As soon as the Third Dutch War came to an end in February, 1674,

another period of feverish retrenchment set in, and an attempt was

made 'to lessen the growing charge in the navy, towards which no one

particular seems more to conduce than that of reducing the number of

the persons employed therein, both at sea and in the yards.'[143] Other

economies were also practised. Ships as they came in were paid off

and laid up[144], and it was decided to undertake no new works 'until

his Majesty hath in some measure got over the debt which remains

to him upon the old.'[145] Meanwhile the official correspondence

contains frequent references to the shortness of money. For instance,

in January, 1674, the _Swan_ was delayed at Plymouth 'from the

unwillingness of the tradesmen to trust his Majesty further'[146];

and in December, 1677, Pepys reports from Sir John Kempthorne that

'the brewer at Portsmouth doth absolutely declare that he will not

provide any beer for the _Rupert_ and _Centurion_ till he is better

assured of his payment than he now is.'[147] At the beginning of

1678 the situation was somewhat relieved by the Parliamentary vote

for preparations against France, but this improvement was of short

duration, and in December we find Pepys referring to one of the most

wasteful consequences of a want of money—'that mighty charge which has

so long lain upon our hands for want of money wherewith to discharge

those of the ships which remain yet unpaid off.'[148]

In spite of the frequent references to want of funds scattered up and

down the official correspondence, the financial position of the navy

greatly improved in the later years of the Restoration period. At Lady

Day, 1686, the debts of the Navy Office were reckoned at £171,836.

2_s._ 9_d._—a remarkable reduction on the enormous totals of 1666[149].

After the accession of James II no less than £305,806 was paid by the

Treasurer of the Navy on account of debts incurred in Charles II's

reign[150], so it is not surprising to find that, both in the closing

years of Charles II and the earlier years of James II, money was still

difficult to get, and the old complaints recur although in a less

aggravated form.

Bearing in mind these facts about finance, let us pass on to consider

some of their practical results.

During the period from 1660 to 1688 the operations of the navy were

grievously hampered by the deficiency of men, both in the dockyards and

at sea; and this deficiency was mainly, if not entirely, due to the

want of pay.

The state of things during the Second Dutch War was appalling. The

_Diary_ contains pitiable stories of poor seamen starving in the

streets because there was no money to pay their wages. 7 October,

1665: 'Did business, though not much, at the Office; because of the

horrible crowd and lamentable moan of the poor seamen that lie starving

in the streets for lack of money, which do trouble and perplex me to

the heart; and more at noon when we were to go through them, for then

a whole hundred of them followed us; some cursing, some swearing,

and some praying to us.'[151] We hear of wages nine months[152],

twenty-two[153], twenty-six, thirty-four[154], and even fifty-two[155]

months in arrear. One captain with a breezy style complains that for

want of pay 'instead of a young commander, he is rendered an old

beggar.'[156] The crews of two ships petition the Navy Board to order

them their pay 'that their families may not be altogether starved

in the streets, and themselves go like heathens, having nothing to

cover their nakedness.'[157] The Commissioner at Portsmouth writes of

workmen in the yard there, that they are turned out of doors by their

landlords, and perish more like dogs than men[158].

Naturally enough, this state of things affected discipline. The crews

of the _Little Victory_ and the _Pearl_ at Hull mutinied for want of

pay, and refused to weigh anchor[159], and in the yards the workmen

gave a great deal of trouble. The Chatham shipwrights and caulkers, to

whom two years' wages were owing, marched up to London to appeal to the

Navy Board, as 'their families are denied trust and cannot subsist,'

