Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the
parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final
release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely
manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Râmânuja
is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going
to Brahman had been described in the preceding pâda.
Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul
stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. This, on
/S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According
to Râmânuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul
views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as
non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul
as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat
tvam asi and the like.[22]
Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul
(i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to
Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature,
possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other
places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva,
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only
characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to
Bâdarâyana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
vyavahârâpekshayâ).
Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the aparâ vidyâ,
and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its
desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former
alternative is accepted--According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a simply
continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the
preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII,
12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves
about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The
question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa
(it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released
soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in
favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration
made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive
him.'
Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied
according to their wish and will.
Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate
several bodies at the same time.--Sûtra 12 gives, according to
/S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare
the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul
do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to
the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the
fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Râmânuja
explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer
either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti =
mata/n/am according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).
Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jîvas participate in all the
perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of
creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of
embodied existence.
After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the
contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as
well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two
modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely
approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras
are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above;
but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair
degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.
We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous
discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled
out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as
to the general drift of the Sûtras and the arrangement of topics. As a
rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases
the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred
to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends
to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sûtras.
This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain
confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the
meaning of the Sûtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of
/S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja are based.
But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number
of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge more or
less widely, and that the Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them,
especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the
Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two
interpretations is entitled to preference.
Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the conspectus of
contents) given it as my opinion that Râmânuja's explanation appears to
be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a
number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal
meaning of a Sûtra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the
necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and
reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while
Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands. To exemplify this
remark, I again direct attention to all those Sûtras which in clear
terms represent the individual soul as something different from the
highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to
have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, not to what is true in
the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked
upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the
Sûtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.
Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to
the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood
by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires
convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second
place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sûtras concerning
whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we
have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter
commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with
the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by
the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jîva,
and where Râmânuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
/S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sûtras. The adhikara/n/a
is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view
held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the
question what kind of Vedânta is embodied in Bâdarâya/n/a's work.
But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a
few detached Sûtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some
opinion as to the relation of the Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief
distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such an
attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the
present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the
conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular doctrines found in
them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.
The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the
Sûtras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to
distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which
leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in
Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
exalted form of individual existence. The adhyâya first to be considered
in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three
latter pâdas of that adhyâya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate
of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two
sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who,
before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.
According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the three pâdas, referring
throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the
successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the
Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it
had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever
without returning into the sa/m/sâra.
On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange
that the concluding section of the Sûtras should be almost entirely
taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an
altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the
true sanctuary of Vedântic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sûtras. It is, I think, not
too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sûtras would--before
having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's
interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From
thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sûtras
conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on
the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual
release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of
existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious
sa/m/sâra, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
And this à priori impression--which, although no doubt significant,
could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed
consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which /S/a@nkara connects with
the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sûtras are interpreted by
/S/a@nkara and Râmânuja has been stated above in the conspectus of
contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Râmânuja
more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to
note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not
decisive in itself--that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of a
new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be
doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekeshâm,' is more
appropriately understood, with Râmânuja, as furnishing a reason for the
opinion advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as
embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,'
i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sûtra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's
interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra
had referred, viz. the followers of the Kâ/n/va-/s/âkhâ (the two Vedic
passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,
11, according to the Kâ/n/va recension); while it is the standing
practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,'
members of Vedic /s/âkhâs, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in
the preceding Sûtras. With this practice Râmânuja's interpretation, on
the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the
Mâdhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmât,'
clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the
Kâ/n/vas denotes the /s/ârira, i.e. the jîva. I think it is not saying
too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke'
would denote the very same Kâ/n/vas to whom the preceding Sûtra had
referred--so that the Kâ/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as
it were--is altogether impossible.
The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sûtras,
alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of
Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion
that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general
topic of the fourth adhyâya, and to be understood as depicting the
condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the
Sûtras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of
confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication
whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as
what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sûtra of the set (7)
obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities
which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to
make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them
'vyavahârâpekshayâ,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is
said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no
vyavahâra exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks,
'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmâtrajânân muktasyâjñânâbhâvât kuta
âj/ñ/ânika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself
attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.
In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth
adhyâya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the
distinction of aparâ and parâ vidyâ, but may yet be shortly referred to
in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of
/S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
Sûtras. The Sûtras 7-16 of the third pâda state the opinions of three
different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the
vidvân repairs on death, or--according to Râmânuja--the worshippers of
which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Râmânuja treats the views
of Bâdari and Jaimini as two pûrvapakshas, and the opinion of
Bâdarâya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhânta. /S/a@nkara, on the
other hand, detaching the Sûtras in which Bâdarâya/n/a's view is set
forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,
although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
illegitimate), maintains that Bâdari's view, which is expounded first,
represents the siddhânta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
is to be considered a mere pûrvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedânta-sûtras as
well as the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras to conclude the discussion of
contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
already accepted.
