be not all new, but as a member, so that it may be termed altogether as
mixt; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a
natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new Principalities;
for men do willingly change their Lord, beleeving to better their
condition; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that
rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find
after by experience, they have made it worse: which depends upon another
natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those,
whose Prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to
entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest
draws along with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine
enemies, whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality,
and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in
it, for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations,
nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them.
For however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he
alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the Countrey, to enter
thereinto. For these reasons, Lewis the twelfth, King of France,
suddenly took Milan, and as soon lost it; and the first time Lodwick his
own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those
people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of
their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised
themselves, could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them.
True it is, that Countreys that have rebelled again the second time,
being recovered, are harder lost; for their Lord, taking occasion from
their rebellion, is less respective of persons, but cares only to secure
himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to
provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make
France lose Milan the first time, it was enough for Duke Lodwick to make
some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they
could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world
together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and
driven out of Italy; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however
though both the first and second time it was taken from him. The
generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we
see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any
one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was,
whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than
the King of France did. I say therefore, that these States which by
Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conqueror, are
either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and
when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are
not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have
extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them: For in other matters,
allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much
difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as
we have seen that Burgundy did, Britany, Gascony, and Normandy, which so
long time continued with France: for however there be some difference of
language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and
whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have
two regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite
extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes
nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with
their ancient Principality. But when any States are gaind in a Province
disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties,
and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain
them; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies, for the
Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the
possession hereof more secure and durable; as the Turk hath done in
Greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that
State, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never
been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the
disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them;
whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown
to some height, and then is there no help for them. Moreover, the
Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the
subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at
hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be
good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and forrein Princes
will be well aware how they invade that State; insomuch, that making his
abode there, he can very hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a
better, is to send Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it
were the keys of that State; for it is necessary either to do this, or
to maintain there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince
makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very
small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only
to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on
those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State; and
those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt
him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and
therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they
are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that
were dispoild. I conclude then, that those colonies that are not
chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and they that
are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harme, as
I have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallyed and
flattered withall, or else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves
of small dammages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when
wrong is done to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no
return of revenge again. But in lieu of Colonies, by maintaining
soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole revenues of that
State are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the conquest proves but a
loss to him that hath got it, and endammages him rather; for it hurts
that whole State to remove the army from place to place, of which
annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemie to thee; as
they are enemies, I wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses,
whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. Every way then is this
guard unprofitable. Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it
is said) should make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull
neighbors, and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty
therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner
as mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they shall
be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or
fear; as the Etolians brought the Romans into Greece; and they were
brought into every countrey they came, by the Natives; and the course of
the matter is, that so soon as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey,
all those that are the less powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by
an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they; so that for these
of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for
presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he
hath gotten: He hath only to beware that these increase not their
strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his
own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty,
and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey. And he that playes
not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath gotten; and while he
holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. The
Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent
colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any
thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and
permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there.
And I will content my self only with the countrey of Greece for example
hereof. The Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them, the Macedons
kingdome was brought low, Antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did the
Achayans or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they would
ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the perswasions of Philip
induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet
could Antiochus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any
State in that countrey: for the Romans did in these cases that which all
judicious Princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all
present mischiefs, but also to the future, and to provide for those with
all industry; for by taking order for those when they are afarre off, it
is easie to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to
thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable:
and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectick feaver, that
in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the course
of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes
easie to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in matters of
State; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to
do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for
not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every
one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the Romans,
seeing these inconvenients afar off, alwaies prevented them, and never
sufferd them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a
war is not undertaken, but deferred for anothers advantage; therefore
would they rather make a war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, to the
end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy, though for that
time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they
thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is
ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes, _to enjoy the
benefits of the present time_; but that rather, to take the benefit of
their valor and wisdome; for time drives forward everything, and may
bring with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. But let us return
to France, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by
them: and we will speak of Lewis, and not of Charles, as of whom by
reason of the long possession he held in Italy we better knew the wayes
he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have
been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and
conditions. King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition,
who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy: I
will not blame his comming, or the course he took, because he had a mind
to begin to set a foot in Italy; but having not any friends in the
country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of King Charles
his carriage there, he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he
could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to
him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. The
King then having conquered Lombardy, recovered presently all that
reputation that Charles had lost him; Genua yeelded to him, the
Florentines became friends with him; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of
Ferrara, the Bentivolti, the Lady of Furli, the Lord of Faenza, Pesaro
Rimino, Camerino, and Piombino, the Lucheses, Pisans and Sienses, every
one came and offered him friendship: then might the Venetians consider
the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their
hands two Townes in Lombardy, made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy.
Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have
maintained his reputation in Italy, if he had followed these aforenamed
rules, and secured and defended those his friends, who because their
number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the Church, and
others of the Venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him, and by
their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against
those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into Milan, than he
took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to Pope Alexander, to seize
upon Romania, and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned
himself, ruining his own friends, and those had cast themselves into his
bosom, making the Church puissant, by adding to their Spiritual power,
they gaind their authority, and so much temporal estate. And having once
got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to
stop Alexanders ambition, and that he should not become Lord of all
Tuscany, of force he was to come into Italy: and this sufficed him not,
to have made the Church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for
the desire he had to get the Kingdome of Naples, he divided it with the
King of Spain: and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy, he
brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of
that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have
otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in
that Kingdome some Vice-King of his own, he took him from thence, to
place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. It is a
thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting
hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they
shall be prais'd for it, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not
able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error
committed. If France then was able with her own power to assail the
Kingdome of Naples, she might well have done it; but not being able, she
should not have divided it: and if the division she made of Lombardy
with the Venetians, deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in
Italy; yet this merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity.
