CHAPTER II

THE DIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS

"I therefore agree that it is impossible to defend the rough and ready

method which has been hitherto adopted as a proper or satisfactory

explanation of the representative principle. It is not merely, as more

than one speaker has pointed out, that under our existing system a

minority in the country may return a majority of the House of Commons,

but what more frequently happens, and what I am disposed to agree is

equally injurious in its results, is that you have almost always a great

disproportion in the relative size of the majority and minority in the

House of Commons as compared with their relative size in the

constituencies."

--THE RIGHT HON. H.H. ASQUITH[1]

"English writers," says Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, in the _Irish Year

Book_, 1909, "often write as if election by a bare majority was the only

natural or possible mode of election, as if it was like day and night,

seedtime and harvest; something fixed and in the nature of things, and

not to be questioned or examined or improved." The unquestioning habit

of our minds goes even farther than Mr. Dobbs suggests. For, although

prior to the Redistribution Act of 1885, every great town in the United

Kingdom, with the exception of London, was a parliamentary unit, yet the

system of single-member constituencies made general by that Act is now

regarded by many as another essential and permanent feature of the

English parliamentary system. But if, as this chapter proposes to show,

existing electoral methods may result, and have resulted, in a complete

travesty of representation, if these methods fail in every respect to

fulfil the requirements of a satisfactory electoral system, then neither

single-member constituencies nor the majority method of election can be

permitted to stand permanently in the way of effective improvement.

_The exaggeration of majorities._

Since the Redistribution Act of 1885, when the system of single-member

constituencies was made general, there have been eight General

Elections, and these are amply sufficient to illustrate the working of

this system. A complete analysis of these elections, prepared by Mr. J.

Rooke Corbett, M.A., of the Manchester Statistical Society, appears in

Appendix V.[2] It will be sufficient for present purposes if attention

is directed to some of the more obvious of their lessons. The General

Elections of 1895, 1900, and 1906, resulted in the return to the House

of Commons of a number of representatives of the victorious party far in

excess of that to which their polling strength entitled them, and this

result, repeated three times in succession, has given rise to a

widespread belief that this system necessarily and always yields to the

victors an exaggerated majority. There is, however, no clear conception

of the extent to which these exaggerated majorities diverge from the

truth, and an examination of the figures is therefore desirable. Here

are the totals for the General Elections of 1900 and 1906:[3]--

GENERAL ELECTION, 1900

Parties. Votes Seats Seats in

Obtained. Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

Unionists 2,548,736 402 343

Home Rulers 2,391,319 268 327

Majorities 157,417 134 16

GENERAL ELECTION, 1906

Parties. Votes Seats Seats in

Obtained. Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

Ministerialists 3,395,811 513 387

Unionists 2,494,794 157 283

Majorities 901,017 356 104

It will be seen that in the General Election of 1900 the Unionists

obtained a majority of 134, but that if parties had been represented in

proportion to their polling strength this majority would have been 16,

whilst the majority of 356 obtained at the General Election of 1906 by

the Ministerialists (in which term, for the purposes of comparison, all

members of the Liberal, Labour and Nationalist parties are included)

would, under similar conditions, have been a majority of 104 only. The

very important change in public opinion disclosed by the polls at the

second of these elections was not nearly sufficient to justify the

enormous displacement that took place in the relative party strengths

within the House of Commons. The extent of the possible displacement in

representation may be more fully realised from a consideration of the

figures for Great Britain, for the representation of Ireland, where

parliamentary conditions have become stereotyped, is but little affected

at any election. An increase in the Liberal vote from 2,073,116 to

3,093,978--an increase of 50 per cent.--resulted in a change in the

number of representatives from 186 to 428, an increase of 130 per cent.,

whilst a decrease in the Conservative vote from 2,402,740 to

2,350,086--a decline of little more than 2 per cent.--resulted in a

reduction in representation from 381 to 139 members, a decline of 63 per

cent. The displacement was even more pronounced in London, where the

number of Liberal members rose from 8 to 40, and the number of

Conservative members fell from 52 to 20. The violence of these changes

was attributed to a similar change on the part of the electors, but it

was much more largely due to an electoral method that exaggerates any

changes in public opinion beyond all reason.

