first days of August. The Second Army, which meanwhile had been
increased to a strength of 194,000 men, had pushed forward its
cantonments to Alsenz-Günnstadt, at the termination of the Haardt
Mountains, a position which had been thoroughly reconnoitered by an
officer of the Staff, and where the troops might boldly await an
attack.
The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were reconnoitering the country in
front. The regiments and squadrons of the Third Army were still
gathering on both banks of the Rhine.
The French so far had made no serious attempt at Saarbrücken;
Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel was able to successfully withstand their
petty attacks with one battalion and three squadrons of cavalry.
It had meanwhile been observed that the French were moving further to
the right, toward Forbach and Bitsch, which seemed to indicate that
the two French Corps, known to be drawn up at Belfort and Strassburg,
might purpose crossing the Rhine and marching on the Black Forest. It
was therefore of very great importance to set the Third Army moving at
the earliest opportunity, first to protect the right bank of the Upper
Rhine by an advance on the left; secondly to cover the progress of the
Second Army towards that point.
A telegraphic order to that effect was dispatched on the evening of
July 30th, but the General in command of the Third Army Corps desired
to wait for the arrival of the Fourth and its baggage train. In spite
of this hesitancy the Second Army was ordered to proceed towards the
Saar, where the French were showing much uneasiness.
The time had gone by when they might have taken advantage of their
over-hasty mobilization; the condition of the men had prohibited any
action. France was waiting for news of a victory; something had to be
done to appease public impatience, so, in order to do something, the
enemy resolved (as is usual under such circumstances) on a hostile
reconnoissance, and, it may be added, with the usual result.
On August 2d three entire Divisions were sent forward against three
battalions, four squadrons, and one battery in Saarbrücken. The
Emperor himself and the Prince Imperial watched the operations. The
IIId Corps advanced on Völklingen, the Vth on Saargemünd, the IId on
Saarbrücken.
The Germans evacuated Saarbrücken after a gallant defence and repeated
sorties, but the French did not cross the Saar. They may have
convinced themselves that they had wasted their strength by hitting in
the air, and had gained no information as to the resources and
position of the enemy.
After this the French generals hesitated for a long while between
contrary resolutions. Orders were given and recalled on the strength
of mere rumors. The left wing was reinforced on account of a current
story that 40,000 Prussians had marched through Trèves, the Guards
received contradictory orders, and, when a small German force showed
itself at Lörrach in the Black Forest, it was at once decreed that the
VIIth Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French forces were spread
over the wide area between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the
Germans were advancing in compact masses on the Saar.
This scattered state of the army finally induced the French leaders to
divide their forces into two distinct armies. Marshal MacMahon took
provisional command of the Ist, VIIth, and Vth Corps, the latter being
withdrawn from Bitsch. The other Divisions were placed under Marshal
Bazaine, with the exception of the Guards, the command of which the
Emperor reserved to himself.
It had now become a pressing necessity to protect the left wing of the
advancing Second German Army against the French forces in Alsace; the
Third Army was therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August 4th,
without waiting any longer for the batteries to come up. The First
Army, forming the right wing, was already encamped near Wadern and
Losheim, three or four days' march nearer to the Saar than the Second
Army in the centre. They were ordered to concentrate in the
neighborhood of Tholey and there await further orders. In the first
place this, the weakest of the two Divisions, was not to be exposed
single-handed to an attack of the enemy's main force; and, secondly,
it was to be used for a flank-movement in case the Second Army should
meet the enemy on emerging from the forests of the Palatinate.
To execute this order, the First Army had to extend its cantonments in
a southerly direction as far as the line of march of the Second Army,
and evacuate its quarters near Ottweiler. This was a difficult matter
to accomplish, as all the towns and villages to the north were
billeted, and quarters had also to be found for the Ist Corps, now
advancing by the Birkenfeld route. General von Steinmetz therefore
decided to march his entire forces in the direction of Saarlouis and
Saarbrücken. The Second Army had assembled, and was ready for action
on August 4th, and received orders to take the field on the farther
side of the wooded zone of Kaiserslautern.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 44: From _The Franco-German War of 1870-71._ Permission
Harper & Brothers, New York and London.]
BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE--ST. PRIVAT[45]
August 18th
TRANSLATED BY CLARA BELL AND HENRY W. FISCHER
Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to proceed to Verdun now
that the Germans were so close on the flank of such a movement. He
preferred to assemble his forces at Metz, in a position which he
rightly supposed to be almost impregnable.
Such a position was afforded by the range of hills, bordering on the
west of the valley of Chatel. That side facing the enemy sloped away
like a _glacis_, while the short and steep decline behind offered
protection for the reserves. The IId, IIId, IVth and VIth Corps were
placed on the ridge of the hills between Roncourt and Rozereuilles, a
distance of one mile and a half (German); thus there were eight or ten
men to every yard of ground.
A brigade of the Vth Corps stood at Ste.-Ruffine in the valley of the
Moselle, the cavalry in the rear of the two wings.
The positions of the IId and IIId Corps were hastily entrenched,
batteries and covered ways were established, and the farmhouses in
front prepared for defense. To approach this left wing from the west
it was necessary to cross the deep valley of the Mance. The VIth Corps
on the other hand had no engineering tools; and it is indicative of
the general ill-equipment of the French that, merely to convey the
wounded to the rear, in spite of the enormous baggage-train, provision
wagons had to be unloaded and their contents burnt. This Corps was
therefore unable to construct such defenses on the side overlooking
the forest of Jaumont as were necessary to strengthen the right wing.
This would undoubtedly have been the place for the Guards, but in his
fear of an attack from the south, Marshal Bazaine kept them in reserve
at Plappeville.
The King again arrived at Flavigny at six o'clock on the morning of
the 18th. All officers in command were ordered to report directly to
headquarters, and Staff-officers of Army Headquarters were despatched
in all directions to watch the progress of the engagement.
The VIIth army Corps, forming the pivot upon which the intended wheel
to the right was to be effected, occupied the Bois de Vaux and Bois
des Ognons; the 8th, under the personal command of the King, halted at
Rezonville, ready to proceed to the north or east, as might be
required. The IXth Corps, on its left, advanced toward the Marcel,
while the IIId and Xth formed the second line. The Guards and XIIth
Corps moved in a northerly direction.
A serious delay occurred when the XIIth Corps of the Second Army,
which was stationed on the right, was commanded to form the left wing,
by the crossing of the two on the march. The Saxon troops did not get
through Mars-la-Tour until nine o'clock, and till then the Guards
could not follow.
The advanced guard of the XIIth Corps had meanwhile reached Jarny, and
proceeded as far as Briey without encountering the enemy.
Before this could be known, the authorities at headquarters had been
convinced that at least the main forces of the enemy were still at
Metz; misapprehension, however, prevailed as to the extension of their
lines, and it was thought the French front did not reach beyond
Montigny. The general in command of the Second Army was therefore
instructed not to proceed further northward, but to join the IXth
Corps in attacking the enemy's right wing, and move in the direction
of Batilly with the Guards and the XIIth Corps. The First Army was
not to attack in the front until the Second was ready to strike.
In obedience to this, Prince Frederick Charles ordered the IXth Corps
to march on to Verneville, and, in case the French right wing should
be found there, to open battle by bringing a large force of artillery
into action. The Guards were to continue their advance _via_ Doncourt
to reinforce the IXth as soon as possible. The XIIth was to remain at
Jarny for the present.
A little later fresh reports came in which indicated that the IXth
Corps, if proceeding in the manner ordered, would come upon the French
centre, instead of their right wing. The Prince therefore determined
that the Corps should postpone the attack till the Guards had done so
at Amanvillers. At the same time the XIIth Corps was pushed on to
Ste.-Marie-aux-Chênes.
But, while these orders were being given, the first heavy firing was
heard at Verneville. This was at twelve o 'clock.
