VI. The Kleptocracies of the East

The process of transition from communism to capitalism

was largely hijacked either by outright criminals in

budding outfits of organized crime - or by pernicious and

all-pervasive kleptocracies: politicians and political

parties bent on looting the state and suppressing the

opposition, sometimes fatally.

In the past 16 years, industrial production in the

economies in transition tumbled in real terms by more

than 60 percent. The monthly salary in the poorer bits

equals the daily wage of a skilled German industrial

worker, or one seventh the European Union's average.

Gross domestic product per capita is less than one third

the EU's. Infrastructure, internal and export markets, state

institutions - all crumbled with dizzying speed.

In some countries - not the least Russia - privatization

amounted to a mass transfer of assets to cronies and

insiders, often well-connected members of the communist

nomenclature: managers, members of the security services

and other penumbral figures. Laws were passed and

institutions tweaked to reflect the special interests of these

groupings.

"Classical" forms of crime flourished throughout the

benighted region. Prostitution, gambling, drugs,

smuggling, kidnapping, organ trafficking and other

varieties of delinquency yielded to their perpetrators

billions of dollars annually. In the impoverished

economies of the east, these fantastic revenues - laundered

through off shore accounts - were leveraged by criminals

to garner political favors, to buy into legitimate businesses

and to infiltrate civil society.

None of this is new to Western publics. Rogues and

"robber barons" have always doubled as entrepreneurs.

The oil, gaming and railways industries in America, for

instance, owe their existence to dubious personas and

questionable practices. Well into the 17th century, the

British sovereign maintained a monopoly on chartering

businesses and awarded the coveted licenses to loyal

servants and obsequious sycophants.

Still, the ubiquity of crime in east Europe and its reach are

unprecedented in European annals. In the void-like

interregnum between centrally planned and free market

economies only criminals, politicians, managers, and

employees of the security services were positioned to

benefit from the upheaval.

At the outset of transition, the underworld constituted an

embryonic private sector, replete with international

networks of contacts, cross-border experience, capital

agglomeration and wealth formation, sources of venture

(risk) capital, an entrepreneurial spirit, and a diversified

portfolio of investments and revenue generating assets.

Criminals were used to private sector practices: price

signals, competition, joint venturing, and third party

dispute settlement.

Crime - alone among all economic activities in communist

societies - obeyed the laws of the free market. Criminals

had to be entrepreneurial and profitable to survive. Their

instincts sharpened by - often lethal - competition, they

were never corrupted by central planning.

Deprived of access to state largesse, criminals invested

their own capital in efficiently-run small to medium size

enterprises. Attuned to the needs and wishes of their

customers, criminals engaged in primitive forms of

market research, through neighborhood and grassroots

"pollsters" and "activists". They responded with agility

and in real time to changes in the patterns of supply and

demand by altering their product mix and their pricing.

They have always been pioneers of bleeding-edge

technologies.

Criminals are effective organizers and managers. They

excel at enforcing workplace discipline with irresistible

incentives and irreversible disincentives, at setting targets

and at networking. The superior felonious echelons are

upwardly mobile and have a clear career path. Every

management fad - from territorially exclusive franchises

to "stock" options - has been invented by criminals long

before they triumphed in the boardroom.

In east Europe, criminals on all levels, from the organized

to the petty, often substituted for the dysfunctional, or

ideologically hidebound organs of the state. Consider the

dispensation of justice. The criminal code of conduct and

court system replaced the compromised and lethargic

official judiciary. Debt collectors and enforcers stood in

for venal and incompetent police forces.

Crime is a growth industry and sustains hordes of

professionals: accountants and lawyers, forgers and cross

border guides, weapons experts and bankers, mechanics

and hit-men. Expertise, know-how and acumen, amassed

over centuries of practice, are taught in the criminal

universities known as penitentiaries: roads less traveled,

countries more lenient, passports to be bought, sold, or

forged, how-to manuals, goods and services on offer and

demand.

Profit margins in crime are outlandish and lead to feverish

wealth accumulation. The banking system is used both to

stash the proceeds and to launder them. Tax havens, off

shore financial institutions and money couriers - all form

part of a global web. Thus cleansed and rendered

untraceable, the money is invested in legitimate activities.

In some countries - especially on the drug path, or on the

trail of white slavery - crime is a major engine of

economic growth.

As opposed to the visible sectors of the east's demonetized

economies, criminal enterprises never run out of liquidity

and thus are always keen to invest. Moreover, crime is

international and cosmopolitan. It is accustomed to

sophisticated export-import transactions.

Many criminals - as opposed to the vast majority of their

countrymen - are polyglottal, well-traveled, aware of

world prices, the international financial system and

demand and supply in various markets. They are

experienced negotiators. In short: criminals are well-

heeled international businessmen, well-connected both

abroad and with the various indigenous elites.

The Wild East in Europe is often compared to the Wild

West in America a century or so ago. The Russian

oligarchs, goes the soothing analogy, are local versions of

Morgan, Rockefeller, Pullman and Vanderbilt. But this

affinity is spurious. the United States always had a civic

culture with civic values and an aspiration to, ultimately,

create a harmonious and benevolent civic society.

Criminality was regarded as a shameful stepping stone on

the way to an orderly community of learned, civilized,

law-abiding citizens.

This cannot be said about Russia, for instance. The

criminal there is, if anything, admired and emulated. Even

the language of legal business in countries in transition is

suffused with underworld parlance. There is no - and

never was - a civic tradition in the countries of eastern

Europe, a Bill of Rights, a veritable Constitution, a

modicum of self rule, a true abolition of classes and

nomenclatures. These territories are accustomed to being

governed by paranoiac and murderous tyrants akin to the

current crop of delinquents. That some criminals are

members of the new political, financial and industrial

elites (and vice versa) - tends to support this long-rooted

association.

In all the countries of the region, politicians and managers

abuse the state and its simulacrum institutions in close

symbiosis with felons. Patronage and sinecures extend to

collaborating lawbreakers. Veritable villains gain access

to state owned assets and resources in a cycle of money

laundering. Law enforcement agencies and the courts are

"encouraged" to turn a blind eye, or even to help criminals

eliminate internal and external competition in their turf.

Criminals, in return, serve as the "long and anonymous

arm" of politicians, obtaining for them illicit goods, or

providing "black" services. Corruption often flows

through criminal channels or via the mediation and

conduit of delinquents. Within the shared sphere of the

informal economy, assets are shifted among these

economic players. Both players oppose attempts at reform

and transparency and encourage - even engender -

nationalism and racism, paranoias and grievances to

recruit foot soldiers.

Fortunately, there is the irrepressible urge to become

legitimate. Politicians, who grope for a new ideological

cover for their opportunism, partner with legitimacy-

seeking, established crime lords. Both groups benefit from

a swelling economic pie. They fight against other, less

successful, criminals, who wish to persist in their old

ways and, thus, hamper economic growth. The battle is

never won but at least it succeeds to firmly drive crime

where it belongs: underground.

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