The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
but to side with Râmânuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
adhyâya of the Sûtras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
Sûtras of the fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
same vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.
If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
the negative evidence of the fourth adhyâya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted. And intimately
connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
point of view--is the question whether the Sûtras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of
illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Î/s/vara.
That Râmânuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the
doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sûtras
themselves.
Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
the outset by the second Sûtra of the first adhyâya, which undertakes to
give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world
proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sûtra meant to define?--That
Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sûtra
declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedânta; that Brahman
whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact
which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to
ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from
which the world originates. In later Vedântic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman
and the lower Brahman related to Mâyâ or the world, we meet with
definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only
remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as
sa/k/-/k/id-ânanda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the
introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/ñk/ada/s/î dilating on the sa/m/vid
svayam-prabhâ, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,
past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).
'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted
only as a definition of Î/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association
with Mâyâ is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and
it certainly is as improbable that the Sûtras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can
accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is
unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of
those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the
idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the
all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own
substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining
one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by
any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
Râmânujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sûtra becomes
altogether unobjectionable.
We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in
which Bâdarâya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish
between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mâyâ, is
confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sûtras being
throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look
less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines
of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the
Sûtrakâra against the Sâ@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world
has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the
non-intelligent pradhâna. The most important Sûtras relative to this
point are to be met with in the first pâda of the second adhyâya. Those
Sûtras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the
unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them
as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sûtra of the pâda mentioned
replies to the Sâ@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus
seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent
things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and
nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from
dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place
from the point of view of the true /S/â@nkara. According to the latter
the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the
latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Mâyâ.
Mâyâ is the upâdâna of the material world, and Mâyâ itself is of a
non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedântic writers
identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sâ@nkhyas. Similarly the
illustrative instances, adduced under Sûtra 9 for the purpose of showing
that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not
impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material
world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its
own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion
with the doctrine of Mâyâ, according to which the material world is no
more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its
subsistence. According to /S/â@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman,
but the special forms into which the upâdâna of the world, i.e. Mâyâ,
had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Mâyâ, whose relation to
Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sûtra
24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power,
transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous
instruments of action, 'kshîravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord
turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring
nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the
illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given
in the Sûtra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces,
chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the
real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to
illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character
of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous
illustrative instances (kshîravad dhi; devâdivat), moreover, seems to
show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite
theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from
Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or
other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent
without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]
That the Mâyâ doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sûtrakâra,
further appears from the latter part of the fourth pâda of the first
adhyâya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but
also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been
the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is
the material cause of the world through Mâyâ only, and that the world is
unreal; but the Sûtras do not contain a single word to that effect.
Sûtra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term
'pari/n/âmât;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of
itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the
Vedânta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/âvada' was used to
denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most
violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not
a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the
effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived
to take place in the way taught by Râmânuja or in some other
manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sûtra, as well as to those
touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms
and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavâda are in
reality reconcilable with it; to Sûtra 26, for instance, Govindânanda
remarks that the term 'pari/n/âma' only denotes an effect in general
(kâryamâtra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of
this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we
were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as
Râmânuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/âma' and similar terms in their
generally received sense.
A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III,
2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance,
as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all
qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting
adjuncts (upâdhis), the offspring of Mâyâ. I have above (in the
conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole
section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Râmânuja on
the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to
the purport of the group of Sûtras widely diverges from that of
/S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sûtras is so eminently concise and vague
that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if
indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the
sense of some Sûtras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve
preference, in the case of others Râmânuja seems to keep closer to the
text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Râmânuja's interpretation of
Sûtra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sûtra is concerned, and more
especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitâvattvam,' whose proper
force is brought out by Râmânuja's explanation only. So much is certain
that none of the Sûtras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
/S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence
and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that
the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both
interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to
tradition than to their desire of forcing Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras to bear
testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.
With special reference to the Mâyâ doctrine one important Sûtra has yet
to be considered, the only one in which the term 'mâyâ' itself occurs,
viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtra signifies that the
environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Mâyâ, i.e.
unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character
of real objects. Râmânuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a
different explanation of the term 'mâyâ,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's
views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now,
from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
are to be called Mâyâ, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the
characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking
soul must not be called Mâyâ. But that the world perceived by waking men
is Mâyâ, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming
consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/â@nkara Vedânta; and the
Sûtra therefore proves either that Bâdarâya/n/a did not hold the
doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after
all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'mâyâ' in a sense
altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on
the other hand, we, with Râmânuja, understand the word 'mâyâ' to denote
a wonderful thing, the Sûtra of course has no bearing whatever on the
doctrine of Mâyâ in its later technical sense.
