The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the
Sâ@nkhyas.
The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10;
11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them
terms used with a special technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-/s/âstra,
avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive
review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has
not the special meaning which the Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes
the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma /s/arîra), but at the
same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of
the subtle one.
Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the
tricoloured ajâ spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the
Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world
springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that
power.--What Râmânuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands
by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above
of the two systems.
Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ mentioned in
B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the
Sâ@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict
itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence
is intelligence, being the cause of the world.
Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he
who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned
in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul,
but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in
Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a
being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into
an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.
The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the
next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be
seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not
the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja,
made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is
anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of
knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.
Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or
operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.
The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/âma; Sûtra
26).--Râmânuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the
Se/s/vara-sâ@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord,
but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts
as an operative cause merely.
Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya views is
applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world
having originated from atoms.
After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyâya and the
succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of
/S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two
questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which
is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sûtras
have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and
Râmânuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into
Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in
the Sûtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to
determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general
question as to how far the Sûtras favour either /S/a@nkara's or
Râmânuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)
The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason
why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by
the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have
occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on
the assumption that the Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented
upon was guided by technicalities of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-system, especially by
a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mîmâ/m/saka
employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position
of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is
rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the
Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyâya, such as given by
Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in
which the Sûtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in
which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would
certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the
same time to exemplify the various pramâ/n/as of the Mîmâ/m/sâ in their
due systematic succession.
As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken
from the Chândogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first
adhyâya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chândogya
passages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman
or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an
opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the
Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sûtrakâra meant to begin
the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the
Chândogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the
anândamaya mentioned in the Taittirîya Upanishad has, in agreement with
Râmânuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and
to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the
fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining
adhikara/n/as of the first pâda follow the order of passages in the
Chândogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the
exception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushîtaki
passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to
account.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pâda returns to the
Chândogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a
Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason
why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly
assigned in the /S/rî-bhâshya, which remarks that, as in the preceding
Sûtra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a
doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest
Self can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the
'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Râmânuja
remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a;
for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a
doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since
the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same
prakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same
matter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chândogya
passage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within
(antaryâmin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Râmânuja also,
to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the
preceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the
argument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that
which is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly
introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had
been said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons
to which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pâda and the first and
third adhikara/n/as of the third pâda owe their places are not apparent
(the second adhikara/n/a of the third pâda treats of a Chândogya
passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the
Pra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara. O/m/kâra is clearly due to
the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been
discussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth
adhikara/n/as investigate Chândogya passages.--The two next Sûtras (22,
23) are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new
adhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines'
(Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Râmânuja looks on them as continuing the
sixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any
rate probable that Râmânuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention
of the author of the Sûtras. The general rule in the first three pâdas
is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the
subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared
to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a
nominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of
the adhyâya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may
be due to the fact that there a new pâda begins, and it therefore was
considered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a
special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent
one; for, as remarked above, Sûtra 19 does not in reality begin a new
adhikara/n/a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in
their places.--Now neither Sûtra 22 nor Sûtra 23 contains any word
intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,
and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Râmânuja, as
continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion
receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next
adhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in
Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being
considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in
Sûtra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amátra properly constitutes the
subject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI;
which, in its turn, implies that Sûtras 22, 23 do not form an
independent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions,
and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sûtra 39 forms a new
adhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Râmânuja,
whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sûtra
does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference
of opinion prevails with regard to Sûtra 40, and it appears from the
translation of the Sûtra given above, according to Râmânuja's view, that
'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two
adhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Râmânuja, to one Chândogya
passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sûtra 42 does not
comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be
discussed.
From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The
Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras
comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important
doubtful--passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These passages are
arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.
Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer,
there being always a special reason why a certain Chândogya passage is
followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons
can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although
not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Râmânuja, a
subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.
The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is
directed specially and avowedly against Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of
Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated
passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the
/S/rî-bhâshya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a
general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the
material as well as the operative cause of the world.
Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of
Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases
an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that
the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the
purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can
hardly be upheld. The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ
Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras are throughout Mîmâ/m/sâ i.e. critical discussions of
such scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of different
interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their
meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutrâs which do not directly
involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but
rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases
are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of
the Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted to the task
of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined
in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what
Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages
concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.
