As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance
of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the
doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That
doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sûtra.--The present Sûtra now
confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of
the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the
world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,
originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they
followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'
/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the
/ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyâsa also speaks as
follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by
Svayambhû, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the
itihâsas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'
30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the
renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.
If--the pûrvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like
the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken
succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical
existence including denominations, things denominated and agents
denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,
and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
(raised in Sùtra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and
Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself
of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and
is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to
have been removed?
To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even
then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a
point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the
beginningless sa/m/sâra we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and
the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we
look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them
according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take
place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking
state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is
carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.
Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes
one with that prâ/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the
eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all
directions, thus from that Self the prâ/n/as proceed, each towards its
place; from the prâ/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'
Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises
in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical
existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping
person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a
mahâpralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a
different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is
interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be
resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that
form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahâpralaya does
cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour
of the highest Lord, the Lords (î/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and
so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in
the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we
see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former
birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.
For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of
grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
observed--although they all have the common attribute of being
animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to
Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,
power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that
account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as
Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by
superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the
present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the
present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the
preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same
form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus
Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)
and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own
thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).
/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/îs of the Veda)
that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and
other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,
of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of
their respective Vedas, such as kâ/nd/as and so on. Scripture also
declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the
mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He
who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which
he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the
Brâhma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c.,
therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Ârsheya
Brâhma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and
its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain
pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects
pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and
do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new
creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit
(of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with
a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also
declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had
turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again
and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or
cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed;
hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain
kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahâpralaya) is
dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the
world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the
root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect
without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of
different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although
the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different
classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the
different conditions based on caste, â/s/rama, religious duty and fruit
(of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted
and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in
the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness
analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the
senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the
relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in
different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth
sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.
As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the
Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there
manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same
names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,
owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical
renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general
creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the
Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti
as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3,
'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air,
and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord
arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun
and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding
kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brâhm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I
become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a
cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikâs.' This passage,
which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras,
declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and
the Agni to whom he offered.[206]
Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for
instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to
see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are
produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahâpralaya). As the
various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time,
thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of
whatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are
the present gods in name and form.'
31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for
the madhu-vidyâ, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the
gods for the Brahma-vidyâ).
A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also
are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,
considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On
account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidyâ,
&c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should
have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidyâ ('the knowledge of the
honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different
(from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not
possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of
the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god
Âditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are
admitted as meditating worshippers, can Âditya meditate upon another
Âditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,
the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the
five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, Maruts, and
Sâdhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus
knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he
sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who
know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the
Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to
attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Âditya
is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is
indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the
doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are
not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis
themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,
such as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are
the /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvâja; the right Gautama, the left
Bharadvâja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is
stated in the following Sûtra.
32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words
denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.
To that sphere of light, the pûrvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in
the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms
such as Âditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from
the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary
passages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it
should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and
the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For
mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.
The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps
be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the
devas is known from the mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, purâ/n/as, and
from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy
of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute
an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known
from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of
knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of
knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under
discussion. Itihâsas and purâ/n/as again being of human origin, stand
themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The
arthavâda passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the
injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by
themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the
devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,
&c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial
action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the
sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of
authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,
and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
33. Bâdarâya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of
qualification for Brahma-vidyâ on the part of the gods); for there are
(passages indicatory of that).
The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the pûrvapaksha.
The teacher, Bâdarâya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification
on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods
cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyâ, and similar topics
of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they
may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in
general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor
does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with
the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not
impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the
case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
Brâhma/n/as, for instance, not for the râjasûya-sacrifice[212].
And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,
contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,
for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to
know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,
if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.
Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the
Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,
in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yâj/ñ/avalkya[213].--Against the
objection raised in the preceding Sûtra (32) we argue as follows. Words
like âditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to
light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs
(persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are
used in that sense in mantras and arthavâda passages. For the devas
possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.
Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavâda passage explaining the words
'ram of Medhâtithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that
'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhâtithi, the
descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that
'Âditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kuntî.' Moreover,
even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be
admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as
'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light
and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted
in the case of the sun (âditya), &c. also; but--as already
remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavâdas it appears
that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those
material elements).
We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pûrvapakshin) that
mantras and arthavâdas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no
power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not
the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other
purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes
a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is
exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other
purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the
pûrvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly
analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the
grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception
of their existence. In the case of an arthavâda, on the other hand,
which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is
impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.
