To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the
term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary
works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu
notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In
the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read
together with running commentaries such as Sâya/n/a's commentaries on
the Sa/m/hitâs and Brâhma/n/as, and the Bhâshyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on
the chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves
conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts,
since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached
passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the
whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at
any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a
comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of
systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing
the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and
sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the
view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to
a separate sâstra or body of doctrine which is termed Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e.
the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry
into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.
Of this Mîmâ/m/sâ two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called
earlier (pûrva) Mîmâ/m/sâ, and the later (uttara) Mîmâ/m/sâ. The former
undertakes to systematise the karmakâ/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of
the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial
action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitâs and the Brâhma/n/as exclusive
of the Âra/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with
regard to the so-called j/ñ/ânaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic
writings which includes the Âra/n/yaka portions of the Brâhma/n/as, and
a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not
action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.
At what period these two /s/âstras first assumed a definite form, we are
unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute
the subject-matter of the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ must have arisen at a very
early period, and the word Mîmâ/m/sâ itself together with its
derivatives is already employed in the Brâhma/n/as to denote the doubts
and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The
want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to
perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of
the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether
practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in
ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover
a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain
Vedic sâkhâ or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their
own brâhma/n/a and sa/m/hitâ, without being under any obligation of
reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally
conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sâkhâs. It was assumed
that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of
man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be
performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or
even by the followers of one and the same sâkhâ.
The Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra may be supposed to have originated
considerably later than the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ. In the first place, the
texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch
of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of
those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal
urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental
attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on
Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and
coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without
any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.
But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing
force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching
of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sâkhâs no
doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while
conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got
over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is
not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation
to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the
like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it
therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole
body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their
teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In
addition there supervened the external motive that, while the
karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of
brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain
sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the
j/ñ/ânâkâ/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards
which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox
community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have
become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different
views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of
systematic defence.
At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two
branches of the Mîmâ/m/sâ. We have, on the one hand, all those works
which constitute the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--or as it is often,
shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--and, on the
other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name
Vedânta-/s/âstra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand
two collections of Sûtras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their
totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed
authors are Jainini and Bâdarâya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt
that the composition of those two collections of Sûtras was preceded by
a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely
represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the
analogy of other /s/âstras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness
with which the Sûtras perform their task of systematizing the teaching
of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the
Sûtras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the
preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sûtras (of the two
Mîmâ/m/sâs as well as of other /s/âstras) mark the beginning; if we,
however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present
irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central
position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary
essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand,
the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well
as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and
may yet have some future before itself.
The general scope of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras and their relation to the
Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some
importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion.
The systematisation of the karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda led to the
elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sûtras on the one
hand, and the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras on the other hand. The former give
nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices
enjoined in the Brâhma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the
general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sûtra has to follow, if
he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of
the Veda. The j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is
systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ or
Vedânta-sûtras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the
teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special
interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sûtras. This difference may be
accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the
karmakâ/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for
summaries such as the Kalpa-sûtras, from which all burdensome
discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason
for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely
theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the
Vedânta-sûtras throughout presuppose the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras, and may
therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods
already established in the latter.
The time at which the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras were composed we are at
present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject
will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to
all the so-called Sûtras which aims at condensing a given body of
doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even
mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras
this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other
philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on
sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras occupy,
however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All
Sûtras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this
whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim
they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be
spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as
in the case of the grammatical Sûtras, by the employment of an
arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for
entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest
intention of the Sûtra writers is to express themselves with as much
clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms
are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically
obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is
essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied,
although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory
and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a
commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary
Sûtras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras.
There scarcely one single Sûtra is intelligible without a commentary.
The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for
instance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or
predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sûtra occurs whose
words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology
is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a
commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sûtra
refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras we
therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question
arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a
guide to their right understanding.
The commentary here selected for translation, together with
Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras (to which we shall henceforth confine our
attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras), is the
one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is
commonly called, /S/a@nkarâ/k/ârya. There are obvious reasons for this
selection. In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya represents the
so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds
the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different
from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as
Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects
of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated
by /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart
from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting
one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedânta
which diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the
non-Vedântic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedânta
in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place,
/S/a@nkara's bhâashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant
commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the
circumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be
admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The
/S/a@nkara-bhâshya further is the authority most generally deferred to
in India as to the right understanding of the Vedânta-sûtras, and ever
since /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have
been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take
into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a
piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics,
undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will
be easily understood.