and under this pressure we are told that arrangements were made 'to

pay off some of the most disorderly.'[160] At Chatham the Commissioner

writes that he is almost torn to pieces by the workmen of the yard for

their weekly pay[161]. Sir John Mennes writes from Portsmouth on 14

July, 1665, for money to be sent immediately to stop 'the bawlings and

impatience of these people, especially of their wives, whose tongues

are as foul as the daughters of Billingsgate.'[162] Apparently the

money did not come, and in October the Commissioner was forced to lend

the men ten shillings apiece to keep them from mutiny[163]. A fortnight

later a mutiny actually broke out, but Commissioner Middleton shewed

praiseworthy promptitude in dealing with it. According to his own

account, he seized 'a good cudgel' out of the hands of one of the men,

and took more pains in the use of it than in any business for the last

twelve months. He adds: 'I have not been troubled since.'[164] On 27

October, 1666, the outlook in London was so threatening that the Navy

Board applied to the Officers of the Ordnance for 'twelve well-fixed

firelocks with a supply of powder and bullet' for the defence of

the Navy Office, in view of 'the present great refractoriness and

tumultuousness of the seamen.'[165] Nor did the trouble end when

peace came, for the financial situation was still difficult. On 11

March, 1671, Jonas Shish wrote from Deptford to the Navy Board: 'The

shipwrights and caulkers are very much enraged by reason that their

wages is not paid them. The last night the whole street next the King's

Yard, both of men and women, was in an uproar, and meeting with Mr

Bagwell, my foreman, they fell on him, and it was God's great mercy

they had not spoiled him. I was then without the gate at my son's

house, and hearing the tumult, I did think how Israel stoned Hadoram

that was over the tribute, and King Rehoboam made speed and gat him

up to fly to Jerusalem, so I gat speedily into the King's Yard, for I

judge if the rude multitude had met with me, I should have had worse

measure than my foreman.'[166]

In view of these facts about pay, it is not surprising that it was

found difficult to obtain men. In order to man the fleets for service

against the Dutch it was necessary to employ the press, and this

produced very poor material. Pepys notes in 1666 that men were pressed

in London that 'were not liable to it,' 'poor patient labouring men

and housekeepers,'[167] and he adds 'it is a great tyranny.' The

redoubtable Commissioner Middleton, writing from Portsmouth on 29

March, 1666, tells Pepys that he is ashamed to see such pressed men

as are sent from Devonshire—one with the falling sickness and a lame

arm; another with dead palsy on one side and not any use of his right

arm[168]. A year later he makes similar complaints from Chatham with

regard to the pressed men supplied by Watermen's Hall. 'The Masters

of Watermen's Hall are good Christians but very knaves; they should

be ordered to send down ten or twelve old women to be nurses to the

children they send.'[169]

On the outbreak of the Third Dutch War in 1672 the same difficulties

recurred, but the complaints are less frequent and less serious, and

the condition of things had evidently improved. But ships had still

to be manned by pressing, and the quality of the pressed men left

much to be desired. For instance, two watermen, pressed in 1673, are

described as 'little children, and never at sea before,' who could not

be suffered 'to pester the ship.'[170]

'It can never be well in the navy,' wrote Pepys on 5 September, 1680,

'till the poor seamen can be paid once in a year at furthest, and

tickets answered like bills of exchange; whereas at this very day

... ships are kept out two or three years, and four of them just

now ordered forth again only for want of money, after being brought

in to be paid off.'[171] A little later he notes the effect of this

upon discipline[172], and comments on the 'unreasonable hardship'

entailed by 'the general practice of our navy' 'of paying those ships

off first where the least sum clears the most men; those who have

served longest, and therefore need their pay most, being postponed

to those who have served least.'[173] In a maturer reflection made

after his retirement, dated December, 1692, Pepys still places the

'length and badness of the payment of the seaman's wages' first among

his 'discouragements.' This, together with 'their ill-usage from

commanders, and want of permission to help themselves in intervals

of public service by a temporary liberty of earning a penny in the

merchant's' are 'discouragements that I cannot think anything can be

proposed of temptations of other kinds sufficient to reconcile them

to.'[174] Nevertheless, Pepys claimed credit for more punctual payments

for the Special Commission of 1686, during the time they held office.

