LII. Macedonia's Augean Stables,

or: Don't Hurry to Invest in Macedonia

In the near past, Macedonia seemed to have been bent on

breaking its own record of surrealism. While politicians in

other countries in transition from communism and

socialism strive to be noticed for not stealing, their

Macedonian counterparts, without a single exception, aim

to steal without being noticed.

The previous VMRO-DPMNE government (1999-2002),

in which Nikola Gruevski, the current Prime Minister,

served as Minister of Finance, plundered the country

shamelessly. The local papers accused then outgoing

prime minister, Ljubco Georgievski - a virtual pauper

when he attained power - of owning land and a residential

building in the capital's most expensive neighborhood.

The erstwhile Minister of Defense, Ljuben Paunovski,

was recently sentenced to 42 months in prison for his

pecuniary shenanigans during his tenure. Another leading

figure, the former Minister of interior, Ljube Boskovski, is

in the dock in the Hague on war crime charges.

Inevitably, VMRO-DPMNE lost power to the SDSM in

the heated elections of 2002 and then fractured as its new

leader, Gruevski, purged the old guard and installed his

own cohorts everywhere.

Then prime minister designate, Branko Crvnkovski (the

country's current President whose legitimacy is contested

by the Gruevski government), vowed to learn from his

party's (SDSM) past mistakes when they venally ruled the

land until 1998. In a sudden and politically-motivated

resurrection, the high court began scrutinizing the "Okta"

deal: the opaque sale of the country's loss-making refinery

to the Greeks in 1999. Heads will roll, promised both the

election victors (the SDSM) and their Western sponsors.

Nothing happened.

The country's current Governor of the Central bank and

then minister of finance, Petar Goshev, a former socialist

high-level functionary known for his integrity, announced

that his top priority would be to eradicate corruption by

instituting structural and legal reforms. His newfound

socialist partners - he headed a center-right outfit - found

this bizarre ardor unpalatable and promptly kicked him

out of office.

Four years later, with Georgievski relegated to the

political wasteland, Crvnkovski ensconced in the

presidential suite, and his successor, Buckovski a

resounding failure, Gruevski's ascent in 2006 was all but

secure. It was the SDSM's turn to crumble acrimoniously

amid a virulent contest for its leadership. It has never

recovered and Macedonia has had no viable opposition

ever since.

Macedonia's post-electoral euphoria faded, in July 2006,

into arduous coalition-building negotiations replete with

arm-twisting by the worried representatives of the

"international community".

The country's new VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister,

Nikola Gruevski (36), excluded from his government the

party that won the majority of Albanian votes because of

its roots in the much-hated Albanian NLA, National

Liberation Army, the instigator of the 2001 near-civil-war.

Albanian factions clashed in a chilling reminder of the

country's inter-ethnic fragility.

To add to Macedonia's precarious standing, its greenhorn

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Milososki, engaged

in intermittent - and utterly avoidable - spats with its

neighbor and biggest foreign investor, Greece, virtually

guarantee delayed accession to both NATO and the

European Union, the much ballyhooed strategic goals of

the current administration. Milososki adopted a similarly

belligerent and ill-informed stance against Bulgaria,

another flanking polity and the newest member of the

coveted European club.

Where the government claims great strides is in its

uncompromising stance against all forms of malfeasance

and delinquency in both the public and the private sectors.

From the army to various municipalities, scandals erupt

daily in an atmosphere often bordering on a frenzied,

media saturated, witch-hunt.

Gruevski is alleged to have rejected a bribe of 3 million

euros (c. 4 million USD) offered to him by a Serb firm.

His government embarked on highly publicized

campaigns against illegal construction (the "urban mafia")

and other festering nests of corruption.

Alas, Gruevski himself appointed members of his family

and innumerable political hacks to senior government

positions in a series of blatant acts of nepotism and

cronyism decried by the European Union and other

watchdogs. Consequently, with one exception (Zoran

Stavreski, the talented vice-premier), the government in

all echelons is largely made up of utterly inexperienced

operators. Plus ca change.

Politics, venality, and terrorism are the sole venues of

social mobility in this tiny, landlocked, country of 2

million impoverished people. Immediately following their

insurgency, the former terrorists of the Albanian National

Liberation - courtesy of Western pressure and the

Albanian voters - occupied crucial ministries with

lucrative opportunities of patronage of which they are

rumored to have availed themselves abundantly.

Comic relief is often provided by bumbling NGOs, such

as the International Crisis Group. In 2001, its

representative in Macedonia, Edward Joseph, went to

Prilep to conduct an impromptu investigation of the

thriving cigarette smuggling trade. Posing to the cameras

he declared that only the local leaf-rolling plant was not

involved in this pernicious line of work.

Macedonia is a hub of expats and consultants in the

Balkans. Ante Markovic, an Austria-based former

Yugoslav prime minister, who served as an oft-criticized

economic advisor to the government until he was dumped,

sued Macedonia for $1 million. In 2001-3, the youthful

former minister of finance, Nikola Gruevski, was asked

by USAID, on behalf of the Serbian-Montenegrin

government, to serve as its consultant on matters of

reform of the financial system. The author of this article

acted as Economic Advisor to Georgievski's government

and, later, to Gruevski himself.

