It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different
kinds of vital air--such as prâ/n/a the ascending vital air, apâna the
descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath
being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect
which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects,
such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.
When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects
also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital
airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as
something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common
character. Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the
vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be
conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage
that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived,
what is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].
21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated
(as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various
faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for
instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent
cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For
Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with
Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'
of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.
Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having
created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the
unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in
consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage
also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names
and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates
the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is
not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman
belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an
independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial
to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death,
old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of
suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for
himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself
absolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming
part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its
liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result
in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which
are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created
this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly
appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the
magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which
he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this
world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot
reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be
beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded
from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the
individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate
Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--We rather declare that that
omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition
and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the
embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults
specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do
not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic
nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or
non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its
knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied
Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the
mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator
of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For
scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be
heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we
must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then
he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self
mounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare
differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and
thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if
it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of
non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and
non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the
possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel
instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a
jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of
non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the
consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state
of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at
once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong
knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of
the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the
like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil
actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the
non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and
so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience,
and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once.
The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the
dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in
reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state
in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows
from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we
must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;
whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the
objections raised) cannot be established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth,
nevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such
as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like,
being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at
dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same
ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and
cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms,
fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces
various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may
contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the
highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections
imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of
the world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished
by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in
speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream
phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of
instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so
Brahman does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is
the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the
observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see
that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and
the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto
by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs,
wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be
without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing
itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman
is not the cause of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible in
consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in
the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice
respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of
Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that
milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent,
viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount
of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.
If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel
it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled
by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of
auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is
merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other
hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus
Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of
him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed
as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI,
8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold
powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in
ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have
the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any
extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the
other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed
to their several work only after having provided themselves with a
complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman,
which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any
auxiliary?
We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, /ri/shis, and other
beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to
create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without
availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention,
which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a
fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, and purâ/n/as;--and as
the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female
crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond
to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman
also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous
means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following
style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel
instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For
the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other
material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent
Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which,
owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree
of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of
thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling
intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually
to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather
wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as
the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples
cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman
is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters,
&c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the
common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work
extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do
not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no
extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel
instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a
peculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as
in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other
cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has
to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be
without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one,
without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any
extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is
raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under
discussion.--The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will
be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its
effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and
other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it
undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But
Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare,
'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault,
without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);
'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but
knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'
(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/. Up.
III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in
Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a
modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves
a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of
the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'
Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen
without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And,
finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted
thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these
difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do
violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of
parts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is
non-eternal.--Hence the Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in
any way.
27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on
account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).
The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that
our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman
undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of
sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of
the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from
its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of
cause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three
divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such
is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him
are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III,
12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to
have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless
sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire
Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union
with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the
passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of
place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of
Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that
hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of
perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus
be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman
has to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman
to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just
because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the
holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are
authoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the
texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that
not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other
hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such
as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to
difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite
effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere
reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their
objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive
without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers
unfathomable by thought! As the Purâ/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning
to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above
all material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is
supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us
understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without
parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is
without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its
entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and
persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it
follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected
with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions
'at the atirâtra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the
atirâtra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction
which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional
adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent
on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the
alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing
(like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished)
depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain
that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of
Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up
into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality
which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and
form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be
defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the
basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while
in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged,
lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names
and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech
only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without
parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as
undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such
instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting
instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world;
that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For
in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'
(which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result
is stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve
any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations
exist in gods[305], &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can
be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its
character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform
creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in
that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots,
horses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too
multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist
in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their
being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it
is, without divesting it of its character of unity.
29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his
(the opponent's) view likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhâna
implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid
of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhâna--is the cause of an
effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is
characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that
doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of parts has to
undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not
consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in
favour of the Sâ@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhâna to be
without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the
three gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhâna
forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that
such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in
hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in
itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by
the two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the
world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies
against the Sâ@nkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on
which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhâna rests) is not
absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhâna consists of parts.--If
you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal,
and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhâna
to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we
reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of
the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having
originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with
another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination
with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do
not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain
that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend
against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,
the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the
advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that
is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to
Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various
powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman
is endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all
powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare
that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions,
all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this,
who never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who
desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1);
'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail')
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gárgì, sun
and moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar
passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the
absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity
to be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the
passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without
mind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to
produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know
(from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent
beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain
effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of
action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural
passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The
transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only,
not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of
one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has
likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of
Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we
assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment
of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands,
hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'
/S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily
organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings
engaging in any action) having a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the
sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know
from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins
to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an
unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much
less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage
confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not
dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self
therefore everything is dear' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking
of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is
certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to
serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate
its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand,
you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of
activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent
person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental
aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created
this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the
omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by
Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an
intelligent Being is untenable.
33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in
ordinary life.
The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life
that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no
unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose;
but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations
in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation
and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose,
merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of
the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own
nature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither
of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the
Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of
this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere
play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we
might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for
sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord,
all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said
that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for
Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the
Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember
that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest
reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by
name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at
intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be
reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for
so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we
follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in
order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection
against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The
Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that
hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would
attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders
eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy;
to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.
