon, and nearly the whole of that flimsy, bamboo-built
place seemed to be immediately in a blaze. The incendiaries had placed
their matches in various parts of the town, and had set fire to them
all the same moment. One half of the town was burned; but the flames
were prevented from reaching our depot of stores and ammunition. This
attempt, which was very nearly successful, brought down a rapid attack
upon Bandula's new position, and defeat and ruin upon himself. On
December 15th--three days after the midnight fire at Rangoon--1,500
British troops and sepoys, unaided by artillery, under the command of
Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, drove Bandula and his mighty host
from all their entrenchments and stockades at Kokeen, and strewed the
position with his dead in thousands.
BHURTPORE
(1826)
If any fortress in India could have been with good reason called
impregnable, that fortress was Bhurtpore. In the early years of the
nineteenth century the chiefs and rajahs of Hindustan were wont to say,
"Yes, you may bully us, but go and take Bhurtpore!" Their belief in its
impregnability was well founded, for in 1805 Lord Lake had attacked it
vigorously, but had failed to reduce its well-fortified works manned by
staunch and numerous defenders. After suffering terrible losses he was
compelled to withdraw, leaving this Jat fortress with a still stronger
claim to impregnability than it had ever possessed before.
When it was once decided by the British Government that Bhurtpore must
fall, the question immediately arose, where was the man to take it? The
East India Company Directors interviewed the Duke of Wellington, asking
him to find a man capable of taking this fortress. The Duke gave them
an answer. He said, "You can't do better than have Lord Combermere.
He's the man to take Bhurtpore." "But," replied the directors with
great surprise, "we thought that your Grace had not a very high opinion
of Lord Combermere, and did not consider him a man of genius." "I
don't care a tuppenny damn" (that was the Iron Duke's favourite par of
exchange in hot words) "about his genius. _I tell you he is the man to
take Bhurtpore!_" And the Duke was right.
There were 25,000 men in the Bhurtpore garrison, and they represented
the most warlike races of India. When Lord Combermere set out with
Bhurtpore as his objective, his army consisted of 30,000 men of
very mixed quality. On reaching the fortress he began with heavy
bombardment. Then for a week he carried forward his siege works,
covered by Gurkha sharpshooters, whose eyes were so keen and whose aim
so sure that no man of the enemy could show his head above the ramparts
with impunity.
Point after point was won until, at last, a small breach was made by
the artillery; and into this breach Lord Combermere flung a force
in which were included 600 dismounted men from the various cavalry
regiments--eighty from the 11th Light Dragoons, eighty from the 16th
Lancers, 200 from Skinner's Horse, and forty from each regiment of
native cavalry.
Skinner's Horse is one of the earliest formed of the many distinguished
Native Irregular Cavalry Corps which have fought for Britain. They
had been under Colonel Skinner for many years, and had served him in
many wars; thus they had come to respect and love him as tribesmen do
their chief. There is a touching story of their valour and faithfulness
during the storming of Bhurtpore. A party was told off according to
rota duty, for the whole regiment had volunteered for the dangerous
service. Skinner placed at their head Shadull Khan, one of his oldest,
most faithful, and trustworthy native officers. Then he spoke to them
as follows: "This is the first time you are going into danger when
I cannot accompany you; but such is my affection for you all that I
cannot allow you to part from me without carrying with you something
dear to me." Then, taking his son by the hand--the lad had only lately
entered the corps--he continued: "See, here is my son. Take him and
gain for him such honour as you have won for his father."
This shows clearly what Colonel Skinner thought of Skinner's Horse,
and also what he knew they thought of him. Old Shadull Khan stepped
forward, and, taking young Skinner by the arm, cried out, "Farewell,
our commander! Trust in God, who never deserts those faithful servants
who do their duty and who, please God, will now do their utmost to
maintain the honour of the corps."
Although the assault on the breach had been planned, it was postponed
for that day, as on further consideration Lord Combermere deemed it was
not practicable. It took place later, after a great explosion of mines
which the engineers had placed beneath the ramparts. On entering the
widened breach our troops encountered fierce opposition. There was a
hand-to-hand fight of the most desperate description, and it was not
until after some hours of fierce fighting that the enemy surrendered.
The Iron Duke's words were justified; Lord Combermere had taken
Bhurtpore, and that successful assault on a fortress long regarded
as impregnable was one which yields in brilliancy and courage to few
in the British annals of war. Its beneficial effect on British rule
and influence in India was as striking as its place among battles is
dramatic.
THE WAR IN SCINDE
(Meeanee, 1843)
"Let there be sixty or a hundred thousand," said Sir Charles Napier, "I
will fight."
This was when he moved away from the banks of the Indus and found that
an overwhelming force of the enemy was massing in his rear, while
another large force held Meeanee in his front. In the spirit of his
words he pushed forward with 2,600 of all arms, including officers
fit for duty in the field, and the result was the important battle of
Meeanee.