The two Corps on the left had, of their own accord, taken an easterly
direction without waiting for orders, and the IId Corps moved up
behind the IXth at the farm of Caulre.
General von Manstein, in command of the IXth, had observed from near
Verneville a French encampment at Amanvillers, apparently in a state
of quietude. From that point of view the great masses of troops on
their immediate left at St.-Privat were not visible. Mistaking this
camp for the right wing, he determined to act on his first orders and
take the foe by surprise. Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.
But it did not take the French troops long to move into the position
assigned to them. The independent action of a single Corps naturally
exposed it not only to the fire of the troops opposite, but to an
attack in flank.
To obtain some shelter on the field, the Prussian batteries had taken
up a position on the shoulder of the hill below Amanvillers facing the
southeast, where they were exposed from the north, on the flank, and
even in the rear to the fire of French artillery, as well as to the
concentrated fire of their infantry.
To meet this, the battalions nearest at hand were ordered forward.
They took possession of the eastern point of the Bois de la Cusse on
the left, and on the right seized the farmhouses of L'Envie and
Chantrenne, forcing their way into the Bois des Genivaux. Thus the
line of battle of the 18th Division gained a front of 4,000 paces.
Its losses were very great, for the French with their long-range
Chassepôt rifles could afford to keep out of range of the needle-gun;
the artillery especially suffered severely. One of the batteries had
already lost forty-five gunners when it was attacked by French
sharpshooters. There was no infantry at hand to retaliate, and two
guns were lost. By two o'clock all the batteries were almost
_hors-de-combat_, and no relief arrived till the Hessian Division
reached Habonville, and brought up five batteries on either side of
the railway, thus diverting on themselves the concentrated fire of the
enemy. The batteries of the 18th Division, which had suffered most,
could now be withdrawn in succession, but even in their retreat they
had to defend themselves against their pursuers by grapeshot.
The artillery of the IIId Corps and the Guards were likewise sent to
the assistance of the IXth, and those of the damaged guns which were
still fit for service were at once brought into line. Thus a front of
130 guns was drawn up before Verneville as far as St.-Ail, and its
fire soon told upon the enemy. Now, when the IIId Corps was
approaching Verneville and the 3d Brigade of Guards had reached
Habonville, there was no fear that the French would break through the
line.
The main force of the Guards had arrived at St.-Ail as early as two
o'clock. General von Pape at once saw that by wheeling to the east he
would not encounter the right wing of the French, which was to be
out-flanked, but would expose his own left wing to the forces
occupying Ste.-Marie-aux-Chênes. The first thing to be done was to
gain possession of this village--almost a town. It was strongly
occupied and well flanked by the main position of the French army;
but, in obedience to superior orders, he must await the arrival of a
coöperative Saxon contingent.
The advance guard of this Corps had already reached the vicinity of
Batilly, but was yet half a mile distant from Ste.-Marie, so its
batteries could not be placed in position west of the town until three
o'clock. But, as the Guards had sent most of their own artillery to
the support of the IXth Corps, this was substantial aid.
Ten batteries now opened fire upon Ste.-Marie, and by the time it was
beginning to tell the 47th Brigade of the XIIth Corps came up. At
half-past three the Prussian and Saxon battalions stormed the town
from the south and west and north, amid vociferous cheers, and without
further returning the fire of the enemy. The French were driven from
the place, and a few hundred were taken prisoners.
The Saxons tried to follow them up, and a lively infantry engagement
ensued, north of Ste.-Marie, which masked the artillery. As soon as
the brigade had been ordered to retire, the batteries reopened fire,
and the repeated efforts of the French to regain the lost position
were frustrated.
Soon afterwards the IXth Corps succeeded in taking and holding the
farm of Champenois, but all further attempts, by isolated battalions
or companies, to force their way on against the broad and compact
centre of the French were, on the face of it, futile. Thus, by about
five o'clock, the infantry ceased fire, and the artillery only fired
an occasional shot. Fatigue on both sides caused an almost total
suspension of hostilities in this part of the field.