We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to
Brahman. Do the Sûtras indicate anywhere that their author held
/S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jîva is in reality
identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a
false surmise due to avidyâ, or do they rather favour the view that the
souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements
of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?
This question is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, but
yet requires a short separate treatment.
In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sûtras in which
the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in
/S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among
others by Râmânuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further
seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pâda of the second adhyâya, which
describes the soul as 'j/ñ/a,' is more appropriately understood in the
sense assigned to it by Râmânuja; and, again, that the Sûtras which
treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's
views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to
authorise.--We next have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul
is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we
have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views
only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'
while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.--We also have
already referred to Sûtra 50, 'âbhâsa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara
interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavâda according to
which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.
But almost every Sûtra--and Sûtra 50 forms no exception--being so
obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often
totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in
view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and
spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no
means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sûtra 50,
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sûtra 43,
which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43
contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the
ava/kkh/edavâda, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by
a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I
confess that Râmânuja's interpretation of the Sûtra (which however is
accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me
particularly convincing; and the Sûtras unfortunately offer us no other
passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be
ascribed to the term âbhâsa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean
hetvâbhâsa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this
one Sûtra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the
pratibimbavâda which, in its turn, presupposes the mâyâvâda, is the
teaching of the Sûtras.
To the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra did not hold the doctrine of the
absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of
/S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with
here and there in the Sûtras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
occasion to direct attention to the important Sûtra II, 1, 22, which
distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or
different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to
be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the
/s/ârîra is not the antaryâmin, because the Mâdhyandinas, as well as the
Kâ/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam
adhîyate), and in 22 the /s/ârîra and the pradhâna are referred to as
the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive
attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the
other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,
21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in
contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/â@nkaras indeed maintain that
all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidyâ. But
this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in
no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands
that the Sûtras should be thus understood. If we accept the
interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether
unintelligible why the Sûtrakâra should never hint even at what
/S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that
the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only,
ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its
nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sûtrakâra
was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of
esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of
interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the
avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat
the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and
hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apâda down to the most
modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to
inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language
that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but
this one knowledge is without true value.
There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the
individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our
attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early
divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedânta. I mean I, 4,
20-22, which three Sûtras state the views of Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
and Kâ/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed
to the highest Self. The siddhânta view is enounced in Sûtra 22,
'avasthiter iti Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for
the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's
abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual
soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enunciation of his own view that the
individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/
parame/s/varo jîvo nânya/h/.' Râmânuja on the other hand, likewise
accepting Kâ/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhânta view, explains
'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,
as described in the antaryâmin-brâhma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that
the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by
Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged
in favour of Râmânuja's interpretation that in the five other places
where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sûtras (I, 2, 17;
II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
abiding or permanent abode within something.
If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as
to the teaching of the Sûtras, I must give it as my opinion that they do
not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
Î/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of
the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara,
proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I
do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results.
Upon Râmânuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without
reserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in
providing us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's
explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of
the text. The author of the Sûtras may have held views about the nature
of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara,
and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Râmânuja. If, however,
the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would
follow even from them that the system of Bâdarâya/n/a had greater
affinities with that of the Bhâgavatas and Râmanuja than with the one of
which the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya is the classical exponent.
It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sûtras that only
a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling
us to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine
advocated by Bâdarâya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part
of the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's
terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no
light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word.
This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging
to /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower
vidyâ is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to
accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we
therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called
lower vidyâ are treated very fully in the Vedânta-sûtras, when we
observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the
investigation of the unity of vidyâs (most of which are so-called
sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyâs) is carried in the third adhyâya, or the
fact of almost the whole fourth adhyâya being devoted to the ultimate
fate of the possessor of the lower vidyâ; we certainly feel ourselves
confirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as
comparatively unimportant formed in Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion part of that
knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is
entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.
The question as to what kind of system is represented by the
Vedânta-sûtras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we
have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sûtras by means of the
different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the
first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sûtras what
doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sûtras
doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads
can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must
consider it at the least highly probable that that very same
doctrine--of whatever special nature it may be--is hidden in the
enigmatical aphorisms of Bâdarâya/n/a.[24]
I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one. Even
if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads
agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will
be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled
unhesitatingly to assume that the Sûtras set forth the same doctrine.
Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the
undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient
times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which
lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the
teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sûtras. Let us suppose, for
argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Mâyâ is distinctly
enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Râmânuja and, for all we know
to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom
he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sûtras, denied
that the Upanishads teach Mâyâ, and it is hence by no means impossible
that Bâdarâya/n/a should have done the same. The à priori style of
reasoning as to the teaching of the Sûtras is therefore without much
force.
