V. Straf - Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

The three policemen barked "straf", "straf" in unison. It

was a Russianized version of the German word for "fine"

and a euphemism for bribe. I and my fianće were

stranded in an empty ally at the heart of Moscow,

physically encircled by these young bullies, an ominous

propinquity. They held my passport ransom and began to

drag me to a police station nearby. We paid.

To do the fashionable thing and to hold the moral high

ground is rare. Yet, denouncing corruption and fighting it

satisfies both conditions. Such hectoring is usually the

preserve of well-heeled bureaucrats, driving utility

vehicles and banging away at wireless laptops. The

General Manager of the IMF makes 400,000 US dollars a

year, tax-free, and perks. This is the equivalent of 2,300

(!) monthly salaries of a civil servant in Macedonia - or

7,000 monthly salaries of a teacher or a doctor in

Yugoslavia, Moldova, Belarus, or Albania. He flies only

first class and each one of his air tickets is worth the bi-

annual income of a Macedonian factory worker. His

shareholders - among them poor and developing countries

- are forced to cough up these exorbitant fees and to

finance the luxurious lifestyle of the likes of Kohler and

Wolfensohn. And then they are made to listen to the IMF

lecture them on belt tightening and how uncompetitive

their economies are due to their expensive labour force.

To me, such a double standard is the epitome of

corruption. Organizations such as the IMF and World

Bank will never be possessed of a shred of moral

authority in these parts of the world unless and until they

forgo their conspicuous consumption.

Yet, corruption is not a monolithic practice. Nor are its

outcomes universally deplorable or damaging. One would

do best to adopt a utilitarian and discerning approach to it.

The advent of moral relativism has taught us that "right"

and "wrong" are flexible, context dependent and culture-

sensitive yardsticks.

What amounts to venality in one culture (Slovenia) is

considered no more than gregariousness or hospitality in

another (Macedonia).

Moreover, corruption is often "imported" by

multinationals, foreign investors, and expats. It is

introduced by them to all levels of governments, often in

order to expedite matters or secure a beneficial outcome.

To eradicate corruption, one must tackle both giver and

taker.

Thus, we are better off asking "cui bono" than "is it the

right thing to do". Phenomenologically, "corruption" is a

common - and misleading - label for a group of

behaviours. One of the following criteria must apply:

(a) The withholding of a service, information, or goods

that, by law, and by right, should have been provided or

divulged.

To have a phone installed in Russia one must openly bribe

the installer (according to a rather rigid tariff). In many of

the former republics of Yugoslavia, it is impossible to

obtain statistics or other data (the salaries of senior public

officeholders, for instance) without resorting to kickbacks.

(b) The provision of a service, information, or goods that,

by law, and by right, should not have been provided or

divulged.

Tenders in the Czech Republic are often won through

bribery. The botched privatizations all over the former

Eastern Bloc constitute a massive transfer of wealth to

select members of a nomenklatura. Licences and

concessions are often granted in Bulgaria and the rest of

the Balkan as means of securing political allegiance or

paying off old political "debts".

(c) That the withholding or the provision of said service,

information, or goods are in the power of the withholder

or the provider to withhold or to provide AND That the

withholding or the provision of said service, information,

or goods constitute an integral and substantial part of the

authority or the function of the withholder or the provider.

The post-communist countries in transition are a

dichotomous lot. On the one hand, they are intensely and

stiflingly bureaucratic. On the other hand, none of the

institutions functions properly or lawfully. While these

countries are LEGALISTIC - they are never LAWFUL.

This fuzziness allows officials in all ranks to usurp

authority, to trade favours, to forge illegal consensus and

to dodge criticism and accountability. There is a direct

line between lack of transparency and venality. Eran

Fraenkel of Search for Common Ground in Macedonia

has coined the phrase "ambient corruption" to capture this

complex of features.

(d) That the service, information, or goods that are

provided or divulged are provided or divulged against a

benefit or the promise of a benefit from the recipient and

as a result of the receipt of this specific benefit or the

promise to receive such benefit.

It is wrong to assume that corruption is necessarily, or

even mostly, monetary or pecuniary. Corruption is built

on mutual expectations. The reasonable expectation of a

future benefit is, in itself, a benefit. Access, influence

peddling, property rights, exclusivity, licences, permits, a

job, a recommendation - all constitute benefits.

(e) That the service, information, or goods that are

withheld are withheld because no benefit was provided or

promised by the recipient.

Even then, in CEE, we can distinguish between a few

types of corrupt and venal behaviours in accordance with

their OUTCOMES (utilities):

(1) Income Supplement

Corrupt actions whose sole outcome is the supplementing

of the income of the provider without affecting the "real

world" in any manner.

Though the perception of corruption itself is a negative

outcome - it is so only when corruption does not

constitute an acceptable and normative part of the playing

field. When corruption becomes institutionalised - it also

becomes predictable and is easily and seamlessly

incorporated into decision making processes of all

economic players and moral agents. They develop "by-

passes" and "techniques" which allow them to restore an

efficient market equilibrium. In a way, all-pervasive

corruption is transparent and, thus, a form of taxation.

This is the most common form of corruption exercised by

low and mid-ranking civil servants, party hacks and

municipal politicians throughout the CEE.

More than avarice, the motivating force here is sheer

survival. The acts of corruption are repetitive, structured

and in strict accordance with an un-written tariff and code

of conduct.