The Commander-in-Chief decided that the First Army should not engage
in serious assault until the Second stood close to the enemy; but when
the day was half-spent and brisk firing was heard about noon from
Vionville, it was to be supposed that the time for action had arrived;
still, for the present permission was only given to send forward the
artillery in preparation for the fight. Sixteen batteries of the
VIIth and VIIIth Corps accordingly drew up to right and left of the
highway running through Gravelotte. Their fire was ineffective, as
they were too far from the enemy; besides they were suffering from the
fire of the French tirailleurs, who had established themselves in the
opposite woods. It became necessary to drive them out, so here again
there was a sharp skirmish. The French had to abandon the eastern
portion of the Mance valley, and the artillery, now increased to
twenty batteries, was able to advance to the western ridge and direct
its fire against the main position of the enemy.
The battalions of the 29th Brigade followed up this advantage. They
pressed forward into the southern part of the Bois des Genivaux on the
left, but were unable to effect a connection with the IXth Corps,
occupying the north of the forest, as the French could not be driven
from the intervening ground. On the right, various detachments took
possession of the quarries and gravel-pits near St.-Hubert.
The artillery meanwhile had got the better of the French guns; several
of their batteries were silenced, others prevented from getting into
position. The French fire was in part directed on the farm of
St.-Hubert, on which the 30th Brigade were gradually encroaching. This
well-defended structure was stormed at three o'clock, close under the
face of the enemy's main position, and in spite of a tremendous fire.
The 31st Brigade had also got across the valley, but an attempt to
reach the farms of Moscow and Leipzig, over the open plain enclosed by
the enemy on three sides, proved a failure and resulted in great loss.
The 26th Brigade had taken possession of Jussy, on the extreme right,
thus maintaining the connection with Metz, but found it impossible to
cross the deep valley of Rozerieulles.
The advanced detachments of the French had been repulsed on all sides,
the farms in their front were burning, their artillery appeared to be
silenced, and, viewing the situation from Gravelotte, there remained
nothing but pursuit. General von Steinmetz, therefore, at four
o'clock, ordered fresh forces to the front for a renewed attack.
While the VIIth Corps occupied the border of the wood, four batteries,
backed by the 1st Cavalry Division, made their way through the narrow
ravine extending for about 1,500 paces east of Gravelotte. But as soon
as the advanced guard of the long column came in sight, the French
redoubled their rifle and artillery fire, which had till now been kept
under. One battery had soon lost the men serving four of its guns, and
was hardly able to return into the wood; a second never even got into
position. The batteries under Hesse and Gnügge, on the other hand,
held their own at St.-Hubert in spite of the loss of seventy-five
horses and of the firing from the quarries in their rear.
The foremost regiment of cavalry wheeled to the right after leaving
the hollow way, and galloped toward Point-du-Jour, but the enemy,
being completely under cover, offered no opportunity for an attack.
Evidently this was no field for utilizing the cavalry, so the
regiments retired through the Mance valley under a heavy fire from all
sides.
This ill-success of the Germans encouraged the French to advance from
Point-du-Jour with swarms of tirailleurs, who succeeded in driving the
Prussians back from the open ground as far as the skirts of the wood.
The bullets of the Chassepots even reached the hill where the
Commander-in-Chief was watching the battle, and Prince Adalbert's
horse was shot under him.
Fresh forces were now at hand and drove the enemy back to his main
position. St.-Hubert had remained in the hands of the Germans; and
though the survivors there were only sufficient to serve one gun,
still every attempt to cross the exposed plateau proved a failure.
Thus hostilities ceased at this point also, at about five o'clock in
the afternoon, allowing the weary troops on both sides to take breath
and reorganize.
King William and his staff rode over to the hill on the south of
Malmaison at about the same hour, but could see nothing of the
situation of the left wing, which was more than a mile away. The
French artillery had ceased firing along the centre, from La Folie to
Point-du-Jour; but to the northward the thunder of artillery was
louder than ever. It was six o'clock, the day was nearly at an end,
and decided action must at once be taken. The King therefore ordered
the First Army to advance once more, and for that purpose placed the
IId Corps, just arrived after a long march, under the command of
General von Steinmetz.