With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first
adhyâya are occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a particularly
important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas is patent
(and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth
adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world
has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the
fourth pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic against
Sâ@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore
perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyâya
is due to the wish, on the part of the Sûtrakâra, to guard his own
doctrine against Sâ@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other
so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sâ@nkhya system
is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to
prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The
Sâ@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which
the Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the
intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhâna or
some product of the pradhâna, or else to the purusha in the Sânkhya
sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the
Vedântin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind,
and this he did in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, selecting
those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason
or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are
certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of
others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them
at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find
fault with the Sûtrakára; for no modern scholar, either European or
Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in
the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when
the Sûtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the
intricacies of the Mîmâ/m/sâ, to judge with confidence which Vedic
passages may give rise to discussions and which not.
Notes:
[Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Srî-bhâshya is, that
identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Nârâya/n/a; but this in no way
affects the interpretations put on the Sûtras and Upanishads. Nârâya/n/a
is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]
[Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a;
the figures in parentheses state the Sûtras comprised in each
adhikara/n/a.]
[Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage
conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two
objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by
all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage
immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'ânandamayo s
bhyâsàt' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam
brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in
that part of the bhâshya which sets forth the former explanation, but
only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates
the latter interpretation.]
[Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/ñ/anasya brahma/nas/
/ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhânâd vyâv/ri/ttir
uktâ, idânî/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u
sa/m/sangammittanâmâvidhân intadukhasagaranimajjaonî/s/addhâ/h/. /k/i
pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauîka/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti
pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyásât.]
[Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it'
in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p.
30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other
commentators.]
[Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text,
which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the
remark made in the preceding note.]
[Footnote 7: Gîvaysa iva parasyâpi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arîrantarvaititvam
abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva
/s/arîrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na,
hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arîrântarvartitvam eva
sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapàparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/
/K/àpahatapâpmana/h/ parahâtmano na sambhavati.]
[Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the
Sanskrit text (beginning with apara âha) Deussen considers to be an
interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in
/S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason
whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that
/S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the
Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only
in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That
the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadára/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va
text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the
Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an
'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]
[Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya
daharâkâsasya parabrahma/n/o snukârâd ayam apahatapâpmatvâdigu/n/ako
vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagâtmâ na daharakâ/s/a/h/ tadanukâras tatsâmya/m/
tathâ hi pratyagâlmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmânukâra/h/ srûyate yadâ
pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartâram î/s/a/m/ purusha/m/
brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvân pu/n/yapâpe vidhûya nira/ñg/ana/h/ parama/m/
sâmyam upaitîty atos'nukartâ prajâpativâkyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukârya/m/
para/m/ brahma na daharâkâ/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sâri/n/oszpi
muktâvasthâyâ/m/ paramasâmyâpattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmânukâra/h/
smaryate ida/m/ j/ñ/ânam upâsritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya
/k/âpi smaryate iti /k/a sûtradvayam adhikara/n/ântara/m/ tam eva
bhântam anubhâti sarva/m/ tasya bhâsâ sarvam ida/m/ vibhâtîty asyâ/h/
/s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayâya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv
ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvâdyâyatana/m/ sva/s/abdâd ity
adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipâdanât
jyoti/sk/ara/n/âbhidhânât ity âdishu parasya brahma/n/o
bhârûpatvâvagates /k/a pûrvapakshânutthânâd ayukta/m/
sûtrâksharavairûpya/k/ /k/a.]
[Footnote 10: Yadi paramâtmâ na bhoktâ eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/tayâ
pratîyamâno jîva eva syâd ity âsankyâha attâ.]
[Footnote 11: Sthânâdivyapade/s/â/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi
tish/th/ann ity âdinâ pratipâdyamâna/m/ /k/akshushi
sthitiniyamanâdika/m/ paramâtmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tvâ
akshipurushasya paramâtmatva/m/ sâdhitam idâni/m/ tad eva samarthayate
antaryâû.]
[Footnote 12: Ânandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 1,
22; prâna/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prâna/h/ I, 1, 28; attâ I, 2,
9; guhâ/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryâmî I, 2, 18;
ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vânara/h/ I, 2, 24;
dyubhvâdyâyatanam I, 3, 1; bhûmâ I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3,
13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) âkâ/s/a/h/
I, 3,41.]