or experiencing some disaster. A bad rider comes up from behind; a
horse sets himself in your way; here a mare kicks up behind; there a
stallion kicks up in front. It is but a small affair to ride alone,
but in the confusion of such a train, in a short trot on a lively
beast, one must keep one's eyes open. Suddenly the Emperor stops, and
there is a general halt; or he turns to one side, and then there is
great confusion; he gallops forward, and all plunge after him, while
the head of the column has again taken a short movement. With all
this the flags are flying, the trumpets are blowing, the drums are
beating, and there are endless hurrahs. But one must also see
something. I rode a little black horse that I would like to possess;
he goes like an East Prussian, but is very spirited, and I constantly
found myself in the front among the grand dukes. But I shall get on
well with him when we know each other better. He needs a quiet rider
with a firm seat, and a light hand on the reins.
This evening at sunset, I again ascended the Kremlin. _"Diem perdidi"_
I should say of the day of my sojourn there in which I did not visit
this wonderful structure.
I descended to the Moskwa, and, from under the fine quay, examined the
massive white walls, the towers and the gate forts which surround the
Czar's palace, and a whole town of churches of the strangest
structure. Tonight the city gives a grand entertainment, from which I
shall absent myself to write. One receives so many impressions that it
is impossible to digest them all and collect one's thoughts.
I am trying to understand this architecture. In Culm, in West Prussia,
I saw last year in the marketplace such a curious City Hall that I
could not reconcile it in my mind; now I understand that it is
Moscovite architecture. The Knights of the Sword of Liefland were in
intimate connection with the German Knights in Prussia, and one of
their architects may have repeated on the Vistula what he had seen on
the Moskwa.
The fountains here remind one of the East; little, round covered
houses on the principal squares, which are constantly surrounded by
men and beasts supplying themselves with water. At first they seem
rude and awkward when compared with the fine style, the rich
sculpture, the golden railings, and the perforated marble walls of the
Tschesmas of Constantinople. There are here, as in the mosques, swarms
of doves that are so bold that they scarcely leave room for carriages
and foot-passengers. They are often chased out of the shops like a
brood of chickens, and they go everywhere for food. No one does them
any harm, and the Russians think it a sin to eat them. The Gostinoy
Dwor (the merchants' court) is especially a repetition of the Oriental
Tschurchi. One booth is next to the other, and the narrow passages
that separate them are covered; therefore the same dim light and the
same smell of leather and spices exist as at the Missir, or Egyptian
market, in Constantinople. The wares here, however, are mostly
European, and cheaper at home, so that we are not much tempted to buy.
If I had my choice, I would rather live in Moscow than in St.
Petersburg.
Peter the Great found an island without any seacoast. He could look
upon the Black Sea or the Baltic as a communication with the civilized
world; but one or the other must first be conquered. The hot-headed
King of Sweden pressed him to a Northern war, and, besides, the
Southern Sea was inhabited by barbarians. His original intention, it
is said, was to build his new capital on the Pontus, and that he even
had selected the spot. The one coast, indeed, is not much farther from
the centre of the empire than the other.
How would it have been had he built his St. Petersburg on the
beautiful harbor of Sebastopol, close to the paradisiac heights of the
Tschadyr Dagh, where the grape grows wild and everything flourishes in
the open air that is forced through a greenhouse on the Neva; where no
floods threaten destruction; where the navy is not frozen fast during
seven months of the year; and where steam power makes an easier
communication with the most beautiful countries of Europe than the
Gulf of Finland does?
What a city would St. Petersburg have been, did her wide streets
extend to Balaklava and did the Winter Palace face the deep blue
mirror of the Black Sea; if the Isaac Church stood at the height of
Malakoff; if Aluschta and Orianda were the Peterhof and Gatschina[43]
of the Imperial family!
THE PEACE MOVEMENT
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[Professor Bluntschli had sent the manual of the Institute of
International Law to Count Moltke, and expressed the hope, in a letter
dated November 19, 1880, that it would meet with his approval. Count
Moltke replied as follows:]
My dear Professor:
You have been good enough to send me the manual published by the
Institute of International Law, and you ask for my approval. In the
first place, I fully recognize your humane endeavors to lessen the
sufferings which war brings in its train.
Eternal peace, however, is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream,
for war is part of God's scheme of the world. In war the noblest
virtues of man develop courage and renunciation, the sense of duty and
abnegation, and all at the risk of his life. Without war the world
would be swallowed up in the morass of materialism.
With the principle stated in the preface, that the gradual advance of
civilization should be reflected in the conduct of war, I fully agree;
but I go further, and believe that civilization alone, and no codified
laws of warfare, can have the desired result.