The positions of the Baluchis were formidable. In the first place they
had a natural ravine in their front. Again, they had 5,000 cavalry and
more than 30,000 infantry, with fifteen guns. Their wings rested on
dense woods which extended on each side of the plain in front for a
considerable distance, so as to flank the British lines on both sides
when it should advance. But, in no mood to be intimidated by these
natural advantages of the enemy, Sir Charles Napier and his little
force fell impetuously on him by the front. The fighting which ensued
was terrific. Our men gradually forced their way across the level
plain, swept as it was by the Baluchi cannon and matchlocks, and
finally crossed the ravine and began the ascent of the high, sloping
bank beyond.
With matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, the Baluchis
waited until the assailants were within twenty yards before they
discharged a volley. But the active British offered an uncertain mark,
and this, combined with the steepness of the declivity, accounted for
the inconsiderable result of their fire.
Now the 22nd (the Cheshire Regiment) were on the top of the bank,
thinking to bear down all before them, but "they staggered back in
amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front. Thick as
standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Baluchis
in their many-coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad,
deep bed of the ravine, they clustered on both banks, and covered the
plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they
shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolling like
a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they dashed forward with
demoniac strength and ferocity full against the front of the 22nd. But
with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and
hearts as big, and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met them with the
queen of weapons--the musket--and sent their foremost masses rolling
back in blood."
The Baluchis closed their dense masses, and again the shouts, the
rolling fire of musketry, and the dreadful rush of their swordsmen
were heard and seen along the whole line; and such a fight ensued as
has seldom been recorded in the annals of war. These wild warriors
continually advanced, sword and shield in hand, striving in all the
fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks; no fire of
small-arms, no thrust of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from
the guns, which were planted in one fearful mass on the right, could
drive the gallant soldiers back; they gave their breasts to be shot at,
they leaped upon the guns by twenties at a time; their dead went down
the slope by hundreds, but the gaps in their masses were continually
filled up from the rear; the survivors of the front rank still pressed
forward with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in
full and frequent conflict.
Our loss in officers was heavy, and our native troops, deprived of
leaders though not of gallantry, were several times forced into
rearguard action; but at a given moment a charge made on the enemy's
right by our entire but small body of horse, under the command of
Colonel Pattle, won the day. The Baluchis had kept their ground for
more than three hours, but now they began to retreat in masses, still
keeping well together, with their broad shields slung over their
backs and their heads half turned towards their pursuers. The victors
followed closely, pouring in volley after volley, until tired of
slaughtering. "Yet," says Napier, "those stern, implacable warriors
preserved their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a
run, though death was at their heels."
In this conflict our officers and men, together with our native
troops, showed the greatest courage. The chief part of the battle was
a hand-to-hand fight. "The noble soldier Pennefather," as Sir Charles
Napier admiringly called him, fell on the top of the bank, to all
appearance mortally wounded, and his place was instantly taken by Major
Pool. Major Teesdale, followed by his sepoys, rode desperately over the
ridge into the midst of the Baluchis, and was instantly killed by shot
and sabre. Major Jackson followed the heroic example of Teesdale, and
met the same fate. Two brave havildars kept close to them in advance of
their regiment, and, like their leaders, they were also killed, but not
until they had slain several of the fiercest of the enemy. Lieutenant
M'Murdogh, of the General's staff, rode, like Teesdale and Jackson,
into the very heart of the Baluchi mass; his horse was killed under
him, yet he rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohabad, one of the most
warlike of the chiefs, slew him in the midst of his clan. Then, while
engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck at him, but
a sergeant of the 22nd killed that enemy so instantly that his blow
fell harmless.
M'Murdogh turned and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving
the head of a Baluchi who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and
Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits. Six European officers
and sixty sergeants and privates were killed, and fourteen officers and
about 200 men wounded. The loss of the Baluchis was enormous; a careful
computation gave it as 6,000--1,000 bodies were heaped in the ravine
alone. What greater proof is wanting of the great courage and tenacity
of the Baluchi warrior, who is now linking his glorious traditions with
ours by deeds worthy of his ancient prowess?
THE FIRST SIKH WAR
(Moodkee, 1845)
It can hardly be said that when Sir H. Hardinge arrived in India in
1844 he found our frontier forces insufficient in numbers or unprepared
for action. When the first Sikh War broke out in December, 1845, there
were at Umballa 12,000 men with 32 guns, at Ferozepore 10,472 with 24
guns, and at Ludhiana 7,235 with 12 guns. Including the force of 1,800
at the hill stations this made a total of 32,479 men with 68 guns--a
very respectable little British army.
On December 7th and 8th news came from Lahore to the effect that
preparations were being made on a large scale for artillery, stores,
and all the munitions of war, but as yet no infantry or artillery
had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier
crossed the Sutlej. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicholson, the
assistant political agent at Ferozepore, reported that a portion of
the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the
10th no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain
Nicholson's report, and the opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh
army would not cross the Sutlej. Our troops, however, moved on the
10th, 11th, 12th, in pursuance of orders given on the 7th and 8th; and
the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutlej were in full
march on the 12th. Some days later the whole of the Ludhiana force was
moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Ludhiana
to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the soldiers left
at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very
improbable contingency.