But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the
Sûtras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to
the true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of
the Sûtras and /S/a@nkara cannot afford to pass over in silence,
especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the
Sûtras and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya do not agree concerning most important
points of Vedântic doctrine. The Sûtras as well as the later
commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than
systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at
least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the
further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads
has been most adequately systematised, whether by Bâdarâya/n/a, or
/S/a@nkara, or Râmânuja, or some other commentator. This question
requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which
commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sûtras, and it
is by no means impossible that /S/a@nkara, for instance, should in the
end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the
teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sûtras.
We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to
deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at
the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded
in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its
entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads
themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came
down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other,
to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a
system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to
every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various
points of Vedântic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to
any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of /S/ruti, it will
certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If
anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads--and the
impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful
investigation--it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole.
They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable
indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the
different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the
separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to
different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what
a mere look at the Chândogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove.
It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should
agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the
Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the
first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the
Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical
society, to different Vedic /s/âkhâs; nay, some of them the tradition
makes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the
period, whose mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a
creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of
later periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic
schools as, for instance, the one of which /S/a@nkara is the great
representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly
bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not
be changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon.
Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those
schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as
a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their
speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not
fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the
promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school
traditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in
the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to
their speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more
certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical
activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation
certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member
of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor
worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and
fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few
leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first
originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not
enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most
probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual
mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by
generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any
rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and
moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required
inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden
being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be spread
everywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources.
/S/vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddâlaka; the proud
Gârgya has to become the pupil of Ajâta/s/atru, the king of Kâ/s/î;
Bhujyu Sâhyâyani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva
possessing a maiden; Satyakâma learns what Brahman is from the bull of
the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako/s/ala
is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of
course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and
theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary
garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a
rigidly systematic doctrine.
And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply
confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for
instance, of M. Paul Régnaud's Matériaux pour servir à l'Histoire de la
Philosophie de l'Inde, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the
different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we
can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general
leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and
very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the
collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the
primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that
whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a
homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there
given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt to different stages of
philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of
priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be
inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for
instance, the legend of the âtman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of
a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits
itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are
produced in succession (B/ri/. Up. I, 1, 4), can be reconciled with the
account given of the creation in the Chândogya Upanishad, where it is
said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat, 'that
which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of
itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The
former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows
striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the
latter account is fairly developed Vedânta (although not Vedânta
implying the Mâyâ doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a
certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold
world from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as
/S/a@nkara does, that the âtman purushavidha of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
is the so-called Virâg of the latter Vedânta--implying thereby that that
section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special
form of Î/s/vara, and not simply the whole process of creation--is the
ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing
more.
How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and
handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned
above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own
sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more
ancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more
advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary
compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked
upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination,
and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and
newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections
of such heterogeneous character as the Chândogya and B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
Upanishads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came
down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task
of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of
the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,
i.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly,
there really is no reason to deny.
For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different
commentators employ in systematizing the contents of the Upanishads
there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is
meant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various
doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a
certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some
few at least of /S/a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the
considerations by which he is guided.
We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when
discussing the meaning of the Sûtras, viz. the question concerning the
ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we
have seen, /S/a@nkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an
insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of
death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a
process from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations
of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand,
who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman
departs from the body by means of the artery called sushum/n/â, and
following the so-called devayâna, the path of the gods, mounts up to the
world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which
/S/a@nkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.
In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of
two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious
works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of
knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where
they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new
forms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of
the gods--on which the sun forms one stage--up to the world of Brahman,
from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch.
Up. V, 10; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B/ri/. Up. VI,
2, 15 ff.; Pra/s/na Up. I, 9 ff.--In other passages only the latter of
the two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, 15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up.
I, 6; B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only
the more important ones.
Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows I think, beyond
any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through
the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the
devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge
enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever
reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that
name.--Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of
the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and
austerities go to light,' &c.--Ch. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to
convey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upako/s/ala's teacher himself
represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of
the sacred fires.--Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old /s/loka which says
that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the
head reaches the Immortal.--Kaush. Up. I, 2--which gives the most
detailed account of the ascent of the soul--contains no intimation
whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman
world, being of an inferior nature.--Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the
Chândogya in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the
forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion,
through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is
imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the
assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are
there referred to.--B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old /s/lokas clearly
referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which
'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on
as entirely free.--That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes
whoever knows Brahman.'--B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the
Pa/ñk/âgnividyâ, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who
in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.--Pra/s/na
Up. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence,
faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Âditya, the sun. There is
the home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest.