But to no avail. The country is a shambles. In the wake of

a civil war, the official unemployment rate is 31-35

percent. Close to 70,000 people work in the bloated

central and local administrations. The trade deficit is an

unparalleled 17 percent of GDP. In 2001, the budget

deficit climbed to 5 percent, though it was since halved.

"The Heritage Foundation" has consistently ranked

Macedonia 95-97 out of 155 countries in terms of

economic freedom. The country is "mostly unfree" it

correctly concludes in its reports, though it cites

sometimes erroneous data. A moderate level of trade

protectionism, low tax rates, moderate inflation, a

moderate burden of the government, moderate barriers to

capital flows and foreign investment, and moderate

interference in the economy are offset by a dysfunctional

banking system, intervention in wages and prices, low

level of protection of property, a high level of regulation,

and a very high level of activity of the black market.

Owing to the IMF's misguided emphasis on exchange rate

stability, the currency is inanely overvalued. The

manufacturing sector has all but evaporated. Industrial

production declined by a vertiginous 20 percent in August

2002 compared to the average the year before - or by 11

percent year on year. The trend has not been reversed

since.

Macedonian steel is exempt from the latest bout of

American protectionism, but not so its textile industry.

Europe is fending off the country's agricultural products.

People make their meager and desultory living catering to

the needs of an ever-expanding international presence or

dabbling in illicit activities. Piracy of intellectual property,

for instance, is thought to yield c. 1 percent of GDP.

Close to half the population is under the poverty line. The

number of welfare cases increased by 70 percent between

1994 and 2002. Generous and incessant multilateral and

bilateral credits sustain the faltering economy (and line

politicians' ever-deepening pockets). The country is

alternately buffeted by floods and droughts. There has

been only one day of rain in all of January 2007.

In a much-touted donor conference after the 2001

skirmishes, the pledges amounted to a whopping 15

percent of GDP. Then governor of the central bank, Ljube

Trpski (currently detained for his role in a murky affair

involving the country's foreign exchange reserves),

cheerfully predicted that these handouts will cover the

gaping hole in the balance of payments.

Macedonia also received 7.5 percent of the gold reserves

of the former federated Yugoslavia of which it was a

component. At between $700 million and one billion USD

net, foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high.

Macedonia has recently decided to prepay its $104 million

debt to the Paris Club creditors.

Both the IMF and the World Bank, who did their best to

obstruct the previous VMRO-DPMNE government in its

last few months in power, promised a speedy return to

business as usual. An hitherto elusive standby

arrangement is likely to be concluded by the end of the

year. World Bank funds, frozen in material breach of its

written contracts with the state, will flow again. The EU

promised development funds if the new government acts

in a "European spirit" - i.e., obeys the diktats of Brussels.

The incoming administration is likely to enjoy a period of

grace with both the trade unions and international

creditors. Strikes and demonstrations by dispossessed

miners and underpaid railways workers have waned. But

Macedonia joined the WTO in 2002 and will thus be

forced to open even more to devastating competition.

Labor unrest is likely to re-erupt soon.

Foreign investment in the country mysteriously wanes and

waxes - some of it laundered money reinvested in

legitimate businesses. The government is doing a great job

of building up the image of Macedonia as an FDI (Foreign

Direct Investment) destination. But public relations and

perceptions management must be followed by palpable

actions and the new government is woefully short on

concrete steps. It talks the talk but hitherto does not walk

the walk.

The government's attempts to attract foreign investors by

introducing lower taxes may backfire: studies clearly

evince that multinationals worry less about taxation and

more about functioning institutions, a commodity that

Macedonia is irreparably short of. Moreover, vanishingly

lower taxes signal desperation and Macedonia indeed

sounds more desperate than confident. No one wants to

buy the country's leading bank, long on offer. Only one

contender (Mobilkom Austria) entered a bid for

Macedonia's third operator cellular network licence.

On a few occasions, domestic firms, using international

fronts, have bid for local factories, such as the textile plant

"Astibo". The national payment card project has been

guzzled by two banks incestuously close to the outgoing

ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE.

But there are real investments, too. The capital's central

heating utility was purchased by a unidentified French

energy outfit, announced the general manager. The

utility's shares were listed in the Athens stock exchange.

The Macedonian construction firm "Granit" will build a

$59 million highway in Ukraine, with which Macedonia

enjoyed an unusually cordial relationship, to American

chagrin. Johnson Controls and others are eying a string of

free trade zones and infrastructure projects (dams, roads,

railways, oil pipeline). A much hyped Vardar Silicone

Valley is in the works.

The contentious census in the first two weeks of

November 2002, a part of the "Ohrid Framework

Agreement" which ended the internecine fighting the year

before, was conducted fairly. The count showed that

Albanians make c. one quarter of the population rather

than one third, as most Albanians spuriously insisted.

But, with Kosovo's independence looming across the

border, the restive Albanians are likely to coerce the

enfeebled Macedonia into translating this numerical

reality into political and economic clout. The

Macedonians are likely to resist. The West will intervene.

Macedonia is facing a hot spring and a sizzling summer.

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