If, however, the results--not of two but of the eight General Elections,

1885-1910--are considered it will be seen that the current belief, that

the single-member system invariably yields a large majority, rests on a

very precarious foundation. The General Election of 1892, for example,

gave to the Liberals (inclusive of the Nationalists) a majority of 44

only. In England (which, excluding Wales and Monmouth, returns 461

members) the Conservatives in 1895 and 1900 had majorities of 233 and

213; in 1906 the Liberals had a majority of 207; but in the elections of

January and December 1910, the Conservatives had on each occasion a

majority of 17 only. If Wales and Monmouth are included, it will be

found that in the 1910 elections the Liberal majorities were 13 and 11

respectively. Single-member constituencies do not therefore guarantee

large majorities. It can with greater truth be said that they guarantee

wrong majorities, for, as the following table shows, there is no

constant relation between the size of the majority in votes and the size

of the majority in seats:--

General Election. Majority in Seats. Majority in Votes.

1885 Liberal 158 Liberal 564,391

1886 Conservative 104 Liberal 54,817

1892 Liberal 44 Liberal 190,974

1895 Conservative 150 Conservative 117,473

1900 Conservative 134 Conservative 157,417

1906 Liberal 356 Liberal 901,017

1910 (Jan.) Liberal 124 Liberal 495,683

1910 (Dec.) Liberal 126 Liberal 355,945

The majority of 44 seats which the Liberals obtained in 1892 represented

a majority of 190,974 votes, whereas a much smaller Conservative

majority at the polls, viz., 117,473, yielded in 1895 a majority in

seats of 150. The overwhelming victory of 1895 represented the very

slender majority of 117,473 votes in a total of 4,841,769, whilst at the

next election, 1900, when the Conservatives increased their majority at

the polls, their majority in the House of Commons was reduced. The

Liberal majority in votes in the election of December 1910 was smaller

than in that of the preceding January, but not the majority in seats. In

1886, the Conservatives obtained the large majority of 104 without

having any majority in votes, and, if England is taken alone, it will be

found that in January 1910 the Liberals had a majority of 29,877 in

votes, and that in December the Conservatives had a majority of 31,744,

whereas on each occasion the Conservatives obtained a majority of

17 seats.

_The disfranchisement of minorities._

Politicians, to whom the one great saving merit of the single-member

system is that it yields an exaggerated majority to the victors, would,

if pressed, find it very difficult to defend the results referred to in

the preceding paragraphs, and would be even more at a loss if asked to

state to what extent they considered that national opinion should be

falsified. The most ardent defenders of the system would hardly deny the

right of the minority to some representation, and it is worthy of note

that one of the reasons advanced by Mr. Gladstone in support of his

decision to adopt it was that such a system tended to secure

representation for minorities.[4] Yet, as prophesied in the debates of

1885, the minorities in the South and West of Ireland have since that

date been permanently disfranchised; in the eight Parliaments,

1885-1911, they have been entirely without representation. This

continued injustice is in itself sufficient to show how baseless was Mr.

Gladstone's assumption that the system of single member constituencies

would secure representation for minorities. This example, however, does

not stand alone. In the General Election of 1906 the Unionists of Wales

contested 17 constituencies, and although at the polls they numbered

52,637, they failed to secure a member; their 91,620 Liberal opponents

secured the whole of the representation allotted to those

constituencies. In addition the Liberals obtained the thirteen seats

which the Unionists did not challenge. The minority throughout Wales,

numbering 36 per cent, of the electors, had no spokesman in the House of

Commons. This result shows how completely a system of single-member

constituencies fails to protect minorities, and an analysis of the votes

cast in Scotland in 1910, both in January and December, reveals the fact

that the Unionist minority only escaped by the narrowest of margins the

fate which befel the Welsh Unionists in 1906. The figures speak for

themselves:--

SCOTLAND (Boroughs and Counties, January 1910)

Parties. Votes. Seats Seats in

Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

Liberal 352,334 59 38

Labour and Socialist 35,997 2 4

Unionist 255,589 9 28

Totals 643,920 70 70

Every Scottish Unionist member of Parliament represented on an average

28,400 voters, whilst a Liberal member represented less than 6000

voters. The figures repay still further examination. One of the Unionist

seats--the Camlachie division of Glasgow--was only captured as the result

of a split in the Ministerialist ranks. The other eight seats were won

by majorities ranging from 41 to 874, amounting in the aggregate to

3156. If therefore in these constituencies some 1600 Unionist voters had

changed sides, the Unionist party, though numbering more than a quarter

of a million, or 40 per cent. of the electorate, might have failed to

secure any representation at all. With the single-member system more

than a quarter of a million of Scottish Unionists only obtained

representation as it were by accident. In the same election the Liberals

in the counties of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent, numbering 134,677, found

themselves without a representative.[5]

_The underrepresentation of majorities._

The failure of existing electoral methods to provide representation for

minorities not only unduly emphasizes racial and other differences

between different parts of the same country, as in Ireland, but often

leads to a complete falsification of public opinion. The results in

Birmingham and Manchester in the election of 1906 may serve as a text.