But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the
Vedânta-sûtras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of
course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's
explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the
Sûtras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has
become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he
objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as
standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position
he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison
of /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras, but
will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's
philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows
that it accurately represents the meaning of Bâdarâya/n/a, who himself
must necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the
modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the
authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian
system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is
clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the
interpretations given of the Vedânta-sûtras--and the Upanishads--by
/S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be
done, to a critical investigation.
This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's
views as to the true meaning of the Sûtras and Upanishads had never been
called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps
hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much
more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India
itself with systems claiming to be Vedântic and based on interpretations
of the Sûtras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of
/S/a@nkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the
right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedânta must
at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to
reject them.
It appears that already at a very early period the Vedânta-sûtras had
come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by
any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present,
at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing
that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Bâdarâya/n/a's
teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sûtras have in the
course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to
give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing,
much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his
Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which
had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance,
Râmânuja's Vedânta-sâra, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the
strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the
doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sûtras; but, on the other
hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not
been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and
certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing
bhâshyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single
out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their
interpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the
Sûtras themselves.
The bhâshya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon
our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish@nava theologian
and philosopher Râmânuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth
century. The Râmânuja or, as it is often called, the /S/rî-bhâshya
appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's. It is
further to be noted that the sect of the Râmânujas occupies a
pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in
their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all
Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/rî-bhâshya moreover is--as
every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very
high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a
writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in
its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it
not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition
to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of
Râmânuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty
tradition.
This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be
demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhâshya
which we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya, represents an
uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between
Bâdarâya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sûtras, and /S/a@nkara; and if,
on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhâshyas are
not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts
of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised
authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would
certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later
bhâshyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sûtras. All
we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's
interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out,
if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhâshya with
the text of the Sûtras, whether the former in all cases faithfully
represents the purport of the latter.
In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as
to how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right
understanding of the Sûtras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the
Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the
generally recognised expositor of true Vedânta doctrine, that that
doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening
between him and the Sûtrakâra, and that there existed from the beginning
only one Vedânta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the
doctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to
prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with
the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a
comparison of the purport of the Sûtras--as far as that can be made out
independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of
them by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on.
Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even
if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and
the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being
confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories,
all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to
the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have
only /S/a@nkara's bhâshya before us, we are naturally inclined to find
in the Sûtras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part
unintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a
reference to other bhâshyas may not impossibly change our views at
once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken
uniformity of Vedântic tradition from another point or view, viz. by
enquiring whether or not the Sûtras themselves, and the
/S/a@nkara-bhâshya, furnish any indications of there having existed
already at an early time essentially different Vedântic systems or lines
of Vedântic speculation.
Beginning with the Sûtras, we find that they supply ample evidence to
the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent
to the final composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present shape,
there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedânta differences of
opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting
the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Bâdarâya/n/a
himself, the reputed author of the Sûtras, the latter quote opinions
ascribed to the following teachers: Âtreya, Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
Kârsh/n/âgini, Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Bâdari. Among the passages
where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted
three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth
pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 5-7), where the opinions of various
teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given,
and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to
Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while
Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and
Bâdarâya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two
views.--The second passage occurs in the third pâda of the fourth
adhyâya (Sûtras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who
possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest
Brahman, while Bâdari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches
that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most
important passage is met with in the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya
(Sûtras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage
of the Brhadâra/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are
strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith
the Sûtras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation
in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to
Â/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by
/S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in
the bhedâbheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor
absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on
the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from
Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it,
and Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is
absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other
presents itself as the individual soul.
That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and
discussions is embodied in the Vedânta-sûtras, disagreed among
themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the
three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as
showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in
the Sûtras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara
hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual
soul with Brahman.
Turning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya itself, we there also meet with
indications that the Vedântins were divided among themselves on
important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous:
/S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly
anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a
peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not
failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also
refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sûtras, and
in several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other'
meant is the V/ri/ttikâra (about whom more will be said shortly). Those
references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw
little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two
remarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this
connexion. The one is made with reference to Sûtras 7-14 of the third
pâda of the fourth adhyâya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those
Sûtras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhânta view, to state
merely the pûrvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen
above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those
who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I,
3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual
soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it
is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vâdina/h/
pâramârthikam eva jaiva/m/ rûpam iti manyante asmadîyâ/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,'
i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion
that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made
use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedântins, and it thus
appears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same
category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Râmânujas
and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious
limitations of Mâyâ, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation
in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.