Every law necessitates an authority to watch over it and to direct its
execution, but there is no power which can enforce obedience to
international agreements. Which third state will take up arms because
one--or both--of two powers at war with each other have broken the
_loi de la guerre?_ The human judge is lacking. In these matters we
can hope for success only from the religious and moral education of
the individuals, and the honor and sense of right of the leaders, who
make their own laws and act according to them, at least to the extent
to which the abnormal conditions of war permit it.
Nobody, I think, can deny that the general softening of men's manners
has been followed by a more humane way of waging war.
Compare, if you will, the coarseness of the Thirty Years' War with the
battles of recent dates.
The introduction in our generation of universal service in the army
has marked a long step in the direction of the desired aim, for it has
brought also the educated classes into the army. Some rough and
violent elements have survived, it is true, but the army no longer
consists of them exclusively.
The governments, moreover, have two means at hand to prevent the worst
excesses. A strong discipline, practiced and perfected in times of
peace, and a commissariat equipped to provide for the troops in the
field.
Without careful provision, discipline itself can be only moderately
well enforced. The soldier who suffers pain and hunger, fatigue and
danger, cannot take merely _en proportion avec les ressources du
pays,_ but he must take whatever he needs. You must not ask of him
superhuman things.
The greatest blessing in war is its speedy termination, and to this
end all means must be permitted which are not downright criminal. I
cannot at all give my approval to the _Déclaration de St.
Petersbourg_, that "the weakening of the hostile army" is the only
justifiable procedure in war. On the contrary, all resources of the
hostile government must be attacked--its finances, railways,
provisions, and even its prestige.
The last war against France was waged in this way, and yet with
greater moderation than any earlier war. The campaign was decided
after two months; and fierceness became characteristic of the fighting
only when a revolutionary government continued the war through four
more months, to the detriment of the country.
I am glad to acknowledge that your manual, with its clear and short
sentences, does greater justice than former attempts to what is needed
in war. But even the acceptance of your regulations by the governments
would not ensure their observance. It has long been a universally
accepted rule of warfare that no messenger of peace should be shot at.
But in the last campaign we frequently saw this done.
No paragraph learned by heart will convince the soldier that the
unorganized natives who _spontanément_ (that is, of their own free
will) take up arms and threaten his life every moment of the day and
night should be recognized as lawful opponents.
Certain requests of the manual, I fear, cannot be put in force. The
identification, for instance, of the dead after a big battle. Others
are subject to doubt, unless you insert _"lorsque les circonstances le
permettent, s'il se peut, si possible, s'il-y-a nécessité,"_ or the
like. This will give them that elasticity without which the bitter
severity of actual warfare will break through all restrictions.
In war, where everything must be treated individually, only those
regulations will work well which are primarily addressed to the
leaders. This includes everything that your manual has to say
concerning the wounded and the sick, the physicians and their
medicines. The general recognition of these principles, and also of
those which have to do with the prisoners of war, would mark a notable
step in advance and bring us nearer the end which the Institute of
International Law is pursuing with such admirable perseverance.
Very respectfully,
COUNT MOLTKE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 38: From _Count Moltke's Letters from Russia_, permission
Harper & Brothers, New York.]
[Footnote 39: Kopecks are equal to about one cent each.]
[Footnote 40: A part of the castle in Marienburg, Prussia, containing
the hall where the knights of the German order, "Deutsche Ritter,"
held their conclaves; also the hall itself, one of the showplaces of
Eastern Prussia.--TRANSLATOR.]
[Footnote 41: A whip with short handle and long thong.--TRANSLATOR.]
[Footnote 42: Militia of the Emperor, but differently constituted from
the American militia or Prussian Landwehr.--TRANSLATOR.]
[Footnote 43: One of the summer palaces of the Emperor.]
FIGHTING ON THE FRONTIER[44]
TRANSLATED BY CLARA BELL AND HENRY W. FISCHER
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of
professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province,
and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present
day call whole nations to arms, there is scarcely a family that does
not suffer by them. The entire financial resources of the State are
appropriated to the purpose, and the different seasons of the year
have no bearing on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As long as
nations continue independent of each other there will be disagreements
that can only be settled by force of arms; but, in the interest of
humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will become less frequent, as
they have become more terrible.
Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which
endangers peace; the passions of the people, its dissatisfaction with
interior conditions and affairs, the strife of parties, and the
intrigues of their leaders are the causes. A declaration of war, so
serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a large
assembly, of which none of the members bears the sole responsibility,
than by a single man, however high his position; and a peace-loving
sovereign is less rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The
great wars of the present day have been declared against the wish and will
of the reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse has assumed such influence
that it has the power to call armies into the field merely to protect its
interests. Mexico and Egypt have been swamped with European armies simply
to satisfy the demands of the _haute finance_. Today the question, "Is a
nation strong enough to make war?" is of less importance than that, "Is
its Government powerful enough to prevent war?" Thus, united Germany has,
up to now, used her strength only to maintain European peace; a weak
Government at the head of our neighboring State must, on the other
hand, be regarded in the light of a standing menace to peace.