(2) Acceleration Fees

Corrupt practices whose sole outcome is to

ACCELERATE decision making, the provision of goods

and services or the divulging of information. None of the

outcomes or the utility functions are altered. Only the

speed of the economic dynamics is altered. This kind of

corruption is actually economically BENEFICIAL. It is a

limited transfer of wealth (or tax) which increases

efficiency. This is not to say that bureaucracies and venal

officialdoms, over-regulation and intrusive political

involvement in the workings of the marketplace are good

(efficient) things. They are not. But if the choice is

between a slow, obstructive and passive-aggressive civil

service and a more forthcoming and accommodating one

(the result of bribery) - the latter is preferable.

Acceleration fees are collected mostly by mid-ranking

bureaucrats and middle rung decision makers in both the

political echelons and the civil service.

(3) Decision Altering Fees

This is where the line is crossed from the point of view of

aggregate utility. When bribes and promises of bribes

actually alter outcomes in the real world - a less than

optimal allocation of resources and distribution of means

of production is obtained. The result is a fall in the general

level of production. The many is hurt by the few. The

economy is skewed and economic outcomes are distorted.

This kind of corruption should be uprooted on utilitarian

grounds as well as on moral ones.

(4) Subversive Outcomes

Some corrupt collusions lead to the subversion of the flow

of information within a society or an economic unit.

Wrong information often leads to disastrous outcomes.

Consider a medical doctor or an civil engineer who bribed

their way into obtaining a professional diploma.

Human lives are at stake. The wrong information, in this

case is the professional validity of the diplomas granted

and the scholarship (knowledge) that such certificates

stand for. But the outcomes are lost lives. This kind of

corruption, of course, is by far the most damaging.

Unfortunately, it is widespread in CEE. It is proof of the

collapse of the social treaty, of social solidarity and of the

fraying of the social fabric.

No Western country accepts CEE diplomas without

further accreditation, studies and examinations. Many

"medical doctors" and "engineers" who emigrated to

Israel from Russia and the former republics of the USSR -

were suspiciously deficient professionally. Israel was

forced to re-educate them prior to granting them a licence

to practice locally.

(5) Reallocation Fees

Benefits paid (mainly to politicians and political decision

makers) in order to affect the allocation of economic

resources and material wealth or the rights thereto.

Concessions, licences, permits, assets privatised, tenders

awarded are all subject to reallocation fees. Here the

damage is materially enormous (and visible) but, because

it is widespread, it is "diluted" in individual terms. Still, it

is often irreversible (like when a sold asset is purposefully

under-valued) and pernicious. a factory sold to avaricious

and criminally minded managers is likely to collapse and

leave its workers unemployed.

Corruption pervades daily life even in the prim and often

hectoring countries of the West. It is a win-win game (as

far as Game Theory goes) - hence its attraction. We are all

corrupt to varying degrees. But it is wrong and wasteful -

really, counterproductive - to fight corruption in CEE in a

wide front and indiscriminately. It is the kind of

corruption whose evil outcomes outweigh its benefits that

should be fought. This fine (and blurred) distinction is too

often lost on decision makers and law enforcement

agencies in both East and West.

ERADICATING CORRUPTION

An effective program to eradicate corruption must include

the following elements:

1. Egregiously corrupt, high-profile, public figures,

multinationals, and institutions (domestic and

foreign) must be singled out for harsh (legal)

treatment and thus demonstrate that no one is

above the law and that crime does not pay.

2. All international aid, credits, and investments must

be conditioned upon a clear, performance-based,

plan to reduce corruption levels and intensity.

Such a plan should be monitored and revised as

needed. Corruption retards development and

produces instability by undermining the

credentials of democracy, state institutions, and

the political class. Reduced corruption is,

therefore, a major target of economic and

institutional developmental.

3. Corruption cannot be reduced only by punitive

measures. A system of incentives to avoid

corruption must be established. Such incentives

should include a higher pay, the fostering of civic

pride, educational campaigns, "good behaviour"

bonuses, alternative income and pension plans,

and so on.

4. Opportunities to be corrupt should be minimized

by liberalizing and deregulating the economy. Red

tape should be minimized, licensing abolished,

international trade freed, capital controls

eliminated, competition introduced, monopolies

broken, transparent public tendering be made

mandatory, freedom of information enshrined, the

media should be directly supported by the

international community, and so on. Deregulation

should be a developmental target integral to every

program of international aid, investment, or credit

provision.

5. Corruption is a symptom of systemic institutional

failure. Corruption guarantees efficiency and

favourable outcomes. The strengthening of

institutions is of critical importance. The police,

the customs, the courts, the government, its

agencies, the tax authorities, the state owned

media - all must be subjected to a massive

overhaul. Such a process may require foreign

management and supervision for a limited period

of time. It most probably would entail the

replacement of most of the current - irredeemably

corrupt - personnel. It would need to be open to

public scrutiny.

6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense

of helplessness. The citizen (or investor, or firm)

feels dwarfed by the overwhelming and capricious

powers of the state. It is through corruption and

venality that the balance is restored. To minimize

this imbalance, potential participants in corrupt

dealings must be made to feel that they are real

and effective stakeholders in their societies. A

process of public debate coupled with

transparency and the establishment of just

distributive mechanisms will go a long way

towards rendering corruption obsolete.

Financial Crime and Corruption · 第 11 / 74 题