THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS
"Nous attachons un intêrét vital, presque aussi grand, à la forme dans
laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-mème du suffrage
universel."--GAMBETTA
_False impressions of public opinion._
The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral
methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of
public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the
exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a "brilliant
victory," and a "crushing defeat" for the other side. The German General
Election of 1907 affords an excellent illustration of these false
impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their
previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain
journals over their "crushing defeat." But the Socialists' poll showed
an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had
not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the
figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest
party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the
movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of
the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also
misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in
which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of
4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen
as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political
thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats
obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored
the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions
of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is
usually supposed.
_False impressions become the basis of legislative action._
False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect
of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of
action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a "reactionary"
policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for
a "progressive" policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of
Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political
destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in
the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly
represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not
almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would
have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election
of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crushing
defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a
true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments?
Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party
and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the
time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and
correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its
predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament
of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in
the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament.
_Loss of prestige by the House of Commons._
Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral
methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences
between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been
directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the
authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government,
misled by the composition of the "representative" House, make use of
its majority in that House for the passage of measures not really
desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not,
guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the
popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would
be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. "A House of
Commons which does not represent," said a leading Liberal journal, "may
stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and
its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to
take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the
imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the
character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the
real sources of the nation's power."[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has
declared that our defective electoral system may "yield a House of
Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the
respect and obedience of citizens."[2]
_Unstable representation._
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon
such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the
authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in
themselves constitute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present
methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of
the pendulum which have often been so pronounced a feature of elections,
give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative
chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed,
imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an
equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular
franchise is in any circumstances a satisfactory basis for government.
The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the
character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective
electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which
accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in
disguise--as being essential to the formation of a strong Government.
But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find
that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of
weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's
dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme
swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually
followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the
high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes
practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats
at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult
to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence
of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have
been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and
prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a
large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority
corresponds to public opinion.
_Weakened personnel_.
Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election
often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House
of Commons. In such a débâcle as that which took place in 1906, there
was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained
the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were
33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of
the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the
divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William
Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich
in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat
being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party
leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are
members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these
qualities are associated with a spirit of independence, find, it
increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls
depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however
eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the
party to maintain its majority in the particular constituency for which
he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a
disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very
pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain
sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet
be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election.
Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they
have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John
Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906,
received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage,
explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their
principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat
at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our
statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member
constituencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago,
inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have
afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous
and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by
exclusion from the House of Commons.
_Degradation of party strife._
There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against
the existing electoral system--it is in no small measure responsible for
that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has
characterised recent political and municipal contests. This debasement
of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the
authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been
laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction
with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debasement of
elections is weakening the faith of many in representative institutions.
An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so
distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the
excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to
undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has
shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy,
however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of
representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that "the empirical
art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the
deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,"[4] and
cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious
appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent
contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a
proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas
thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false
impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for
the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the
electors will succumb to such influences. The votes of this small
section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long
as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation
allotted to any given constituency is awarded to the party which can
secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive
degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory
has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by
which the victory is obtained, and if "the exploitation of subconscious
non-rational inferences" is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly
exploit them to the best of his powers.
_The final rally._
Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable illustration
of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid
description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a
very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our
electoral system. "The voters," says he, "who came in were the results
of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the
room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward
by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with
broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and
bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the
making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the
public-house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them
seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the
name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to
vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of
my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely
tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very
anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief
feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as
even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city
of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and
resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political
opinion would enable us to improve it." The political "boss" has no such
qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally,
and every effort must be made to ensure that the party's poll exceeds
that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely
suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details
of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend
the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of
such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as "a
decently satisfactory method of creating a Government." But we are not
compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible
justification is there for making the representation of all the other
electors of a constituency depend upon the result of a final rally?