From thence they do not return, for it is the end.'--Maitr. Up. VI, 30
quotes /s/lokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the
solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to
the highest path.'
All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage
who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum/n/â, and ascends by the path
of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some
blissful state. But, according to /S/a@nkara, all these texts are meant
to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the
knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so
entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as B/ri/. Up. VI, 2,
15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to
worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only
Hira/n/yagarbha!--And why?--Only because the system so demands it, the
system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on
their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place.
The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires,
and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from
the old one, accompanied by all the prâ/n/as, there is contrasted the
fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not
desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his
desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do
not depart--being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'
We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the
important Sûtras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place,
depends whether or not we must admit the Sûtrakâra to have acknowledged
the distinction of a parâ and an aparâ vidyâ. Here the passage interests
us as throwing light on the way in which /S/a@nkara systematises. He
looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to
the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of
those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies
followed by all prâ/n/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,
section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of
the body, but becomes one with Brahman then and there. This
interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly
right, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at
setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know
Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who
does know Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no
distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining
section 6 /S/a@nkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya prâ/n/a
utkrâmanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify
that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does
not ascend to the world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may
simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e.
do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.
On /S/a@nkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new
difficulty. In the /s/lokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the
description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and
higher on clearly refers--as noticed already above--to the path through
the veins, primarily the sushum/n/â, on which, according to so many
other passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is,
according to /S/a@nkara, followed by him only who has not risen above
the lower knowledge, and yet the /s/lokas have manifestly to be
connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of
the parâ vidyâ. Hence /S/a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the
/s/lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in
Professor Max Müller's version) as follows:
8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which final
release is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to know, and
old, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully
reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release
(svargaloka/s/abda/h/ samnihitaprakara/n/ât mokshâbhidhâyaka/h/).
9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green
or red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in
accordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c.;
but that is false, for the paths through the arteries lead at the best
to the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa/m/sâra); that
path (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is
found by Brahman, i.e. by such Brâhma/n/as as through true knowledge
have become like Brahman,' &c.
A significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going
systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally!
But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether
/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6,
be right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view
all those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as
belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages
declare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares
the sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without
due discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other
passages met with in the same Upanishad even--for as we have remarked
above the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka contains pieces manifestly belonging to
different stages of development;--much less does it entitle us to put
arbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.
Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to
understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds
along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later--and, if we like,
more philosophic--conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's
Self, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We
may even apply to those two views the terms aparâ and parâ--lower and
higher--knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to
believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an
inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors
of the Upanishads.
We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point
considered in what precedes, viz. the second Brâhma/n/a of the third
adhyâya of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka. The discussion there first turns upon
the grahas and atigrahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects,
and Yâjñavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is
overcome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy
then turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Ârtabhâga
asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart
from him or not?' and Yâjñavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up
in him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is
lying.'--Now this is for /S/a@nkara an important passage, as we have
already seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his comment on
Ved.-sûtra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage B/ri/.
Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment
of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must
refer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam
purusha' must be 'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest
knowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding
clause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as
Râmânuja also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption
that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section
11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self
of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Râmânuja
himself, viz. that the prâ/n/as do not depart from the jîva of the dying
man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although
he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general),
and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt
to account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and
inflated.--A little further on (section 13) Ârtabhâga asks what becomes
of this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire,
his breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear
that we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13
anybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections;
in spite of this /S/a@nkara--according to whose system the organs of the
true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly merged in
Brahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the
'asa/m/yagdar/s/in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to the cognition
of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is
required by the system. The asa/m/yagdar/s/in also--who as such has to
remain in the sa/m/sâra--cannot do without the organs, since his jîva
when passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the
subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly
does say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the
different elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are
abandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!
The whole third adhyâya indeed of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka affords ample
proof of the artificial character of /S/a@nkara's attempts to show that
the teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth
brâhma/n/a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest
non-related Brahman, while the preceding brâhma/n/as had treated only of
Î/s/vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, brâhma/n/a 8,
after having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all
qualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same
Brahman as the ruler of the world, 'By the command of that Imperishable
sun and moon stand apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of
the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman
in--/S/a@nkara's sense.--The preceding brâhma/n/a (7) treats of the
antaryâmin, i.e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything.
This, according to /S/a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called
Î/s/vara; but we observe that the antaryâmin as well as the so-called
highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two
sections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he,
there is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it,
nothing that hears but it, &c.).--Nothing can be clearer than that all
these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know
nothing of the distinctions made by the developed Vedânta, however valid
the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view.
We may refer to one more similar instance from the Chândogya Upanishad.