To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion
and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person
acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential
goodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the
infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form
part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty,
a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman
cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation
and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own
account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation,
he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he
is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.
Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit
and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for
which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on
as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is
the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,
while the difference between the various species is due to the various
potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the
common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences
between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging
to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot
be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we
are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with
its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture
declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For
he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do
a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from
these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)[312]; and, 'A man
becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13).
Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite
to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so,
for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha.
Gî. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit
and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit
and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on
the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
But--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the
beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation
there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which
the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to
have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings
subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular
reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and
diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as
acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;
but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist,
it follows that the first creation must have been free, from
inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is
without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a
beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are,
like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore
no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know
that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.
36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and
is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if
it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into
existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter
into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there
would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure
and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and
punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad
action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already
been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a
uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of
inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from
action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other
afflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter
into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be
formed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are
led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,
explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and
sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world
being without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first
place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living
Self (jîva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the
embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to
creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is
the sustaining principle of the prâ/n/as--shows that this phenomenal
world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prâ/n/as
would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied
Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by
a name which depends on the existence of those prâ/n/as. Nor can it be
said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the
prâ/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being
already existing, is of greater force than a mere future
relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly
devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which
intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the
world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor
its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the
Purâ/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the
future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world)
are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of
character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward
against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that
the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to
refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the
foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view
should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the
cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world)
are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and
possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system,
founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.
Notes:
[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sâ@nkhya/s/âstra as
taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Âsuri,
Pa/ñk/a/s/ikha, and others.]
[Footnote 254: Mîmâ/m/sâ Sû. I, 1, 2: /k/odanâlaksha/n/osxrtho
dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odanâ iti kriyâyâ/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam
âhu/h/.]
[Footnote 255: Purushârtha; in opposition to the rules referred to in
the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according
to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]
[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ already
that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]
[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare
the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii,
p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhâshya,
takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]
[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive
passages of the Veda.]
[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is
not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvâtmavâdin is
mentioned there.]
[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon'
(nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of
the Yoga.]
[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akâs (certain oblations to be made on the
eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira)
furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that
Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]
[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the
refutation of the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other
Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedânta views?]
[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a
passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic
knowledge.]
[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of
anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely
connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply
reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ânanda Giri comments on the passage from
anubhavâvasânam as follows: brahmasâkshâtkârasya mokshopâyatayâ
prâdhânyât tatra /s/abdâd api parokshago/k/arâd
aparokshârthasâdharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva
balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamâtre/n/a pravâdapâramparyamâtre/n/a
parokshatayeti yâvat. Anubhavasya prâdhânye tarkasyoktanyâyena tasminn
antara@ngatvâd âgamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvâd antara@ngabahira@ngayor
antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyâyâd ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam.
Anubhavaprâdhânya/m/ tu nâdyâpi siddham ity â/s/a@nkyâhânubhaveti. Nanu
Brahmaj/ñ/âdna/m/ vaidikatvâd dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/
tat kutosxsyânubhavâvasânâvidyânivartakatva/m/ tatrâha moksheti.
Adhish/th/ânasâkshâtkârasya /s/uktyâdj/ñ/âne
tadavidyâtatkâryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/ñ/ânasyâpi
tarkava/s/âd asambhâvanâdinirâsadvârâ sâkshâtkârâvasâyinas
tadavidyâdinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nâd/ri/sh/t/aphalatety
artha/h/.]
[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/ayâ/h/, upajanâpâyadharma/s/ûnyatva/m/
nirati/s/ayatvam. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the
world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be
intelligent.]
[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered
non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ,
and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi
/k/aitanyasya tatra tatrânta/h/kara/n/apari/n/âmânuparâgâd anupalabdhir
aviruddhâ. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 268: On î/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,
note 41.]
[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all
MSS. I have consulted.]
[Footnote 270: Ânanda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyâkâ@nkshita/m/
tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. Svapnajâgaritayor
mithovyabhi/k/ârâd âtmana/h/ svabhâvatas tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâ dvayena
tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jîvasyâvasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity
artha/h/. Tathâpi dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na
ni/h/prapa/ñk/abrahmatety â/s/a@nkyâha sa/m/prasâde /k/eti. Satâ somya
tadâ sa/m/panno bhavatîti /s/rute/h/ sushupte
ni/h/prapa/ñk/asadâtmatvâvagamâd âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity
artha/h/. Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham
âtmanosxdvitîyabrahmatvam ity â/s/a@nkya tajjatvâdihetunâ
brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher adhyakshâdînâm atatvâvedakaprâmâ/n/yâd
avirodhâd yuktam âtmano xsvitîyabrahmatvam ity âha prapa/ñk/asyeti.]
[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a
vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire
whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an
intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]
[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâ/s/ /k/en nâvatish/th/eran na
tarhi kâra/n/adharmâ api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedât
tatrâhânanyatveszpîti. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhâna they must as such
be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]
[Footnote 274: And that the Vedânta view is preferable because the
nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]
[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mîmâ/m/sâ would
be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no pûrvapaksha view
could be maintained.]