The war of 1870-71 arose from just such relations. A Napoleon on the
throne of France was bound to establish his rights by political and
military success. Only for a time did the victories won by French arms
in distant countries give general satisfaction; the triumphs of the
Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a
challenge; and the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal
spirit of the epoch was opposed to the autocratic Government of the
Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his civil authority was
weakened, and one fine day the nation was informed by its
representatives that it desired war with Germany.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR
The wars carried on by France on the other side of the ocean, simply
for financial ends, had consumed immense sums and had undermined the
discipline of the army. The French were by no means _archiprêts_ for a
great war, but the Spanish succession to the throne, nevertheless, had
to serve as a pretext to declare it. The French Reserves were called
to arms July 15th, and only four days later the French declaration of
war was handed in at Berlin, as though this were an opportunity not to
be lost.
[Illustration: KING WILLIAM AT THE MAUSOLEUM OF HIS PARENTS ON THE DAY
OF THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR ANTON VON WERNER]
One Division was ordered to the Spanish frontier as a corps of
observation; only such troops as were absolutely necessary were left
in Algiers and in Civita Vecchia; Paris and Lyons were sufficiently
garrisoned. The entire remainder of the army: 332 battalions, 220
squadrons, 924 cannon, in all about 300,000 men, formed the army of
the Rhine. This was divided into eight Corps, which, at any rate in
the first instance, were to be directed by one central head, without
any kind of intervention. The _Imperator_ himself was the only person
to assume this difficult task; Marshal Bazaine was to command the army
as it assembled, until the Emperor's arrival.
It is very probable that the French were counting on the old
dissensions of the German races. True, they dared not look upon the
South Germans as allies, but they hoped to reduce them to inactivity
by an early victory, or even to win them over to their side. Prussia
was a powerful antagonist even when isolated, and her army more
numerous than that of the French, but this advantage might be
counterbalanced by rapidity of action.
The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of
unforeseen attacks. The strong fleets of war and transport ships were
to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, and
there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body of the
army, it was supposed, would await the French attack behind the
fortresses on the Rhine. The French intended to cross the Rhine at
once, at and below Strassburg, thus avoiding the great fortresses; and
also, at the start, preventing the South-German army, which was
destined to defend the Black Forest, from uniting with the
North-Germans. To execute this plan it would have been imperative to
assemble the main forces of the French army in Alsace. Railway
accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance
it was only possible to carry 100,000 men to Strassburg; 150,000 had
to leave the railways near Metz, and remain there till they could be
moved up. Fifty thousand men were encamped at Châlons as reserves,
115 battalions were ready to march as soon as the National Guard had
taken their places in the interior. The various corps were distributed
as follows:
Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki--Nancy.
Ist Corps, Marshal MacMahon--Strassburg.
IId Corps, General Frossard--St. Avold.
IIId Corps, Marshal Bazaine--Metz.
IVth Corps, General Ladmirault--Diedenhofen.
Vth Corps, General Failly--Bitsch.
VIth Corps, Marshal Canrobert--Châlons.
VIIth Corps, General Félix Douay--Belfort.
Thus there were only two Corps in Alsace, and five on the Moselle;
and, on the day of the declaration of war, one of these, the IId
Corps, was pushed forward close to the German frontier, near St. Avold
and Forbach. This IId Corps, however, received instructions not to
engage in any serious conflict.
The regiments had marched out of quarters incomplete as to numbers,
and insufficiently equipped. Meanwhile the reserves called out to fill
their place had choked the railway traffic; they crowded the depôts,
and filled the railway stations.
The progress to their destination was delayed, for it was often
unknown at the railway stations where the regiments to which the
reserves were to be sent were at the time encamped. When they at last
joined they were without the most necessary articles of equipment. The
Corps and Divisions had no artillery or baggage, no ambulances, and
only a very insufficient number of officers. No magazines had been
established beforehand, and the troops were to depend on the
fortresses. These were but ill-supplied, for in the assured
expectation that the armies would be almost immediately sent on into
the enemy's country they had been neglected.
In the same way the Staff-officers had been provided with maps of
Germany, but not of their own provinces. The Ministry of War in Paris
was inundated with claims, protestations, and expostulations, and
finally it was left to the troops to help themselves as best they
could. _On se débrouillera_ was the hope of the authorities.
When the Emperor arrived at Metz, a week after the declaration of war,
the regiments were not yet complete, and it was not even exactly known
where whole Divisions were at that time encamped. The Emperor ordered
the troops to advance, but his Marshals declared that the condition of
the troops made this impossible for the time being.