For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more
comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for
instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words
constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning
only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an
additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of
the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the
instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).
The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one
whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor
syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavâda, on the other hand,
the words constituting the arthavâda form a separate group of their own
which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to
that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they
enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as
an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of
prosperity is to offer to Vâyu a white animal.' All the words contained
in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,
however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding
arthavâda passage, 'For Vâyu is the swiftest deity; Vâyu he approaches
with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of
this arthavâda are not grammatically connected with the single words of
the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which
contains the praise of Vâyu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far
as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with
a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate
(arthavâda) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the
arthavâda acts as a mere anuvâda, i.e. a statement referring to
something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by
other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avâda, i.e. a
statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavâda is to be
taken as a gu/n/avâda on account of the absence of other means of
knowledge, or as an arthavâda referring to something known (i.e. an
anuvâda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of
proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting
people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.
There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The
Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the
other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual
divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent
Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to
it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is
taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).
Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a
thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing
(denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness
of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and
the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and
arthavâdas.--Moreover, itihâsas and purâ/n/as also--because based on
mantra and arthavâda which possess authoritative power in the manner
described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the
devas. Itihâsa and purâ/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on
perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have
been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.
Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyâsa and others conversed with the gods
face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were
no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would
thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well
maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by
which the scriptural injunction of the râjasûya-sacrifice[218] would be
stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of
duty of the different castes and â/s/ramas were as generally unsettled
as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture
which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore
altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in
consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods
face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda
there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sûtra II,
44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement
of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact
which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also
proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,
and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is
no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body
produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the
right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who
see the mantras and brâhma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this
it appears that the itihâsas and purâ/n/as have an adequate basis.--And
the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be
unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as
possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavâdas,
itihâsas, purâ/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods
may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be
considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the
declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]
agree with this latter supposition only.
34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jâna/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing
a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of
that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/ûdra); for it (the grief) is pointed
at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to
knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.
also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for
the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/ûdras also
possess such a claim.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the /S/ûdras also have such a claim,
because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and
because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural
prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
'Therefore[220] the /S/ûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.
VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/ûdras for
sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not
invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be
apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an
inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/ûdras; for in the
so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jâna/s/ruti
Pautrâya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/ûdra 'Fie,
necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/ûdra, together with the cows' (Ch.
Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidûra and others who were
born from /S/ûdra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the
/S/ûdra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the /S/ûdras have no such claim, on account of
their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and
understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a
/S/ûdra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its
antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the
three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a
condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if
capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute
a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the
/S/ûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the
Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/ûdra is unfit for
sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for
knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both
cases[221].--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's opinion that the fact
of the word '/S/ûdra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge
constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/ûdra's qualification for
knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on
account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential
mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments
being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage
quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/ûdra' which occurs in the
sa/m/varga-vidyâ would establish a claim on the part of the /S/ûdras to
that one vidyâ only, not to all vidyâs. In reality, however, it is
powerless, because occurring in an arthavâda, to establish the /S/ûdras'
claim to anything.--The word '/S/ûdra' can moreover be made to agree
with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When
Jâna/s/ruti Pautrâya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the
flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were
like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,
and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/ûdra, in
order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation
must be accepted because a (real) born /S/ûdra is not qualified (for the
sa/m/varga-vidyâ). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen
in Jânasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/ûdra, we
reply: On account of the rushing on (âdrava/n/a) of the grief. For we
may etymologise the word /S/ûdra by dividing it into its parts, either
as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrâva) or as 'grief rushed on
him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand
it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.
The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover
expressly touched upon in the legend[223].
35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jâna/s/ruti) is understood from
the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with
/K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).
Jâna/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/ûdra by birth for that reason also
that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.
his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya
/K/aitraratha Abhipratârin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage
complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidyâ, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi
Abhipratârin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kâpeya and Abhipratârin
Kâkshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratârin was a /K/aitrarathi
(i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion
with a Kâpeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of
/K/itraratha himself with the Kâpeyas ('the Kâpeyas made /K/itraratha
perform that sacrifice;' Tâ/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule
sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one
and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from
him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he
(/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a
kshattriya. The fact now of Jâna/s/ruti being praised in the same vidyâ
with the kshattriya Abhipratârin intimates that the former also was a
kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.