From what precedes it follows that the Vedântins of the school to which
/S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedântic
teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now
proceed to enquire whether the Râmânuja system, which likewise claims to
be Vedânta, and to be founded on the Vedânta-sûtras, has any title to be
considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.
It appears that Râmânuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally
admitted--to follow in his bhâshya the authority of Bodhâyana, who had
composed a v/ri/tti on the Sûtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the
/S/rî-bhâshya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163),
'Bhagavad-bodhâyanak/ri/tâ/m/ vistîrnâ/m/ brahmasûtra-v/ri/tti/m/
pûrvâ/k/âryâ/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatânusâre/n/a sûtrâksharâ/n/i
vyâkhyâsyante.' Whether the Bodhâyana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed
is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sûtra, and other works,
cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sûtras
connected with Bodhâyana's name actually existed, there is not any
reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places
of the /S/rî-bhâshya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's
commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed
against the V/ri/ttikâra. In addition to Bodhâyana, Râmânuja appeals to
quite a series of ancient teachers--pûrvâ/k/âryâs--who carried on the
true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedânta and the meaning of the
Sûtras. In the Vedârthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Râmânuja
himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following
authorities: Bodhâyana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin,
Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not
unfrequent in the Vedârthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/rî-bhâshya. The
author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the
Drami/d/a-bhâshya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhâshyakâra.
Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vâkyakâra is, I am told, to be
identified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting
in this place the information concerning the relative age of these
writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Râmânuja
sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that
Drami/d/â/k/ârya or Dravi/d/â/k/ârya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of
time. In his /t/îkâ on /S/a@nkara's bhâshya to the Chândogya Upanishad
III, 10, 4, Ânandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to
reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of
Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt
made by the Dravi/d/â/k/ârya.
It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedânta-sûtras
with which the /S/rî-bhâshya makes us acquainted is not due to
innovating views on the part of Râmânuja, but had authoritative
representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This
latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the
relation in which the so-called Râmânuja sect stands to earlier sects.
What the exact position of Râmânuja was, and of what nature were the
reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new
sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally
acknowledged that the Râmânujas are closely connected with the so-called
Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras, who are known to have existed already at a
very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various
kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that,
according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators,
the last Sûtras of the second pâda of the second adhyâya
(Vedânta-sûtras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhâgavatas--which
tenet forms part of the Râmânuja system also--viz. that the highest
being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyûha) as Vâsudeva,
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical
with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas),
and the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Whether those Sûtras embody an
approval of the tenet referred to, as Râmânuja maintains, or are meant
to impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the
opinion of the best commentators the Bhâgavatas, the direct forerunners
of the Râmânujas, are mentioned in the Sûtras themselves, and hence must
not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of
importance at the time when the Sûtras were composed. And considering
the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhâgavatas and the
later Râmânujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were
at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedânta-sûtras.
The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show
that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Râmânuja
interprets the Sûtras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in
fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to
make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of
scholiasts to the meaning of the Sûtras themselves. A full and
exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed
far exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that
task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when
the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/rî-bhâshya has been printed, and
thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible,
and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sûtras to
compare the interpretations, given by the two bhâshyakâras, of those
Sûtras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the
Vedânta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but
full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the
Vedânta-sûtras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the
side-glances at Râmânuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through
the Sûtras and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya. Before, however, entering on that
task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical
systems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja, which may be referred to
when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.
In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and
not enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is
more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to
Deussen's System of the Vedânta, in which the details of the entire
system, as far as they can be learned from the Sûtra-bhâshya, are
represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the
Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid
sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedânta, founded on the Sûtra-bhâshya, the
Upanishad bhâshyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's
school. With regard to Râmânuja's philosophy our chief source was,
hitherto, the Râmânuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the
short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the
/S/rî-bhâshya itself.
What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as
follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one
universal being called Brahman or Paramâtman, the highest Self. This
being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or,
which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya,
j/ñ/âna). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as
its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking
being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities;
whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of
it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the
appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in
which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer
runs, is associated with a certain power called Mâyâ or avidyâ to which
the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called
'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called
'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the
appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the
undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world
comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this
principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of
the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of
animate and inanimate beings. Mâyâ thus constitutes the upâdâna, the
material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the
circumstance that Mâyâ belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that
the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated
with Mâyâ. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called
Î/s/vara, the Lord.
Mâyâ, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive
evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by
special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there
spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole
bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently,
individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present,
but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Mâyâ has specialised
itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a
multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called
jîvas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jîva is only
the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising
bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience
separate and distinguish one jîva from another, is the offspring of Mâyâ
and as such unreal.