'Not a penny left unpaid,' he writes, 'to any officer, seaman, workman,

artificer, or merchant, for any service done in, or commodity delivered

to the use of the Navy, either at sea or on shore, within the whole

time of this Commission, where the party claiming the same was in the

way to receive it.'[175]

In connexion with the seamen something should be said about the

organisation for the care of the sick and wounded. The credit of

being the first English Government to recognise the obligation of

providing for the sick and wounded belongs to the Commonwealth. The

principle that the State should provide for those who had suffered

in its service was laid down by the Long Parliament in 1642, and

an attempt was made to apply it to the case of soldiers wounded in

the Civil War[176]. A little later the same principle was applied

to seamen, and the idea and the machinery were taken over by the

Restoration statesmen. In October, 1664, in view of the impending war

with the Dutch, a temporary Commission for the care of Sick and Wounded

Seamen on the model of the Commission of 1653 was appointed for the

duration of the war, the most active member of it being John Evelyn,

the diarist[177]. This Commission was re-appointed in March, 1672,

for the Third Dutch War, and the elaborate instructions given to it

are to be found in the volume of _Naval Precedents_ in the Pepysian

Library[178]. The Commissioners were to distribute the sick and

wounded among the hospitals of England, 'thereby to ease his Majesty's

charge'; and as soon as this accommodation was exhausted, they were

to billet them upon private persons at the King's expense. London,

Yarmouth, Ipswich, Southwold, Aldeburgh, Harwich, Chatham, Gravesend,

Deal, Dover, Gosport, Southampton, Weymouth, Dartmouth, and Plymouth

were specially assigned for the reception of sick and wounded men set

ashore from their ships. At these 'places of reception' as they were

called, the Commissioners were to appoint an agent, and to provide

'a physician (if need be) and chirurgeon, and nurses, fire, candle,

linen, medicaments, and all things necessary,' but in 'as husbandly and

thrifty a manner' as might be. The Commission was also charged with

the care of prisoners of war, and was instructed to provide for their

maintenance on a scale 'not exceeding 5_d._ per diem for every common

seaman and inferior officer, and 12_d._ per diem for every commission

officer.' For a time also it was concerned with awarding gratuities to

the 'widows, children, and impotent parents of such as shall be slain

in his Majesty's service at sea'; but in 1673 these duties were taken

over by another commission, for Widows and Orphans, and a regular scale

was established on which gratuities were to be given. Widows of men

slain in the service were to receive a gratuity equal to eleven months

of their husband's pay, an additional third being allowed to each

orphan except those who were married at the time of the father's death.

If the deceased left no widow, his mother was to receive the bounty,

provided that she was herself a widow, indigent, and over 50 years of

age. The bounty to a child was to be allowed to accumulate until it was

of an age to be apprenticed. This Commission terminated at the end of

the war, and by an order of 21 December, 1674, its functions devolved

on the Navy Board.

These arrangements were all admirable upon paper, and the members

of the Commissions displayed indefatigable industry, but in this

department of affairs as in others the best of schemes were wrecked

on the rock of finance. On 30 September, 1665, Evelyn wrote that he

had 5000 sick, wounded, and prisoners dying for want of bread and

shelter. 'His Majesty's subjects,' he adds, 'die in our sight and at

our thresholds without our being able to relieve them, which, with our

barbarous exposure of the prisoners to the utmost of sufferings, must

needs redound to his Majesty's great dishonour, and to the consequence

of losing the hearts of our own people, who are ready to execrate

and stone us as we pass.'[179] On 5 June, 1672, the same loyal and

humane gentleman wrote in a similar strain from Rochester: 'I have

near 600 sick and wounded men in this place, 200 prisoners, and the

apprehension of hundreds more.... I hope there will be care to supply

my district here with moneys, or else I shall be very miserable, for

no poor creature does earn his bread with greater anxiety than I at

present.'[180] The moneys did not come, and by the end of the summer

some of the localities were becoming restive at the non-payment of

arrears. There was a great deal of noise made at Gravesend when the

Commissioners of the Navy passed by, and on 27 August Evelyn wrote to

Pepys: 'Those cursed people of Gravesend have no bowels, and swear that

they will receive not a man more till their arrears are discharged. We

are above £2000 indebted in Kent, where our daily charge is £100 for

quarters only. Judge by this how comfortable a station I am in.'[181]

When the war came to an end the temporary Commission was withdrawn,

and by a warrant from the Lords of the Admiralty dated 28 March, 1674,

its duties were handed over to James Pearse, 'chirurgeon-general of

his Majesty's navy.'[182] Pearse was a man of business after Pepys's

own heart, and he carefully systematised the whole of his functions,

reducing them 'into such a method that it is not possible for me

(or whomsoever shall succeed me) to wrong his Majesty or injure his

subjects.'[183]