As a result of that election these two towns were represented in

Parliament as being absolutely opposed to one another--a heightened

contrast which was a pure caricature of the difference disclosed by the

polls. Manchester (including Salford) returned nine Ministerialists;

they were elected by the votes of 51,721 citizens, whilst the votes of

their 33,907 political opponents counted for nothing. Manchester was

solid for Liberalism. Birmingham (with Aston Manor) was represented by

eight Unionist members elected by 51,658 citizens, but here again the

polls disclosed a dissentient minority of 22,938. The total number of

votes in Manchester was 85,628, and in Birmingham 74,596. Manchester

(with Salford) has one more member than Birmingham (with Aston Manor),

because of the larger population and electorate of the former area. The

Ministerialists of Manchester and Salford were equal in number to the

Unionists in Birmingham, and it is interesting to observe that the

former obtained additional representation because their opponents were

more numerous than were the opponents of the Unionists in Birmingham.

The combined results of these two districts disclose the crowning

weakness of a system of single-member constituencies. Taken together the

Unionists numbered 85,565, the Ministerialists 74,659, and if the net

Unionist majority of 10,906 had been spread over the whole of the two

areas it would have yielded in each constituency the very respectable

majority of 640. If their voting power had been evenly diffused the

Unionists might have won the whole of the seventeen seats, whereas they

were, as a result of the election, in a minority of one. This possible

inversion of the true opinion of the electorate may perhaps be more

clearly understood from another example taken from the same

election,--the results of the polls in the county divisions of

Warwickshire.

WARWICKSHIRE (ELECTION, 1906)

Electoral Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal

Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority.

Tamworth 7,561 4,842 2,719 --

Nuneaton 5,849 7,677 -- 1,828

Rugby 4,907 5,181 -- 274

Stratford-on-Avon 4,173 4,321 -- 148

-------------------------------------------

22,490 22,021 469

The Conservatives, who were in a majority of 469, obtained one-fourth of

the representation allotted to the county. Similar examples can be given

from nearly every election. Thus the figures for the five divisions of

Sheffield in the election of December 1910 were as follows:--

SHEFFIELD (ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910)

Electoral Ministerial Unionist Ministerial Unionist

Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority.

Attercliffe 6,532 5,354 1,178 --

Brightside 5,766 3,902 1,864 --

Central 3,271 3,455 -- 184

Eccleshall 5,849 6,039 -- 190

Hallam 5,593 5,788 -- 195

-------------------------------------------

27,011 24,538 2,473

It will be seen that the Ministerial majority in each of the

Attercliffe and Brightside divisions was larger than the aggregate of

the Unionist majorities in the other three divisions; yet the Unionists

obtained three seats out of five.

In the same election the result of the contested seats in London

(including Croydon and West Ham) was as follows:--

Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained.

Unionist . . . . . . 268,127 29

Ministerialist . . . . 243,722 31

The Unionists were in a majority of 24,405, but only obtained a minority

of the seats. Had their majority been uniformly distributed throughout

London there would have been an average majority for the Unionists of

400 in every constituency, and in that case the press would have said

that London was solidly Unionist.

It may be contended that the foregoing are isolated cases, but

innumerable examples can be culled from electoral statistics showing how

a system of single-member constituencies may fail to secure for

majorities the influence and power which are rightly theirs. In the

General Election of 1895 the contested elections yielded the following

results:--

GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 (Contested Constituencies)

Parties. Votes. Seats.

Unionists . . . . . . 1,785,372 282

Home Rulers . . . . 1,823,809 202

These figures show that in a contest extending over no less than 484

constituencies the Unionists, who were in a minority of 38,437,

obtained a majority of 80 seats. In this election, if an allowance is

made for uncontested constituencies, it will be found that the Unionists

were in a majority, but in the General Election of 1886 the figures for

the whole of the United Kingdom (including an allowance for uncontested

seats made on the same basis[6]) were as follows:--

GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 (All Constituencies)

Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained.