[Footnote 276: The following arthavâda-passage, for instance, 'the
sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense;
because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its
literal meaning.]
[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]
[Footnote 278: Pari/n/âmavâdam avalambyâpâtato virodha/m/ samadhâya
vivartavâdam â/s/ritya paramasamâdhânam âha. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 279: Ânanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti,
paramârthato vij/ñ/âtam iti sambandha/h/.]
[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kadâ/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am
anityam iti yâvat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asû/k/ita/m/ pratîtikâlesxpi
sattârâhitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram âha svarûpe/n/eti. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication,
being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be
guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]
[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real
effects spring from unreal causes.]
[Footnote 283: Svapnajâgraddehayor vyabhi/k/ârezpi pratyabhij/ñ/ânât
tadanugatâtmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rûtmano
dehadvayâtiredkasiddher dehâtrâtmavâdo na yukta ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahâra' presents itself to our mind,
we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness
whereby to account for the vyavahâra; but as soon as we arrive at true
knowledge, the vyavahâra vanishes, and there remains no longer any
reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]
[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yâdi/s/rutînâ/m/ svârthe phatavaikalye
satîti yâvat. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 286: A Mîmâ/m/sâ principle. A sacrificial act, for instance,
is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred
texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely
auxiliary to another act.]
[Footnote 287: According to the /S/rutî 'in whatever mode he worships
him into that mode he passes himself.']
[Footnote 288: Tattvânyatvâbhyâm iti, na hîsvaratvena te niru/k/yete
ja/d/âjadayor abhedâyogât nâpi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/
svâtantrye/n/a sattâsphûrtyasambhavât na hi j/ad/am aga/d/ânapekshya/m/
sattâsphûrtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngât tasmâd
avidyâtmake nâmarûpe ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we
cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of
nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]
[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base
is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]
[Footnote 291: I.e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation
of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of
one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground
of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible
without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam
tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatva/m/ /k/â kâryasya kâra/n/ânanyatve hetur
dhûmavi/s/eshasya /k/âgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvesxpi na
tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam agnibhânasya dhûmabhânâdhînatvât.]
[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth
by non-existing.]
[Footnote 293: Samavâya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate
relation, is, according to the Nyâya, the relation connecting a whole
and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]
[Footnote 294: Samavâyasya svâtantryapaksha/m/ dûshayati
anabhyupagamyamâne/k/eti. Samavâyasya samavâyibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate
ki/m/ tu svâtantryam evety atrâvayavâvayavinor dravyagu/n/âdînâ/m/ /k/a.
viprakarsha/h/ syât sa/m/nidhâyakâbhâvâd ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyâya tenet
that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground
on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined
substances by means of the samavaya relation.]
[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we
apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole
thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend
some few of the flowers.]
[Footnote 297: Kalpântaram utthâpayati atheti, tathâ /k/a
yathâvayavai/h/ sûtra/m/ kusumâni vyâpnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi
g/r/ihyate tathâ katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am
ity artha/h/. Tatra kim ârambhakâvayavair eva teshv avayavî vartteta
ki/m/ vâ tadatiriklâvayavair iti vikalpyâdyam pratyâha tadâpîti. Yatra
yad varttate tat tadatiriktâvayavair eva tatra vartamâna/m/ drish/l/am
iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum â/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitîyam
dûshayati anavastheti. Kalpitânantâvayavavyavahitatayâ
prak/ri/tâvayavino dûraviprakarshât tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syâd
iti bhâva/h/. An. Gi.]
[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a
causal agent.]
[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkâra says, requires an agent, i.e. a
substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar
exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the
substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence
(for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and
have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative
causes of the jar.]
[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pâda
of this adhyâya.]
[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are
identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]
[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by
the 'and' of the Sûtra.]
[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etanâ' as
found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]
[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti,
pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadârthasvabhâvebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am
â/k/âryâdyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sûtra;
Ân. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: âtmani /k/eti vyâkhyâya vi/k/itrâ/s/
/k/a hîti vyâ/k/ash/t/e.']
[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either
change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of
parts.]
[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that
the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in
combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality
of the different effects could not be accounted for.]
[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial
contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is
entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two
atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]
[Footnote 309: The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is
an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been
disposed of in Sûtra 24.]
[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhàva) of the Lord is, the commentators
say, Mâyâ joined with time and karman.]
[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord
might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and
the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with
Mâyâ the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. Avidyâ naturally tends towards
effects, without any purpose. Bhâ.
Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîládâv asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva niv/ri/tter api
darsanâd î/s/varasyâpi mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm tathâ-bhâve vinâpi
sa/my/agj/ñ/âna/m/ sa/m/sârasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatrâha na /ke/ti.
Anirvâ/ky/â khalv avidyâ paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhâvo lîleti
/kok/yate tatra na prâtîtikasvabhâvâyâm anupapattir avataratîty
artha/h/.]
[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators
say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or
demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which
he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common
cause only (as Parjanya does).]
[Footnote 313: Râgadveshamohâ râgadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhâdibhi/h/
kli/s/yantîtá kle/s/âs tesb/âm/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/âs tâbhir
áksbipta/m/ dharmâdilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshâvidyâ. Ân. Gi.]