'Mariners and soldiers maimed in his Majesty's service at sea' were

entitled to relief out of the Chest at Chatham, a fund provided by

deducting 6_d._ a month from each man's pay. Fourpence a month was

also deducted for the maintenance of a chaplain, and Pepys explains

how the Chest benefited from an arrangement by which all moneys

were also assigned to it 'arising out of the seamen's contributions

for a chaplain upon ships where (by the remissness or impiety of

the commander) no chaplain is provided.'[184] A paper of 24 July,

1685[185], gives the scale of this relief:

A leg or arm lost is £6. 13. 4. paid as present relief, and

so much settled as an annual pension for his lifetime £6 13 4

If two legs be lost his pension is doubled £13 6 8

For the loss of two arms, in consideration of his being

thereby rendered uncapable of getting a livelihood

any other way, per annum £15 0 0

But if an arm be on, and disabled only, is £5 per annum £5 0 0

An eye lost is £4 per annum £4 0 0

... And where any wound or hurt occasions a fracture, contusion,

impostumation, or the like, under the loss of a limb, such are viewed

by the chirurgeons, and certified to deserve what in their opinions

may be a proportionable reward in full satisfaction. And these sorts

of hurts frequently accompany the loss of a limb in other parts of the

body, for which they have a reward apart from their annual allowance,

according to the chirurgeon's discretion.

One more question remains for our consideration to-day—that of the

rates of pay in the navy during the period 1660-88.

As far as the rates themselves were concerned the story is one of

steady improvement. In 1653 the pay of a general or admiral of the

fleet had been £3 a day during his employment; of a vice-admiral, £2;

and of a rear-admiral, £1[186]. The scale adopted by Order in Council,

26 February, 1666[187], raised the admiral's pay from £3 to £4; the

vice-admiral's from £2 to £2. 10_s._; and the rear-admiral's from

£1 to £2. The vice-admiral of a squadron only was to get 30_s._ and

the rear-admiral of a squadron £1. The pay of the other officers was

not increased beyond the rates fixed in 1653[188]. The able seamen

in 1660 received 24_s._ a month; the ordinary seamen, 19_s._; the

apprentices or 'gromets,' 14_s._ 3_d._; and the 'boys,' 9_s._ 6_d._ The

wages of the carpenter, boatswain, and gunner varied from £2 to £4 a

month according to the rate of the ship. Monthly wages in harbour, as

distinguished from sea wages, were on a lower scale[189]. In 1686 a new

establishment of wages[190] made a few minor changes, but the pay of

the seamen was not affected thereby.

The misfortune of the 'poor seaman' was not that his rate of pay was

insufficient, but that he could not get his money, or if he got it at

all it was in the depreciated paper currency known as the 'ticket.' A

ticket was a certificate from the officers of his ship, issued to each

seaman, specifying the term and quality of his service. This, when

countersigned by the Navy Board, was the seaman's warrant for demanding

his wages from the Treasurer of the Navy on shore. The original purpose

of tickets was to save the necessity of transporting large sums of

money on board ship, but the want of funds in the navy soon made it

the regular practice to treat tickets as inconvertible paper, and to

discharge all seamen with tickets instead of money—or with money for

part of their time and a ticket for the rest. Theoretically, the ticket

should have supplied the seaman with credit almost up to the full

amount of his wages, but in practice the long waiting and uncertainty

of payment caused a great depreciation of tickets. We hear of women

brokers standing about the Navy Office, offering to help seamen who

might have tickets to ready money—but always upon terms. They took

them to Mrs Salesbury in Carpenter's Yard, near Aldgate, who bought

them for cash at a discount of at least 5_s._ in the £, and sometimes

more[191]. This caused great discontent among the seamen, who naturally

objected to being paid by the State in depreciated paper, and on

13 February, 1667, Pepys records in the _Diary_ that 'there was a

very great disorder this day at the Ticket Office, to the beating

and bruising of the face' of one Carcasse, the clerk. The grievance

attracted attention, and in 1667 the House of Commons enquired into

'the buying and selling of tickets.'[192] The 'infinite great disorder'

of the Ticket Office also attracted the notice of the Commissioners of

Public Accounts[193], but the reply of the Navy Board when invited to

justify the practice was conclusive. 'We conceive the use of tickets

to be by no other means removable than by a supply of money in every

place, at all times, in readiness where and when ... any ... occasions

of discharging seamen shall arise.'[194]