We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyâs describing
the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the
Sâ/nd/ilya-vidyâ. This small vidyâ is decidedly one of the finest and
most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another
passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally
short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text,
which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of
Brahman's nature that Sâ/nd/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by
/S/a@nkara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidyâ
only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is,
according to their terminology, not j/ñ/âna, i.e. knowledge, but the
injunction of a mere upâsanâ, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far
as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its
form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Râmânujas, on the other hand,
quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of
their highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that /S/a@nkara is
free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies
absolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason
whatever for supposing that Sâ/nd/ilya, or whoever may have been the
author of that vidyâ, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of
the highest truth accessible to man.
We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads,
apart from the systems of the commentators.--From what precedes it will
appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy
a philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all
contradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made
in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even
be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the
human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be
systematised simply because they were never meant to form a system.
/S/â/nd/ilya's views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details
agree with those of Yâj/ñ/avalkya, and Uddâlaka differed from both. In
this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests
altogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached
philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different
authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom
manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a
perfectly consistent whole.
The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms
'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in
which /S/a@nkara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them,
but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In
this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a
philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in
details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven
back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that
the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may
belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that
the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right
understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the
latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by
the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts
are concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even
specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate.
The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started
when examining the doctrine of the Sûtras, viz. the question whether the
Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in /S/a@nkara's
sense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we
find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently
opposed to avîdyâ, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance
as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several
places we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with
its supplementary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge
of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/nd/aka Up. (I, 4)
applies the terms aparâ and parâ vîdyâ. But a formal recognition of the
essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as
possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of
all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed
sometimes described as sagu/n/a and sometimes as nirgu/n/a (to use later
terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two
different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results.
The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed;
hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same
vidyâs it is spoken of as sagu/n/a as well as nirgu/n/a. When the mind
of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all
this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it
distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman,
then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the
omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows
out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious
reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward
manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from
sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may
be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are
only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity.
Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the
Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching
Mâyâ.--From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have
inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Mâyâ, i.e. of the
unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a
feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was
introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Bâdarâya/n/a
or /S/a@nkara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the
doctrine of Mâyâ forms an integral element of the teaching of the
Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less
distinctly in more than one place, has in recent times been advocated
with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of
the Upanishads.
In his Matériaux, &c. M. Paul Régnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of
Mâyâ, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly
become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of
development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent
eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sâ@nkhya philosophy),
and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in
the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'--To
the two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to
add a third one, viz. that form of the Vedânta of which the theory of
the Bhâgavatas or Râmânujas is the most eminent type, and according to
which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the
material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an
independent entity like the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, but which at the
same time is not an unreal Mâyâ but quite as real as any other part of
Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed
itself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we
clearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the
Upanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the
world.
In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Mâyâ doctrine or not,
we must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the
system, i.e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without
careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the
teaching--direct or inferred--of any one passage to the end of
determining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit
that some passages, notably of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, contain at any
rate the germ of the later developed Mâyâ doctrine[25], and thus render
it quite intelligible that a system like /S/a@nkara's should evolve
itself, among others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid
reason for interpreting Mâyâ into other texts which give a very
satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant
to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts
of the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the
illusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least,
had that theory been held by the authors of those accounts; but not a
word to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those
accounts--the one given in the sixth chapter of the Chândogya
Upanishad--forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume
that the 'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which
is there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to
represent a vivarta rather than a pari/n/âma that the process of the
origination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything
else but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval
Self. The introductory words, addressed to /S/vetaketu by Uddâlaka,
which are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of
the evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially,
intimate any such thing[26]. For what is capable of being proved, and
manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump
of clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things
made of clay and gold? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its
causal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen
pot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through
which any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one.
We--including Uddâlaka--may surely say that all earthen pots are in
reality nothing but earth--the earthen pot being merely a special
modification (vikâra) of clay which has a name of its own--without
thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,
which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not
real but a mere baseless illusion.
In the same light we have to view numerous other passages which set
forth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle.
When, for instance, we meet in the Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial
enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross
material world and the highest Self (the Person), with the
'avyâk/ri/ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the purusha; and when
again the Mu/nd/aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable'
higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to
see in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that
real element in Brahman from which, as in the Râmânuja system, the
material universe springs by a process of real development. We must of
course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real'
and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach
emphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any
principle independent from the Lord like the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas;
the world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power,
and hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its
strict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior
in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated,
and which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither
unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes
unreality in the sense in which the Mâyâ of /S/a@nkara is unreal.
According to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous
appearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is
mistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined
snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is
certainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review
of the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not
confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some
detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the
whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the
great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things
have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the
bond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do
not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as /S/a@nkara
says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the
world--the inferior mûrta rûpa of Brahman, to use an expression of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka--and to become one with Brahman in its highest form.