Home Rulers . . . . 2,103,954 283

Unionists . . . . . . 2,049,137 387

This election was regarded as a crushing defeat for Mr. Gladstone. He

found himself in the House of Commons in a minority of 104, but his

supporters in the country were in a majority. The results of the General

Election of 1874--although the system of single-member constituencies

had not then been made general--are equally instructive. The figures are

as follows:--

GENERAL ELECTION, 1874

Parties. Votes Seats Seats in

Obtained. Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

Conservative . . . . . . 1,222,000 356 300

Liberal and Home Rulers . 1,436,000 296 352

From this it appears that in 1874, while the Liberals in the United

Kingdom, in the aggregate, had a majority of 214,000 votes, the

Conservatives had a majority of 60 in the members elected, whereas with

a rational system of representation the Liberals should have had a

majority of 52.[7]

Such anomalous results are not confined to this country; they are but

examples of that inversion of national opinion which marks at all stages

the history of elections based on the majority system. Speaking of the

United States, Professor Commons says that "as a result of the district

system the national House of Representatives is scarcely a

representative body. In the fifty-first Congress, which enacted the

McKinley Tariff Law, the majority of the representatives were elected by

a minority of the voters." In the fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892,

the Democrats, with 47.2 per cent, of the vote, obtained 59.8 per cent,

of the representatives.

The stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was equally unjustified; the

Republican majority of 134 should have been a minority of 7, as against

all other parties.[8] Similarly in New South Wales the supporters of Mr.

Reid's government, who secured a majority of the seats at the election

of 1898, were in a minority of 15,000. The figures of the New York

Aldermanic election of 1906 show an equally striking contrast between

the actual results of the election and the probable results under a

proportional system:--

_A "game of dice."_

Parties. Seats Seats in

Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

Republican 41 18

Democrat 26 27

Municipal Ownership

Candidates 6 25

Socialist -- 2

It is unnecessary to proceed with the recital of the anomalous results

of existing electoral methods. It has been abundantly shown that a

General Election often issues in a gross exaggeration of prevailing

opinion; that such exaggeration may at one time involve a complete

suppression of the minority, whilst at another time a majority may fail

to obtain its fair share of representation. M. Poincaré may well liken

an election to a game of dice (he speaks of _les coups de dé du système

majoritaire_,) for no one who has followed the course of elections could

have failed to have observed how largely the final results have depended

upon chance. This, indeed, was the most striking characteristic of the

General Elections of 1910. In the January election there were 144

constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a majority

of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the

Ministerialists and 75 by the Unionists. The majorities were in some

cases as low as 8, 10, and 14. The aggregate of the majorities in the

Ministerialist constituencies amounted to 16,931, and had some 8500

Liberals in these constituencies changed sides, the Ministerialist

majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the

Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had

fortune favoured the Ministeralists in these constituencies their

majority would have been no less than 274. Such is the stability of the

foundation on which the House of Commons rests; such the method to which

we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation on grave

national issues.

_The importance of boundaries_.

All these anomalies can be traced to the same cause--that with a

single-member system the whole of the representation of a constituency

must necessarily be to the majority of the electors, whether that

majority be large or small. It directly follows that the results of

elections often depend not so much upon the actual strength of political

parties, as upon the manner in which that strength is distributed over

the country. If that strength is evenly distributed, then the minority

may be crushed in every constituency; if unevenly distributed any result

is possible. In the latter case the result may be considerably

influenced by the manner in which the constituencies are arranged. A

slight change in the line of the boundaries of a constituency might

easily make a difference of 50 votes, whilst "to carry the dividing line

from North to South, instead of from East to West, would, in many

localities, completely alter the character of the representation." [9] An

example will make this statement clear. Take a town with 13,000 Liberal

and 12,000 Conservative electors and divide it into five districts of

5000 electors each. If there is a section of the town in which the

Liberals largely preponderate--and it often happens that the strength of

one or other of the parties is concentrated in a particular area--the

net result of the election in five districts will depend upon the way in

which the boundary lines are drawn. The possible results of two

different distributions may be shown in an extreme form thus:--

Constituency Libs. Cons.

1st. 4,000 1,000 Lib. victory.

2nd. 2,400 2,600 Cons. "

3rd. 2,300 2,700 " "

4th. 2,200 2,800 " "

5th. 2,100 2,900 " "

------ ------

13,000 12,000

Constituency Libs. Cons.

1st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. victory.

2st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. "

3st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. "

4th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. "

5th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. "

------ ------

13,000 12,000

_The gerrymander_.