_Bribery and "nursing"_
Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the
effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the
influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes
of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an
electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon
the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been
rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a
much more subtle form--"nursing" the constituency--would appear to be on
the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable
electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the
expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means,"
says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals
for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the constituency in
which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals
relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as
those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political
influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made
to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the
electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section--is favourably
influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given £100 to the funds of the
hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given £5, 5_s_., or nothing at all.
Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are
even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to
ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against
giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give £20, but
waits to see if Mr. B. gives £25, in which case he will raise his
intended £20 to £30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of
the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and
still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are
simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a
successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the
psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the
electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose
activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician
can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact
potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes
in large and unmistakable characters.... The writer was once consulted
by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to
represent a London constituency. The path was clear to his selection as
a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after
noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he
might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless
he were prepared to spend from £1500 to £2000 a year from that time
until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he
might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The constituency was one
where money _must_ be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his
opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be
increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a
local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might
make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to
electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer
gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part
when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the
necessities of the existing system." Some of the practices associated
with constituency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation,
but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more
subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these
practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation
of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the
attentions of a rich patron?
_The organization of victory._
The cumulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is
shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of
the party leader--separation which is becoming more and more complete.
The work of covering hoardings with posters of a repulsive type, the
task of preparing election "literature," must be carried out by men of a
different character from those who are responsible for the public
direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their
appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the
mere force of competition is compelling agents, sometimes against their
own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of
the Municipal Reform campaign in the London County Council election of
1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of
their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by
gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more
victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his
power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the
political "boss" in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods
have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political "boss"
has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable
factor in successful political organization. At the London County
Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Municipal Reform Party
dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against
the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections
was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become
possible in England for a political organization such as "Tammany Hall"
to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of
fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a
notice such as that which appeared in the New York _Evening Post:_
"There are a thousand 'colonizers' waiting to vote for the Tammany
ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your
name."[8] In New York the Citizens' Unions have at each election to
spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence
on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections
renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the
Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the
results of a "final rally," the votes of the least worthy citizens,
assiduous "nursing," or suggestive posters to decide the representation
of a constituency.
_Party exclusiveness._
The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must
not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party
organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is
intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our
defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon
which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but
a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the
political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of
Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in
1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: "The opposition to me is not
to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. ... We are face to face
with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far
it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to
creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of
being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may
become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do
not want a system of political assassination under which any one who is
in the way may be put out of the way." To realize the dangerous weapon
which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it
is not necessary to give complete assent to the statement of Lord Hugh
Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The
power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the
secret organization known as "confederates" was reported to have marked
down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy
approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it
was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but
it nevertheless constituted a serious attack upon the representative
character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House
will be deprived of its rightful place in the constitution of this
country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of
Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which
will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of
1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce
many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was
completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the
future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest
fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent
part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so
eager for Tariff Reform at all costs--the "confederates"
themselves--would probably have protested most vigorously had the same
policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the
attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the
comment of _The Times_ on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of
those who value the representative character of the House of Commons
more highly than an immediate party triumph:--
"Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole,
and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of
opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line
which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any
hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of
representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our
institutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of
a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we
should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in
Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable
programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation
to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not
for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that
direction."[9]
This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative
chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General
Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments,
was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground
that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government.
Mr. Harold Cox, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of
the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the
Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support.
Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member
was required to accept in writing the constitution of the party, and
this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided
at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written
pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party
decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an
amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure
as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion
within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against
the amendment, and commenting on the incident the _Labour Leader_ said:
"Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party's mandate? We invite
the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to
this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict
will be."
_Mechanical debates._
These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all
respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members
must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the
party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of
the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more
and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of
the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of
each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and
independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of
their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made
parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion
necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in
the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour's
administration were very real and full of life, because argument could
and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of
excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates
will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord
Hugh Cecil has said[10]: "The present system unquestionably weakens the
House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in
sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering
obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing
parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one
side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the
majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to
represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral
authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative
character of the House of Commons as now constituted, leave it only the
credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of
that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives
of the whole people. "Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the
debate on the Women's Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he
rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government
programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. "To think in
programmes," said he, "is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization
of the political intellect." And the nation suffers.