'We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;' the
natural meaning of this is, 'we are to look upon this whole world as a
true manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.'
The mâyâvâdin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and
interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so
only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate
to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that
everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
over it and hiding it from us.
Stress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms,
indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added
'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatrânyad iva syât; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati;
âtmâ dhyâyatîva lelâyatîva). Those passages no doubt readily lend
themselves to Mâyâ interpretations, and it is by no means impossible
that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Mâyâ
doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also
admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of
the unreality of the world. If Yâj/ñ/avalkya refers to the latter as
that 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality
as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion,
according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are
opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all
things being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts
of--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being
unreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes
of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is
only one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self
thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators
the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is
thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self
is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Mâyâ,
as /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Râmânuja teaches,
is an altogether different question.
I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to
admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the
writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin
to--although much less explicit than--the Mâyâ of /S/a@nkara. But what I
object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all,
doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Mâyâ doctrine
into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully
intelligible without it.[28]
The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to
touch upon is the relation of the jîvas, the individual souls to the
highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by /S/a@nkara
and Râmânuja, as have been stated before. Confronting their theories
with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without
hesitation, that /S/a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the
prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least,
viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage--whatever its original
relation to Brahman may be--is in the end completely merged and
indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly
alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain
texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path
of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered
years, i.e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take, the
passage Kaushît. Up. I--the fundamental text of the Râmânujas concerning
the soul's fate after death--belong to an earlier stage of philosophic
development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual
existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which
the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the
universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who
knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman becomes all
this;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and
form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the
whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the
doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the
Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly
stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the
state of deep dreamless sleep.
It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the
Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to
the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be
viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it.
Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which
the soul is merely brahma bhrântam or brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way
countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If
the emission of the elements, described in the Chândogya and referred to
above, is a real process--of which we saw no reason to doubt--the jîva
âtman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is
equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself.
After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedântic
doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider
/S/a@nkara's system and mode of interpretation--with whose details we
had frequent opportunities of finding fault--as a whole. It has been
said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the
Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an
intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are
quite ready to admit that /S/a@nkara's system is most probably the best
which can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads
recognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the
distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the
adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an
instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the
heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This
becomes very manifest as soon as we compare /S/a@nkara's system with
that of Râmânuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we
should say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those
passages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a
personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on
the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as
transcending all qualities, as one undifferenced mass of impersonal
intelligence, Râmânuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has
to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system.
The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent
the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Râmânuja
cannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation
carried as far as possible. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully
ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to
find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks
of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set
forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the
author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where
the legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world
become somewhat crude and gross, Hira/n/yagarbha and Virâj are summoned
forth and charged with the responsibility. Of Virâj Mr. Gough remarks
(p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads
for the purusha of the ancient /ri/shis, the divine being out of whom
the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we
substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox
Vedânta system--for the Upanishads give no indication whatever that by
their purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Virâj
occupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system;--but the
mere phrase, 'providing a place' intimates with sufficient clearness the
nature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedântic doctrine are
engaged.
/S/a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to
different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly
existing differences which other systematisers are intent on
obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more
important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more
pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other
systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony
with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other
Vedântic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction
made by /S/a@nkara between Brahman and Î/s/vara is known to the
Upanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of
determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made
between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu/n/a, and those
which ascribe to it personal attributes, /S/a@nkara is right in giving
preference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old
Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual
consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back
temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in
death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal
Î/s/vara of Râmânuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older
Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes
of their highest being, and hence /S/a@nkara is right in so far as he
assigns to his hypostatised personal Î/s/vara[29] a lower place than to
his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing
spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate of the soul,
we have already remarked above. And although the Mâyâ doctrine cannot,
in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads,
it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very
point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the
physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is
left by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the
Mâyâ doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite
intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it
that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a
development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought
which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Mâyâ theory may
be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening
speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a
more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any
second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any
elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal
being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of
texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a
manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly
consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call
it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is
indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's
nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a
more thorough following out of the conception that the union with
Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally
led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state
from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an
act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous
notion, an illusion.--A further circumstance which may not impossibly
have co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's
unreality will be referred to later on.[30]
We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of
Vedânta is represented by the Vedânta-sûtras, although reason was shown
for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more
closely related to the system of Râmânuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If
so, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the
teaching of the Upanishads than the Sûtras of Bâdarâya/n/a. This would
indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we
should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Bâdarâya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a
priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence
to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of
Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the
possibility of Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being
than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads.