Apart from the disastrous results of the practice of issuing tickets

without money to pay them, the actual machinery of the system was

better under Charles II than it had hitherto been. Printed tickets with

counterfoils had been invented under the Commonwealth, and were in

use as early as August, 1654[195]; but in 1667 elaborate instructions

for the examining and signing of tickets and comparing them with the

counterfoils were issued by the Navy Board to protect the Office

against fraud[196]. John Hollond complains of the abuses to which even

a solvent ticket system gave rise. It enabled 'wrong parties' to secure

the seaman's wages—these being 'such as have wrought upon the advantage

of the men's necessities'—'either pursers, clerks of the check, or

creditors, whether alehouse-keepers, or slopsellers, or else pretended

sweethearts.'[197] He also notes the facilities which the system

afforded for the abuse of 'dead pays,' tickets being issued for seamen

who were dead or who never served, and men suborned to personate them

at the pay-table[198]. This was particularly easy in time of war, when

the pressure of business was too great to allow of the tickets being

properly examined.

A new and important principle in connexion with the pay of naval

officers was established in 1668. Deane had urged in 1653 that seamen

should be entered for continuous service and kept on continuous pay

like soldiers[199], but the practice of the navy was quite different,

both for officers and men. Hitherto it had been usual to regard naval

officers as appointed for particular services, and possessing no claim

upon the Government when these services had been discharged. The result

of this was that, except in time of war, the field of employment was

far too small, and a number of good officers were thrown upon their

own resources. But at the close of the Second Dutch War the Government

formally recognised for the first time the claims of officers to pay

in time of peace. The first step did not go far, but the principle

now accepted was destined to lead to the modern system of continuous

employment. By an Order in Council of 17 July, 1668[200], it was

provided that, in consideration of 'the eminent services performed in

the late war against the Dutch by the flag officers,' and the fact

that 'during the time of peace several of them are out of employment,

and thereby disabled to support themselves in a condition answerable

to their merits and those marks of honour his Majesty hath conferred

on them,' they should receive 'pensions' in proportion to the scale of

pay on active service which had been fixed at the beginning of the war.

These 'pensions' ranged from £150 a year for captains of flag-ships

up to £250 a year for rear-admirals and vice-admirals of fleets[201].

By an Order of 26 June, 1674, the same scale was established for flag

officers who had served in the Third Dutch War[202]; and in 1674 and

1675 the system of half-pay for officers when they were not being

actually employed was further extended to the captains and masters of

first and second rate ships who had served in the war[203], and to the

commanders of squadrons[204].

In 1672[205] another important change relating to pay was made by the

Council. The principle of pensions on superannuation was adopted for

officers. These were to be 'equal to the salary and known allowances

they enjoyed,' provided that they had completed fifteen years of

service 'where the employment is constant, such as that of boatswains,

gunners, pursers, carpenters, &c.,' or eight years where it is not

constant, 'such as that of masters, chirurgeons, &c.' In 1673[206]

the principle of superannuation was extended from cases of old age to

officers wounded in service at sea. Such officers were to receive one

year's wages, 'and the continuance of them in pay during the whole time

they shall by good proof appear to have lain under cure.'

LECTURE IV

VICTUALLING; DISCIPLINE; SHIPS; GUNS

The arrangements for victualling had always had an important bearing

upon the contentment and efficiency of the seamen. 'However the pay

of the mariners, both for sea and harbour, may be wanting for some

time,' wrote one of the Victuallers, 'yet they must have continual

supplies of victuals, otherwise they will be apt to fall into very

great disorders.'[207] Pepys, in his private _Minute Book_[208], makes

the same point. 'Englishmen,' he says, 'and more especially seamen,

love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be

remembered, in the management of the victualling of the navy, that to

make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the

victuals, is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point,

and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any

one other hardship that can be put upon them.' But in this department

also the want of money had fatal effects, and contributed more than any

other cause to the comparative failure of the administration to provide

victuals of good quality, sufficient quantity, and promptly delivered

where they were required.

Samuel Pepys and the Royal Navy · 第 3 / 6 段