_The disfranchisement of minorities in bi-racial countries_
The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only
through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the
preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to
postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive
his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next
General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed
their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole,
and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the
disfranchisement of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties.
The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial
divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchisement. Only
one--Barberton--of the twenty-six country constituencies of the
Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk,
although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more
than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained
but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest.
The disfranchisement of minorities heightened the natural difference
which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal--a
difference which would have been still more pronounced had not Het Volk
succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total
of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first
elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated
contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats
were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the
Constitutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the
extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election _The Friend_, the
organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that "if Bloemfontein ventures to vote
for the Constitutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to
the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the
country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards." On the
morrow of the election the same paper declared that "the election
results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout
the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown
itself politically an alien city." But would Bloemfontein have "shown
itself politically an alien city" if the electoral method had been such
that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts,
had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength?
Had the Constitution of South Africa provided for the representation of
minorities in the House of Assembly, as proposed in the original draft
signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and
the conflicting interests of the constituent States and of town and
country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United
Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South
Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to
South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example
of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from
complete, and the process has been retarded, and is at the present time
being retarded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland
still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions
within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our
representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of
Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and
Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is
represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while
those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have
endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South
are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of
Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have
still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that
contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in
addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from
Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its
unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the
House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day,
and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less
difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full
play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects,
be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise
from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales
of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes
of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered
36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority
sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last
two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would
not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been
considerably modified, would not the process of political unification
have been made more complete?
The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial
religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony.
Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking
districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation
members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result
has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political
consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects
of the disfranchisement of minorities is to be seen in the American
Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported
in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the
North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the
report the absence of minority representation "in the States of the
South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to
break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of
those States together and have given them voice in the electoral
colleges.... Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice
and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and
to civil war."
_Defective representation in municipal bodies_.]
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening
of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the
degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery,
the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these
are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections
with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force
both in County Council and in Municipal elections are based on the same
false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results
almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council
elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the
Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the
personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious
consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of
the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost
their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues
because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale
dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it
more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote
the necessary time to the study of London's problems, for it is
generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no
sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting
attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of
members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was
the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of
voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would
not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the
presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of
different policies.
_Wasteful municipal finance._
Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the
personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful
expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or
was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be
more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at
great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that
policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and
its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless
expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such
violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that
the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the
deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are
fairly represented.
_No continuity in administration_.]
The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The
Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7
Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and
Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the
Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive
elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council.
Lewisham's experience is typical of that of several other London
boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in municipal affairs
lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no
security of continuity in the administration of the business of the
Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a
select committee of the House of Lords, said: "I found, of course, when
I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience
except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced
had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was
vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no
previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one
of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact
that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a
weakness."[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years' hard work
before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough,
and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our
local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked
ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our
electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating
swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing,
such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The
influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the
representative assembly declines.
_The root of the evil._
In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we
trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils constitute a
complete answer to Lord Morley's criticism of Mill, that the latter laid
undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a
false basis, those democratic institutions, on which so many hopes have
been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of
shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to
the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from
the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may
make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and
conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says,
concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular
character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be
such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent
interest in the affairs of their country.
[Footnote 1: _The Manchester Guardian_, 12 February 1909.]
[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May
1906.]
[Footnote 3: _The Times_, 8 January 1906.]
[Footnote 4: _Human Nature in Politics_, pp. 241 _et seq_.]
[Footnote 5: _The Times_, 22 August 1906.]
[Footnote 6: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ pp. 102 _et seq_.]
[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States
there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of
the "boss."]
[Footnote 8: _The Manchester Guardian_, 21 April 1908.]
[Footnote 9: _The Times_, 22 January 1909.]
[Footnote 10: Letter read at the annual meeting of the Proportional
Representation Society, 24 April 1907.]
[Footnote 11: Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.]
[Footnote 12: Before the Union.]
[Footnote 13: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H. L.)_, 1907
(132).]