With one set of boundaries the area in which the Liberals largely

preponderate might be enclosed in one constituency. The Liberals might

obtain a majority of 3000 in this constituency but lose the other four

seats. If, however, the boundary lines were so arranged that each

constituency included a portion of this excessively Liberal area, the

Liberals might obtain the whole of the five seats. In both cases the

result of the election would fail to give a true presentation of the

real opinions of the town. The influence of boundaries in determining

the results of an election has been clearly realized in the United

States for more than a century. Professor Commons states that whenever

the periodical rearrangement of constituencies takes place the

boundaries are "gerrymandered." "Every apportionment Act," says he,

"that has been passed in this or any other country has involved

inequality; and it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such

an Act, and give the advantage of the inequality to the opposite party.

Consequently, every apportionment Act involves more or less of the

gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of

districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it

small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the

opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of

districts.... Many of the worst gerrymanders have been so well designed

that they come close within all constitutional requirements." [10]

Although the National Congress has stated that the district for

congressional elections must be a compact and contiguous territory, the

law is everywhere disregarded.

The word "gerrymander" has found its way into English journalism. It was

used by Liberals in their criticism of Mr. Balfour's abortive

redistribution scheme of 1905, and has been equally used by Unionists in

1909 in their criticism of Mr. Harcourt's London Elections Bill. On

neither occasion was the word used in its original meaning, and,

although its history is to be found in most works on electoral methods,

the story may, perhaps, be repeated with advantage:--

"The term Gerrymander dates from the year 1811, when Elbridge Gerry was

Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then

termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the

State. In order to secure themselves in the possession of the

Government, the party in power passed the famous law of 11 February

1812, providing for a new division of the State into senatorial

districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the

Federalists should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all

natural and customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the

State, particularly the counties of Worcester and Essex, presented

similar examples of political geography. It is said that Gilbert Stuart,

seeing in the office of the _Columbian Centinel_ an outline of the Essex

outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the country, added with

his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead,

exclaiming, 'There, that will do for a salamander!' 'Salamander!' said

Mr. Russell, the editor: 'I call it a Gerrymander!' The mot obtained

vogue, and a rude cut of the figure published in the _Centinel_ and in

the _Salem Gazette_, with the natural history of the monster duly set

forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary of the

country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164

Democratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by

51,766 Federalists; and Essex county, which, when voting as a single

district had sent five Federalists to the Senate, was now represented in

that body by three Democrats and two Federalists." [11]

Mr. Balfour's scheme did not involve a political rearrangement of

boundaries, and the word "gerrymandering" was thus incorrectly employed

in relation to it, but so long as we retain a system of single-member

constituencies a Redistribution Bill will always invite suspicion

because of the possibilities of influencing the arrangement of

constituencies which such a measure affords. Instructions are usually

given to boundary commissioners to attach due consideration "to

community or diversity of interests, means of communication, physical

features, existing electoral boundaries, sparsity or density of

population;" [12] but although such instructions are at once reasonable

and just, they would not prevent, and indeed might be used to

facilitate, a gerrymander in the American sense of the term were such a

proceeding determined upon. It is quite conceivable that a mining

district in which one party had a very large majority might be

surrounded by an area in which the political conditions were more

balanced, but in which the opposite party had a small majority. If that

mining area was, in accordance with the wording of these instructions,

treated as one constituency because of its community of interests and

the surrounding area divided into three or more districts, the minority

would in all probability obtain a majority of seats.

_ The modern gerrymander_

The new constituencies required by the South Africa Act of 1909 have

been arranged with the utmost care,[13] but had the delegates to the

South African National Convention adhered to their original proposal to

abandon single-member constituencies, they would have secured for South

Africa, among other invaluable benefits, complete security from the

gerrymander, any possibility of which begets suspicion and reacts in a

disastrous way upon political warfare. The gerrymander is nothing more

or less than a fraudulent practice. But the United States is not the

only country in which such practices take place. Their counter-part in

Canada was described by Sir John Macdonald as "hiving the grits," and

even in England, without any change of boundaries, practices have arisen

within the last few years which have had their birth in the same motives

that produced the American gerrymander. In boroughs which are divided

into more than one constituency there is a considerable number of voters

who have qualifications in more than one division. A man may vote in any

division in which he has a qualification, but in not more than one. He

may make his choice. In Edinburgh for many years, on both sides of

politics, there has been a constant transfer of voters from one register

to another in the hopes of strengthening the party's position in one or

other division. It was even alleged that the precise moment of a vacancy

in West Edinburgh (May 1909) was determined by the desire to ascertain

the strength of the Unionist party in that division, to discover how

many Unionist votes should be transferred for the purpose of improving

Unionist prospects or of defeating the designs of their opponents. This

allegation may be wholly unfounded, but the single-member system

encourages such a proceeding, and the statement at least indicates how

the voting power of a division may be manipulated. The mere possibility

of such an action arouses the suspicion that it has taken place. Similar

practices have, it is stated, been pursued in Bristol. Votes have been

transferred from one division, where one of the parties was in a

hopeless minority, for the purpose of strengthening its position in

other divisions. An examination of the figures of the election in

Birmingham in 1906 shows that in one division, Birmingham East, the

Unionists narrowly escaped defeat. They won by a majority of 585 only.