That Jâna/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending
his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the
text).--Hence the /S/ûdras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
Brahman).
36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case
of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in
the case of the /S/ûdras).
That the /S/ûdras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also
that in different places of the vidyâs such ceremonies as the upanayana
and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,
3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!
thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in
Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their
hands, approached the venerable Pippalâda, thinking that he would teach
them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having
made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),
shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With
reference to the /S/ûdras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies
is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are
spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/ûdra is the fourth caste,
once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/ûdra there is not any sin, and
he is not fit for any ceremony.'
37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jâbâla) on the
ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/ûdra).
The /S/ûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having
ascertained Jâbâla not to be a /S/ûdra from his speaking the truth,
proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brâhma/n/a
would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which
scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/ûdras not
being capable of initiation).
38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/ûdras')
hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)
matters.
The /S/ûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti
prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their
understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing
the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who
hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a
/S/ûdra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in
the vicinity of a /S/ûdra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of
studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in
whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express
prohibition (of the /S/ûdras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be
slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves
it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the
prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there
are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart
knowledge to the /S/ûdra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,
sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/ûdras, however,
who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in
consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their
knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about
its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihâsas and purâ/n/as;
compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahâbh.).--It
remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such
qualification with regard to the Veda.
39. (The prâ/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of
the whole world).
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we
entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief
topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedânta-texts.--We read
(Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
trembles in the prâ/n/a. It (the prâ/n/a) is a great terror, a raised
thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This passage
declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in prâ/n/a, and that
there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that
through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not
immediately clear what the prâ/n/a is, and what that terrible
thunderbolt, a discussion arises.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of the term, prâ/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that
the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and
that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he
says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five
forms--which is here called prâ/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also
spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,
when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,
rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of
that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural
passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things
together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that
the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on
account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as
well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;
how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once
the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as
follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one
goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from
the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in
prâ/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the
abode of the whole world. That the word prâ/n/a can denote the highest
Self also, appears from such passages as 'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a
quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere
air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the prâ/n/a and the breath
that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.
II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,
from terror Indra and Vâyu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,
and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of
that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the
whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that
the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the
ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of
Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great
terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to
denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man
strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in
his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened
punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry
out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,
air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from
fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a
thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is
Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the
sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the
fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further
follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is
immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of
Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him
only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,
15).--That immortality which the pûrvapakshin asserts to be sometimes
represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely
relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is
quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of
the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in
the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally
from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas
in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to
the highest Self.
40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in
the scriptural passage).
We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this
body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word
'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and
dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known
(physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.
For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under
I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the
chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning
aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the nâ/d/îs of
the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he
departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our
passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the
highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the
whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the
Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general
subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is
thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be
understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I
shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom
from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when
he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'
VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and
it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'
(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the pûrvapakshin, that
Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we
remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,
since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That
the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards
we shall show later on.
41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different,
&c. (from name and form).
Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (âkâ/s/a) is the revealer of
all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are
contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the
highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin
declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because
it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,
secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very
well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room
(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory
mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.
To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest
Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the
clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'
designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,
excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and
form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names
and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be
accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which
declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)
with this living Self (jîva âtman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.
VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent
that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the
passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the
individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement
concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of
signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the
like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,
14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as
different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and
departing.
In the sixth prapâ/th/aka of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka there is given, in
reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the
nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the prâ/n/as, the
person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here
the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an
additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known
already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature
of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and
concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the
prâ/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the
embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great
unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must
therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages
also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,
represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving
information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements
about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being
designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep
sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,
'This person embraced by the intelligent (prâj/ñ/a) Self knows nothing
that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'
must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he
knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and
without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his
case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of
departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self
moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the
individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'
the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the
'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account
of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep
sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the
passage.--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire
chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the
latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in
the first place the introductory passage ('He among the prâ/n/as who
consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of
the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the
nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at
declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that
the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],
aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The
concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,
'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that
that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prâ/n/as, is the
great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that
the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth
the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking
state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants
to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the
states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the
soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as
free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident
from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in
every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/ñ/avalkya
replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is
not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he
says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for
he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,
to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the
nature of the non-transmigrating Self.