That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent
at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably
had sprung up in altogether different--priestly or
non-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for
our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary
monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable,
viz. the Bhagavadgîtâ. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgîtâ represents a
fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a
personal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects
approximates very closely to the system of the Bhâgavatas; the attempts
of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth
pure Vedânta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be
set aside. But this same Bhagavadgîtâ is quoted in Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras
(at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent
scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in
authority. The Sûtras, moreover, refer in different places to certain
Vedântic portions of the Mahâbhârata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms of Vedânta distinctly differing from
/S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the
Bhâgavatas.
Facts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are
prevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the primâ facie strangeness
of the assumption that the Vedânta-sûtras, which occupy an intermediate
position between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in
their teaching from both. The Vedânta of Gau/d/apâda and /S/a@nkara
would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all
combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the
teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever
since /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by
Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the
wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in
India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India,
are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in
which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who
think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'[31] The
only forms of Vedântic philosophy which are--and can at any time have
been--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads
has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the
devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part
of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only
religious books of widespread influence are such as the Râmâyan of
Tulsidâs, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute
Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Mâyâ,
but love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and
merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the
supplication of the worshipper.
* * * * *
The present translation of the Vedânta-sûtras does not aim at rendering
that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly
follows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the
latter agrees with the views held by Bâdarâya/n/a has been discussed
above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be
left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a
translation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of
the Sûtras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the
method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to
in the Sûtras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the
views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of
the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course
following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor
Max Müller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not
inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render
intelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find
space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for
making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating
the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller
notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on
the /t/îkâs composed by Ânandagiri and Govindânanda (the former of which
is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhâmatî.
My best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Râma Mi/s/ra /S/âstrin and
Ga@ngâdhara /S/âstrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have
consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my
obligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/âstrin, of the same institution, who
most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present
volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.
Notes:
[Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatâkopâsananirv/ri/ttaye
v/ri/shyannâdiphalânîsh/t/âny eva katha/m/ teshâ/m/ virodhâd vinâ/s/a
u/k/yate. Tatrâha pâte tv iti. /S/arîrapâte tu teshâ/m/ vinâ/s/a/h/
/s/arîrapâtâd ûrdhv/m/ tu vidyânugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalâni suk/ri/tâni
na/s/yantîty artha/h/.]
[Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayânena panthâ ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam
pratibrûuyât satyam brûyâd iti /k/andramasâ sa/m/vâdava/k/anena
/s/arîrasadbhâva/h/, ata/h/ sûkshma/s/arîram anuvartate.]
[Footnote 21: When the jîva has passed out of the body and ascends to
the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it
reaches the river Vijarâ. There it divests itself of the subtle body,
and the latter is merged in Brahman.].
[Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/
saivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramâtmana/h/
p/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatprahâratayâ tadavibhaktam iti visnye
so, /s/nate sarvân kamân saha brahma/n/â vipas/k/itâ pasya/h/ pasyate
rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram ìsa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvin
pu/n/yapape vidhuya nirañgana/h/ parama/m/ sâmyam upaiti ida/m/ jñanam
upasritya mama sâdharinyam âgata/h/ sarve, punopajâyante pralayena
vyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a
sâhityasâmyasádharmyâvagamât p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatîu prâpte
u/k/yate. Avibhâgeneti. Parasmâd brahmana/h/ svatmanam
avibhâgenânubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvât. Para/m/
brahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyânrodhanasya yathâtathyena svâtamano
d/ri/sh/ta/tvât. Svatmana/h/ ssvarûpa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam âtmâ
brahma aitadâtmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/
brahnetyâdisâmânâdhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya âtmani tishtan atmano ntaro
yam âtmâ na veda yastatmâ sarîra/m/ ya âtmânam antaro yamayati
âtmântaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishta/h/ sâstâ anânâm ityâdibhis /k/a
paramatmâtmaka/m/ ta/kk/harîtatayâ tatprakâtabhûtam iti pratipâditam
avashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrâto vibhagenaha/m/ brahmâsmîty
cvanubhavati.]
[Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the
magician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known
to the Sûtras.]
[Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.]
[Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the
/S/vitâsvatara and Maitrâyanîya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits
the word 'mâyâ.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k
Sa/m/bitâ in which mâyâ means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Régnaud, La Mâyâ,
in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.]
[Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Râmânuja.]
[Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.]
[Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Mâyâ passages of the
Svetâsvatara and the Maitrâyanîya Upanishads. Reasons which want of
space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that
neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when
wishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.]
[Footnote 29: The Î/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new
forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit
cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal
conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the
individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is
one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
systematisers of Vedântic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid
altogether.]
[Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point
referred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the
second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point
concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.]
[Footnote 31:
Così tra questa
Immensità s'annega il pensier mio,
E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.
LEOPARDI.
]