It was gradually dawning upon them that, instead of attacking the
enemy in his country, they would have to defend their own. Rumor had
it, that a strong army of the enemy had assembled between Mayence and
Coblentz; instead of sending reinforcements from Metz to Strassburg,
they were ordered to proceed from the Rhine to the Saar. The
determination to invade South Germany was already abandoned; the fleet
had sailed round, but without any troops to land.
Germany had been surprised by the declaration of war, but she was not
unprepared. The possibility of such an event had been foreseen.
When Austria had separated her interests from those of the other
German states, Prussia undertook the sole leadership, and paved the
way to more intimate relations with the South-German states. The idea
of national unification had been revived, and found an echo in the
patriotic sentiments of the entire people.
The means of mobilizing the North-German army had been reviewed year
by year, in view of any changes in the military or political
situation, by the Staff, in conjunction with the Ministry of War.
Every branch of the administration throughout the country had been
kept informed of all it ought to know of these matters. The Berlin
authorities had likewise come to a confidential understanding with the
army chiefs of the South-German states on all important points. It
had been conceded that Prussia was not to be reckoned on for the
defence of any particular point, as the Black Forest, for instance;
and it was decided that the best way of protecting South Germany would
be by an incursion into Alsace across the central part of the Rhine;
which could be backed up by the main force assembled at that point.
The fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and
Hesse, denuding their own countries as it were, were ready to place
their contingents under the command of King William proves their
entire confidence in the Prussian generals.
As soon as this understanding was arrived at the other preparations
could be made. The orders for marching, and traveling by rail or boat,
were worked out for each division of the army, together with the most
minute directions as to their different starting points, the day and
hour of departure, the duration of the journey, the refreshment
stations, and place of destination. At the meeting-point cantonments
were assigned to each Corps and Division, stores and magazines were
established; and thus, when war was declared, it needed only the Royal
signature to set the entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed
precision. There was nothing to be changed in the directions
originally given; it sufficed to carry out the plans prearranged and
prepared.
The mobilized forces were divided into three independent armies on a
basis worked out by the general of the Prussian staff.
The First Army, under the command of General von Steinmetz, consisted
of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps, and one division of cavalry; 60,000 men
all told. It was ordered to encamp at Wittlich and form the right
wing.
The Second Army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, was
131,000 strong, and constituted the central army. It consisted of the
IIId, IVth, and Xth Corps of Guards, and two divisions of cavalry. Its
meeting-point was in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen. The
Third Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, was to
form the left wing, near Landau and Rastat, a strength of about
130,000 men. It consisted of the Vth and XIth Prussian, and the Ist
and IId Bavarian Corps, the Würtemberg and the Baden Field Divisions,
and one division of cavalry.
The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse divisions, was
united with the XIIth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000
men, and was encamped before Mayence, to reinforce the Second Army,
which was thus brought up to the strength of 194,000 men.
The three armies combined numbered 384,000 men.
There were still the Ist, IId, and IVth Corps, 100,000 men; but they
were not at first included, as the means of railway transport were
engaged for twenty-one days.
The 17th Division and the Landwehr troops were told off to defend the
coast. During the night of July 16th the Royal order for the
mobilization of the army was issued, and when His Majesty arrived in
Mayence, a fortnight later, he found 300,000 men assembled on and in
front of the Rhine.
In his plan of war, submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and
accepted by the King, that officer had his eye fixed, from the first,
upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of
more importance in France than in other countries. On the way thither
the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible back
from the fertile southern states into the narrower tract on the north.
But above all the plan of war was based on the resolve to attack the
enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces so compact
that a superior force could always be brought into the field. By
whatever special means these plans were to be accomplished was left to
the decision of the hour; the advance to the frontiers alone was
preordained in every detail.
It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a
prolonged period and carried out in every point. The first collision
with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the
result. Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which
originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of
an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide
for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose
unflinchingly.
The departure of the French troops to the frontier, before they were
thoroughly prepared for service in the field, which is a very serious
step to take, was evidently ordered for the purpose of surprising the
German army, with the forces immediately at command, and thus
interfering with the formation of their advance. But, in spite of
this, the German commanders did not deviate from their purpose of
massing their armies on the Rhine and crossing that river. The railway
transport of the troops of the IId and IIId Corps, however, was to end
at the Rhine; thence they were to march on foot into the cantonments
prepared on the left bank of the river. They moved in echelon,
advancing only so many at a time as would make room for the Division
behind them, as far as the line marked by the towns of Bingen,
Dürkheim, and Landau.
The final advance towards the frontier was not to be undertaken until
the Divisions and Corps were all collected, and provided with the
all-necessary baggage train; and then proceed in a state of readiness
to confront the enemy at any moment.
The assembling of the First Army appeared to be less threatened, as
its route lay through neutral territory, and was protected by the
garrisons of Trèves, Saarlouis, and Saarbrücken, the German outposts
on the Saar.