The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahâra) thus
consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions,
volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which
those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific
cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for
both are altogether due to Mâyâ. But at the same time we have to reject
the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which
nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or
ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things,
although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as
much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.
The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Mâyâ,
which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of
recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its
adjuncts (upâdhi), the fictitious offspring of Mâyâ, and thus looks for
its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ
(manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in
reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited
in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and
enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit,
the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future
embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting
to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its
previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called
kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world
is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Mâyâ, while the individual
souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upâdhis, lie in deep
slumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are
not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as
soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of
birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has
lasted from all eternity.
The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ára, the way out of which
can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the
Veda. The karmaká/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain
actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious
works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the
j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be
distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of
Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by
various attributes, i.e. of Î/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and,
secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman
transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the
individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman
as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to
final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the
world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a
distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and
knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through
it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose
soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of
Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have
taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest
Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he
withdraws altogether from the influence of Mâyâ, and asserts himself in
his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.
Thus /S/a@nkara.--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the teaching
of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only
one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.
This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all
imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as
/S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord
is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is
fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself
whatever exists. While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to
be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only
be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere
illusion; Brahman--according to Râmânuja's view--comprises within itself
distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute
reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by
ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and
the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential
real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and
/k/it) constitute, according to Râmânuja's terminology, the body of the
Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and
subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body
stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules
all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryâmin; the
fundamental text for this special Râmânuja tenet--which in the writings
of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryâmin
brâhma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements,
all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides
an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual
souls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are
also called modes of him (prakâra). They are to be looked upon as his
effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is
theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into
Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically
alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in
which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily
known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.
Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are
not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of
contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state
which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in
its causal condition (kâra/n/âvasthâ). To that state all those
scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in
the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not
absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a
germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not
to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as
something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes
to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the
Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other
condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible
attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from
ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion
with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit
acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at
the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vikâ/s/a). The Lord,
together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is
Brahman in the condition of an effect (káryâvasthâ). Cause and effect
are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause
which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/âma). Hence the cause being
known, the effect is known likewise.
Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are
implicated in the sa/m/sâra, the endless cycle of birth, action, and
death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study
of the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of
the karmakâ/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sâra; but he who,
assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in
the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final
emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of
the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting
blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of
transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to
those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities
and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract
the entire world.
The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the
one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as
follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There
exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the
prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sâ@nkhyas, but there exists only one
all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is
a rigorous, absolute one, Râmânuja's doctrine has to be characterised as
visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a
difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman
itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality
must be illusory. According to Râmânuja also, whatever is, is Brahman;
but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself
elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a
diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of
existence and individual souls is not unreal Mâyâ, but a real part of
Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of
/S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless
thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only
through its association with the unreal principle of Mâyâ, so
that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his Î/s/vara, is
himself something unreal. Râmânuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is
essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a
real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room
for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am
brahma, between Brahman and Î/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is
Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upâdhis due to Mâyâ. The
individual soul of Râmânuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it
has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but
nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a
personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sâra means, according to
/S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due
to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from
Brahman; according to Râmânuja it only means the soul's passing from the
troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will
remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Râmânuja does not
distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and
lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the
Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened
devotee to one result only [1].
I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedânta-sûtras
according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important
points concerning which Râmânuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here
have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is
only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope
to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of
the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the
Sûtras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the
present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the
different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of
which comprises one or more Sûtras, I shall follow the subdivision into
adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyâsâdhika-ra/n/amâlâ, the text of which is
printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the
Sûtras.
FIRST ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.
The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with
regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the
Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the
world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the
source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic
of all Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various
arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts represent as the
cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be
identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna from which the world
springs according to the Sâ@nkhyas.
With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of
essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first
adhyâya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in
the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the
jîva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the
preceding ten Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the
Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry
should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that
the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities
and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an
investigation whether certain Vedic texts of primâ facie doubtful import
set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the
higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an
investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the
first adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras nor even
from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the
Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the
golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and
lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chândogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6,
6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord.
/S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the
gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape
made of Mâyâ. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative
lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul,
not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.
Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ânandamaya, mentioned
in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual
soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on
the latter supposition--and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in
favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to
a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the
Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad
expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the
ânandamaya[3].--Râmânuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although
not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of
/S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the
ânandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara
looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory
discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic
passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuja separates the adhikara/n/a
from the subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had
preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be
identified with the pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from
the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the
system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that
the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the
eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high
eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the
ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not
the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest
Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The prâ/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5
denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light
spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but
the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prâ/n/a
mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.