Those battalions of VII Corps which could still do good service,
except five, which were kept in reserve, were again sent up the Mance
valley, and the battalions from the Bois de Vaux came to their support
toward Point-du-Jour and the quarries. The IId Corps of the French
Army thus attacked was now reinforced by Guard Voltigeur Division. All
the reserves were brought to the front. The artillery was more rapidly
served, and a destructive musketry fire was directed on the advancing
enemy. Then the French on their side made an attack. A strong body of
riflemen dispersed the smaller parties which were lying in the open,
destitute of commanders, and drove them back to the wood. There,
however, their advance was checked, and there was still another Army
Corps ready for action.
The IId Corps, the last to come up by rail to the seat of war, had up
to this time followed in the wake of the army by forced marches, but
had not yet fought in any engagement. It had started from
Point-à-Mousson at 2 p.m. and, taking the road by Buxières and
Rezonville, arrived south of Gravelotte in the evening. The
Pomeranians were eager to get at the enemy without delay.
It would have been better if the Chief of the Staff, who was
personally on the field at the time, had not allowed this movement at
so late an hour. A body of troops, still completely intact, might have
been of great value the next day; it was not likely this evening to
affect the issue.
Rushing out of Gravelotte, the foremost battalions of the IId Corps
pushed forward to the quarries, and up to within a few hundred paces
of Point-du-Jour; but those following were soon entangled in the
turmoil of the troops under fire south of St.-Hubert, and any further
advance toward Moscow was arrested. Darkness was falling, and friend
became indistinguishable from foe. So the firing was stopped; but not
until ten o'clock did it entirely cease.
The advance of the IId Corps resulted in some good, however, for these
fresh troops could occupy the fighting-line for the night, while the
mixed companies of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps were enabled to re-form
in their rear.
The whole course of the engagement had conclusively proved that the
position of the French left wing, made almost impregnable by nature
and art, could not be shaken even by the most devoted bravery and the
greatest sacrifices. Both parties were now facing each other in
threatening proximity, and both fully able to reopen battle next
morning. The success of the day must depend on events at the other end
of the French line.
The Prince of Wurtemburg, standing at Ail, believed that the hour had
come for an attack on the French right at about a quarter-past five;
but that wing extended much further north than the line of his Guards,
further, indeed, than the French Commander-in-Chief himself was aware
of. Though the Saxons had participated in the capture of
Ste.-Marie-aux-Chênes, the Crown Prince deemed it necessary to
assemble his Corps at the Bois d'Auboue, to attack the enemy in flank.
One of the brigades had to come from Jarny, and one from Ste.-Marie;
so, as the Corps was late in getting away from Mars-la-Tour, it was
not expected to be on the field for some hours yet.
The 4th Brigade of Foot Guards, in obedience to orders, proceeded in
the direction of Jerusalem, immediately south of St.-Privat. As soon
as General von Manstein, in command of the IXth Corps, observed this,
he ordered the 3d Brigade of Guards, which had been placed at his
orders, to advance from Habonville toward Amanvillers.
Between these two brigades marched the Hessians, but it was not till
half an hour later that the First Division of Guards joined from
Ste.-Marie, marching on St.-Privat, on the left of the Second. This
attack was directed against the broad front of the French IVth and
VIth Corps. Their fortified positions at St.-Privat and Amanvillers
had as yet hardly felt the fire of the German batteries, which had
found sufficient employment in replying to the enemy's artillery
outside the villages.
Several ranks of riflemen, one above the other, were placed in front
of the French main position, on the hedges and fences in a slope up
the ridge. At their back towered St.-Privat, castle-like, with its
massive buildings, which were crowded by soldiers to the very roof.
The open plain in front was thus exposed to an overwhelming shower of
projectiles.