In the other divisions the Unionists won by very large majorities. Must

not the possibility of transferring surplus votes in strong

constituencies to strengthen the position in weak constituencies prove

an irresistible temptation to the agents responsible for the success of

the party? They are entitled to make use of all the advantages at their

disposal. In this way a new and more subtle form of the "gerrymander"

has arisen in England, and if we are to redeem English political warfare

from proceedings which approximate very closely to sharp practices, we

must so amend our electoral system as to give due weight to the votes

not only of the majority but of the minority as well.

_The Block Vote_

The analysis of the results of majority systems would not be complete

without some reference to the use of the "block" vote in the London

County Council, the London Borough Council, and other elections. In the

London County Council elections each constituency returns two members,

and each elector can give one vote to each of two candidates. The

Metropolitan boroughs are divided into wards returning from three to

nine members, each elector giving one vote apiece to candidates up to

the number to be returned. [14] Both in the London County and London

Borough elections the majority, as in a single-member constituency, can

obtain the whole of the representation. All the defects which arise from

parliamentary elections again appear, and often in a more accentuated

form. The figures of the two London County elections, 1904, 1907,

disclose a catastrophic change in representation similar to that which

characterized the General Election of 1906:--

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1904

Seats in

Parties. Votes. Seats proportion

Obtained. to Votes.

Progressive and Labour 357,557 83 64

Moderate 287,079 34 52

Independent 12,940 1 2

Progressive majority over

Moderates 70,478 49 12

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1907

Seats in

Parties. Votes. Seats proportion

Obtained. to Votes.

Moderate 526,700 79 67

Progressive and Labour 395,749 38 50

Independent 6,189 1 1

Moderate majority over

Progressive and Labour 130,951 41 17

_The London County Council elections_.

A swing of the pendulum which, measured in votes, would have transferred

a majority of twelve into a minority of seventeen, had the effect of

changing a majority of 49 into a minority of 41. This alternate

exaggeration of the prevailing tendencies in municipal politics gives

rise to a false impression of the real opinions of the elector. The

citizens of London are not so unstable as the composition of their

Council, but it is the more violent displacement which forms the basis

of comment in the press and of municipal action. These elections, too,

like the Parliamentary elections, showed with what ease the minority

throughout large areas may be deprived of representation. Six adjoining

suburban boroughs--Brixton, Norwood, Dulwich, Lewisham, Greenwich,

Woolwich--were, before the election of 1907, represented by twelve

Progressives. At that election they returned twelve Moderates; indeed on

that occasion the outer western and southern boroughs, in one continuous

line from Hampstead to Fulham, from Wandsworth to Woolwich, returned

Moderates and Moderates only.

_The election of aldermen of the L.C.C._

The London County Council elections of 1910 gave the Municipal Reform

party a majority of two councillors over the Progressive and Labour

parties. The transfer of a single vote in Central Finsbury would have

been sufficient to have produced an exact balance. It was the duty of

the new Council to elect the aldermen, the block vote being used. The

majority of two was sufficient to enable the Municipal Reformers to

carry the election of every one of the ten candidates nominated by them,

thus depriving the minority of any voice in the election of aldermen.

The object for which aldermen were instituted was entirely set at

naught, and this the method of election alone made possible. The

privilege of selecting aldermen was used by the party in power, not for

the purpose of strengthening the Council by the addition of

representative men, but for the purpose of strengthening the party

position.[15] The privilege has been abused in a similar way by the

English provincial boroughs. In these boroughs, prior to the Election of

Aldermen Act, 1910, aldermen as well as councillors took part in the

election of aldermen. In some cases a party having once obtained a

predominant position has, by making full use of its power to elect

aldermen in sympathy with itself, succeeded in perpetuating its

predominance, although defeated at the polls. The minority of the

councillors, with the assistance of the non-retiring aldermen, has not

only elected further aldermen from members of the same party, but has

controlled the policy of the Council. The Act referred to merely

prevents aldermen in municipal councils from voting in the election of

other aldermen, but does not go to the root of the evil. An alteration

in the method of election is required.

[Sidenote 1: _The election of Representative Peers of Scotland_.]

A further example of the use of the block vote may be taken from the

election of Scottish Representative Peers. At the commencement of each

Parliament the Scottish Peers meet in Holyrood Palace for the purpose of

electing sixteen of their number to represent the peerage of Scotland in

the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Peers are in a

majority, and the block vote enables them to choose sixteen Unionist

Peers. At the election of January 1910 Lord Torphichen, a Unionist Peer,

who had voted against his party on the Finance Bill of the previous

year, failed to secure re-election. Lord Torphichen was elected in the

following December, but the incident shows how complete is the power

conferred upon the majority by this method of election; not only

political opponents but dissenting members of the same party can be

excluded from representation.

_The Australian Senate_.

The block vote is used also in the election of members of the Australian

Senate. Each State elects six senators, half of whom retire every three

years. Each State is polled as a separate constituency, and each elector

has three votes. At the election of 1910 the Labour Party polled the

highest number of votes in each of the States, and thus succeeded in

returning eighteen senators, all other parties obtaining none. The

figures here given for the elections in Victoria and New South Wales

show that in Victoria the successful candidates were not even supported

by a majority of electors, and that in both States the excess of the

successful over their leading opponents was so small that a slight turn

over would have completely altered the result of the elections:--

ELECTION of AUSTRALIAN SENATORS, 1910

_Victoria._

Successful. Unsuccessful.

Findley (Lab.)....217,673 Best (Fusionist) ....... 213,976

Barker (Lab.).....216,199 Trenwith (Fusionist).... 211,058

Blakey (Lab.).....215,117 M'Cay (Fusionist) ...... 195,477

Goldstein (Independent) 53,583

Ronald (Independent) ... 18,380

648,889 692,474

_New South Wales._

Successful. Unsuccessful.

A.M'Dougall(Lab.) ..., 249,212 J.P. Gray (Fusionist)... 220,569

A. Gardiner (Lab.) ... 247,047 E. Pulsford (Fusionist). 214,889

A. Rae (Lab.)..........239,307 J. C. Neild (Fusionist). 212,150

J. Norton (Independ.)... 50,893

R. Mackenzie (Independ.) 13,608

J.O. Maroney (Independ.) 9,660

T. Hoare (Independ.).... 8,432

735,566 730,201

_London Borough Councils_

The London Borough Council elections yield results equally

unsatisfactory. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords

which, in 1907, examined the Municipal Representation Bill introduced by

Lord Courtney of Penwith, sums up these results in the following

paragraphs:--

"If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if

little more than one-half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in

one borough the Progressives, with 19,430 votes, obtained all the 30

seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did

not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the

Progressives did not secure any representation. "On the other hand, the

system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards

are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts,

the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one

borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only

obtained 24.

"The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are

nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change

may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903

election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in

1905, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42

seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one."[16]

One example will suffice to illustrate the findings of this Committee.

Here are the results of two wards in the Borough of Battersea:--

BATTERSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTION, 1906

Ward Votes Obtained.

Municipal Reform Progressive

Candidates. Candidates.

Shaftesbury 786 905 }

(six seats) 777 902 }

769 899 }all

753 895 }successful.

753 891 }

741 852 }

----- -----

Totals 4,579 5,344

St. John's 747 } 217

(three seats) 691 }all 197

686 }successful. 191

----- -----

Totals 2,124 605

Totals for both wards 6,703 5,949

These tables disclose some curious anomalies. Each elector in the

Shaftesbury ward has six votes--the ward being entitled to six

Councillors--whereas each elector in the St. John's ward, which is only

entitled to three Councillors, has but three votes. The additional

representation is allotted to the Shaftesbury ward because of its larger

electorate, but the only electors to reap any advantage from this fact

are the Progressives. The presence in the ward of a large number of

citizens who are Municipal Reformers has merely had the effect of

increasing the amount of representation obtained by their opponents.

Further, the number of Municipal Reformers in the Shaftesbury ward

exceeded the number of Municipal Reformers in the St. John's ward; in

the former they obtained no representation, in the latter they obtained

three seats. The two wards taken together showed a net majority in votes

of 754 for the Municipal Reformers who, however, only secured three

seats out of nine. Taking the Borough as a whole the Municipal Reformers

obtained 24 representatives with 53,910 votes, whereas the Progressives

obtained 30 representatives with 46,274 votes.

_Provincial Municipal Councils_.

Nor are the results of the Provincial Borough elections more

satisfactory. These boroughs are usually divided into wards returning

three or six members each. One-third of the councillors retire each

year, and each ward is called upon to elect one or two councillors, as

the case may be. The figures for the Municipal elections held in

November 1908, at Manchester, Bradford, and Leeds disclose a similar

discrepancy between the votes polled and the seats obtained. [_See

table below_.]

BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1908

Parties Votes Seats Seats in

Polled. Obtained. proportion

to Votes.

_Manchester_.

Conservative 25,724 14 10

Independent 11,107 3 4

Liberal 14,474 7 6

Labour and Socialist 15,963 2 6

_Bradford_.

Conservative 12,809 10 6

Liberal 12,106 6 5

Socialist-Labour 11,388 0 5

Independent 1,709 1 1

_Leeds_.

Conservative 18,145 8 5

Liberal 19,507 3 5

Socialist-Labour 9,615 1 2

Independent 3,046 1 1

_Summary._

The examples given in this chapter may be briefly summarised. The same

defects are disclosed in Parliamentary, County Council and Municipal

(both metropolitan and provincial) elections. These defects may be

classified under three heads: (1) often a gross exaggeration of the

strength of the victorious party; (2) sometimes a complete

disfranchisement of the minority; and (3) at other times a failure of a

majority of citizens to obtain their due share of representation. In

addition, running through all the results, there is an element of

instability due to the fact that a slight change in public opinion may

produce an altogether disproportionate effect, the violence of the swing

of the pendulum arising more from the electoral method than from the

fickleness of the electorate. These defects all spring from the same

root cause--that the representation of any constituency is awarded to

the majority of the electors in that constituency irrespective of the

size of the majority; that the votes of the minority count for nothing.

The result of a General Election is thus often dependent not upon the

relative strengths of political forces, but upon the chance way in which

those forces are distributed, and in a considerable measure may be

influenced by the way in which the boundaries of constituencies are

drawn. Such a system invites and encourages gerrymandering, both in its

original and modern forms, but this detestable practice can be made of

no avail and the results of elections rendered trustworthy if we so

reform present methods as to give due weight to the strength of each

political party irrespective of the way in which that strength may be

distributed.

[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation, House of Commons, 10 November 1908.]

[Footnote 2: Mr. Corbett's analyses were accepted by the Royal

Commission on Electoral Systems as "representing the truth as nearly as

circumstances will permit."--Report, p. 31.]

[Footnote 3: There is a marked difference between the electoral

conditions of Great Britain and Ireland, but as the Government of the

day depends for support upon a majority of the representatives of all

parts of the kingdom, the figures here given are those for the

United Kingdom.]

[Footnote 4: Mr. Gladstone, in introducing the Redistribution of Seats

Bill, 1 December 1884, said: "The recommendations of this system

(one-member districts) I think are these--that it is very economical, it

is very simple, and it goes a very long way towards that which many

gentlemen have much at heart, viz., what is roughly termed

representation of minorities."--Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 294, p. 379.]

[Footnote 5: Other examples are given in Appendix V. The representation

of minorities varies very considerably in amount, and, as shown in the

Appendix, depends not upon their size but upon the way in which they are

distributed over the electoral area.]

[Footnote 6: The basis of calculation, as explained by Mr. Rooke

Corbett, is as follows: "It seems to me reasonable to suppose that those

changes of public opinion which affected the contested constituencies

affected the uncontested constituencies also, and therefore, in

estimating the number of voters in an uncontested constituency, I have

assumed that the strength of each party varied from one election to

another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the same

county."--P. R. Pamphlet, No. 14. _Recent Electoral Statistics_, p. 5.]

[Footnote 7: These figures are taken from an article by Robert B.

Hayward in _The Nineteenth Century_, February 1884, p. 295.]

[Footnote 8: _Proportional Representation_, by Professor Commons, p. 52

_et seq_. For further examples in the United States the reader should

consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.]

[Footnote 9: _Preferential Voting_, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith.

p. 8.]

[Footnote 10: _Proportional Representation_, p. 50.]

[Footnote 11: _The Machinery of Politics_, W. R. Warn, 1872.]

[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South

African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at

Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.]

[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.]

[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In

Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general

ticket, on the Continent the _scrutin de liste_.]

[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Municipal

Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.]

[Footnote 16: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H.L.)_, 1907

(132), p. vi.]

Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election · 第 2 / 14 章