Lewis then committed these five faults; extinguisht the feebler ones,
augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy,
brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither himself to
dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he
liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so
ill, had he not committed the sixt, to take from the Venetians their
State; for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought
the Spaniard into Italy, it had bin necessary to take them lower; but
having first taken those other courses, he should never have given way
to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies
have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy. For
the Venetians would never have given their consents thereto, unless they
should have been made Lords of it themselves; and the others would never
have taken it from France, to give it them: and then they would never
have dar'd to go and set upon them both together. And if any one should
say, that King Lewis yeelded Romania to Alexander, and the Kingdome of
Naples to Spain, to avoid a war; I answer with the reasons above
alledged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for
avoiding of a war; for that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy
disadvantage. And if any others argue, that the King had given his word
to the Pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage,
and for giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan; I answer with that
which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words, how they ought to be
kept. King Lewis then lost Lombardy, for not having observ'd some of
those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of
countries, and desir'd to keep them. Nor is this any strange thing, but
very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with
that French Cardinal, when Valentine (for so ordinarily was Cæsar Borgia
Pope Alexanders son call'd) made himself master of Romania; for when the
Cardinal said to me, that the Italians understood not the feats of war;
I answered, the Frenchmen understood not matters of State: for had they
been well vers'd therein, they would never have suffer'd the Church to
have grown to that greatness. And by experience we have seen it, that
the power hereof in Italy, and that of Spain also, was caused by France,
and their own ruine proceeded from themselves. From whence a general
rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, _That he that
gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines himself_; for that
power is caus'd by him either with his industry, or with his force; and
as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is
grown puissant.
CHAP. IV
Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexander, rebelled not against
Alexanders Successors after his death.
The difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining
of a State new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass, that
Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years; and having hardly
possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all
that State should have rebelled; nevertheless his Successors kept the
possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than
what arose among themselves through their own ambition. I answer, that
all the Principalities whereof we have memory left us, have been
governed in two several manners; either by a Prince, and all the rest
Vassals, who as ministers by his favor and allowance, do help to govern
that Kingdom; or by a Prince and by Barons, who not by their Princes
favor, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. And these kinds
of Barons have both states of their own, and Vassals who acknowledge
them for their Lords; and bare them a true natural affection. Those
States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals, have their Prince
ruling over them with more authority; for in all his countrey, there is
none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yeeld obedience
to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor beare
they him any particular good will. The examples of these two different
Governments now in our dayes, are, the Turk, and the King of France. The
Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord, and the rest are all his
Vassals; and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or
Governments, he sends several thither, and those he chops and changes,
as he pleases. But the King of France is seated in the midst of a
multitude of Lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their
subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their preheminencies; nor can
the King take their States from them without danger. He then that
considers the one and the other of these two States, shall find
difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State; but when once it is
subdu'd, great facility to hold it. The reasons of these difficulties in
taking of the Turks Kingdom from him, are, because the Invader cannot be
called in by the Princes of that Kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of
those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize:
which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his
slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case
they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being
able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have shewed:
whereupon he that assails the Turk, must think to find him united; and
must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but
when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot
repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the Royal
blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feard,
none of the others having any credit with the people. And as the
conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought
he not to fear them. The contrary falls out in Kingdoms governed as is
that of France: for it is easie to be enterd by the gaining of any Baron
in the Kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and
those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alledg'd are
able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy victory,
which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many
difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou
hast supprest. Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race:
for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will be the ring-leaders
of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor
extinguish them, thou losest that State, whensoever the occasion is
offerd. Now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of
Darius was, thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion, and therefore
Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him
out of the field; after which victory Darius being dead, that State was
left secure to Alexander, for the reasons we treated of before: and his
successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease:
nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults, than those they
themselves stir'd up. But of the States that are order'd and grounded as
that of France, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from
hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against
the Romans, by reason of the many Principalities those States had:
whereof while the memory lasted, the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of
the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by
the power and continuance of the Empire, at length they enjoy'd it
securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another,
each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces,
according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that
because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent, they
acknowledg'd no other but the Romans. By the consideration then of these
things, no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to
keep together the State of Asia; and that others have had such great
difficulties to maintain their conquest, as Pyrrhus, and many others;
which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but
from the difference of the subject.
CHAP. V
In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd, which,
before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own Laws.
When those States that are conquered, as it is said, have been
accustomed to live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three
wayes for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong
places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to
suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some
tribute, and creating therein an Oligarchy, that may continue it in thy
service: for that State being created by that Prince, knowes it cannot
consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to
maintain it; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own
Citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by any other
way of keeping. We have for example the Spartans and the Romans; the
Spartans held Athens and Thebes, creating there an Oligarchy: yet they
lost it. The Romans to be sure of Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept
Greece as the Spartans had held them, leaving them free, and letting
them enjoy their own Laws; and it prospered not with them: so that they
were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it. For in
truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by
demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free,
and dismantells it not, let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for
it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge,
and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for
any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that
can be done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and
dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but
presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as Pisa did after so
many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines. But when the
Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince, and that
whole race is quite extirpated: on one part being us'd to obey; on the
other, not having their old Prince; they agree not to make one from
among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner
that they are much slower to take armes; and with more facility may a
Prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. But in Republiques there
is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of
revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave
them, or suffer them to rest; so that the safest way, is, either to
ruine them, or dwell among them.
CHAP. VI
Of new Principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour.